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**THE  
HISTORY OF THE REIGN  
OF  
THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.  
AND  
AN HISTORICAL DISQUISITION  
CONCERNING  
THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE ANCIENTS HAD  
OF  
INDIA.**

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C. and C. Whittingham, Chiswick.

THE  
HISTORY OF THE REIGN  
OF  
THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.  
AND  
*An Historical Disquisition*  
CONCERNING  
INDIA.

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THE  
HISTORY OF THE REIGN  
OF  
THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.

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BOOK I.

CHARLES V. was born at Ghent on the twenty-fourth day of February, in the year one thousand five hundred. His father, Philip the Handsome, Archduke of Austria, was the son of the Emperor Maximilian, and of Mary, the only child of Charles the Bold, the last Prince of the house of Burgundy. His mother, Joanna, was the second daughter of Ferdinand King of Aragon, and of Isabella Queen of Castile.

A long train of fortunate events had opened the way for this young Prince to the inheritance of more extensive dominions than any European monarch, since Charlemagne, had possessed. Each of his ancestors had acquired kingdoms or provinces, towards which their prospect of succession was extremely remote. The rich possessions of Mary of Burgundy had been destined for another family, she having been contracted by her father to the only son of Louis XI. of France; but that capricious monarch, indulging his hatred to her family, chose rather to strip her of part of her territories by force

than to secure the whole by marriage; and by this misconduct, fatal to his posterity, he threw all the Netherlands and Franche Comté into the hands of a rival. Isabella, the daughter of John II. of Castile, far from having any prospect of that noble inheritance which she transmitted to her grandson, passed the early part of her life in obscurity and indigence. But the Castilians, exasperated against her brother Henry IV. an ill advised and vicious Prince, publicly charged him with impotence, and his Queen with adultery. Upon his demise, rejecting Joanna, whom Henry had uniformly, and even on his deathbed, owned to be his lawful daughter, and whom an assembly of the States had acknowledged to be the heir of his kingdom, they obliged her to retire into Portugal, and placed Isabella on the throne of Castile. Ferdinand owed the crown of Aragon to the unexpected death of his elder brother, and acquired the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, by violating the faith of treaties, and disregarding the ties of blood. To all these kingdoms, Christopher Columbus, by an effort of genius and of intrepidity, the boldest and most successful that is recorded in the annals of mankind, added a new world, the wealth of which became one considerable source of the power and grandeur of the Spanish monarchs.

Don John, the only son of Ferdinand and Isabella, and their eldest daughter, the Queen of Portugal, being cut off, without issue, in the flower of youth, all their hopes centred in Joanna and her posterity. But as her husband, the Archduke, was a stranger to the Spaniards, it was thought expedient to invite him into Spain, that, by residing among them, he might accustom himself to their

laws and manners; and it was expected that the Cortes, or assembly of States, whose authority was then so great in Spain that no title to the crown was reckoned valid unless it received their sanction, would acknowledge his right of succession, together with that of the Infanta his wife. Philip and Joanna, passing through France in their way to Spain [1502], were entertained in that kingdom with the utmost magnificence. The Archduke did homage to Louis XII. for the earldom of Flanders, and took his seat as a Peer of the realm in the Parliament of Paris. They were received in Spain with every mark of honour that the parental affection of Ferdinand and Isabella, or the respect of their subjects could devise; and their title to the crown was soon after acknowledged by the Cortes of both kingdoms.

But amidst these outward appearances of satisfaction and joy, some secret uneasiness preyed upon the mind of each of these Princes. The stately and reserved cèremonial of the Spanish court was so burdensome to Philip, a Prince young, gay, affable, fond of society and pleasure, that he soon began to express a desire of returning to his native country, the manners of which were more suited to his temper. Ferdinand, observing the declining health of his Queen, with whose life he knew that his right to the government of Castile must cease, easily foresaw that a Prince of Philip's disposition, and who already discovered an extreme impatience to reign, would never consent to his retaining any degree of authority in that kingdom; and the prospect of this diminution of his power awakened the jealousy of that ambitious monarch.

Isabella beheld, with the sentiments natural to a mother, the indifference and neglect with which the

Archduke treated her daughter, who was destitute of those beauties of person, as well as those accomplishments of mind, which fix the affections of a husband. Her understanding, always weak, was often disordered. She doted on Philip with such an excess of childish and indiscreet fondness as excited disgust rather than affection. Her jealousy, for which her husband's behaviour gave her too much cause, was proportioned to her love, and often broke out in the most extravagant actions. Isabella, though sensible of her defects, could not help pitying her condition, which was soon rendered altogether deplorable by the Archduke's abrupt resolution of setting out in the middle of winter for Flanders, and of leaving her in Spain. Isabella entreated him not to abandon his wife to grief and melancholy, which might prove fatal to her, as she was near the time of her delivery. Joanna conjured him to put off his journey for three days only, that she might have the pleasure of celebrating the festival of Christmas in his company. Ferdinand, after representing the imprudence of his leaving Spain, before he had time to become acquainted with the genius, or to gain the affections of the people who were one day to be his subjects, besought him, at least, not to pass through France, with which kingdom he was then at open war. Philip, without regarding either the dictates of humanity or the maxims of prudence, persisted in his purpose, and on the 22d of December set out for the Low Countries by the way of France<sup>1</sup>.

From the moment of his departure Joanna sunk into a deep and sullen melancholy<sup>2</sup>, and, while she was in that situation, bore Ferdinand, her second

<sup>1</sup> Petri Martyris Angeli Epistola, 250, 253.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Epist. 250.

son, for whom the power of his brother Charles afterwards procured the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, and to whom he at last transmitted the Imperial sceptre. Joanna was the only person in Spain who discovered no joy at the birth of this Prince. Insensible to that, as well as to every other pleasure, she was wholly occupied with the thoughts of returning to her husband; nor did she, in any degree, recover tranquillity of mind until she arrived at Brussels next year<sup>3</sup> [1504].

Philip, in passing through France, had an interview with Louis XII. and signed a treaty with him, by which he hoped that all the differences between France and Spain would have been finally terminated. But Ferdinand, whose affairs at that time were extremely prosperous in Italy, where the superior genius of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the great Captain, triumphed on every occasion over the arms of France, did not pay the least regard to what his son-in-law had concluded, and carried on hostilities with greater ardour than ever.

From this time Philip seems not to have taken any part in the affairs of Spain, waiting in quiet till the death either of Ferdinand or of Isabella should open the way to one of their thrones. The latter of these events was not far distant. The untimely death of her son and eldest daughter had made a deep impression on the mind of Isabella; and as she could derive but little consolation for the losses which she had sustained either from her daughter Joanna, whose infirmities daily increased, or from her son-in-law, who no longer preserved even the appearance of a decent respect towards that unhappy Princess, her spirits and health began gradually to

<sup>3</sup> Mariana, lib. 27, c. 11, 14. Flechier Vie de Ximen. t. 191.

decline, and, after languishing some months, she died at Medina del Campo on the 26th of November, 1504. She was no less eminent for virtue than for wisdom; and whether we consider her behaviour as a queen, as a wife, or as a mother, she is justly entitled to the high encomiums bestowed upon her by the Spanish historians<sup>4</sup>.

A few weeks before her death she made her last will; and, being convinced of Joanna's incapacity to assume the reins of government into her own hands, and having no inclination to commit them to Philip, with whose conduct she was extremely dissatisfied, she appointed Ferdinand regent or administrator of the affairs of Castile, until her grandson Charles should attain the age of twenty. She bequeathed to Ferdinand likewise one half of the revenues which should arise from the Indies, together with the grand masterships of the three military orders; dignities which rendered the person who possessed them almost independent, and which Isabella had, for that reason, annexed to the crown<sup>5</sup>. But, before she signed a deed so favourable to Ferdinand, she obliged him to swear that he would not, by a second marriage or by any other means, endeavour to deprive Joanna or her posterity of their right of succession to any of his kingdoms<sup>6</sup>.

Immediately upon the Queen's death, Ferdinand resigned the title of King of Castile, and issued orders to proclaim Joanna and Philip the sovereigns of that kingdom. But, at the same time, he assumed the character of Regent, in consequence of Isabella's

<sup>4</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 27.

<sup>5</sup> P. Martyr. Ep. 277. Mar. Hist. lib. 28, c. 11. Ferrera Hist. Gener. d'Espagne, tom. viii. 263.

<sup>6</sup> Mar. Hist. lib. 28, c. 14.

testament; and not long after he prevailed on the Cortes of Castile to acknowledge his right to that office [1505]. This, however, he did not procure without difficulty, nor without discovering such symptoms of alienation and disgust among the Castilians as filled him with great uneasiness. The union of Castile and Aragon for almost thirty years had not so entirely extirpated the ancient and hereditary enmity which subsisted between the natives of these kingdoms, that the Castilian pride could submit, without murmuring, to the government of a king of Aragon. Ferdinand's own character, with which the Castilians were well acquainted, was far from rendering his authority desirable. Suspicious, discerning, severe, and parsimonious, he was accustomed to observe the most minute actions of his subjects with a jealous attention, and to reward their highest services with little liberality; and they were now deprived of Isabella, whose gentle qualities, and partiality to her Castilian subjects, often tempered his austerity or rendered it tolerable. The maxims of his government were especially odious to the grandees; for that artful Prince, sensible of the dangerous privileges conferred upon them by the feudal institutions, had endeavoured to curb their exorbitant power<sup>7</sup>, by extending the royal jurisdiction, by protecting their injured vassals, by increasing the immunities of cities, and by other measures equally prudent. From all these causes, a formidable party among the Castilians united against Ferdinand; and though the persons who composed it had not hitherto taken any public step in opposition to him, he plainly saw that upon the least encouragement from their new King, they would proceed to the most violent extremities.

<sup>7</sup> Mariana. lib. 28, c. 12.

There was no less agitation in the Netherlands upon receiving the accounts of Isabella's death, and of Ferdinand's having assumed the government of Castile. Philip was not of a temper tamely to suffer himself to be supplanted by the ambition of his father-in-law. If Joanna's infirmities, and the non-age of Charles, rendered them incapable of government, he, as a husband, was the proper guardian of his wife, and, as a father, the natural tutor of his son. Nor was it sufficient to oppose to these just rights, and to the inclination of the people of Castile, the authority of a testament the genuineness of which was perhaps doubtful, and its contents to him appeared certainly to be iniquitous. A keener edge was added to Philip's resentment, and new vigour infused into his councils by the arrival of Don John Manuel. He was Ferdinand's ambassador at the Imperial court, but, upon the first notice of Isabella's death, repaired to Brussels, flattering himself that, under a young and liberal Prince, he might attain to power and honours which he could never have expected in the service of an old and frugal master. He had early paid court to Philip, during his residence in Spain, with such assiduity as entirely gained his confidence; and, having been trained to business under Ferdinand, could oppose his schemes with equal abilities, and with arts not inferior to those for which the monarch was distinguished<sup>13</sup>.

By the advice of Manuel, ambassadors were dispatched to require Ferdinand to retire into Aragon, and to resign the government of Castile to those persons whom Philip should intrust with it, until his own arrival in that kingdom. Such of the Castilian nobles as had discovered any dissatisfaction with Ferdinand's administration, were encouraged

*Zurita Annales de Aragon, tom. vi. p. 12.*

by every method to oppose it. At the same time a treaty was concluded with Louis XII. by which Philip flattered himself that he had secured the friendship and assistance of that monarch.

Meanwhile Ferdinand employed all the arts of address and policy, in order to retain the power of which he had got possession. By means of Conchillos, an Aragonian gentleman, he entered into a private negotiation with Joanna, and prevailed on that weak Princess to confirm, by her authority, his right to the regency. But this intrigue did not escape the penetrating eye of Don John Manuel; Joanna's letter of consent was intercepted; Conchillos was thrown into a dungeon; she herself confined to an apartment in the palace, and all her Spanish domestics secluded from her presence<sup>9</sup>.

The mortification which the discovery of this intrigue occasioned to Ferdinand was much increased by his observing the progress which Philip's emissaries made in Castile. Some of the nobles retired to their castles; others, to the towns in which they had influence; they formed themselves into confederacies, and began to assemble their vassals. Ferdinand's court was almost totally deserted; not a person of distinction but Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, the Duke of Alva, and the Marquis of Denia remaining there; while the houses of Philip's ambassadors were daily crowded with noblemen of the highest rank.

Exasperated at this universal defection, and mortified perhaps with seeing all his schemes defeated by a younger politician, Ferdinand resolved, in defiance of the law of nature and of decency, to deprive his daughter and her posterity of the crown

<sup>9</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 287. Zurita Annals, vi. p. 14.

of Castile, rather than renounce the regency of that kingdom. His plan for accomplishing this was no less bold than the intention itself was wicked. He demanded in marriage Joanna, the supposed daughter of Henry IV, on the belief of whose illegitimacy Isabella's right to the crown of Castile was founded; and by reviving the claim of this Princess, in opposition to which he himself had formerly led armies and fought battles, he hoped once more to get possession of the throne of that kingdom. But Emanuel, King of Portugal, in whose dominions Joanna resided, at that time having married one of Ferdinand's daughters by Isabella, refused his consent to that unnatural match; and the unhappy Princess herself, having lost all relish for the objects of ambition by being long immured in a convent, discovered no less aversion to it<sup>10</sup>.

The resources, however, of Ferdinand's ambition were not exhausted. Upon meeting with a repulse in Portugal, he turned towards France, and sought in marriage Germain de Foix, a daughter of the Viscount of Narbonne and of Mary the sister of Louis XII. The war which that monarch had carried on against Ferdinand in Naples had been so unfortunate that he listened with joy to a proposal which furnished him with an honourable pretence for concluding peace: and though no prince was ever more remarkable than Ferdinand for making all his passions bend to the maxims of interest, or become subservient to the purposes of ambition, yet so vehement was his resentment against his son-in-law, that the desire of gratifying it rendered him regardless of every other consideration. In

<sup>10</sup> Sandoz, Hist. of Civil Wars in Castil. Lond. 1655, p. 5.  
Zurita Annales de Aragon, tom. vi. p. 213.

order to be revenged of Philip, by detaching Louis from his interest, and in order to gain a chance of excluding him from his hereditary throne of Aragon, and the dominions annexed to it, he was ready once more to divide Spain into separate kingdoms, though the union of these was the great glory of his reign, and had been the chief object of his ambition; he consented to restore the Neapolitan nobles of the French faction to their possessions and honours; and submitted to the ridicule of marrying, in an advanced age, a Princess of eighteen<sup>11</sup>.

The conclusion of this match, which deprived Philip of his only ally, and threatened him with the loss of so many kingdoms, gave him a dreadful alarm, and convinced Don John Manuel that there was now a necessity of taking other measures with regard to the affairs of Spain<sup>12</sup>. He accordingly instructed the Flemish ambassadors in the court of Spain, to testify the strong desire which their master had of terminating all differences between him and Ferdinand in an amicable manner, and his willingness to consent to any conditions that would reestablish the friendship which ought to subsist between a father and a son-in-law. Ferdinand, though he had made and broken more treaties than any prince of any age, was apt to confide so far in the sincerity of other men, or to depend so much upon his own address and their weakness, as to be always extremely fond of a negotiation. He listened with eagerness to the declarations, and soon concluded a treaty at Salamanca [Nov. 24]; in which it was stipulated, that the government of Castile should be carried on in the joint names of Joanna,

<sup>11</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 290, 292. Mariana, lib. 28, c. 16, 17.

<sup>12</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 293.

of Ferdinand, and of Philip; and that the revenues of the crown, as well as the right of conferring offices, should be shared between Ferdinand and Philip, by an equal division<sup>13</sup>.

1500.] Nothing, however, was further from Philip's thoughts than to observe this treaty. His sole intention in proposing it was to amuse Ferdinand, and to prevent him from taking any measures for obstructing his voyage into Spain. It had that effect. Ferdinand, sagacious as he was, did not for some time suspect his design; and though, when he perceived it, he prevailed on the King of France not only to remonstrate against the Archduke's journey, but to threaten hostilities if he should undertake it; though he solicited the Duke of Gueldres to attack his son-in-law's dominions in the Low Countries, Philip and his consort nevertheless set sail with a numerous fleet and a good body of land forces. They were obliged by a violent tempest to take shelter in England, where Henry VII. in compliance with Ferdinand's solicitations, retained them upwards of three months<sup>14</sup>; at last they were permitted to depart, and, after a more prosperous voyage, they arrived in safety at Corunna in Galicia [April 28], nor durst Ferdinand attempt, as he once intended, to oppose their landing by force of arms.

The Castilian nobles, who had been obliged hitherto to conceal or to dissemble their sentiments, now declared openly in favour of Philip. From every corner of the kingdom, persons of the highest rank, with numerous retinues of their vassals, repaired to their new sovereign. The treaty of Salamanca was universally condemned, and all agreed

<sup>13</sup> Zurita *Annales de Aragon* vi. 14. P. Mart. Ep. 293, 294.

<sup>14</sup> Ferrer, *Hist.* viii. 285.

to exclude from the government of Castile a Prince, who, by consenting to disjoin Aragon and Naples from that crown, discovered so little concern for its true interests. Ferdinand, meanwhile, abandoned by almost all the Castilians, disconcerted by their revolt, and uncertain whether he should peaceably relinquish his power, or take arms in order to maintain it, earnestly solicited an interview with his son-in-law, who, by the advice of Manuel, studiously avoided it. Convinced at last, by seeing the number and zeal of Philip's adherents daily increase, that it was vain to think of resisting such a torrent, Ferdinand consented, by treaty, to resign the regency of Castile into the hands of Philip [June 27], to retire into his hereditary dominions of Aragon, and to rest satisfied with the masterships of the military orders, and that share of the revenue of the Indies which Isabella had bequeathed to him.— Though an interview between the Princes was no longer necessary, it was agreed to on both sides from motives of decency. Philip repaired to the place appointed, with a splendid retinue of Castilian nobles, and a considerable body of armed men. Ferdinand appeared without any pomp, attended by a few followers mounted on mules, and unarmed. On that occasion Don John Manuel had the pleasure of displaying before the monarch whom he had deserted, the extensive influence which he had acquired over his new master: while Ferdinand suffered, in presence of his former subjects, the two most cruel mortifications which an artful and ambitious Prince can feel; being at once overreached in conduct, and stripped of power<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Zurita *Annales de Arag.* vi. 64. *Mar. lib.* 28, c. 19, 20. *P. Mart. Ep.* 301, 205, &c.

Not long after [July], he retired into Aragon; and hoping that some favourable accident would soon open the way to his return into Castile, he took care to protest, though with great secrecy, that the treaty concluded with his son-in-law, being extorted by force, ought to be deemed void of all obligation<sup>16</sup>.

Philip took possession of his new authority with a youthful joy. The unhappy Joanna, from whom he derived it, remained during all these contests under the dominion of a deep melancholy; she was seldom allowed to appear in public; her father, though he had often desired it, was refused access to her; and Philip's chief object was to prevail on the Cortes to declare her incapable of government, that an undivided power might be lodged in his hands until his son should attain to full age. But such was the partial attachment of the Castilians to their native Princess, that though Manuel had the address to gain some members of the Cortes assembled at Valladolid, and others were willing to gratify their new sovereign in his first request, the great body of the representatives refused their consent to a declaration which they thought so injurious to the blood of their Monarchs<sup>17</sup>. They were unanimous, however, in acknowledging Joanna and Philip Queen and King of Castile, and their son Charles Prince of Asturias.

This was almost the only memorable event during Philip's administration. A fever put an end to his life [Sept. 25, 1506], in the twenty-eighth year of his age, when he had not enjoyed the regal dignity, which he had been so eager to obtain, full three months<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Zurita *Annales de Arag.* vi. p. 68. Ferrer, *Hist.* viii. 290.

<sup>17</sup> Zurita *Annales de Arag.* vi. p. 75. — Marian, *lib.* 28, c. 23.

The whole royal authority in Castile ought of course to have devolved upon Joanna. But the shock occasioned by a disaster so unexpected as the death of her husband, completed the disorder of her understanding and her incapacity for government. During all the time of Philip's sickness, no entreaty could prevail on her, though in the sixth month of her pregnancy, to leave him for a moment. When he expired, however, she did not shed one tear, or utter a single groan. Her grief was silent and settled; she continued to watch the dead body with the same tenderness and attention as if it had been alive<sup>19</sup>; and though at last she permitted it to be buried, she soon removed it from the tomb to her own apartment. There it was laid upon a bed of state, in a splendid dress: and having heard from some monk a legendary tale of a King who revived after he had been dead fourteen years, she kept her eyes almost constantly fixed on the body, waiting for the happy moment of its return to life. Nor was this capricious affection for her dead husband less tinctured with jealousy than that which she had borne to him while alive. She did not permit any of her female attendants to approach the bed on which his corpse was laid; she would not suffer any woman who did not belong to her family to enter the apartment; and rather than grant that privilege to a midwife, though a very aged one had been chosen on purpose, she bore the Princess Catharine without any other assistance than that of her own domestics<sup>20</sup>.

A woman in such a state of mind was little capa-

<sup>19</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 316.

<sup>20</sup> Mar. Hist. lib. 29, c. 3 & 5. P. Mart. Ep. 318, 321, 328, 332.

ble of governing a great kingdom; and Joanna, who made it her sole employment to bewail the loss, and to pray for the soul of her husband, would have thought her attention to public affairs an impious neglect of those duties which she owed to him. But though she declined assuming the administration herself, yet, by a strange caprice of jealousy, she refused to commit it to any other person; and no entreaty of her subjects could persuade her to name a Regent, or even to sign such papers as were necessary for the execution of justice and the security of the kingdom.

The death of Philip threw the Castilians into the greatest perplexity. It was necessary to appoint a Regent, both on account of Joanna's phrensy, and the infancy of her son; and as there was not among the nobles any person so eminently distinguished either by superiority in rank or abilities, as to be called by the public voice to that high office, all naturally turned their eyes either towards Ferdinand or towards the Emperor Maximilian. The former claimed that dignity, as administrator for his daughter, and by virtue of the testament of Isabella; the latter thought himself the legal guardian of his grandson, whom, on account of his mother's infirmity, he already considered as King of Castile. Such of the nobility as had lately been most active in compelling Ferdinand to resign the government of the kingdom, trembled at the thoughts of his being restored so soon to his former dignity. They dreaded the return of a monarch not apt to forgive, and who, to those defects with which they were already acquainted, added that resentment which the remembrance of their behaviour, and reflection upon his own disgrace, must naturally have excited.

Though none of these objections lay against Maximilian, he was a stranger to the laws and manners of Castile; he had not either troops or money to support his pretensions; nor could his claim be admitted without a public declaration of Joanna's incapacity for government; an indignity to which, notwithstanding the notoriety of her distemper, the delicacy of the Castilians could not bear the thoughts of subjecting her.

Don John Manuel, however, and a few of the nobles who considered themselves as most obnoxious to Ferdinand's displeasure, declared for Maximilian, and offered to support his claim with all their interest. Maximilian, always enterprising and decisive in council, though feeble and dilatory in execution, eagerly embraced the offer. But a series of ineffectual negotiations was the only consequence of this transaction. The Emperor, as usual, asserted his rights in a high strain, promised a great deal, and performed nothing <sup>21</sup>.

A few days before the death of Philip, Ferdinand had set out for Naples, that, by his own presence, he might put an end, with great decency, to the vicerealty of the great Captain, whose important services and cautious conduct did not screen him from the suspicions of his jealous master. Though on account of his son-in-law's death reached him at Porto-fino, in the territories of Genoa, he was so solicitous to discover the secret intrigues which he supposed the great Captain to have been carrying on, and to establish his own authority on a firm foundation in the Neapolitan dominions, by removing him from the supreme command there, that, rather than discontinue his voyage, he chose to

<sup>21</sup> Mariana, lib. 29, c. 7. Zurita *Anales de Arag.* vi. 93.

leave Castile in a state of anarchy, and even to risk, by this delay, his obtaining possession of the government of that kingdom<sup>22</sup>.

Nothing but the great abilities and prudent conduct of his adherents could have prevented the bad effects of this absence. At the head of these was Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, who, though he had been raised to that dignity by Isabella, contrary to the inclination of Ferdinand, and though he could have no expectation of enjoying much power under the administration of a master little disposed to distinguish him by extraordinary marks of attention, was nevertheless so disinterested as to prefer the welfare of his country before his own grandeur, and to declare, that Castile could never be so happily governed as by a Prince whom long experience had rendered thoroughly acquainted with its true interest. The zeal of Ximenes to bring over his countrymen to this opinion induced him to lay aside somewhat of his usual austerity and haughtiness. He condescended, on this occasion, to court the disaffected nobles, and employed address as well as arguments to persuade them. Ferdinand seconded his endeavours with great art; and by concessions to some of the grantees, by promises to others, and by letters full of complaisance to all, he gained many of his most violent opponents<sup>23</sup>. Though many cabals were formed, and some commotions were excited, yet when Ferdinand, after having settled the affairs of Naples, arrived in Castile [Aug. 21, 1507], he entered upon the administration without opposition. The prudence with which he exercised his authority in that kingdom

<sup>22</sup> Zurita *Annales de Arag.* vi. p. 85.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* vi. p. 87. 91. 109.

equaled the good fortune by which he had recovered it. By a moderate but steady administration, free from partiality and from resentment, he entirely reconciled the Castilians to his person, and secured to them, during the remainder of his life, as much domestic tranquillity as was consistent with the genius of the feudal government, which still subsisted among them in full vigour<sup>24</sup>.

Nor was the preservation of tranquillity in his hereditary kingdoms the only obligation which the Archduke Charles owed to the wise regency of his grandfather; it was his good fortune during that period, to have very important additions made to the dominions over which he was to reign. On the coast of Barbary, Oran, and other conquests, of no small value, were annexed to the crown of Castile by Cardinal Ximenes, who, with a spirit very uncommon in a monk, led in person a numerous army against the Moors of that country [1509]; and, with a generosity and magnificence still more singular, defrayed the whole expense of the expedition out of his own revenues<sup>25</sup>. In Europe, Ferdinand, under pretences no less frivolous than unjust, as well as by artifices the most shameful and treacherous, expelled John D'Albert, the lawful sovereign from the throne of Navarre; and, seizing on that kingdom, extended the limits of the Spanish monarchy from the Pyrenees on the one hand, to the frontiers of Portugal on the other<sup>26</sup>.

It was not, however, the desire of aggrandizing the Archduke, which influenced Ferdinand in this, or in any other of his actions. He was more apt to consider that young Prince as a rival who might

<sup>24</sup> Mariana, lib. 29, c. 10.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., lib. 29, c. 18.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., lib. 30, c. 11, 12, 18, 24.

one day wrest out of **his** hands the government of Castile, than as a **grandson** for whose interest he was intrusted with the **administration**. This jealousy soon begot aversion, and even hatred, the symptoms of which he was at no pains to conceal. Hence proceeded his immoderate joy when his young Queen was delivered of a son [1509], whose life would have deprived Charles of the crowns of Aragon, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia; and upon the untimely death of that Prince, he discovered, for the **same reason**, an excessive solicitude to have other children. This impatience hastened, in all probability, the accession of Charles to the crown of Spain. Ferdinand, in order to procure a blessing, of which, from his advanced age, and the intemperance of his youth, he could have little prospect, had recourse to his physicians [1513], and by their prescription took one of those potions, which are supposed to add vigour to the constitution, though they more frequently prove fatal to it. This was its effect on a frame so feeble and exhausted as that of Ferdinand; for though he survived a violent disorder which it at first occasioned, it brought on such an habitual languor and dejection of mind as rendered him averse from any serious attention to public affairs, and fond of frivolous amusements, on which he had not hitherto bestowed much time<sup>7</sup>. Though he now despaired of having any son of his own, his jealousy of the Archduke did not abate, nor could he help viewing him with that aversion which Princes often bear to their successors. In order to gratify this unnatural passion, he made a will [1515], appointing Prince Ferdinand, who, having been born and

<sup>7</sup> Zurita *Annales de Arag.* vi. p. 347. P. Mart. Ep. 531. Argensola *Annales de Aragon*, lib. i. p. 1.

educated in Spain, was much beloved by the Spaniards, to be Regent of all his kingdoms until the arrival of the Archduke his brother; and by the same deed he settled upon him the Grand-mastership of the three military orders. The former of these grants might have put it in the power of the young Prince to have disputed the throne with his brother; the latter would, in any event, have rendered him almost independent of him.

Ferdinand retained to the last that jealous love of power, which was so remarkable through his whole life. Unwilling even at the approach of death to admit a thought of relinquishing any portion of his authority, he removed continually from place to place, in order to fly from his distemper, or to forget it. Though his strength declined every day, none of his attendants durst mention his condition; nor would he admit his Father Confessor, who thought such silence criminal and unchristian, into his presence. At last the danger became so imminent that it could be no longer concealed. Ferdinand received the intimation with a decent fortitude; and touched perhaps with compunction at the injustice which he had done his grandson, or influenced by the honest remonstrances of Carvajal Zapara, and Vargas, his most ancient and faithful counselors, who represented to him, that by investing Prince Ferdinand with the regency he would infallibly entail a civil war on the two brothers, and by bestowing on him the Grand-mastership of the military orders would strip the crown of its noblest ornament and chief strength, he consented to alter his will with respect to both these particulars. By a new deed he left Charles the sole heir of all his dominions [1516], and allotted to Prince Ferdinand, instead of

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18763

that throne of which he thought himself almost secure, an inconsiderable establishment of fifty thousand ducats a year<sup>28</sup>. He died a few hours after signing this will, on the 23d day of January, 1516.

Charles, to whom such a noble inheritance descended by his death, was near the full age of sixteen. He had hitherto resided in the Low Countries, his paternal dominions. Margaret of Austria, his aunt, and Margaret of York, the sister of Edward IV. of England, and widow of Charles the Bold, two Princesses of great virtue and abilities, had the care of forming his early youth. Upon the death of his father, the Flemings committed the government of the Low Countries to his grandfather, the Emperor Maximilian, with the name rather than the authority of Regent<sup>29</sup>. Maximilian made choice of William de Croy Lord of Chievres to superintend the education of the young Prince his grandson<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Mar. Hist. lib. 30. c. ult. Zurita Annales de Arag. vi. 401. P. Mart. Ep. 565, 566. Argensola Annales de Arag. lib. i. p. 11.

<sup>29</sup> Pontius Heuterus, Rerum Austriacarum, lib. xv. Lov. 1649. lib. vii. c. 2. p. 155.

<sup>30</sup> The French historians, upon the authority of M. de Bellay, Mem. p. 11. have unanimously asserted that Philip, by his last will, having appointed the King of France to have the direction of his son's education, Louis XII. with a disinterestedness suitable to the confidence reposed in him, named Chievres for that office. Even the President Henaut has adopted this opinion. Abregé Chron. A. D. 1507. Varillas, in his usual manner, pretends to have seen Philip's testament. Pract. de l'Education des Princes, p. 16. But the Spanish, German, and Flemish historians concur in contradicting this assertion of the French authors. It appears from Heuterus, a contemporary Flemish historian of great authority, that Louis XII. by consenting to the marriage of Germaine de Foix with Ferdinand, had lost much of that confidence which Philip once placed in him, that his disgust was increased by the French King's giving in marriage to the Count of Angoulême his eldest daughter, whom he

That nobleman possessed, in an eminent degree, the talents which fitted him for such an important office, and discharged the duties of it with great fidelity. Under Chievres, Adrian of Utrecht acted as preceptor. This preferment, which opened his way to the highest dignities an ecclesiastic can attain, he owed not to his birth, for that was extremely mean; nor to his interest, for he was a stranger to the arts of a court; but to the opinion which his countrymen entertained of his learning. He was indeed no inconsiderable proficient in those frivolous sciences which, during several centuries, assumed the name of philosophy, and had published a commentary, which

had formerly betrothed to Charles; Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. v. 151. That the French, a short time before Philip's death, had violated the peace which subsisted between them and the Flemings, and Philip had complained of this injury, and was ready to resent it. Heuter. *ibid.* All these circumstances render it improbable that Philip, who made his will a few days before he died, Heuter. p. 152, should commit the education of his son to Louis XII. In confirmation of these plausible conjectures, positive testimony can be produced. It appears from Heuterus that Philip, when he set out for Spain, had intrusted Chievres both with the care of his son's education, and with the government of his dominions in the Low Countries. Heuter. lib. vii. p. 153. That an attempt was made, soon after Philip's death, to have the Emperor Maximilian appointed Regent during the minority of his grandson, but this being opposed, Chievres seems to have continued to discharge both the offices which Philip had committed to him. Heuter. *ibid.* 153. 155. That in the beginning of the year 1508, the Flemings invited Maximilian to accept of the regency; to which he consented, and appointed his daughter Margaret, together with a council of Flemings, to exercise the supreme authority when he himself should at any time be absent. He likewise named Chievres as governor, and Adrian of Utrecht as preceptor to his son. Heut. *ibid.* 155. 157. What Heuterus relates with respect to this matter is confirmed by Morinus in *Vita Adriani* apud *Analecta Casp.* Burmanni de Adriano, cap. 10., by Barlandus *Chronio. Brabant.* *ibid.* p. 25, and by Harmsus *Annal. Brab.* vol. ii. 520, &c.

was highly esteemed, upon *The Book of Sentences*, a famous treatise of Petrus Lombardus, considered at that time as the standard system of metaphysical theology. But whatever admiration these procured him in an illiterate age, it was soon found that a man accustomed to the retirement of a college, unacquainted with the world, and without any tincture of taste or elegance, was by no means qualified for rendering science agreeable to a young Prince. Charles, accordingly, discovered an early aversion to learning, and an excessive fondness for those violent and martial exercises, to excel in which was the chief pride, and almost the only study of persons of rank in that age. Chievres encouraged this taste, either from a desire of gaining his pupil by indulgence, or from too slight an opinion of the advantages of literary accomplishments<sup>31</sup>. He instructed him, however, with great care in the arts of government; he made him study the history not only of his own kingdoms, but of those with which they were connected; he accustomed him, from the time of his assuming the government of Flanders in the year 1515, to attend to business; he persuaded him to peruse all papers relating to public affairs; to be present at the deliberations of his privy counsellors, and to propose to them himself those matters concerning which he required their opinion<sup>32</sup>. From such an education, Charles contracted habits of gravity and recollection which scarcely suited his time of life. The first openings of his genius did not indicate that superiority which its maturer age dis-

<sup>31</sup> Jovii Vita Adriani, p. 91. Struvii Corpus Hist. Germ. ii. 967. P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. vii. c. 3. p. 157.

<sup>32</sup> Mémoires de Bellay, 8vo. Par. 1573. p. 11. P. Heuter. lib. viii. c. 1. p. 184.

played<sup>33</sup>. He did not discover in his youth the impetuosity of spirit which commonly ushers in an active and enterprising manhood. Nor did his early obsequiousness to Chievres, and his other favourites, promise that capacious and decisive judgment which afterwards directed the affairs of one half of Europe. But his subjects, dazzled with the external accomplishments of a graceful figure and manly address, and viewing his character with that partiality which is always shown to Princes during their youth, entertained sanguine hopes of his adding lustre to those crowns which descended to him by the death of Ferdinand.

The kingdoms of Spain, as is evident from the view which I have given of their political constitution, were at that time in a situation which required an administration no less vigorous than prudent. The feudal institutions, which had been introduced into all its different provinces by the Goths, the Suevi, and the Vandals, subsisted in great force. The nobles, who were powerful and warlike, had long possessed all the exorbitant privileges which these institutions vested in their order. The cities in Spain were more numerous and more considerable than the genius of feudal government, naturally unfavourable to commerce and to regular police, seemed to admit. The personal rights and political influence which the inhabitants of these cities had acquired, were extensive. The royal prerogative, circumscribed by the privileges of the nobility, and by the pretensions of the people, was confined within very narrow limits. Under such a form of government, the principles of discord were many; the bond of union was extremely feeble; and Spain felt not

<sup>33</sup> P. Martyr. Ep. 569. 655.

only all the inconveniences occasioned by the defects in the feudal system, but was exposed to disorders arising from the peculiarities in its own constitution.

During the long administration of Ferdinand, no internal commotion, it is true, had arisen in Spain. His superior abilities had enabled him to restrain the turbulence of the nobles, and to moderate the jealousy of the commons. By the wisdom of his domestic government, by the sagacity with which he conducted his foreign operations, and by the high opinion that his subjects entertained of both, he had preserved among them a degree of tranquillity, greater than was natural to a constitution in which the seeds of discord and disorder were so copiously mingled. But, by the death of Ferdinand, these restraints were at once withdrawn; and faction and discontent, from being long repressed, were ready to break out with fiercer animosity.

In order to prevent these evils, Ferdinand had in his last will taken a most prudent precaution, by appointing Cardinal Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, to be sole Regent of Castile until the arrival of his grandson in Spain. The singular character of this man, and the extraordinary qualities which marked him out for that office at such a juncture, merit a particular description. He was descended of an honourable, not of a wealthy family; and the circumstances of his parents, as well as his own inclinations, having determined him to enter into the church, he early obtained benefices of great value, and which placed him in the way of the highest preferment. All these, however, he renounced at once; and, after undergoing a very severe noviciate, assumed the habit of St. Francis in a monastery of

Observantine Friars, one of the most rigid orders in the Romish church. There he soon became eminent for his uncommon austerity of manners, and for those excesses of superstitious devotion, which are the proper characteristics of the monastic life. But, notwithstanding these extravagances, to which weak and enthusiastic minds alone are usually prone, his understanding, naturally penetrating and decisive, retained its full vigour, and acquired him such great authority in his own order as raised him to be their Provincial. His reputation for sanctity soon procured him the office of Father Confessor to Queen Isabella, which he accepted with the utmost reluctance. He preserved in a court the same austerity of manners which had distinguished him in the cloister. He continued to make all his journeys on foot; he subsisted only upon alms; his acts of mortification were as severe as ever, and his penances as rigorous. Isabella, pleased with her choice, conferred on him, not long after, the Archbishopric of Toledo, which, next to the Papacy, is the richest dignity in the church of Rome. This honour he declined, with a firmness which nothing but the authoritative injunction of the Pope was able to overcome. Nor did this height of promotion change his manners. Though obliged to display in public that magnificence which became his station, he himself retained his monastic severity. Under his pontifical robes he constantly wore the coarse frock of St. Francis, the rents in which he used to patch with his own hands. He at no time used linen; but was commonly clad in hair cloth. He slept always in his habit, most frequently on the ground, or on boards; rarely in a bed. He did not taste any of the delicacies which appeared at his table, but satisfied

himself with that simple diet which the rule of his order prescribed<sup>34</sup>. Notwithstanding these peculiarities, so opposite to the manners of the world, he possessed a thorough knowledge of its affairs; and no sooner was he called by his station, and by the high opinion which Ferdinand and Isabella entertained of him, to take a principal share in the administration, than he displayed talents for business which rendered the fame of his wisdom equal to that of his sanctity. His political conduct, remarkable for the boldness and originality of all his plans, flowed from his real character, and partook both of its virtues and its defects. His extensive genius suggested to him schemes vast and magnificent. Conscious of the integrity of his intentions, he pursued these with unremitting and undaunted firmness. Accustomed from his early youth to mortify his own passions, he showed little indulgence toward those of other men. Taught by his system of religion to check even his most innocent desires, he was the enemy of every thing to which he could affix the name of elegance or pleasure. Though free from any suspicion of cruelty, he discovered in all his commerce with the world a severe inflexibility of mind, and austerity of character, peculiar to the monastic profession, and which can hardly be conceived in a country where that is unknown.

Such was the man to whom Ferdinand committed the regency of Castile; and though Ximenes was then near fourscore, and perfectly acquainted with the labour and difficulty of the office, his natural intrepidity of mind and zeal for the public good prompted him to accept of it without hesitation.

<sup>34</sup> *Histoire de l'Administration du Card. Ximen. par Mich. Baudier*, 4to. 1633, p. 13.

Adrian of Utrecht, who had been sent into Spain a few months before the death of Ferdinand, produced full powers from the Archduke to assume the name and authority of Regent, upon the demise of his grandfather; but such was the aversion of the Spaniards to the government of a stranger, and so unequal the abilities of the two competitors, that Adrian's claim would at once have been rejected, if Ximenes himself, from complaisance to his new master, had not consented to acknowledge him as Regent, and to carry on the government in conjunction with him. By this, however, Adrian acquired a dignity merely nominal. Ximenes, though he treated him with great decency, and even respect, retained the whole power in his own hands<sup>35</sup>.

The Cardinal's first care was to observe the motions of the infant Don Ferdinand, who, having been flattered with so near a prospect of supreme power, bore the disappointment of his hopes with greater impatience than a Prince at a period of life so early could have been supposed to feel. Ximenes, under pretence of providing more effectually for his safety, removed him from Guadaloupe, the place in which he had been educated, to Madrid, where he fixed the residence of the court. There he was under the Cardinal's own eye, and his conduct, with that of his domestics, was watched with the utmost attention<sup>36</sup>.

The first intelligence he received from the Low Countries gave greater disquiet to the Cardinal, and convinced him how difficult a task it would be to conduct the affairs of an unexperienced Prince, under the influence of counsellors unacquainted with

<sup>35</sup> Comestrus de Reb. gest. Ximenii, p. 150, fol. Compl. 1569.

<sup>36</sup> Mariana Contin. Marianæ, lib. i. c. 2. Baudier, Hist. de Ximenes, p. 118.

the laws and manners of Spain. No sooner did the account of Ferdinand's death reach Brussels than Charles, by the advice of his Flemish ministers, resolved to assume the title of King. By the laws of Spain, the sole right to the crowns, both of Castile and of Aragon, belonged to Joanna; and though her infirmities disqualified her from governing, this incapacity had not been declared by any public act of the Cortes in either kingdom; so that the Spaniards considered this resolution, not only as a direct violation of their privileges, but as an unnatural usurpation in a son on the prerogatives of a mother, towards whom, in her present unhappy situation, he manifested a less delicate regard than her subjects had always expressed<sup>37</sup>. The Flemish court, however, having prevailed both on the Pope and on the Emperor to address letters to Charles as King of Castile (the former of whom, it **was** pretended, had a right **as** head of the church, and the latter as head of the empire, to confer this title), instructions were sent to Ximenes, to prevail on the Spaniards to acknowledge it. Ximenes, though he had earnestly remonstrated against the measure, as no less unpopular than unnecessary, resolved to exert all his authority and credit in carrying it into execution, and immediately assembled such of the nobles as were then at court. What Charles required was laid before them; and when, instead of complying with his demands, they began to murmur against such an unprecedented encroachment on their privileges, and to talk high of the rights of Joanna, and their oath of allegiance to her, Ximenes hastily interposed, and, with that firm and decisive tone which was natural to him, told them that they were not

<sup>37</sup> P. Mart. l. p. 568.

called now to deliberate, but to obey; that their sovereign did not apply to them for advice, but expected submission; and "this day," [April 13] added he, "Charles shall be proclaimed King of Castile in Madrid; and the rest of the cities, I doubt not, will follow its example." On the spot he gave orders for that purpose<sup>41</sup>; and, notwithstanding the novelty of the practice, and the secret discontents of many persons of distinction, Charles's title was universally recognised. In Aragon, where the privileges of the subject were more extensive, and the abilities, as well as authority of the Archbishop of Saragossa, whom Ferdinand had appointed Regent, were far inferior to those of Ximenes, the same obsequiousness to the will of Charles did not appear, nor was he acknowledged there under any other character but that of Prince until his arrival in Spain<sup>42</sup>.

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Ximenes, though possessed only of delegated power, which, from his advanced age, he could not expect to enjoy long, assumed, together with the character of Regent, all the ideas natural to a monarch, and adopted schemes for extending the regal authority, which he pursued with as much intrepidity and ardour, as if he himself had been to reap the advantages resulting from their success. The exorbitant privileges of the Castilian nobles circumscribed the prerogative of the Prince within very narrow limits. These privileges the Cardinal considered as so many unjust extortions from the crown, and determined to abridge them. Dangerous as the attempt was, there were circumstances in his situation which promised him greater success than any

<sup>41</sup> Gometius, p. 152, &c. Baudier Hist. de Aragon, p. 121.  
<sup>42</sup> Mart. Ep. 572.

King of Castile could have expected. The strict and prudent economy of his archiepiscopal revenues furnished him with more ready money than the crown could at any time command: the sanctity of his manners, his charity, and munificence rendered him the idol of the people; and the nobles themselves, not suspecting any danger from him, did not observe his motions with the same jealous attention as they would have watched those of one of their monarchs.

Immediately upon his accession to the regency, several of the nobles, fancying that the reins of government would of consequence be somewhat relaxed, began to assemble their vassals, and to prosecute, by force of arms, private quarrels, and pretensions, which the authority of Ferdinand had obliged them to dissemble or to relinquish. But Ximenes, who had taken into pay a good body of troops, opposed and defeated all their designs with unexpected vigour and facility; and though he did not treat the authors of these disorders with any cruelty, he forced them to acts of submission extremely mortifying to the haughty spirit of Castilian grandees.

But while the Cardinal's attacks were confined to individuals, and every act of rigour was justified by the appearance of necessity, founded on the forms of justice, and tempered with a mixture of lenity, there was scarcely room for jealousy or complaint. It was not so with his next measure, which, by striking at a privilege essential to the nobility, gave a general alarm to the whole order. By the feudal constitution, the military power was lodged in the hands of the nobles, and men of an inferior condition were called into the field only as their vassals, and to follow their banners. A King, with scanty

revenues and a limited prerogative, depended on these potent barons in all his operations. It was with their forces he attacked his enemies, and with them he defended his kingdom. While at the head of troops attached warmly to their own immediate lords, and accustomed to obey no other commands, his authority was precarious, and his efforts feeble. From this state Ximenes resolved to deliver the crown; and as mercenary standing armies were unknown under the feudal government, and would have been odious to a martial and generous people, he issued a proclamation, commanding every city in Castile to enrol a certain number of its burgesses, in order that they might be trained to the use of arms on Sundays and holidays; he engaged to provide officers to command them at the public expense; and, as an encouragement to the private men, promised them an exemption from all taxes and impositions. The frequent incursions of the Moors from Africa, and the necessity of having some force always ready to oppose them, furnished a plausible pretence for this innovation. The object really in view was to secure the King a body of troops independent of his barons, and which might serve to counterbalance their power<sup>40</sup>. The nobles were not slow in perceiving what was his intention, and saw how effectually the scheme which he had adopted would accomplish his end: but as a measure which had the pious appearance of resisting the progress of the infidels was extremely popular, and as any opposition to it, arising from their order alone, would have been imputed wholly to interested motives, they endeavoured to excite the cities themselves to refuse obedience, and to inveigh against the proclamation

<sup>40</sup> Miniana Continuation Mariana, fol. Hag. 1733, p. 3.

as inconsistent with their charters and privileges. In consequence of their instigations, Burgos, Valladolid, and several other cities, rose in open mutiny. Some of the grandees declared themselves their protectors. Violent remonstrances were presented to the King. His Flemish counsellors were alarmed. Ximenes alone continued firm and undaunted; and partly by terror, partly by entreaty; by force in some instances, and by forbearance in others; he prevailed on all the refractory cities to comply<sup>11</sup>. During his administration, he continued to execute his plan with vigour; but soon after his death it was entirely dropped.

His success in this scheme for reducing the exorbitant power of the nobility encouraged him to attempt a diminution of their possessions, which were no less exorbitant. During the contests and disorders inseparable from the feudal government, the nobles, ever attentive to their own interest, and taking advantage of the weakness or distress of their monarchs, had seized some parts of the royal demesnes, obtained grants of others, and, having gradually wrested almost the whole out of the hands of the Prince, had annexed them to their own estates. The titles, by which most of the grandees held these lands, were extremely defective; it was from some successful usurpation which the crown had been too feeble to dispute, that many derived their only claim to possession. An inquiry carried back to the origin of these encroachments, which were almost coeval with the feudal system, was impracticable; and as it would have stripped every nobleman in Spain of great part of his lands, it must have excited a general revolt. Such a step was too bold even for the

<sup>11</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 356, &c. Gomertius, p. 160, &c.

enterprising genius of Ximenes. He confined himself to the reign of Ferdinand; and, beginning with the pensions granted during that time, refused to make any further payment, because all right to them expired with his life. He then called to account such as had acquired crown lands under the administration of that monarch, and at once resumed whatever he had alienated. The effects of these revocations extended to many persons of high rank; for though Ferdinand was a Prince of little generosity, yet he and Isabella having been raised to the throne of Castile by a powerful faction of the nobles, they were obliged to reward the zeal of their adherents with great liberality, and the royal demesnes were their only fund for that purpose. The addition made to the revenue of the crown by these revocations, together with his own frugal economy, enabled Ximenes not only to discharge all the debts which Ferdinand had left, and to remit considerable sums to Flanders, but to pay the officers of his new militia, and to establish magazines not only more numerous, but better furnished with artillery, arms, and warlike stores, than Spain had ever possessed in any former age<sup>12</sup>. The prudent and disinterested application of these sums was a full apology to the people for the rigour with which they were exacted.

The nobles, alarmed at these repeated attacks, began to think of precautions for the safety of their order. Many cabals were formed, loud complaints were uttered, and desperate resolutions taken; but before they proceeded to extremities, they appointed some of their number to examine the powers in consequence of which the Cardinal exercised acts of such high authority. The Admiral of Castile, the

<sup>12</sup> Flechier *Vie de Ximen* ii. 600

Duke de Infantado, and the Condé de Benevento, grandees of the first rank, were intrusted with this commission. Ximenes received them with cold civility, and, in answer to their demand, produced the testament of Ferdinand by which he was appointed Regent, together with the ratification of that deed by Charles. To both these they objected; and he endeavoured to establish their validity. As the conversation grew warm, he led them insensibly towards a balcony, from which they had a view of a large body of troops under arms, and of a formidable train of artillery. "Behold," says he, pointing to these and raising his voice, "the powers which I have received from His Catholic Majesty. With these I govern Castile; and with these I will govern it, until the King, your master and mine, takes possession of his kingdom<sup>1</sup>." A declaration so bold and haughty silenced them, and astonished their associates. To take arms against a man aware of his danger, and prepared for his defence, was what despair alone would dictate. All thoughts of a general confederacy against the Cardinal's administration were laid aside; and, except from some slight commotions excited by the private resentment of particular noblemen, the tranquillity of Castile suffered no interruption.

It was not only from the opposition of the Spanish nobility that obstacles arose to the execution of the Cardinal's schemes; he had a constant struggle to maintain with the Flemish ministers, who, presuming upon their favour with the young King, aimed at directing the affairs of Spain, as well as those of their own country. Jealous of the great abilities and independent spirit of Ximenes, they considered him

<sup>1</sup> Flech. ii. 551. Petrus Hist. viii. 133.

rather as a rival who might circumscribe their power, than as a minister who by his prudence and vigour was adding to the grandeur and authority of their master. Every complaint against his administration was listened to with pleasure by the courtiers in the Low Countries. Unnecessary obstructions were thrown by their means in the way of all his measures; and though they could not, either with decency or safety, deprive him of the office of Regent, they endeavoured to lessen his authority by dividing it. They soon discovered that Adrian of Utrecht, already joined with him in office, had neither genius nor spirit sufficient to give the least check to his proceedings; and therefore Charles, by their advice, added to the commission of regency La Chau, a Flemish gentleman, and afterwards Amerstorff, a nobleman of Holland; the former distinguished for his address, the latter for his firmness. Ximenes, though no stranger to the malevolent intention of the Flemish courtiers, received these new associates with all the external marks of distinction due to the office with which they were invested; but when they came to enter upon business, he abated nothing of that air of superiority with which he had treated Adrian, and still retained the sole direction of affairs. The Spaniards, more averse, perhaps, than any other people to the government of strangers, approved of all his efforts to preserve his own authority. Even the nobles, influenced by this national passion, and forgetting their jealousies and discontent, chose rather to see the supreme power in the hands of one of their countrymen, whom they feared, than in those of foreigners, whom they hated.

Ximenes, though engaged in such great schemes of domestic policy, and embarrassed by the artifices

and intrigues of the Flemish ministers, had the burden of two foreign wars to support. The one was in Navarre, which was invaded by its unfortunate monarch, John d'Albert. The death of Ferdinand, the absence of Charles, the discord and disaffection which reigned among the Spanish nobles, seemed to present him with a favourable opportunity of recovering his dominions. The Cardinal's vigilance, however, defeated a measure so well concerted. As he foresaw the danger to which that kingdom might be exposed, one of his first acts of administration was to order thither a considerable body of troops. While the King was employed with one part of his army in the siege of St. Jean Pied en Port, Villalva, an officer of great experience and courage, attacked the other by surprise and cut it to pieces. The King instantly retreated with precipitation, and an end was put to the war<sup>11</sup>. But as Navarre was filled at that time with towns and castles slightly fortified and weakly garrisoned, which, being unable to resist an enemy, served only to furnish him with places of retreat; Ximenes, always bold and decisive in his measures, ordered every one of these to be dismantled, except Pampeluna, the fortifications of which he proposed to render very strong. To this uncommon precaution Spain owes the possession of Navarre. The French, since that period, have often entered, and have as often overrun the open country; while they were exposed to all the inconveniences attending an invading army, the Spaniards have easily drawn troops from the neighbouring provinces to oppose them: and the French, having no place of any strength to which they could retire, have been obliged repeatedly to abandon their conquest with as much rapidity as they gained it.

<sup>11</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 570.

The other war which he carried on in Africa, against the famous adventurer Horuc Barbarossa, who, from a private corsair, raised himself, by his singular valour and address, to be King of Algiers and Tunis, was far from being equally successful. The ill conduct of the Spanish general, and the rash valour of his troops, presented Barbarossa with an easy victory. Many perished in the battle, more in the retreat, and the remainder returned into Spain covered with infamy. The magnanimity, however, with which the Cardinal bore this disgrace, the only one he experienced during his administration, added new lustre to his character<sup>45</sup>. Great composure of temper under a disappointment was not expected from a man so remarkable for the eagerness and impatience with which he urged on the execution of all his schemes.

This disaster was soon forgotten; while the conduct of the Flemish court proved the cause of constant uneasiness, not only to the Cardinal, but to the whole Spanish nation. All the great qualities of Chievres, the prime minister and favourite of the young King, were sullied with an ignoble and sordid avarice. The accession of his master to the crown of Spain opened a new and copious source for the gratification of this passion. During the time of Charles's residence in Flanders, the whole tribe of pretenders to offices or to favour resorted thither. They soon discovered that, without the patronage of Chievres, it was vain to hope for preferment; nor did they want sagacity to find out the proper method of securing his protection. Great sums of money were drawn out of Spain. Every thing was venal, and disposed of to the highest

<sup>45</sup> Gometius, lib. vi. p. 179.

bidder. After the example of Chievres, the inferior Flemish ministers engaged in this traffic, which became as general and avowed as it was infamous<sup>46</sup>. The Spaniards were filled with rage when they beheld offices of great importance to the welfare of their country set to sale by strangers unconcerned for its honour or its happiness. Ximenes, disinterested in his whole administration, and a stranger, from his native grandeur of mind, to the passion of avarice, inveighed with the utmost boldness against the venality of the Flemings. He represented to the King, in strong terms, the murmurs and indignation which their behaviour excited among a free and high spirited people, and besought him to set out without loss of time for Spain, that, by his presence, he might dissipate the clouds which were gathering all over the kingdom<sup>47</sup>.

Charles was fully sensible that he had delayed too long to take possession of his dominions in Spain. Powerful obstacles, however, stood in his way, and detained him in the Low Countries. The war which the league of Cambray had kindled in Italy, still subsisted; though, during its course, the armies of all the parties engaged in it had changed their destination and their objects. France was now in alliance with Venice, which it had at first combined to destroy. Maximilian and Ferdinand had for some years carried on hostilities against France, their original ally, to the valour of whose troops the confederacy had been indebted in a great measure for its success. Together with his kingdoms, Ferdinand transmitted this war to his grandson; and there was reason to expect that Maximilian, always fond of new enterprises, would persuade the young

<sup>46</sup> Miniana, Contin. l. i. c. 2.

<sup>47</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 376.

monarch to enter into it with ardour. But the Flemings, who had long possessed an extensive commerce, which, during the league of Cambray, had grown to a great height upon the ruins of the Venetian trade, dreaded a rupture with France; and Chievres, sagacious to discern the true interest of his country, and not warped on this occasion by his love of wealth, warmly declared for maintaining peace with the French nation. Francis I. destitute of allies, and solicitous to secure his late conquests in Italy by a treaty, listened with joy to the first overtures of accommodation. Chievres himself conducted the negotiation in the name of Charles. Gouffier appeared as plenipotentiary for Francis. Each of them had presided over the education of the Prince whom he represented. They had both adopted the same pacific system; and were equally persuaded that the union of the two monarchs was the happiest event for themselves as well as for their kingdoms. In such hands the negotiation did not languish. A few days after opening their conferences at Noyon, they concluded a treaty of confederacy and mutual defence between the two monarchs [August 13, 1516]; the chief articles in which were, that Francis should give in marriage to Charles his eldest daughter the Princess Louise, an infant of a year old, and, as her dowry, should make over to him all his claims and pretensions upon the kingdom of Naples; that, in consideration of Charles's being already in possession of Naples, he should, until the accomplishment of the marriage, pay a hundred thousand crowns a year to the French King; and the half of that sum annually as long as the Princess had no children; that when Charles shall arrive in Spain, the heirs of the King

of Navarre may represent to him their right to that kingdom; and if, after examining their claim, he does not give them satisfaction, Francis shall be at liberty to assist them with all his forces<sup>48</sup>. This alliance not only united Charles and Francis, but obliged Maximilian, who was unable alone to cope with the French and Venetians, to enter into a treaty with those powers, which put a final period to the bloody and tedious war that the league of Cambray had occasioned. Europe enjoyed a few years of universal tranquillity, and was indebted for that blessing to two Princes, whose rivalry and ambition kept it in perpetual discord and agitation during the remainder of their reigns.

By the treaty of Noyon, Charles secured a safe passage into Spain. It was not, however, the interest of his Flemish ministers, that he should visit that kingdom soon. While he resided in Flanders, the revenues of the Spanish crown were spent there, and they engrossed, without any competitors, all the effects of their monarch's generosity; their country became the seat of government, and all favours were dispensed by them. Of all these advantages they ran the risk of seeing themselves deprived, from the moment that their sovereign entered Spain. The Spaniards would naturally assume the direction of their own affairs; the Low Countries would be considered only as a province of that mighty monarchy; and they who now distributed the favours of the Prince to others, must then be content to receive them from the hands of strangers. But what Chievres chiefly wished to avoid was, an interview between the King and Ximenes. On the one hand, the wisdom, the integrity, and the magnanimity of that pre-

<sup>48</sup> Leonard Recueil des Traitez, tom. ii. 69.

late gave him a wonderful ascendant over the minds of men; and it was extremely probable that these great qualities, added to the reverence due to his age and office, would command the respect of a young Prince, who, capable of noble and generous sentiments himself, would, in proportion to his admiration of the Cardinal's virtues, lessen his deference towards persons of another character. Or, on the other hand, if Charles should allow his Flemish favourites to retain all the influence over his councils which they at present possessed, it was easy to foresee that the Cardinal would remonstrate loudly against such an indignity to the Spanish nation, and vindicate the rights of his country with the same intrepidity and success with which he had asserted the prerogatives of the crown. For these reasons all his Flemish counsellors combined to retard his departure; and Charles, unsuspicious, from want of experience, and fond of his native country, suffered himself to be unnecessarily detained in the Netherlands a whole year after signing the treaty of Noyon.

1517.] The repeated entreaties of Ximenes, the advice of his grandfather Maximilian, and the impatient murmurs of his Spanish subjects, prevailed on him at last to embark. He was attended not only by Chievres, his prime minister, but by a numerous and splendid train of the Flemish nobles, fond of beholding the grandeur, or of sharing in the bounty of their Prince. After a dangerous voyage, he landed at Villa Viciosa, in the province of Asturias [Sept. 13], and was received with such loud acclamations of joy as a new monarch, whose arrival was so ardently desired, had reason to expect. The Spanish nobility resorted to their sovereign

from all parts of the kingdom, and displayed a magnificence which the Flemings were unable to emulate<sup>49</sup>.

Ximenes, who considered the presence of the King as the greatest blessing to his dominions, was advancing towards the coast, as fast as the infirm state of his health would permit, in order to receive him. During his regency, and notwithstanding his extreme old age, he had abated in no degree the rigour or frequency of his mortifications; and to these he added such laborious assiduity in business, as would have worn out the most youthful and vigorous constitution. Every day he employed several hours in devotion; he celebrated mass in person; he even allotted some space for study. Notwithstanding these occupations, he regularly attended the council; he received and read all papers presented to him; he dictated letters and instructions; and took under his inspection all business, civil, ecclesiastical, or military. Every moment of his time was filled up with some serious employment. The only amusement in which he indulged himself, by way of relaxation after business, was to canvass, with a few friars and other divines, some intricate article in scholastic theology. Wasted by such a course of life, the infirmities of age daily grew upon him. On his journey a violent disorder seized him at Bos Equillos, attended with uncommon symptoms; which his followers considered as the effect of poison<sup>50</sup>, but could not agree whether the crime ought to be imputed to the hatred of the Spanish nobles, or to the malice of the Flemish courtiers. This accident obliging him to stop short, he wrote to Charles, and with his usual boldness advised him to dismiss all

<sup>49</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 599. 601.

<sup>50</sup> Miniana, Contin. lib. i. c. 3.

the strangers in his train, whose numbers and credit gave offence already to the Spaniards, and would ere long alienate the affections of the whole people. At the same time he earnestly desired to have an interview with the King, that he might inform him of the state of the nation, and the temper of his subjects. To prevent this, not only the Flemings but the Spanish grandees employed all their address, and industriously kept Charles at a distance from Aranda, the place to which the Cardinal had removed. Through their suggestions every measure that he recommended was rejected; the utmost care was taken to make him feel, and to point out to the whole nation, that his power was on the decline; even in things purely trivial, such a choice was always made as was deemed most disagreeable to him. Ximenes did not bear this treatment with his usual fortitude of spirit. Conscious of his own integrity and merit, he expected a more grateful return from a Prince to whom he delivered a kingdom more flourishing than it had been in any former age, together with authority more extensive and better established than the most illustrious of his ancestors had ever possessed. He could not, therefore, on many occasions, refrain from giving vent to his indignation and complaints. He lamented the fate of his country, and foretold the calamities which it would suffer from the insolence, the rapaciousness, and ignorance of strangers. While his mind was agitated by these passions, he received a letter from the King, in which, after a few cold and formal expressions of regard, he was allowed to retire to his diocese, that, after a life of such continued labour, he might end his days in tranquillity. This message proved fatal to Ximenes,

His haughty mind, it is probable, could not survive disgrace; perhaps his generous heart could not bear the prospect of the misfortunes ready to fall on his country. Whichsoever of these opinions we embrace, certain it is that he expired a few hours after reading the letter [Nov. 8]<sup>51</sup>. The variety, the grandeur, and the success of his schemes, during a regency of only twenty months, leave it doubtful whether his sagacity in council, his prudence in conduct, or his boldness in execution, deserve the greatest praise. His reputation is still high in Spain, not only for wisdom, but for sanctity; and he is the only prime minister mentioned in history, whom his contemporaries revered as a saint<sup>52</sup>, and to whom the people under his government ascribed the power of working miracles.

1518.] Soon after the death of Ximenes, Charles made his public entry, with great pomp, into Valladolid, whither he had summoned the Cortes of Castile. Though he assumed on all occasions the name of King, that title had never been acknowledged in the Cortes. The Spaniards considering Joanna as possessed of the sole right to the crown, and no example of a son's having enjoyed the title of King during the life of his parents occurring in their history, the Cortes discovered all that scrupulous respect for ancient forms; and that aversion to innovation, which are conspicuous in popular assemblies. The presence, however, of their Prince, the address, the artifices, and the threats of his ministers, prevailed on them at last to proclaim him King, in conjunction with his mother, whose name they ap-

<sup>51</sup> Marsollier, *Vie de Ximenes*, p. 447. Gomelius, lib. vii. p. 206, &c. Baudier, *Hist. de Ximen*. ii. p. 208.

<sup>52</sup> Flechier, *Vie de Ximen*. ii. p. 746.

pointed to be placed before that of her son in all public acts. But, when they made this concession, they declared, that if, at any future period, Joanna should recover the exercise of reason, the whole authority should return into her hands. At the same time they voted a free gift of six hundred thousand ducats to be paid in three years, a sum more considerable than had ever been granted to any former monarch<sup>53</sup>.

Notwithstanding this obsequiousness of the Cortes to the will of the King, the most violent symptoms of dissatisfaction with his government began to break out in the kingdom. Chievres had acquired over the mind of the young monarch the ascendant not only of a tutor, but of a parent. Charles seemed to have no sentiments but those which his minister inspired, and scarcely uttered a word but what he put into his mouth. He was constantly surrounded by Flemings; no person got access to him without their permission; nor was any admitted to audience but in their presence. As he spoke the Spanish language very imperfectly, his answers were always extremely short, and often delivered with hesitation. From all these circumstances many of the Spaniards were led to believe that he was a Prince of a slow and narrow genius. Some pretended to discover a strong resemblance between him and his mother, and began to whisper that his capacity for government would never be far superior to hers; and though they who had the best opportunity of judging concerning his character maintained that, notwithstanding such unpromising appearances, he possessed a large fund of knowledge, as well as of sagacity<sup>54</sup>;

<sup>53</sup> Miniana, Contin. lib. i. c. 3. P. Mart. Ep. 608. Sandoval, p. 12.

<sup>54</sup> Sandoval, p. 31. P. Mart. Ep. 635.

yet all agreed in condemning his partiality toward the Flemings, and his attachment to his favourite as unreasonable and immoderate. Unfortunately for Charles, these favourites were unworthy of his confidence. To amass wealth seems to have been their only aim; and as they had reason to fear that either their master's good sense, or the indignation of the Spaniards, might soon abridge their power they hastened to improve the present opportunity and their avarice was the more rapacious because they expected their authority to be of no long duration. All honours, offices, and benefices, were either engrossed by the Flemings, or publicly sold by them. Chievres, his wife, and Sauvage, whom Charles, on the death of Ximenes, had imprudently raised to be chancellor of Castile, vied with each other in all the refinements of extortion and venality. Not only the Spanish historians, who, from resentment, may be suspected of exaggeration, but Peter Martyr Angleria, an Italian, who resided at that time in the court of Spain, and who was under no temptation to deceive the persons to whom his letters are addressed, gives a description which is almost incredible, of the insatiable and shameless covetousness of the Flemings. According to Angleria's calculation, which he asserts to be extremely moderate, they remitted into the Low Countries, in the space of ten months, no less a sum than a million and one hundred thousand ducats. The nomination of William de Croy, Chievres' nephew, a young man not of canonical age, to the Archbishopric of Toledo, exasperated the Spaniards more than all these exactions. They considered the elevation of a stranger to the head of their church, and to the richest benefice in the kingdom, not only as an injury, but as an insult to the whole nation; both

clergy and laity, the former from interest, the latter from indignation, joined in exclaiming against it<sup>55</sup>.

Charles, leaving Castile thus disgusted with his administration, set out for Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, that he might be present in the Cortes of that kingdom. On his way thither, he took leave of his brother Ferdinand, whom he sent into Germany on the pretence of visiting their grandfather Maximilian, in his old age. To this prudent precaution Charles owed the preservation of his Spanish dominions. During the violent commotions which arose there soon after this period, the Spaniards would infallibly have offered the crown to a Prince who was the darling of the whole nation; nor did Ferdinand want ambition, or counsellors, that might have prompted him to accept of the offer<sup>56</sup>.

The Aragonese had not hitherto acknowledged Charles as King, nor would they allow the Cortes to be assembled in his name, but in that of the Justiza, to whom, during an interregnum, this privilege belonged<sup>57</sup>. The opposition Charles had to struggle with, in the Cortes of Aragon, was more violent and obstinate than that which he had overcome in Castile: after long delays, however, and with much difficulty, he persuaded the members to confer on him the title of King, in conjunction with his mother. At the same time he bound himself, by that solemn oath which the Aragonese exacted of their Kings, never to violate any of their rights or liberties. When a donative was demanded, the members were still more intractable; many months elapsed before

<sup>55</sup> Sandoval, 28—31. P. Mart. Ep. 608. 611. 613, 614. 622, 623. 639. Miniana, Contin. lib. i. c. 3. p. 8.

<sup>56</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 619. Ferreras, viii. 460.

<sup>57</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 605.

they would agree to grant Charles two hundred thousand ducats; and that sum they appropriated so strictly for paying debts of the crown which had long been forgotten, that a very small part of it came into the King's hands. What had happened in Castile taught them caution, and determined them rather to satisfy the claims of their fellow-citizens, how obsolete soever, than to furnish strangers the means of enriching themselves with the spoils of their country<sup>58</sup>.

During these proceedings of the Cortes, ambassadors arrived at Saragossa from Francis I. and the young King of Navarre, demanding the restitution of that kingdom in terms of the treaty of Noyon. But neither Charles, nor the Castilian nobles, whom he consulted on this occasion, discovered any inclination to part with this acquisition. A conference held soon after at Montpellier, in order to bring this matter to an amicable issue, was altogether fruitless: while the French urged the injustice of the usurpation, the Spaniards were attentive only to its importance<sup>59</sup>.

1519.] From Aragon Charles proceeded to Catalonia, where he wasted as much time, encountered more difficulties, and gained less money. The Flemings were now become so odious in every province of Spain by their exactions, that the desire of mortifying them, and of disappointing their avarice, augmented the jealousy with which a free people usually conduct their deliberations.

The Castilians, who had felt most sensibly the weight and rigour of the oppressive schemes carried on by the Flemings, resolved no longer to submit with a tameness fatal to themselves, and which

<sup>58</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 615—634.

<sup>59</sup> Ib. 605, 633, 640.

rendered them the objects of scorn to their fellow subjects in the other kingdoms of which the Spanish monarchy was composed. Segovia, Toledo, Seville, and several other cities of the first rank, entered into a confederacy for the defence of their rights and privileges; and notwithstanding the silence of the nobility, who, on this occasion, discovered neither the public spirit nor the resolution which became their order, the confederates laid before the King a full view of the state of the kingdom, and of the mal-administration of his favourites. The preferment of strangers, the exportation of the current coin, the increase of taxes, were the grievances of which they chiefly complained; and of these they demanded redress with that boldness which is natural to a free people. These remonstrances presented at first at Saragossa, and renewed afterwards at Barcelona, Charles treated with great neglect. The confederacy, however, of these cities, at this juncture, was the beginning of that famous union among the commons of Castile, which not long after threw the kingdom into such violent convulsions as shook the throne, and almost overturned the constitution<sup>60</sup>.

Soon after Charles's arrival at Barcelona, he received the account of an event which interested him much more than the murmurs of the Castilians, or the scruples of the Cortes of Catalonia. This was the death of the Emperor Maximilian [Jan. 12]; an occurrence of small importance in itself, for he was a Prince conspicuous neither for his virtues, nor his power, nor his abilities; but rendered by its consequences more memorable than any that had happened during several ages. It broke that profound

<sup>60</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 630. Ferreras, viii. 461.

and universal peace which then reigned in the Christian world; it excited a rivalry between two Princes, which threw all Europe into agitation, and kindled wars more general and of longer duration than had hitherto been known in modern times.

The revolutions occasioned by the expedition of the French King Charles VIII. into Italy, had inspired the European Princes with new ideas concerning the importance of the Imperial dignity. The claims of the Empire upon some of the Italian States were numerous; its jurisdiction over others was extensive; and though the former had been almost abandoned, and the latter seldom exercised under Princes of slender abilities and of little influence, it was obvious that, in the hands of an Emperor possessed of power or of genius, they might be employed as engines for stretching his dominion over the greater part of that country. Even Maximilian, feeble and unsteady as his conduct always was, had availed himself of the infinite pretensions of the Empire, and had reaped advantage from every war, and every negotiation in Italy during his reign. These considerations, added to the dignity of the station, confessedly the first among Christian Princes, and to the rights inherent in the office, which, if exerted with vigour, were far from being inconsiderable, rendered the Imperial crown more than ever an object of ambition.

Not long before his death, Maximilian had discovered great solicitude to preserve this dignity in the Austrian family, and to procure the King of Spain to be chosen his successor. But he himself having never been crowned by the Pope, a ceremony deemed essential in that age, was considered only as Emperor *elect*. Though historians have

not attended to that distinction, neither the Italian nor German chancery bestowed any other title upon him than that of King of the Romans; and no example occurring in history of any person's being chosen a successor to a King of the Romans, the Germans, always tenacious of their forms, and unwilling to confer upon Charles an office for which their constitution knew no name, obstinately refused to gratify Maximilian in that point<sup>61</sup>.

By his death this difficulty was at once removed, and Charles openly aspired to that dignity which his grandfather had attempted, without success, to secure for him. At the same time Francis I. a powerful rival, entered the lists against him; and the attention of all Europe was fixed upon this competition, no less illustrious from the high rank of the candidates than for the importance of the prize for which they contended. Each of them urged his pretensions with sanguine expectations, and with no unpromising prospect of success. Charles considered the Imperial crown as belonging to him of right, from its long continuance in the Austrian line; he knew that none of the German Princes possessed power or influence enough to appear as his antagonist; he flattered himself that no consideration would induce the natives of Germany to exalt any foreign Prince to a dignity, which during so many ages had been deemed peculiar to their own nation; and least of all, that they would confer this honour upon Francis I. the sovereign of a people whose genius, and laws, and manners differed so widely from those of the Germans that it was hardly pos-

<sup>61</sup> Guicciardini, lib. xiii. p. 15. *Hist. Gener. d'Allemagne*, par P. Barre, tom. viii. part 1, p. 1087. *P. Heuter. Rerum Austr. lib. vii. c. 17. 179. lib. viii. c. 2, p. 183.*

sible to establish any cordial union between them; he trusted not a little to the effect of Maximilian's negotiations, which, though they did not attain their end, had prepared the minds of the Germans for his elevation to the Imperial throne: but what he relied on as a chief recommendation, was the fortunate situation of his hereditary dominions in Germany, which served as a natural barrier to the Empire against the encroachments of the Turkish power. The conquests, the abilities, and the ambition of Sultan Selim II. had spread over Europe, at that time, a general and well founded alarm. By his victories over the Mamalukes, and the extirpation of that gallant body of men, he had not only added Egypt and Syria to his empire, but had secured to it such a degree of internal tranquillity, that he was ready to turn against Christendom the whole force of his arms, which nothing hitherto had been able to resist. The most effectual expedient for stopping the progress of this torrent, seemed to be the election of an Emperor possessed of extensive territories in that country, where its first impression would be felt, and who, besides, could combat this formidable enemy with all the forces of a powerful monarchy, and with all the wealth furnished by the mines of the New World, or the commerce of the Low Countries. These were the arguments by which Charles publicly supported his claim; and to men of integrity and reflection they appeared to be not only plausible but convincing. He did not, however, trust the success of his cause to these alone. Great sums of money were remitted from Spain; all the refinements and artifice of negotiation were employed; and a considerable body of troops, kept on foot at that time by the states

of the Circle of Suabia, was secretly taken into his pay. The venal were gained by presents; the objections of the more scrupulous were answered or eluded; some feeble Princes were threatened and overawed<sup>62</sup>.

On the other hand, Francis supported his claim with equal eagerness, and no less confidence of its being well founded. His emissaries contended that it was now high time to convince the Princes of the house of Austria that the Imperial crown was elective, and not hereditary; that other persons might aspire to an honour which their arrogance had accustomed them to regard as the property of their family; that it required a sovereign of mature judgment and of approved abilities to hold the reins of government, in a country where such unknown opinions concerning religion had been published, as had thrown the minds of men into an uncommon agitation, which threatened the most violent effects; that a young Prince without experience, and who had hitherto given no specimens of his genius for command, was no fit match for Selim, a monarch grown old in the art of war, and in the course of victory; whereas a King, who in his early youth had triumphed over the valour and discipline of the Swiss, till then reckoned invincible, would be an antagonist not unworthy the Conqueror of the East; that the fire and impetuosity of the French cavalry, added to the discipline and stability of the German infantry, would form an army so irresistible, that, instead of waiting the approach of the Ottoman forces, it might carry hostilities into the heart of their dominions; that the election of Charles

<sup>62</sup> Guic. lib. xiii. 159. Sleidan, *Hist. of the Reformat.* 14. Struvii Corp. *Hist. German.* ii. 971. Not. 20.

would be inconsistent with a fundamental constitution, by which the person who holds the crown of Naples is excluded from aspiring to the Imperial dignity; that his elevation to that honour would soon kindle a war in Italy, on account of his pretensions to the duchy of Milan, the effects of which could not fail of reaching the Empire, and might prove fatal to it<sup>61</sup>. But while the French ambassadors enlarged upon these and other topics of the same kind, in all the courts of Germany, Francis, sensible of the prejudices entertained against him as a foreigner unacquainted with the German language or manners, endeavoured to overcome these, and to gain the favour of the Princes, by immense gifts and by infinite promises. As the expeditious method of transmitting money, and the decent mode of conveying a bribe, by bills of exchange, were then little known, the French ambassadors travelled with a train of horses loaded with treasure, an equipage not very honourable for that Prince by whom they were employed, and infamous for those to whom they were sent<sup>62</sup>.

The other European Princes could not remain indifferent spectators of a contest, the decision of which so nearly affected every one of them. Their common interest ought naturally to have formed a general combination, in order to disappoint both competitors, and to prevent either of them from obtaining such a preeminence in power and dignity as might prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe. But the ideas with respect to a proper distribution and balance of power were so lately introduced into

<sup>61</sup> Guicci. lib. xiii. 160. Sleid. p. 16. Geor. Sabini de Elect. Car. V. Historia quod Scardus Script. Rer. German. vol. ii. p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> Mémoires de March. de Fleuranges, p. 296.

the system of European policy, that they were not hitherto objects of sufficient attention. The passions of some Princes, the want of foresight in others, and the fear of giving offence to the candidates, hindered such a salutary union of the powers of Europe, and rendered them either totally negligent of the public safety, or kept them from exerting themselves with vigour in its behalf.

The Swiss Cantons, though they dreaded the elevation of either of the contending monarchs, and though they wished to have seen some Prince whose dominions were less extensive, and whose power was more moderate, seated on the Imperial throne, were prompted, however, by their hatred of the French nation, to give an open preference to the pretensions of Charles, while they used their utmost influence to frustrate those of Francis<sup>65</sup>.

The Venetians easily discerned that it was the interest of their republic to have both the rivals set aside; but their jealousy of the house of Austria, whose ambition and neighbourhood had been fatal to their grandeur, would not permit them to act up to their own ideas, and led them hastily to give the sanction of their approbation to the claim of the French King.

It was equally the interest, and more in the power of Henry VIII. of England, to prevent either Francis or Charles from acquiring a dignity which would raise them so far above other monarchs. But though Henry often boasted that he held the balance of Europe in his hand, he had neither the steady attention, the accurate discernment, nor the dispassionate temper which that delicate function required. On this occasion it mortified his vanity

<sup>65</sup> Sabinus, p. 6.

so much to think that he had not entered early into that noble competition which reflected such honour upon the two antagonists, that he took a resolution of sending an ambassador into Germany, and of declaring himself a candidate for the Imperial throne. The ambassador, though loaded with caresses by the German Princes and the Pope's Nuncio, informed his master that he could hope for no success in a claim which he had been so late in preferring. Henry, imputing his disappointment to that circumstance alone, and soothed with this ostentatious display of his own importance, seems to have taken no further part in the matter, either by contributing to thwart both his rivals, or to promote one of them<sup>66</sup>.

Leo X. a Pontiff no less renowned for his political abilities than for his love of the arts, was the only Prince of the age who observed the motions of the two contending monarchs, with a prudent attention, or who discovered a proper solicitude for the public safety. The Imperial and Papal jurisdiction interfered in so many instances, the complaints of usurpation were so numerous on both sides, and the territories of the church owed their security so little to their own force, and so much to the weakness of the powers around them, that nothing was so formidable to the court of Rome as an Emperor with extensive dominions, or of enterprising genius. Leo trembled at the prospect of beholding the Imperial crown placed on the head of the King of Spain and of Naples, and the master of the new world; nor was he less afraid of seeing a King of France, who was Duke of Milan and Lord of Genoa, exalted to that dignity. He foretold that the election of

<sup>66</sup> *Mémoires de Fleuranges*, 311. Herbert, *Hist. of Henry VIII.*

either of them would be fatal to the independence of the Holy See, to the peace of Italy, and perhaps to the liberties of Europe. But to oppose them with any prospect of success required address and caution in proportion to the greatness of their power, and their opportunities of taking revenge. Leo was defective in neither. He secretly exhorted the German Princes to place one of their own number on the Imperial throne, which many of them were capable of filling with honour. He put them in mind of the constitution by which the Kings of Naples were for ever excluded from that dignity<sup>67</sup>. He warmly exhorted the French King to persist in his claim; not from any desire that he should gain his end; but, as he foresaw that the Germans would be more disposed to favour the King of Spain, he hoped that Francis himself, when he discovered his own chance of success to be desperate, would be stimulated by resentment and the spirit of rivalry, to concur with all his interest in raising some third person to the head of the Empire: or, on the other hand, if Francis should make an unexpected progress, he did not doubt but that Charles would be induced by similar motives to act the same part: and thus, by a prudent attention, the mutual jealousy of the two rivals might be so dexterously managed as to disappoint both. But this scheme, the only one which a Prince in Leo's situation could adopt, though concerted with great wisdom, was executed with little discretion. The French ambassadors in Germany fed their master with vain hopes; the Pope's nuncio, being gained by them, altogether forgot the instructions which he had received; and Francis persevered so long and with such obstinacy

<sup>67</sup> Goldasti *Constitutiones Imperiales*. Francof. 1673, vol. i. 439.

in urging his own pretensions, as rendered all Leo's measures abortive<sup>61</sup>.

Such were the hopes of the candidates, and the views of the different Princes, when the Diet was opened according to form at Frankfort [June 17]. The right of choosing an Emperor had long been vested in seven great Princes, distinguished by the name of Electors, the origin of whose office as well as the nature and extent of their powers have already been explained. These were, at that time, Albert of Brandenburg, Archbishop of Mentz; Herman Count de Wied, Archbishop of Cologne; Richard de Griefenklau, Archbishop of Triers; Lewis, King of Bohemia; Lewis, Count Palatine of the Rhine; Frederic, Duke of Saxony; and Joachim I. Marquis of Brandenburg. Notwithstanding the artful arguments produced by the ambassadors of the two Kings in favour of their respective masters, and in spite of all their solicitations, intrigues, and presents, the Electors did not forget that maxim on which the liberty of the German constitution was thought to be founded. Among the members of the Germanic body, which is a great republic composed of states almost independent, the first principle of patriotism is to depress and limit the power of the Emperor; and of this idea, so natural under such a form of government, a German politician seldom loses sight. No Prince of considerable power or extensive dominions had for some ages been raised to the Imperial throne. To this prudent precaution many of the great families in Germany owed the splendour and independence which they had acquired during that period. To elect either of the contending monarchs would have been a gross violation of that salutary maxim; would have given to the Em-

<sup>61</sup> Guicciar. lib. xiii. 161.

pire a master instead of a head; and would have reduced themselves from the rank of being almost his equals to the condition of his subjects.

Full of these ideas, all the Electors turned their eyes towards Frederic, Duke of Saxony, a Prince of such eminent virtue and abilities as to be distinguished by the name of the *Sage*, and with one voice they offered him the Imperial crown. He was not dazzled with that object, which monarchs, so far superior to him in power, courted with such eagerness; and after deliberating upon the matter a short time, he rejected it with a magnanimity and disinterestedness no less singular than admirable. "Nothing," he observed, "could be more impolitic than an obstinate adherence to a maxim which, though sound and just in many cases, was not applicable to all. In times of tranquillity, said he, we wish for an Emperor who has not power to invade our liberties; times of danger demand one who is able to secure our safety. The Turkish armies, led by a gallant and victorious monarch, are now assembling. They are ready to pour in upon Germany with a violence unknown in former ages. New conjectures call for new expedients. The Imperial sceptre must be committed to some hand more powerful than mine, or that of any other German Prince. We possess neither dominions, nor revenues, nor authority which enables us to encounter such a formidable enemy. Recourse must be had in this exigency to one of the rival monarchs. Each of them can bring into the field forces sufficient for our defence. But as the King of Spain is of German extraction; as he is a member and Prince of the Empire by the territories which descend to him from his grandfather; as his dominions stretch along

that frontier which lies most exposed to the enemy; his claim is preferable, in my opinion, to that of a stranger to our language, to our blood, and to our country; and therefore I give my vote to confer on him the Imperial crown."

This opinion, dictated by such uncommon generosity, and supported by arguments so plausible, made a deep impression on the Electors. The King of Spain's ambassadors, sensible of the important service which Frederic had done their master, sent him a considerable sum of money, as the first token of that Prince's gratitude. But he who had greatness of mind to refuse a crown disdained to receive a bribe; and, upon their entreating that at least he would permit them to distribute part of that sum among his attendants, he replied, That he could not prevent them from accepting what should be offered, but whoever took a single florin should be dismissed next morning from his service<sup>69</sup>.

No Prince in Germany could now aspire to a dignity which Frederic had declined, for reasons applicable to them all. It remained to make a choice

<sup>69</sup> P. Daniel, an historian of considerable name, seems to call in question the truth of this account of Frederic's behaviour in refusing the Imperial crown, because it is not mentioned by Georgius Sabinus in his History of the Election and Coronation of Charles V. tom. iii. p. 63. But no great stress ought to be laid on an omission in a superficial author, whose treatise, though dignified with the name of History, contains only such an account of the ceremonial of Charles's election as is usually published in Germany on like occasions. Scard. Rer. Germ. Script. vol. ii. p. 1. The testimony of Erasmus, lib. xiii. epist. 4, and that of Sleidan, p. 18, are express. Seckendorf, in his *Commentarius Historicus et Apologeticus de Lutheranism*, p. 121, has examined this fact with his usual industry, and has established its truth by the most undoubted evidence. To these testimonies which he has collected, I may add the decisive one of Cardinal Cajetan, the Pope's legate at Frankfort, in his letter, July 5th. 1519. *Epistres des Princes, &c. recueilles par Ruscelli. traduits par Belforest.* Par. 1572, p. 60.

between the two great competitors. But besides the prejudice in Charles's favour, arising from his birth as well as the situation of his German dominions, he owed not a little to the abilities of the Cardinal de Gurk, and the zeal of Erard de la Mark, Bishop of Liege, two of his ambassadors, who had conducted their negotiations with more prudence and address than those intrusted by the French King. The former, who had long been the minister and favourite of Maximilian, was well acquainted with the art of managing the Germans; and the latter, having been disappointed of a Cardinal's hat by Francis, employed all the malicious ingenuity with which the desire of revenge inspires an ambitious mind, in thwarting the measures of that monarch. The Spanish party among the Electors daily gained ground; and even the Pope's nuncio, being convinced that it was vain to make any further opposition, endeavoured to acquire some merit with the future Emperor, by offering voluntarily, in the name of his master, a dispensation to hold the Imperial crown in conjunction with that of Naples<sup>70</sup>.

On the 28th of June, five months and ten days after the death of Maximilian, this important contest, which had held all Europe in suspense, was decided. Six of the Electors had already declared for the King of Spain; and the Archbishop of Triers, the only firm adherent to the French interest, having at last joined his brethren, Charles was, by the unanimous voice of the Electoral College, raised to the Imperial throne<sup>71</sup>.

But though the Electors consented, from various

<sup>70</sup> Freheri Rer. German. Scriptores, vol. iii. 172, *cur.* Struvii. Argent. 1717. Giannone Hist. of Naples, ii. 498.

<sup>71</sup> Jac. Aug. Thoan. Hist. sui Temporis, edit. Bulkley, lib. i. c. 9.

motives, to promote Charles to that high station, they discovered at the same time great jealousy of his extraordinary power, and endeavoured, with the utmost solicitude, to provide against his encroaching on the privileges of the Germanic body. It had long been the custom to demand of every new Emperor a confirmation of these privileges, and to require a promise that he would never violate them in any instance. While Princes, who were formidable neither from extent of territory nor of genius, possessed the Imperial throne, a general and verbal engagement to this purpose was deemed sufficient security. But under an Emperor so powerful as Charles, other precautions seemed necessary. A *Capitulation* or claim of right was formed, in which the privileges and immunities of the Electors, of the Princes of the Empire, of the cities, and of every other member of the Germanic body are enumerated. This capitulation was immediately signed by Charles's ambassadors in the name of their master, and he himself, at his coronation, confirmed it in the most solemn manner. Since that period the Electors have continued to prescribe the same conditions to all his successors; and the capitulation, or mutual contract between the Emperor and his subjects, is considered in Germany as a strong barrier against the progress of the Imperial power, and as the great charter of their liberties, to which they often appeal<sup>72</sup>.

The important intelligence of his election was conveyed in nine days from Frankfort to Barcelona, where Charles was still detained by the obstinacy of the Catalonian Cortes, which had not hitherto

<sup>72</sup> Plessel Abrégé de l'Hist. de Droit Publique d'Allemagne, 560. Lämnei Capitulat. Imper. Epistres des Princes par Ruscelli, p. 60.

brought to an issue any of the affairs which came before it. He received the account with the joy natural to a young and aspiring mind, on an accession of power and dignity which raised him so far above the other Princes of Europe. Then it was that those vast prospects, which allured him during his whole administration, began to open; and from this era we may date the formation, and are able to trace the gradual progress of a grand system of enterprising ambition, which renders the history of his reign so worthy of attention.

A trivial circumstance first discovered the effects of this great elevation upon the mind of Charles. In all the public writs which he now issued as King of Spain, he assumed the title of *Majesty*, and required it from his subjects as a mark of their respect. Before that time all the monarchs of Europe were satisfied with the appellation of *Highness* or *Grace*; but the vanity of other courts soon led them to imitate the example of the Spanish. The epithet of *Majesty* is no longer a mark of preeminence. The most inconsiderable monarchs in Europe enjoy it, and the arrogance of the greater potentates has invented no higher denomination<sup>73</sup>.

The Spaniards were far from viewing the promotion of their King to the Imperial throne with the same satisfaction which he himself felt. To be deprived of the presence of their sovereign, and to be subjected to the government of a viceroy and his council, a species of administration often oppressive and always disagreeable, were the immediate and necessary consequences of this new dignity. To see the blood of their countrymen shed in quarrels,

<sup>73</sup> Miniane Contin. Mar. p. 13. Ferreras, viii. 475. Mémoires Hist. de la Houssaie, tom. i. p. 53, &c.

wherein the nation had no concern; to behold its treasures wasted in supporting the splendour of a foreign title; to be plunged in the chaos of Italian and German politics, were effects of this event almost as unavoidable. From all these considerations, they concluded, that nothing could have happened more pernicious to the Spanish nation; and the fortitude and public spirit of their ancestors, who, in the Cortes of Castile, prohibited Alphonso the Wise from leaving the kingdom in order to receive the Imperial crown, were often mentioned with the highest praise, and pronounced to be extremely worthy of imitation at this juncture<sup>74</sup>.

But Charles, without regarding the sentiments or murmurs of his Spanish subjects, accepted of the Imperial dignity which the Count Palatine, at the head of a solemn embassy, offered him in the name of the Electors [Nov.]; and declared his intention of setting out soon for Germany, in order to take possession of it. This was the more necessary, because, according to the forms of the German constitution, he could not, before the ceremony of a public coronation, exercise any act of jurisdiction or authority<sup>75</sup>.

Their certain knowledge of this resolution augmented so much the disgust of the Spaniards, that a sullen and refractory spirit prevailed among persons of all ranks. The Pope having granted the King the tenths of all ecclesiastical benefices in Castile, to assist him in carrying on a war with greater vigour against the Turks, a convocation of the clergy unanimously refused to levy that sum, upon pretence that it ought never to be exacted but at those times when Christendom was actually invaded

<sup>74</sup> Sandoval, i. p. 32. Miniane Contin. p. 14.

<sup>75</sup> Sabinus, P. Barre, VIII. 1085.

by the Infidels ; and though Leo, in order to support his authority, laid the kingdom under an interdict, so little regard was paid to a censure which was universally deemed unjust, that Charles himself applied to have it taken off. Thus the Spanish clergy, besides their merit in opposing the usurpations of the Pope, and disregarding the influence of the crown, gained the exemption which they had claimed<sup>76</sup>.

The commotions which arose in the kingdom of Valencia, annexed to the crown of Aragon, were more formidable, and produced more dangerous and lasting effects. A seditious monk having by his sermons excited the citizens of Valencia, the capital city, to take arms, and to punish certain criminals in a tumultuary manner, the people, pleased with this exercise of power, and with such a discovery of their own importance, not only refused to lay down their arms, but formed themselves into troops and companies, that they might be regularly trained to martial exercises. To obtain some security against the oppression of the grandees was the motive of this association, and proved a powerful bond of union ; for as the aristocratical privileges and independence were more complete in Valencia than in any other of the Spanish kingdoms, the nobles, being scarcely accountable for their conduct to any superior, treated the people not only as vassals but as slaves. They were alarmed, however, at the progress of this unexpected insurrection, as it might encourage the people to attempt shaking off the yoke altogether ; but as they could not repress them without taking arms, it became necessary to have recourse to the Emperor, and to desire his permission to attack them. [1520.] At the same time the people made

<sup>76</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 162. Ferreras, viii. 473.

choice of deputies to represent their grievances, and to implore the protection of their sovereign. Happily for the latter, they arrived at court when Charles was exasperated to a high degree against the nobility. As he was eager to visit Germany, where his presence became every day more necessary, and as his Flemish courtiers were still more impatient to return into their native country, that they might carry thither the spoils which they had amassed in Castile, it was impossible for him to hold the Cortes of Valencia in person. He had for that reason empowered the Cardinal Adrian to represent him in that assembly, and in his name to receive their oath of allegiance, to confirm their privileges with the usual solemnities, and to demand of them a free gift. But the Valencian nobles, who considered this measure as an indignity to their country, which was no less entitled than his other kingdoms to the honour of their sovereign's presence, declared, that by the fundamental laws of the constitution they could neither acknowledge as King a person who was absent, nor grant him any subsidy: and to this declaration they adhered with a haughty and inflexible obstinacy. Charles, piqued by their behaviour, decided in favour of the people, and rashly authorised them to continue in arms. Their deputies returned in triumph, and were received by their fellow citizens as the deliverers of their country. The insolence of the multitude increasing with their success, they expelled all the nobles out of the city, committed the government to magistrates of their own election, and entered into an association distinguished by the name of *Germanada* or *Brotherhood*, which proved the source not only of the wildest disorders, but of the most fatal calamities in that kingdom<sup>77</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 651. Ferreras, viii. 176, 485.

Meanwhile the kingdom of Castile was agitated with no less violence. No sooner was the Emperor's intention to leave Spain made known, than several cities of the first rank resolved to remonstrate against it, and to crave redress once more of those grievances which they had formerly laid before him. Charles artfully avoided admitting their deputies to audience; and as he saw from this circumstance how difficult it would be at this juncture to restrain the mutinous spirit of the greater cities, he summoned the Cortes of Castile to meet at Compostella, a town in Galicia. His only reason for calling that assembly was the hope of obtaining another donative; for, as his treasury had been exhausted in the same proportion that the riches of his ministers increased, he could not, without some additional aid appear in Germany with splendour suited to the Imperial dignity. To appoint a meeting of the Cortes in so remote a province, and to demand a new subsidy before the time of paying the former was expired, were innovations of a most dangerous tendency; and among a people not only jealous of their liberties, but accustomed to supply the wants of their sovereigns with a very frugal hand, excited a universal alarm. The magistrates of Toledo remonstrated against both these measures in a very high tone; the inhabitants of Valladolid, who expected that the Cortes should have been held in that city, were so enraged that they took arms in a tumultuary manner; and if Charles, with his foreign counsellors, had not fortunately made their escape during a violent tempest they would have massacred all the Flemings, and have prevented him from continuing his journey towards Compostella.

Every city through which he passed petitioned against holding a Cortes in Galicia, a point with re-

gard to which Charles was inflexible. But though the utmost influence had been exerted by the ministers, in order to procure a choice of representatives favourable to their designs, such was the temper of the nation that, at the opening of the assembly [April 1], there appeared among many of the members unusual symptoms of ill humour, which threatened a fierce opposition to all the measures of the Court. No representatives were sent by Toledo; for the lot, according to which, by ancient custom, the election was determined in that city, having fallen upon two persons devoted to the Flemish ministers, their fellow citizens refused to grant them a commission in the usual form, and in their stead made choice of two deputies, whom they empowered to repair to Compostella, and to protest against the lawfulness of the Cortes assembled there. The representatives of Salamanca refused to take the usual oath of fidelity, unless Charles consented to change the place of meeting. Those of Toro, Madrid, Cordova, and several other places, declared the demand of another donative to be unprecedented, unconstitutional, and unnecessary.<sup>75</sup> All the arts, however, which influence popular assemblies, bribes, promises, threats, and even force, were employed, in order to gain members. The nobles, soothed by the respectful assiduity with which Chievres and the other Flemings paid court to them, or instigated by a mean jealousy of that spirit of independence which they saw rising among the commons, openly favoured the pretensions of the Court, or at the utmost did not oppose them; and at last, in contempt not only of the sentiments of the nation, but of the ancient forms of the constitution, a majority voted to grant the donative for which the Emperor had applied<sup>76</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 663. Sandoval, p. 32, &c

Together with this grant, the Cortes laid before Charles a representation of those grievances whereof his people complained, and in their name craved redress; but he, having obtained from them all that he could expect, paid no attention to this ill timed petition, which it was no longer dangerous to disregard<sup>79</sup>.

As nothing now retarded his embarkation, he disclosed his intention with regard to the regency of Castile during his absence, which he had hitherto kept secret, and nominated Cardinal Adrian to that office. The viceroyalty of Aragon he conferred on Don John de Lanuza; that of Valencia on Don Diego de Mendoza Condé de Melito. The choice of the two latter was universally acceptable; but the advancement of Adrian, though the only Fleming who had preserved any reputation among the Spaniards, animated the Castilians with new hatred against foreigners; and even the nobles, who had so tamely suffered other inroads upon the constitution, felt the indignity offered to their own order by his promotion, and remonstrated against it as illegal. But Charles's desire of visiting Germany, as well as the impatience of his ministers to leave Spain, were now so much increased that, without attending to the murmurs of the Castilians, or even taking time to provide any remedy against an insurrection in Toledo, which at that time threatened, and afterwards produced most formidable effects, he sailed from Corunna on the 22d of May; and by setting out so abruptly in quest of a new crown, he endangered a more important one of which he was already in possession<sup>80</sup>.

<sup>79</sup> Sandoral, 84.    <sup>80</sup> P. Martyr, Ep. 670    Sandov. 86.

## BOOK II.

1520.

MANY concurring circumstances not only called Charles's thoughts towards the affairs of Germany, but rendered his presence in that country necessary. The Electors grew impatient of so long an interregnum; his hereditary dominions were disturbed by intestine commotions; and the new opinions concerning religion made such rapid progress as required the most serious consideration. But, above all, the motions of the French King drew his attention, and convinced him that it was necessary to take measures for his own defence with no less speed than vigour.

When Charles and Francis entered the lists as candidates for the Imperial dignity, they conducted their rivalry with many professions of regard for each other, and with repeated declarations that they would not suffer any tincture of enmity to mingle itself with this honourable emulation, "We both court the same mistress," said Francis, with his usual vivacity; "each ought to urge his suit with all the address of which he is master; the most fortunate will prevail, and the other must rest contented<sup>1</sup>." But though two young and high spirited Princes, and each of them animated with the hope of success, might be capable of forming such a generous resolution, it was soon found that they promised upon a moderation too refined and disinterested for human nature. The preference given

<sup>1</sup> Gaic. lib. xiii. p. 159.

to Charles in the sight of all Europe mortified Francis extremely, and inspired him with all the passions natural to disappointed ambition. To this was owing the personal jealousy and rivalry which subsisted between the two monarchs during their whole reign; and the rancour of these, augmented by a real opposition of interest, which gave rise to many unavoidable causes of discord, involved them in almost perpetual hostilities. Charles had paid no regard to the principal article in the treaty of Noyon, by refusing oftener than once to do justice to John d'Albert, the excluded monarch of Navarre, whom Francis was bound in honour and prompted by interest to restore to his throne. The French King had pretensions to the crown of Naples, of which Ferdinand had deprived his predecessor by a most unjustifiable breach of faith. The Emperor might reclaim the duchy of Milan as a fief of the Empire, which Francis had seized, and still kept in possession, without having received investiture of it from the Emperor. Charles considered the duchy of Burgundy as the patrimonial domain of his ancestors, wrested from them by the unjust policy of Louis XI. and observed with the greatest jealousy the strict connexions which Francis had formed with the Duke of Gueldres, the hereditary enemy of his family.

When the sources of discord were so many and various, peace could be of no long continuance, even between Princes the most exempt from ambition or emulation. But as the shock between two such mighty antagonists could not fail of being extremely violent, they both discovered no small solicitude about its consequences, and took time not only to collect and to ponder their own strength,

and to compare it with that of their adversary, but to secure the friendship or assistance of the other European powers.

The Pope had equal reason to dread the two rivals, and saw that he who prevailed would become absolute master in Italy. If it had been in his power to engage them in hostilities, without rendering Lombardy the theatre of war, nothing would have been more agreeable to him than to see them waste each other's strength in endless quarrels. But this was impossible. Leo foresaw, that on the first rupture between the two monarchs, the armies of France and Spain would take the field in the Milanese; and while the scene of their operations was so near, and the subject for which they contended so interesting to him, he could not long remain neuter. He was obliged, therefore, to adapt his plan of conduct to his political situation. He courted and soothed the Emperor and King of France with equal industry and address. Though warmly solicited by each of them to espouse his cause, he assumed all the appearances of entire impartiality, and attempted to conceal his real sentiments under that profound dissimulation which seems to have been affected by most of the Italian politicians in that age.

The views and interest of the Venetians were not different from those of the Pope; nor were they less solicitous to prevent Italy from becoming the seat of war, and their own republic from being involved in the quarrel. But through all Leo's artifices, and notwithstanding his high pretensions to a perfect neutrality, it was visible that he leaned towards the Emperor, from whom he had both more to fear and more to hope than from Francis; and it was equally

manifest, that if it became necessary to take a side, the Venetians would, from motives of the same nature, declare for the King of France. No considerable assistance, however, was to be expected from the Italian states, who were jealous to an extreme degree of the Transalpine powers, and careful to preserve the balance even between them, unless when they were seduced to violate this favourite maxim of their policy, by the certain prospect of some great advantage to themselves.

But the chief attention both of Charles and of Francis was employed in order to gain the King of England, from whom each of them expected assistance more effectual, and afforded with less political caution. Henry VIII. had ascended the throne of that Kingdom in the year 1509, with such circumstances of advantage as promised a reign of distinguished felicity and splendour. The union in his person of the two contending titles of York and Lancaster, the alacrity and emulation with which both factions obeyed his commands, not only enabled him to exert a degree of vigour and authority in his domestic government which none of his predecessors could have safely assumed ; but permitted him to take a share in the affairs of the continent from which the attention of the English had long been diverted by their unhappy intestine divisions. The great sums of money which his father had amassed rendered him the most wealthy Prince in Europe. The peace, which had subsisted under the cautious administration of that monarch, had been of sufficient length to recruit the population of the kingdom after the desolation of the civil wars, but not so long as to enervate its spirit ; and the English, ashamed of having rendered their own country

so long a scene of discord and bloodshed, were eager to display their valour in some foreign war, and to revive the memory of the victories gained on the continent by their ancestors. Henry's own temper perfectly suited the state of his kingdom, and the disposition of his subjects. Ambitious, active, enterprising, and accomplished in all the martial exercises which in that age formed a chief part in the education of persons of noble birth, and inspired them with an early love of war, he longed to engage in action, and to signalize the beginning of his reign by some remarkable exploit. An opportunity soon presented itself; and the victory at Guinegate [1513], together with the successful sieges of Terouenne and Tournay, though of little utility to England; reflected great lustre on its monarch, and confirmed the idea which foreign Princes entertained of his power and consequence. So many concurring causes, added to the happy situation of his own dominions, which secured them from foreign invasion; and to the fortunate circumstance of his being in possession of Calais, which served not only as a key to France, but opened an easy passage into the Netherlands, rendered the King of England the natural guardian of the liberties of Europe, and the arbiter between the Emperor and French monarch. Henry himself was sensible of this singular advantage, and convinced, that, in order to preserve the balance even, it was his office to prevent either of the rivals from acquiring such superiority of power as might be fatal to the other, or formidable to the rest of Christendom. But he was destitute of the penetration, and still more of the temper, which such a delicate function required. Influenced by caprice, by vanity, by resentment, by affection, he was inca-

pable of forming any regular and extensive system of policy, or of adhering to it with steadiness. His measures seldom resulted from attention to the general welfare, or from a deliberate regard to his own interest, but were dictated by passions which rendered him blind to both, and prevented his gaining that ascendant in the affairs of Europe, or from reaping such advantages to himself, as a Prince of greater art, though with inferior talents, might have easily secured.

All the impolitic steps in Henry's administration must not, however, be imputed to defects in his own character; many of them were owing to the violent passions and insatiable ambition of his prime minister and favourite, Cardinal Wolsey. This man, from one of the lowest ranks in life, had risen to a height of power and dignity to which no English subject ever arrived; and governed the haughty, presumptuous, and untractable spirit of Henry with absolute authority. Great talents, and of very different kinds, fitted him for the two opposite stations of minister and of favourite. His profound judgment, his unwearied industry, his thorough acquaintance with the state of the kingdom, his extensive knowledge of the views and interests of foreign courts, qualified him for that uncontrolled direction of affairs with which he was intrusted. The elegance of his manners, the gaiety of his conversation, his insinuating address, his love of magnificence, and his proficiency in those parts of literature of which Henry was fond, gained him the affection and confidence of the young monarch. Wolsey was far from employing this vast and almost royal power to promote either the true interest of the nation, or the real grandeur of his master. Rapacious at the

same time, and profuse, he was insatiable in desiring wealth. Of boundless ambition, he aspired after new honours with an eagerness unabated by his former success; and being rendered presumptuous by his uncommon elevation, as well as by the ascendant which he had gained over a Prince who scarcely brooked advice from any other person, he discovered in his whole demeanour the most overbearing haughtiness and pride. To these passions he himself sacrificed every consideration; and whoever endeavoured to obtain his favour, or that of his master, found it necessary to sooth and to gratify them.

As all the states of Europe sought Henry's friendship at that time, all courted his minister with incredible attention and obsequiousness, and strove by presents, by promises, or by flattery, to work upon his avarice, his ambition, or his pride<sup>2</sup>. Francis had, in the year 1518, employed Bonnivet, Admiral of France, one of his most accomplished and artful courtiers, to gain this haughty prelate. He himself bestowed on him every mark of respect and confidence. He consulted him with regard to his most important affairs, and received his responses with implicit deference. By these arts, together with the grant of a large pension, Francis attached the Cardinal to his interest, who persuaded his master to surrender Tournay to France, to conclude a treaty of marriage between his daughter the Princess Mary and the Dauphin, and to consent to a personal interview with the French King<sup>3</sup>. From that time the most familiar intercourse subsisted between the two courts; Francis, sensible of the great value of

<sup>2</sup> Fiddes' *Life of Wolsey*, 166. Rymer's *Fœdera*, xiii. 718.

<sup>3</sup> Herbert's *Hist. of Henry VIII.* 30. Rymer, xiii. 624.

Wolsey's friendship, laboured to secure the continuance of it by every possible expression of regard, bestowing on him, in all his letters, the honourable appellations of Father, Tutor, and Governor.

Charles observed the progress of this union with the utmost jealousy and concern. His near affinity to the King of England gave him some title to his friendship; and soon after his accession to the throne of Castile, he had attempted to ingratiate himself with Wolsey, by settling on him a pension of three thousand livres. His chief solicitude at present was to prevent the intended interview with Francis, the effects of which upon two young Princes, whose hearts were no less susceptible of friendship than their manners were capable of inspiring it, he extremely dreaded. But after many delays, occasioned by difficulties with respect to the ceremonial, and by the anxious precautions of both courts for the safety of their respective sovereigns, the time and place of meeting were at last fixed. Messengers had been sent to different courts, inviting all comers, who were gentlemen, to enter the lists at tilt and tournament, against the two monarchs and their knights. Both Francis and Henry loved the splendour of these spectacles too well, and were too much delighted with the graceful figure which they made on such occasions to forego the pleasure or glory which they expected from such a singular and brilliant assembly. Nor was the Cardinal less fond of displaying his own magnificence in the presence of two courts, and of discovering to the two nations the extent of his influence over both their monarchs. Charles, finding it impossible to prevent the interview, endeavoured to disappoint its effects, and to preoccupy the favour of the English monarch and his

minister by an act of complaisance still more flattering and more uncommon. Having sailed from Corunna, as has already been related, he steered his course directly towards England, and, relying wholly on Henry's generosity for his own safety, landed at Dover [May 26]. This unexpected visit surprised the nation. Wolsey, however, was well acquainted with the Emperor's intention. A negotiation, unknown to the historians of that age, had been carried on between him and the court of Spain; this visit had been concerted; and Charles granted the Cardinal, whom he calls his *most dear friend*, an additional pension of seven thousand ducats<sup>1</sup>. Henry, who was then at Canterbury, in his way to France, immediately dispatched Wolsey to Dover, in order to welcome the Emperor; and, being highly pleased with an event so soothing to his vanity, hastened to receive, with suitable respect, a guest who had placed in him such unbounded confidence. Charles, to whom time was precious, staid only four days in England; but, during that short space, he had the address not only to give Henry favourable impressions of his character and intentions, but to detach Wolsey entirely from the interest of the French King. All the grandeur, the wealth, and the power which the Cardinal possessed, did not satisfy his ambitious mind while there was one step higher to which an ecclesiastic could ascend. The papal dignity had for some time been the object of his wishes, and Francis, as the most effectual method of securing his friendship, had promised to favour his pretensions, on the first vacancy, with all his interest. But as the Emperor's influence in the college of Cardinals was greatly superior to that of

<sup>1</sup> Rymer, xiii. 711.

the French King, Wolsey grasped eagerly at the offer which that artful Prince had made him, of exerting it vigorously in his behalf; and allured by this prospect, which, under the pontificate of Leo, still in the prime of his life, was a very distant one, he entered with warmth into all the Emperor's schemes. No treaty, however, was concluded at that time between the two monarchs; but Henry, in return for the honour which Charles had done him, promised to visit him in some place of the Low Countries immediately after taking leave of the French King.

His interview with that Prince was in an open plain between Guisnes and Ardres [June 7], where the two Kings and their attendants displayed their magnificence with such emulation and profuse expense, as procured it the name of the *Field of the Cloth of Gold*. Feats of chivalry, parties of gallantry, together with such exercises and pastimes as were in that age reckoned manly or elegant, rather than serious business, occupied both courts during eighteen days that they continued together<sup>1</sup>. Whatever impression the engaging manners of Francis, or the liberal and unsuspicious confidence with which he treated Henry, made on the mind of that monarch, was soon effaced by Wolsey's artifices, or by an interview he had with the Emperor at

<sup>1</sup> The French and English historians describe the pomp of this interview, and the various spectacles, with great minuteness. One circumstance mentioned by the Mareschal de Fleuranges, who was present, and which must appear singular in the present age, is commonly omitted. "After the tournament," says he, "the French and English wrestlers made their appearance, and wrestled in presence of the Kings, and the ladies, and as there were many stout wrestlers there, it afforded excellent pastime; but as the King of France had neglected to bring any wrestlers out of Bretagne, the English gained the prize.---After this, the

Gravelines [July 10]; which was conducted with less pomp than that near Guisnes, but with greater attention to what might be of political utility.

This assiduity, with which the two greatest monarchs in Europe paid court to Henry, appeared to him a plain acknowledgment that he held the balance in his hands, and convinced him of the justness of the motto which he had chosen, "That whoever he favoured would prevail." In this opinion he was confirmed by an offer which Charles made, of submitting any difference that might arise between him and Francis to his sole arbitration. Nothing could have the appearance of greater candour and moderation than the choice of a judge who was reckoned the common friend of both. But as the Emperor had now attached Wolsey entirely to his interest, no proposal could be more insidious, nor, as appeared by the sequel, more fatal to the French King<sup>6</sup>.

Charles, notwithstanding his partial fondness for the Netherlands, the place of his nativity, made no long stay there; and, after receiving the homage and congratulations of his countrymen, hastened to Aix-la-Chapelle, the place appointed by the golden bull for the coronation of the Emperor. There, in presence of an assembly more numerous and splendid than had appeared on any former occasion, the crown of Charlemagne was placed on his head

Kings of France and England retired to a tent, where they drank together, and the King of England, seizing the King of France by the collar, said "*My brother, I must wrestle with you,*" and endeavoured once or twice to trip up his heels; but the King of France, who is a dexterous wrestler, twisted him round, and threw him on the earth with prodigious violence. The King of England wanted to renew the combat, but was prevented."—*Mémoires de Fleuranges*, 12mo. Paris, 1753, p. 329.

<sup>6</sup> Herbert, 37.

[Oct. 23], with all the pompous solemnity which the Germans affect in their public ceremonies, and which they deem essential to the dignity of their empire<sup>7</sup>.

Almost at the same time Solyman the Magnificent, one of the most accomplished, enterprising, and victorious of the Turkish sultans, a constant and formidable rival to the Emperor, ascended the Ottoman throne. It was the peculiar glory of that period to produce the most illustrious monarchs who have at any one time appeared in Europe. Leo, Charles, Francis, Henry, and Solyman, were each of them possessed of talents which might have rendered any age wherein they happened to flourish conspicuous. But such a constellation of great Princes shed uncommon lustre on the sixteenth century. In every contest, great power as well as great abilities were set in opposition; the efforts of valour and conduct on one side, counterbalanced by an equal exertion of the same qualities on the other, not only occasioned such a variety of events as renders the history of that period interesting, but served to check the exorbitant progress of any of those Princes, and to prevent their attaining such preeminence in power as would have been fatal to the liberty and happiness of mankind.

The first act of the Emperor's administration was to appoint a Diet of the Empire to be held at Worms on the 6th of January, 1521. In his circular letters to the different Princes, he informed them that he had called this assembly in order to concert with them the most proper measures for checking the progress of those new and dangerous opinions, which

<sup>7</sup> Hartmann. *Mauri Relatio Coronat. Car. V. ap. Goldast. Polit. Imperial. Franc. 1614, fol. p. 264.*

threatened to disturb the peace of Germany, and to overturn the religion of their ancestors.

Charles had in view the opinions which had been propagated by Luther and his disciples since the year 1517. As these led to that happy reformation in religion which rescued one part of Europe from the papal yoke, mitigated its rigour in the other, and produced a revolution in the sentiments of mankind, the greatest, as well as the most beneficial, that has happened since the publication of Christianity, not only the events which at first gave birth to such opinions, but the causes which rendered their progress so rapid and successful, deserve to be considered with minute attention.

To overturn a system of religious belief, founded on ancient and deep rooted prejudices, supported by power, and defended with no less art than industry; to establish in its room doctrines of the most contrary genius and tendency; and to accomplish all this, not by external violence or the force of arms, are operations which historians, the least prone to credulity and superstition, ascribe to that Divine Providence, which, with infinite ease, can bring about events which to human sagacity appear impossible. The interposition of Heaven in favour of the Christian religion, at its first publication, was manifested by miracles and prophecies wrought and uttered in confirmation of it. Though none of the Reformers possessed, or pretended to possess, these supernatural gifts; yet that wonderful preparation of circumstances, which disposed the minds of men for receiving their doctrines; that singular combination of causes, which secured their success, and enabled men destitute of power and of policy to triumph over those who employed against them extraordi-

nary efforts of both, may be considered as no slight proof, that the same hand which planted the Christian religion protected the reformed faith, and reared it from beginnings extremely feeble, to an amazing degree of vigour and maturity.

It was from causes seemingly fortuitous, and from a source very inconsiderable, that all the mighty effects of the Reformation flowed. Leo X. when raised to the papal throne, found the revenues of the church exhausted by the vast projects of his two ambitious predecessors, Alexander VI. and Julius II. His own temper, naturally liberal and enterprising, rendered him incapable of that severe and patient economy which the situation of his finances required. On the contrary, his schemes for aggrandizing the family of Medici, his love of splendour, his taste for pleasure, and his magnificence in rewarding men of genius, involved him daily in new expenses; in order to provide a fund for which, he tried every device that the fertile invention of priests had fallen upon, to drain the credulous multitude of their wealth. Among others, he had recourse to a sale of *Indulgences*. According to the doctrine of the Romish church, all the good works of the saints, over and above those which were necessary towards their own justification, are deposited, together with the infinite merits of Jesus Christ, in one inexhaustible treasury. The keys of this were committed to St. Peter, and to his successors the Popes, who may open it at pleasure, and, by transferring a portion of this superabundant merit to any particular person for a sum of money, may convey to him either the pardon of his own sins, or a release for any one in whose happiness he is interested from the pains of purgatory. Such indulgences were

first invented in the eleventh century by Urban II. as a recompense for those who went in person upon the meritorious enterprise of conquering the Holy Land. They were afterwards granted to those who hired a soldier for that purpose; and in process of time were bestowed on such as gave money for accomplishing any pious work enjoined by the Pope<sup>8</sup>. Julius II. had bestowed indulgences on all who contributed towards building the church of St. Peter at Rome; and as Leo was carrying on that magnificent and expensive fabric, his grant was founded on the same pretence<sup>9</sup>.

The right of promulgating these indulgences in Germany, together with a share in the profits arising from the sale of them, was granted to Albert, Elector of Mentz and Archbishop of Magdeburg, who, as his chief agent for retailing them in Saxony, employed Tetzl, a Dominican friar of licentious morals, but of an active spirit, and remarkable for his noisy and popular eloquence. He, assisted by the monks of his order, executed the commission with great zeal and success, but with little discretion or decency; and though, by magnifying excessively the benefit of their indulgences<sup>10</sup>, and by disposing

<sup>8</sup> History of the Council of Trent, by F. Paul, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Palavic. Hist. Conc. Trident. p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> As the form of these Indulgences, and the benefits which they were supposed to convey, are unknown in Protestant countries, and little understood, at present, in several places where the Roman Catholic religion is established, I have, for the information of my readers, translated the form of absolution used by Tetzl: "May our Lord Jesus Christ have mercy upon thee, and absolve thee by the merits of his most holy passion. And I by his authority, that of his blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and of the most holy Pope, granted and committed to me in these parts, do absolve thee, first from all ecclesiastical censures in whatever manner they have been incurred, and then from all thy

of them at a very low price, they carried on for some time an extensive and lucrative traffic among the credulous and the ignorant; the extravagance of their assertions, as well as the irregularities in their conduct, came at last to give general offence. The

sins, transgressions and excesses, how enormous soever they may be, even from such as are reserved for the cognizance of the Holy See; and as far as the keys of the holy church extend, I remit to you all punishment which you deserve in purgatory on their account; and I restore you to the holy sacraments of the church, to the unity of the faithful, and to that innocence and purity which you possessed at baptism; so that, when you die, the gates of punishment shall be shut, and the gates of the paradise of delight shall be opened; and if you shall not die at present, this grace shall remain in full force when you are at the point of death. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Sekend. Comment. lib. i. p. 14.

The terms in which Tetzel and his associates described the benefits of indulgences, and the necessity of purchasing them, are so extravagant that they appear to be almost incredible. If any man (said they) purchase letters of indulgence, his soul may rest secure with respect to its salvation. The souls confined in purgatory, for whose redemption indulgences are purchased, as soon as the money tinkles in the chest, instantly escape from that place of torment, and ascend into heaven. That the efficacy of indulgences was so great that the most heinous sins, even if one should violate (which was impossible) the mother of God, would be remitted and expiated by them, and the person be freed both from punishment and guilt. That this was the unspeakable gift of God, in order to reconcile men to himself. That the cross erected by the preachers of indulgences was as efficacious as the cross of Christ itself. Lo! the heavens are open; if you enter not now, when will you enter? For twelve pence you may redeem the soul of your father out of purgatory; and are you so ungrateful, that you will not rescue your parent from torment? If you had but one coat, you ought to strip yourself instantly, and sell it, in order to purchase such benefits, &c. These, and many such extravagant expressions, are selected out of Luther's works by Chemnitz in his *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, apud Herm. Vonder Hardt. *Hist. Liter. Reform.* pars iv. p. 6. The same author has published several of Tetzel's discourses, which prove that these expressions were neither singular nor exaggerated. Ibid. p. 14.

Princes and nobles were irritated at seeing their vassals drained of so much wealth, in order to replenish the treasury of a profuse Pontiff. Men of piety regretted the delusion of the people, who, being taught to rely for the pardon of their sins on the indulgences which they purchased, did not think it incumbent on them either to study the doctrines taught by genuine Christianity, or to practise the duties which it enjoins. Even the most unthinking were shocked at the scandalous behaviour of Tetzels and his associates, who often squandered in drunkenness, gaming, and low debauchery, those sums which were piously bestowed in hopes of obtaining eternal happiness; and all began to wish that some check were given to this commerce, no less detrimental to society than destructive to religion.

Such was the favourable juncture, and so disposed were the minds of his countrymen to listen to his discourses, when Martin Luther first began to call in question the efficacy of indulgences, and to declaim against the vicious lives and false doctrines of the persons employed in promulgating them. Luther was a native of Eisleben in Saxony, and, though born of poor parents, had received a learned education, during the progress of which he gave many indications of uncommon vigour and acuteness of genius. His mind was naturally susceptible of serious sentiments, and tinged with somewhat of that religious melancholy which delights in the solitude and devotion of a monastic life. The death of a companion, killed by lightning at his side in a violent thunderstorm, made such an impression on his mind, as cooperated with his natural temper in inducing him to retire into a convent of Augustinian friars, where, without suffering the entreaties of his

parents to divert him from what he thought his duty to God, he assumed the habit of that order. He soon acquired great reputation, not only for piety, but for his love of knowledge, and his unwearied application to study. He had been taught the scholastic philosophy and theology, which were then in vogue by very able masters, and wanted not penetration to comprehend all the niceties and distinctions with which they abound; but his understanding, naturally sound and superior to every thing frivolous, soon became disgusted with those subtile and unstructive sciences, and sought for some more solid foundation of knowledge and of piety in the Holy Scriptures. Having found a copy of the Bible, which lay neglected in the library of his monastery, he abandoned all other pursuits, and devoted himself to the study of it with such eagerness and assiduity as astonished the monks, who were little accustomed to derive their theological notions from that source. The great progress which he made in this uncommon course of study, augmented so much the fame both of his sanctity and of his learning, that Frederic, Elector of Saxony, having founded a university at Wittemberg on the Elbe, the place of his residence, Luther was chosen first to teach philosophy, and afterwards theology, there; and discharged both offices in such a manner, that he was deemed the chief ornament of that society.

While Luther was at the height of his reputation and authority, Tetzel began to publish indulgences in the neighbourhood of Wittemberg, and to ascribe to them the same imaginary virtues which had, in other places, imposed on the credulity of the people. As Saxony was not more enlightened than the other provinces of Germany, Tetzel met with prodigious

success there. It was with the utmost concern that Luther beheld the artifices of those who sold, and the simplicity of those who bought indulgences. The opinions of Thomas Aquinas and the other schoolmen, on which the doctrine of indulgences was founded, had already lost much of their authority with him; and the Scriptures, which he began to consider as the great standard of theological truth, afforded no countenance to a practice equally subversive of faith and of morals. His warm and impetuous temper did not suffer him long to conceal such important discoveries, or to continue a silent spectator of the delusion of his countrymen. From the pulpit, in the great church of Wittemberg, he inveighed bitterly against the irregularities and vices of the monks who published indulgences; he ventured to examine the doctrines which they had taught, and pointed out to the people the danger of relying for salvation upon any other means than those appointed by God in his word. The boldness and novelty of these opinions drew great attention; and being recommended by the authority of Luther's personal character, and delivered with a popular and persuasive eloquence, they made a deep impression on his hearers. Encouraged by the favourable reception of his doctrines among the people, he wrote to Albert, Elector of Mentz and Archbishop of Magdeburg, to whose jurisdiction that part of Saxony was subject, and remonstrated warmly against the false opinions, as well as wicked lives, of the preachers of indulgences; but he found that prelate too deeply interested in their success to correct their abuses. His next attempt was to gain the suffrage of men of learning. For this purpose he published ninety-five theses containing his sentiments

with regard to indulgences. These he proposed not as points fully established, or of undoubted certainty, but as subjects of inquiry and disputation; he appointed a day on which the learned were invited to impugn them, either in person or by writing; to the whole he subjoined solemn protestations of his high respect for the apostolic see, and of his implicit submission to its authority. No opponent appeared at the time prefixed; the theses spread over Germany with astonishing rapidity; they were read with the greatest eagerness; and all admired the boldness of the man, who had ventured not only to call in question the plenitude of papal power, but to attack the Dominicans armed with all the terrors of inquisitorial authority<sup>11</sup>.

The friars of St. Augustine, Luther's own order, though addicted with no less obsequiousness than the other monastic fraternities to the papal see, gave no check to the publication of these uncommon opinions. Luther had, by his piety and learning, acquired extraordinary authority among his brethren; he professed the highest regard for the authority of the Pope; his professions were at that time sincere; and as a secret enmity, excited by interest or emulation, subsists among all the monastic orders in the Romish church, the Augustinians were highly pleased with his invectives against the Dominicans, and hoped to see them exposed to the hatred and scorn of the people. Nor was his sovereign, the Elector of Saxony, the wisest Prince at that time in Germany, dissatisfied with this obstruction which Luther threw in the way of the publication of indul-

<sup>11</sup> *Lutheri Opera*, Jenæ, 1612, vol. i. præfat. 3. p. 2. 66i. *Hist. of Council of Trent*, by F. Paul, p. 4. Seeckend. Com. Apol, p. 16.

gences. He secretly encouraged the attempt, and flattered himself that this dispute among the ecclesiastics themselves might give some check to the exactions of the court of Rome, which the secular princes had long, though without success, been endeavouring to oppose.

Many zealous champions immediately arose to defend opinions on which the wealth and power of the church were founded against Luther's attacks. In opposition to his theses, Tetzel published counter theses at Franckfort on the Oder; Eccius, a celebrated divine of Augsburg, endeavoured to refute Luther's notions; and Prierias, a Dominican friar, master of the sacred palace and Inquisitor General, wrote against him with all the virulence of a scholastic disputant. But the manner in which they conducted the controversy did little service to their cause. Luther attempted to combat indulgences by arguments founded in reason, or derived from Scripture; they produced nothing in support of them but the sentiments of schoolmen, the conclusions of the canon law, and the decrees of Popes<sup>12</sup>. The decision of judges so partial and interested did not satisfy the people, who began to call in question the authority even of these venerable guides, when they found them standing in direct opposition to the dictates of reason, and the determinations of the Divine law<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> F. Paul, p. 6. Seckend. p. 40. Palavic. p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> Seckend. p. 30.

Guicciardini has asserted two things with regard to the first promulgation of Indulgences: 1. That Leo bestowed a gift of the profits arising from the sale of indulgences in Saxony, and the adjacent provinces of Germany, upon his sister Magdalen, the wife of Franceschetto Cibo. Guic. lib. xiii. 168. 2. That Aroemboldo, a Genoese ecclesiastic, who had been bred a merchant, and still retained all the activity and address of that profession, was appointed by her to collect the money which should

Meanwhile, these novelties in Luther's doctrines, which interested all Germany, excited little attention and no alarm in the court of Rome. Leo, fond of elegant and refined pleasures, intent upon great schemes of policy, a stranger to theological controversies, and apt to despise them, regarded with the utmost indifference the operations of an obscure friar, who, in the heart of Germany, carried on a scholastic disputation in a barbarous style. Little did he apprehend, or Luther himself dream, that the effects of this quarrel would be so fatal to the papal see. Leo imputed the whole to monastic enmity and emulation, and seemed inclined not to interpose in the contest, but to allow the Augustinians and Dominicans to wrangle about the matter with their usual animosity.

be raised. F. Paul has followed him in both these particulars, and adds, that the Augustinians in Saxony had been immemorially employed in preaching indulgences; but that Arcemboldo and his deputies, hoping to gain more by committing this trust to the Dominicans, had made their bargain with Tetzel, and that Luther was prompted at first to oppose Tetzel and his associates, by a desire of taking revenge for this injury offered to his order. F. Paul, p. 5. Almost all historians since their time, Popish as well as Protestant, have, without examination, admitted these assertions to be true upon their authority. But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of two authors, so eminent both for exactness and veracity, we may observe,

1. That Felix Contolori, who searched the pontifical archives for the purpose, could not find this pretended grant to Leo's sister in any of those registers where it must necessarily have been recorded. Palav. p. 5.
2. That the profits arising from indulgences in Saxony and the adjacent countries, had been granted not to Magdalen, but to Albert Archbishop of Mentz, who had the right of nominating those who published them. Seck. p. 12. Luth. Oper. i. præf. p. i. Palav. p. 6.
3. That Arcemboldo never had concern in the publication of indulgences in Saxony; his district was Flanders and the Upper and Lower Rhine. Seck. p. 14. Palav. p. 6.
4. That Luther and his adherents never mentioned this grant of Leo's to his sister, though a

The solicitations, however, of Luther's adversaries, who were exasperated to a high degree by the boldness and severity with which he animadverted on their writings, together with the surprising progress which his opinions made in different parts of Germany, roused at last the attention of the Court of Rome, and obliged Leo to take measures for the security of the church against an attack that now appeared too serious to be despised. For this end, he summoned Luther to appear at Rome [July, 1518], within sixty days, before the auditor of the chamber, and the Inquisitor General Prierias, who had written against him, whom he empowered jointly to examine his doctrines, and to decide concerning them. He wrote, at the same time, to the Elector of Saxony, beseeching him not to protect a man whose

circumstance of which they could hardly have been ignorant, and which they would have been careful not to suppress. 5. The publication of indulgences in Germany was not usually committed to the Augustinians. The promulgation of them, at three different periods under Julius II. was granted to the Franciscans; the Dominicans had been employed in the same office a short time before the present period. Palav. p. 46. 6. The promulgation of those indulgences, which first excited Luther's indignation, was intrusted to the Archbishop of Mentz, in conjunction with the guardian of the Franciscans; but the latter having declined accepting of that trust, the sole right became vested in the Archbishop. Palav. 6. Seck. p. 16, 17. 7. Luther was not instigated by his superiors among the Augustinians to attack the Dominicans their rivals, or to depreciate indulgences because they were promulgated by them; his opposition to their opinions and vices proceeded from more laudable motives. Seck. p. 15, 32. Lutheri Opera, i. p. 64. 6. 8. A diploma of indulgences is published by Herm. Vonder Hardt, from which it appears, that the name of the guardian of the Franciscans is retained together with that of the Archbishop, although the former did not act. The limits of the country to which their commissions extended, viz. the diocese of Mentz, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and the territories of the Marquis of Brandenburg, are mentioned in that diploma. Hist. Literaria Reformat. pars iv. p. 14.

heretical and profane tenets were so shocking to pious ears; and enjoined the provincial of the Augustinians to check, by his authority, the rashness of an arrogant monk, which brought disgrace upon the order of St. Augustine, and gave offence and disturbance to the whole church.

From the strain of these letters, as well as from the nomination of a judge so prejudiced and partial as Prierias, Luther easily saw what sentence he might expect at Rome. He discovered, for that reason, the utmost solicitude to have his cause tried in Germany, and before a less suspected tribunal. The professors in the university of Wittemberg, anxious for the safety of a man who did so much honour to their society, wrote to the Pope; and, after employing several pretexts to excuse Luther from appearing at Rome, entreated Leo to commit the examination of his doctrines to some persons of learning and authority in Germany. The Elector requested the same thing of the Pope's legate at the diet of Augsburg; and as Luther himself, who, at that time, was so far from having any intention to disclaim the papal authority that he did not even entertain the smallest suspicion concerning its divine original, had written to Leo a most submissive letter, promising an unreserved compliance with his will; the Pope gratified them so far as to empower his legate in Germany, Cardinal Cajetan, a Dominican, eminent for scholastic learning, and passionately devoted to the Roman see, to hear and determine the cause.

Luther, though he had good reason to decline a judge chosen among his avowed adversaries, did not hesitate about appearing before Cajetan; and, having obtained the Emperor's safe conduct, immediately

repaired to Augsburg. The Cardinal received him with decent respect, and endeavoured at first to gain upon him by gentle treatment. The Cardinal, relying on the superiority of his own talents as a theologian, entered into a formal dispute with Luther concerning the doctrines contained in his theses<sup>14</sup>. But the weapons which they employed were so different, Cajetan appealing to papal decrees and the opinions of schoolmen, and Luther resting entirely on the authority of Scripture, that the contest was altogether fruitless. The Cardinal relinquished the character of a disputant, and, assuming that of a judge, enjoined Luther, by virtue of the apostolic powers with which he was clothed, to retract the errors which he had uttered with regard to indulgences, and the nature of faith; and to abstain, for the future, from the publication of new and dangerous opinions. Luther, fully persuaded of the truth of his own tenets, and confirmed in the belief of them by the approbation which they had met with among persons conspicuous both for learning and piety, was surprised at this abrupt mention of a recantation, before any endeavours were used to convince him that he was mistaken. He had flattered himself, that, in a conference concerning the points in dispute with a prelate of such distinguished abilities, he should be able to remove many of those imputations with which the ignorance or malice of his antagonists had loaded him; but the high tone of authority that the Cardinal assumed extinguished

<sup>14</sup> In the former editions I asserted, upon the authority of Father Paul, that Cajetan thought it beneath his dignity to enter into any dispute with Luther; but M. Beausobre, in his *Histoire de la Reformation*, vol. i. p. 121, &c. has satisfied me that I was mistaken. See also Seckend. lib. i. p. 46, &c.

at once all hopes of this kind, and cut off every prospect of advantage from the interview. His native intrepidity of mind, however, did not desert him. He declared with the utmost firmness, that he could not, with a safe conscience, renounce opinions which he believed to be true; nor should any consideration ever induce him to do what would be so base in itself, and so offensive to God. At the same time, he continued to express no less reverence than formerly for the authority of the apostolic see<sup>15</sup>; he signified his willingness to submit the whole controversy to certain universities which he named, and promised neither to write nor to preach concerning indulgences for the future, provided his adversaries were likewise enjoined to be silent with respect to them<sup>16</sup>. All these offers Cajetan disregarded or rejected, and still insisted peremptorily on a simple recantation, threatening him with ecclesiastical censures, and forbidding him to appear again in his presence, unless he resolved instantly to comply with what he had required. This haughty and violent manner of proceeding, as well as other circumstances, gave Luther's friends such strong reasons to suspect, that even the Imperial safe conduct would not be able to protect him from the legate's power and resentment, that they prevailed on him to withdraw secretly from Augsbourg, and to return to his own country. But before his departure, according to a form of which there had been some examples, he prepared [Oct. 18] a solemn appeal from the Pope ill informed at that time concerning his cause, to the Pope when he should receive more full information with respect to it<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Luth. Oper. vol. i. p. 164.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 160.

<sup>17</sup> Sleid. Hist. of Reform. p. 7. Seckend. p. 45. Luth. Oper. i. 163

Cajetan, enraged at Luther's abrupt retreat, and at the publication of his appeal, wrote to the Elector of Saxony, complaining of both; and requiring him, as he regarded the peace of the church, or the authority of its head, either to send that seditious monk a prisoner to Rome, or to banish him out of his territories. It was not from theological considerations that Frederic had hitherto countenanced Luther; he seems to have been much a stranger to controversies of that kind, and to have been little interested in them. His protection flowed almost entirely, as hath been already observed, from political motives, and was afforded with great secrecy and caution. He had neither heard any of Luther's discourses, nor read any of his books; and though all Germany resounded with his fame, he had never once admitted him into his presence<sup>18</sup>. But upon this demand which the Cardinal made, it became necessary to throw off somewhat of his former reserve. He had been at great expense, and had bestowed much attention, on founding a new university, an object of considerable importance to every German Prince; and foreseeing how fatal a blow the removal of Luther would be to its reputation<sup>19</sup>, he, under various pretexts, and with many professions of esteem for the Cardinal, as well as of reverence for the Pope, not only declined complying with either of his requests, but openly discovered great concern for Luther's safety<sup>20</sup>.

The inflexible rigour with which Cajetan insisted on a simple recantation gave great offence to Luther's followers in that age, and hath since been censured as imprudent by several popish writers. But it was impossible for the legate to act another

<sup>18</sup> Seckend. p. 27. Sleid. Hist. p. 12. <sup>19</sup> Seckend. p. 59.

part. The judges, before whom Luther had been required to appear at Rome, were so eager to display their zeal against his errors, that, without waiting for the expiration of sixty days allowed him in the citation, they had already condemned him as a heretic<sup>21</sup>. Leo had, in several of his briefs and letters, stigmatized him as a child of iniquity, and a man given up to a reprobate sense. Nothing less, therefore, than a recantation could save the honour of the church, whose maxim it is, never to abandon the smallest point that it has established, and which is even precluded, by its pretensions to infallibility, from having it in its power to do so.

Luther's situation, at this time, was such as would have filled any other person with the most disquieting apprehensions. He could not expect that a Prince so prudent and cautious as Frederic would, on his account, set at defiance the thunders of the church, and brave the papal power, which had crushed some of the most powerful of the German Emperors. He knew what veneration was paid, in that age, to ecclesiastical decisions; what terrors ecclesiastical censures carried along with them; and how easily these might intimidate and shake a Prince, who was rather his protector from policy, than his disciple from conviction. If he should be obliged to quit Saxony, he had no prospect of any other asylum, and must stand exposed to whatever punishment the rage or bigotry of his enemies could inflict. Though sensible of his danger, he discovered no symptoms of timidity or remissness, but continued to vindicate his own conduct and opinions, and to inveigh against those of his adversaries with more vehemence than ever<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Luther. Oper. 161.

<sup>22</sup> Seckend. p. 59.

But as every step taken by the court of Rome, particularly the irregular sentence by which he had been so precipitately declared a heretic, convinced Luther that Leo would soon proceed to the most violent measures against him, he had recourse to the only expedient in his power, in order to prevent the effect of the papal censures. He appealed to a General Council, which he affirmed to be the representative of the Catholic church, and superior in power to the Pope, who being a fallible man might err, as St. Peter, the most perfect of his predecessors, had erred<sup>23</sup>.

It soon appeared that Luther had not formed rash conjectures concerning the intentions of the Romish church. A bull of a date prior to his appeal was issued by the Pope, in which he magnifies the virtue and efficacy of indulgences, in terms as extravagant as any of his predecessors had ventured to use in the darkest ages; and without applying such palliatives, or mentioning such concessions, as a more enlightened period, and the disposition in the minds of many men at that juncture, seemed to call for, he required all Christians to assent to what he delivered as the doctrine of the Catholic church, and subjected those who should hold or teach any contrary opinion to the heaviest ecclesiastical censures.

Among Luther's followers, this bull which they considered as an unjustifiable effort of the Pope in order to preserve that rich branch of his revenue which arose from indulgences, produced little effect. But, among the rest of his countrymen, such a clear decision of the sovereign Pontiff against him, and enforced by such dreadful penalties, must have been

<sup>23</sup> Sleid. Hist. 12. Luth. Oper. i. 179.

attended with consequences very fatal to his cause; if these had not been prevented in a great measure by the death of the Emperor Maximilian [Jan. 17, 1519], whom both his principles and his interest prompted to support the authority of the Holy See. In consequence of this event, the vicariat of that part of Germany which is governed by the Saxon laws devolved to the Elector of Saxony; and under the shelter of his friendly administration, Luther not only enjoyed tranquillity, but his opinions were suffered, during the interregnum which preceded Charles's election, to take root in different places, and to grow up to some degree of strength and firmness. At the same time, as the election of an Emperor was a point more interesting to Leo than a theological controversy, which he did not understand, and of which he could not foresee the consequences, he was so extremely solicitous not to irritate a Prince of such considerable influence in the electoral college as Frederic, that he discovered a great unwillingness to pronounce the sentence of excommunication against Luther, which his adversaries continually demanded with the most clamorous importunity.

To these political views of the Pope, as well as to his natural aversion from severe measures, was owing the suspension of any further proceedings against Luther for eighteen months. Perpetual negotiations, however, in order to bring the matter to some amicable issue, were carried on during that space. The manner in which these were conducted having given Luther many opportunities of observing the corruption of the court of Rome; its obstinacy in adhering to established errors; and its indifference about truth, however clearly proposed or

strongly proved, he began to utter some doubts with regard to the divine original of the papal authority. A public disputation was held upon this important question at Leipsic, between Luther and Eccius, one of his most learned and formidable antagonists; but it was as fruitless and indecisive as such scholastic combats usually prove. Both parties boasted of having obtained the victory; both were confirmed in their own opinions; and no progress was made towards deciding the point in controversy<sup>24</sup>.

Nor did this spirit of opposition to the doctrines and usurpations of the Romish church break out in Saxony alone; an attack no less violent, and occasioned by the same causes, was made upon them about this time in Switzerland. The Franciscans, being intrusted with the promulgation of indulgences in that country, executed their commission with the same indiscretion and rapaciousness, which had rendered the Dominicans so odious in Germany. They proceeded, nevertheless, with uninterrupted success till they arrived at Zurich. There Zuingleus, a man not inferior to Luther himself in zeal and intrepidity, ventured to oppose them; and being animated with a republican boldness, and free from those restraints which subjection to the will of a Prince imposed on the German Reformer, he advanced with more daring and rapid steps to overturn the whole fabric of the established religion<sup>25</sup>. The appearance of such a vigorous auxiliary, and the progress which he made, was at first matter of great joy to Luther. On the other hand, the decrees of the universities of Cologne and Louvain, which pronounced his opinions to be erroneous, afforded great cause of triumph to his adversaries.

<sup>24</sup> Luth. Oper. i. 199.

<sup>25</sup> Sleid. Hist. 22. Seckend. 59.

But the undaunted spirit of Luther acquired additional fortitude from every instance of opposition; and pushing on his inquiries and attacks from one doctrine to another, he began to shake the firmest foundations on which the wealth or power of the church was established. Leo came at last to be convinced, that all hopes of reclaiming him by forbearance were vain; several prelates of great wisdom exclaimed, no less than Luther's personal adversaries, against the Pope's unprecedented lenity in permitting an incorrigible heretic, who during three years had been endeavouring to subvert every thing sacred and venerable, still to remain within the bosom of the church; the dignity of the papal see rendered the most vigorous proceedings necessary; the new Emperor, it was hoped, would support its authority; nor did it seem probable that the Elector of Saxony would so far forget his usual caution, as to set himself in opposition to their united power. The college of Cardinals was often assembled, in order to prepare the sentence with due deliberation, and the ablest canonists were consulted how it might be expressed with unexceptionable formality. At last, on the 15th of June, 1520, the bull so fatal to the church of Rome was issued. Forty-one propositions, extracted out of Luther's works, are therein condemned as heretical, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears; all persons are forbidden to read his writings, upon pain of excommunication; such as had any of them in their custody were commanded to commit them to the flames; he himself, if he did not within sixty days publicly recant his errors and burn his books, is pronounced an obstinate heretic; is excommunicated and delivered unto Satan for the destruction of his flesh; and all secu-

lar Princes are required, under pain of incurring the same censure, to seize his person, that he might be punished as his crimes deserved<sup>26</sup>.

The publication of this bull in Germany excited various passions in different places. Luther's adversaries exulted, as if his party and opinions had been crushed at once by such a decisive blow. His followers, whose reverence for the papal authority daily diminished, read Leo's anathemas with more indignation than terror. In some cities the people violently obstructed the promulgation of the bull; in others, the persons who attempted to publish it were insulted, and the bull itself was torn in pieces and trodden under foot<sup>27</sup>.

This sentence, which he had for some time expected, did not disconcert or intimidate Luther. After renewing his appeal to the general council [Nov. 17], he published remarks upon the bull of excommunication; and being now persuaded that Leo had been guilty both of impiety and injustice in his proceedings against him, he boldly declared the Pope to be that man of sin, or Antichrist, whose appearance is foretold in the New Testament; he declaimed against his tyranny and usurpations with greater violence than ever; he exhorted all Christian Princes to shake off such an ignominious yoke; and boasted of his own happiness in being marked out as the object of ecclesiastical indignation, because he had ventured to assert the liberty of mankind. Nor did he confine his expressions of contempt for the papal power to words alone: Leo having, in execution of the bull, appointed Luther's books to be burnt at Rome, he, by way of retalia-

<sup>26</sup> Palavic. 27. Luth. Oper. i. 423.

<sup>27</sup> Seckend. p. 116.

tion, assembled all the professors and students in the university of Wittemberg, and with great pomp, in presence of a vast multitude of spectators, cast the volumes of the canon law, together with the bull of excommunication, into the flames; and his example was imitated in several cities of Germany. The manner in which he justified this action was still more offensive than the action itself. Having collected from the canon law some of the most extravagant propositions with regard to the plenitude and omnipotence of the papal power, as well as the subordination of all secular jurisdiction to the authority of the Holy See, he published these with a commentary; pointing out the impiety of such tenets, and their evident tendency to subvert all civil government<sup>28</sup>.

Such was the progress which Luther had made, and such the state of his party, when Charles arrived in Germany. No secular prince had hitherto embraced Luther's opinions; no change in the established forms of worship had been introduced; and no encroachments had been made upon the possessions or jurisdiction of the clergy; neither party had yet proceeded to action; and the controversy, though conducted with great heat and passion on both sides, was still carried on with its proper weapons, with theses, disputations, and replies. A deep impression, however, was made upon the minds of the people; their reverence for ancient institutions and doctrines was shaken; and the materials were already scattered which kindled into the combustion that soon spread over all Germany. Students crowded from every province of the Empire to Wittemberg; and under Luther himself, Melancthon,

<sup>28</sup> Luth. Oper. ii. 316.

Carlostadius, and other masters then reckoned eminent, imbibed opinions which, on their return, they propagated among their countrymen, who listened to them with that fond attention which truth, when accompanied with novelty, naturally commands<sup>29</sup>.

During the course of these transactions, the court of Rome, though under the direction of one of its ablest pontiffs, neither formed its schemes with that profound sagacity, nor executed them with that steady perseverance, which had long rendered it the most perfect model of political wisdom to the rest of Europe. When Luther began to declaim against indulgences, two different methods of treating him lay before the Pope; by adopting one of which, the attempt, it is probable, might have been crushed, and by the other it might have been rendered innocent. If Luther's first departure from the doctrines of the church had instantly drawn upon him the weight of its censures, the dread of these might have restrained the Elector of Saxony from protecting him, might have deterred the people from listening to his discourses, or even might have overawed Luther himself; and his name, like that of many good men before his time, would now have been known to the world only for his honest but ill timed effort to correct the corruptions of the Romish church. On the other hand, if the Pope had early testified some displeasure with the vices and excesses of the friars who had been employed in publishing indulgences; if he had forbidden the mentioning of controverted points in discourses addressed to the people; if he had enjoined the disputants on both sides to be silent; if he had been careful not to risk the credit of the church by defining articles

<sup>29</sup> Seckend. 50.

which had hitherto been left undetermined; Luther would, probably, have stopped short at his first discoveries; he would not have been forced in self-defence to venture upon new ground, and the whole controversy might possibly have died away insensibly; or, being confined entirely to the schools, might have been carried on with as little detriment to the peace and unity of the Romish church, as that which the Franciscans maintained with the Dominicans concerning the immaculate conception, or that between the Jansenists and Jesuits concerning the operations of grace. But Leo, by fluctuating between these opposite systems, and by embracing them alternately, defeated the effects of both. By an improper exertion of authority, Luther was exasperated, but not restrained. By a mistaken exercise of lenity, time was given for his opinions to spread, but no progress was made towards reconciling him to the church; and even the sentence of excommunication, which at another juncture might have been decisive, was delayed so long that it became at last scarcely an object of terror.

Such a series of errors in the measures of a court seldom chargeable with mistaking its own true interest, is not more astonishing than the wisdom which appeared in Luther's conduct. Though a perfect stranger to the maxims of worldly wisdom, and incapable, from the impetuosity of his temper, of observing them, he was led naturally, by the method in which he made his discoveries, to carry on his operations in a manner which contributed more to their success, than if every step he took had been prescribed by the most artful policy. At the time when he set himself to oppose Tetzels, he was far from intending that reformation which he afterwards

effected; and would have trembled with horror at the thoughts of what at last he gloried in accomplishing. The knowledge of truth was not poured into his mind all at once, by any special revelation; he acquired it by industry and meditation, and his progress, of consequence, was gradual. The doctrines of popery are so closely connected, that the exposing of one error conducted him naturally to the detection of others; and all the parts of that artificial fabric were so united together, that the pulling down of one loosened the foundation of the rest, and rendered it more easy to overturn them. In confuting the extravagant tenets concerning indulgences, he was obliged to inquire into the true cause of our justification and acceptance with God. The knowledge of that discovered to him, by degrees, the inutility of pilgrimages and penances; the vanity of relying on the intercession of saints; the impiety of worshiping them; the abuses of auricular confession; and the imaginary existence of purgatory. The detection of so many errors led him, of course, to consider the character of the clergy who taught them; and their exorbitant wealth, the severe injunction of celibacy, together with the intolerable rigour of monastic vows, appeared to him the great sources of their corruption. From thence, it was but one step to call in question the divine original of the papal power, which authorized and supported such a system of errors. As the unavoidable result of the whole, he disclaimed the infallibility of the Pope, the decisions of schoolmen, or any other human authority, and appealed to the word of God, as the only standard of theological truth. To this gradual progress Luther owed his success. His hearers were not shocked at first by any proposition

too repugnant to their ancient prejudices, or too remote from established opinions. They were conducted insensibly from one doctrine to another. Their faith and conviction were able to keep pace with his discoveries. To the same cause was owing the inattention, and even indifference with which Leo viewed Luther's first proceedings. A direct or violent attack upon the authority of the church would at once have drawn upon Luther the whole weight of its vengeance: but as this was far from his thoughts, as he continued long to profess great respect for the Pope, and made repeated offers of submission to his decisions, there seemed to be no reason for apprehending that he would prove the author of any desperate revolt; and he was suffered to proceed step by step in undermining the constitution of the church, until the remedy applied at last came too late to produce any effect.

But whatever advantages Luther's cause derived, either from the mistakes of his adversaries or from his own good conduct, the sudden progress and firm establishment of his doctrines must not be ascribed to these alone. The same corruptions in the church of Rome which he condemned had been attacked long before his time. The same opinions which he now propagated had been published in different places, and were supported by the same arguments. Waldus, in the twelfth century, Wickliff in the fourteenth, and Huss in the fifteenth, had inveighed against the errors of popery with great boldness, and confuted them with more ingenuity and learning than could have been expected in those illiterate ages in which they flourished. But all these premature attempts towards a reformation proved abortive. Such feeble lights, incapable of dispelling the

darkness which then covered the church, were soon extinguished; and though the doctrines of these pious men produced some effects, and left some traces in the countries where they taught, they were neither extensive nor considerable. Many powerful causes contributed to facilitate Luther's progress, which either did not exist, or did not operate with full force in their days; and at that critical and mature juncture when he appeared, circumstances of every kind concurred in rendering each step that he took successful.

The long and scandalous schism which divided the church during the latter part of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, had a great effect in diminishing the veneration with which the world had been accustomed to view the papal dignity. Two or three contending Pontiffs roaming about Europe at a time; fawning on the Princes whom they wanted to gain; extorting large sums of money from the countries which acknowledged their authority; excommunicating their rivals, and cursing those who adhered to them, discredited their pretensions to infallibility, and exposed both their persons and their office to contempt. The laity, to whom all parties appealed, came to learn that some right of private judgment belonged to them, and acquired the exercise of it so far as to choose, among these infallible guides, whom they would please to follow. The proceedings of the councils of Constance and Basil spread this disrespect for the Romish See still wider; and, by their bold exertion of authority in deposing and electing Popes, taught men that there was in the church a jurisdiction superior even to the papal power, which they had long believed to be supreme.

The wound given on that occasion to the papal authority was scarcely healed up, when the pontificates of Alexander VI. and Julius II. both able Princes, but detestable ecclesiastics, raised new scandal in Christendom. The profligate morals of the former in private life; the fraud, the injustice, and cruelty of his public administration, place him on a level with those tyrants whose deeds are the greatest reproach to human nature. The latter, though a stranger to the odious passions which prompted his predecessor to commit so many unnatural crimes, was under the dominion of a restless and ungovernable ambition, that scorned all considerations of gratitude, of decency, or of justice, when they obstructed the execution of his schemes. It was hardly possible to be firmly persuaded that the infallible knowledge of a religion, whose chief precepts are purity and humility, was deposited in the breasts of the profligate Alexander, or the overbearing Julius. The opinion of those who exalted the authority of a Council above that of the Pope, spread wonderfully under their pontificates: and as the Emperor and French Kings, who were alternately engaged in hostilities with those active Pontiffs, permitted and even encouraged their subjects to expose their vices with all the violence of invective and all the petulance of ridicule; men's ears, being accustomed to these, were not shocked with the bold or ludicrous discourses of Luther and his followers concerning the papal dignity.

Nor were such excesses confined to the head of the church alone. Many of the dignified clergy, secular as well as regular, being the younger sons of noble families, who had assumed the ecclesiastical character for no other reason but that they found in the church stations of great dignity and

affluence, were accustomed totally to neglect the duties of their office, and indulged themselves without reserve in all the vices to which great wealth and idleness naturally give birth. Though the inferior clergy were prevented by their poverty from imitating the expensive luxury of their superiors, yet gross ignorance and low debauchery rendered them as contemptible as the others were odious<sup>30</sup>. The severe and unnatural law of celibacy, to which both were equally subject, occasioned such irregularities that in several parts of Europe the concubinage of priests was not only permitted but enjoined. The employing of a remedy so contrary to the precepts of the Christian religion is the strongest proof that the crimes it was intended to prevent were both numerous and flagrant. Long before the sixteenth century, many authors of great name and authority give such descriptions of the dissolute morals of the clergy, as seem almost incredible in the present age<sup>31</sup>. The voluptuous lives of ecclesiastics occa-

<sup>30</sup> The corrupt state of the church prior to the Reformation is acknowledged by an author, who was both abundantly able to judge concerning this matter, and who was not overforward to confess it. "For some years (says Bellarmine) before the Lutheran and Calvinistic heresies were published, there was not (as contemporary authors testify) any severity in ecclesiastical judicatories, any discipline with regard to morals, any knowledge of sacred literature, any reverence for divine things; there was almost not any religion remaining." Bellarminus *Concio* xxviii. *Oper. tom. vi. col. 296*, edit. Colon. 1617, apud Gerdesii *Hist. Evan. Renovati*, vol. i. p. 25.

<sup>31</sup> *Centum Gravamina Nation. German. in Fasciculo Rer. expetend. et fugiendarum, per Ortuinum Gratium*, vol. i. 361.—See innumerable passages to the same purpose in the appendix, or second volume, published by Edw. Brown.—See also Herm. vonder Hardt. *Hist. Lit. Reform. pars iii.* and the vast collections of Walchius in his four volumes of *Monumenta Medii Ævi*. Götting. 1757.

The authors I have quoted enumerate the vices of the clergy. When they ventured upon actions manifestly criminal, we may

sioned great scandal, not only because their manners were inconsistent with their sacred character; but the laity, being accustomed to see several of them raised from the lowest stations to the greatest affluence, did not show the same indulgence to their excesses as to those of persons possessed of hereditary wealth or grandeur; and, viewing their condition with more envy, they censured their crimes with greater severity. Nothing, therefore, could be more acceptable to Luther's hearers than the violence with which he exclaimed against the immoralities of churchmen, and every person in his audience could, from his own observation, confirm the truth of his invectives.

The scandal of these crimes was greatly increased by the facility with which such as committed them obtained pardon. In all the European kingdoms, the importance of the civil magistrate, under forms of government extremely irregular and turbulent, made it necessary to relax the rigour of justice; and upon payment of a certain fine or composition pre-

conclude that they would be less scrupulous with respect to the decorum of behaviour. Accordingly, their neglect of the decent conduct suitable to their profession seems to have given great offence. In order to illustrate this, I shall transcribe one passage, because it is not taken from any author whose professed purpose it was to describe the improper conduct of the clergy; and who, from prejudice or artifice, may be supposed to aggravate the charge against them. The Emperor Charles IV. in a letter to the Archbishop of Mentz, A. D. 1359, exhorting him to reform the disorders of the clergy, thus expresses himself: "*De Christi patrimonio, ludo, hastiludia et torneamenta exerceant; habitum militare cum prætextis aureis et argenteis gestant, et calceos militares; comam et barbam nutriunt, et nihil quod ad vitam et ordinem ecclesiasticum spectat, ostendunt. Militaribus se duntaxat et secularibus actibus, vita et moribus, in suæ salutis dispendium, et generale populi scandalum, immiscent.*" *Codex Diplomaticus Anecdotorum, per Val. Ferd. Gudenum, 4to. vol. iii. p. 138.*

scribed by law, judges were accustomed to remit further punishment, even of the most atrocious crimes. The court of Rome, always attentive to the means of augmenting its revenues, imitated this practice; and, by a preposterous accommodation of it to religious concerns, granted its pardons to such transgressors as gave a sum of money in order to purchase them. As the idea of a composition for crimes was then familiar, this strange traffic was so far from shocking mankind that it soon became general; and in order to prevent any imposition in carrying it on, the officers of the Roman chancery published a book, containing the precise sum to be exacted for the pardon of every particular sin. A deacon, guilty of murder, was absolved for twenty crowns. A bishop, or abbot, might assassinate for three hundred livres. Any ecclesiastic might violate his vows of chastity, even with the most aggravating circumstances, for the third part of that sum. Even such shocking crimes as occur seldom in human life, and perhaps exist only in the impure imagination of a casuist, were taxed at a very moderate rate. When a more regular and perfect mode of dispensing justice came to be introduced into civil courts, the practice of paying a composition for crimes went gradually into disuse; and mankind having acquired more accurate notions concerning religion and morality, the conditions on which the court of Rome bestowed its pardons appeared impious, and were considered as one great source of ecclesiastical corruption<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> Fascicul. Rer. expet. et fug. i. 355. J. G. Schelhornii Amoenit. Literar. Francof. 1725. vol. ii. 369. Diction. de Bayle, artic. Banck et Tippius. Taxa Cancellar. Romanæ. edit. Francof. 1651, passim.

This degeneracy of manners among the clergy might have been tolerated, perhaps, with greater indulgence, if their exorbitant riches and power had not enabled them, at the same time, to encroach on the rights of every other order of men. It is the genius of superstition, fond of whatever is pompous or grand, to set no bounds to its liberality towards persons whom it esteems sacred, and to think its expressions of regard defective, unless it hath raised them to the height of wealth and authority. Hence flowed the extensive revenues and jurisdiction possessed by the church in every country in Europe, and which were become intolerable to the laity, from whose undiscerning bounty they were at first derived.

The burden, however, of ecclesiastical oppression had fallen with such peculiar weight on the Germans, as rendered them, though naturally exempt from levity, and tenacious of their ancient customs, more inclinable than any people in Europe to listen to those who called on them to assert their liberty. During the long contests between the Popes and Emperors concerning the right of investiture, and the wars which these occasioned, most of the considerable German ecclesiastics joined the papal faction; and while engaged in rebellion against the head of the Empire, they seized the Imperial domains and revenues, and usurped the Imperial jurisdiction within their own diocesses. Upon the re-establishment of tranquillity they still retained these usurpations, as if by the length of an unjust possession they had acquired a legal right to them. The Emperors, too feeble to wrest them out of their hands, were obliged to grant the clergy fiefs of those ample territories, and they enjoyed all the immuni-

ties, as well as honours, which belonged to feudal barons. By means of these many bishops and abbots in Germany were, not only ecclesiastics but princes, and their character and manners partook more of the licence too frequent among the latter than of the sanctity which became the former<sup>33</sup>.

The unsettled state of government in Germany, and the frequent wars to which that country was exposed, contributed in another manner towards aggrandizing ecclesiastics. The only property, during those times of anarchy, which enjoyed security from the oppression of the great, or the ravages of war, was that which belonged to the church. This was owing not only to the great reverence for the sacred character prevalent in those ages, but to a superstitious dread of the sentence of excommunication, which the clergy were ready to denounce against all who invaded their possessions. Many observing this made a surrender of their lands to ecclesiastics, and, consenting to hold them in fee of the church, obtained as its vassals a degree of safety, which without this device they were unable to procure. By such an increase of the number of their vassals, the power of ecclesiastics received a real and permanent augmentation; and as lands held in fee by the limited tenures common in those ages often returned to the persons on whom the fief depended, considerable additions were made in this way to the property of the clergy<sup>34</sup>.

The solicitude of the clergy in providing for the safety of their own persons was still greater than that which they displayed in securing their posses-

<sup>33</sup> F. Paul, *History of Ecclesiast. Benefices*, p. 107.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 66. Boulainvillers, *Etat de France*, tom. i. 169. Lond. 1737.

sions; and their efforts to attain it were still more successful. As they were consecrated to the priestly office with much outward solemnity; were distinguished from the rest of mankind by a peculiar garb and manner of life; and arrogated to their order many privileges which do not belong to other Christians, they naturally became the objects of excessive veneration. As a superstitious spirit spread, they were regarded as beings of a superior species to the profane laity, whom it would be impious to try by the same laws, or to subject to the same punishments. This exemption from civil jurisdiction, granted at first to ecclesiastics as a mark of respect, they soon claimed as a point of right. This valuable immunity of the priesthood is asserted, not only in the decrees of Popes and Councils, but was confirmed in the most ample form by many of the greatest Emperors<sup>35</sup>. As long as the clerical character remained, the person of an ecclesiastic was in some degree sacred; and unless he were degraded from his office, the unhallowed hand of the civil judge durst not touch him. But as the power of degradation was lodged in the spiritual courts, the difficulty and expense of obtaining such a sentence too often secured absolute impunity to offenders. Many assumed the clerical character for no other reason than that it might screen them from the punishment which their actions deserved<sup>36</sup>. The German nobles complained loudly, that these anointed malefactors, as they called them<sup>37</sup>, seldom suffered capitally, even for the most atrocious crimes; and their independence of the civil magistrate is often mentioned

<sup>35</sup> Goldasti Constitut. Imperial. Francof. 1673, vol. ii. 92. 107.

<sup>36</sup> Rymer's Fœdera, vol. xiii. 532.

<sup>37</sup> Centum Gravam. § 31.

in the remonstrances of the diets, as a privilege equally pernicious to society, and to the morals of the clergy.

While the clergy asserted the privileges of their own order with so much zeal, they made continual encroachments upon those of the laity. All causes relative to matrimony, to testaments, to usury, to legitimacy of birth, as well as those which concerned ecclesiastical revenues, were thought to be so connected with religion that they could be tried only in the spiritual courts. Not satisfied with this ample jurisdiction, which extended to one half of the subjects that give rise to litigation among men, the clergy, with wonderful industry, and by a thousand inventions, endeavoured to draw all other causes into their own courts<sup>38</sup>. As they had engrossed almost the whole learning known in the dark ages, the spiritual judges were commonly so far superior in knowledge and abilities to those employed in the secular courts, that the people at first favoured any stretch that was made to bring their affairs under the cognizance of a judicature on the decisions of which they could rely with more perfect confidence than on those of the civil courts. Thus the interest of the church and the inclination of the people, concurring to elude the jurisdiction of the lay magistrate, soon reduced it almost to nothing<sup>39</sup>. By means of this, vast power accrued to ecclesiastics, and no inconsiderable addition was made to their revenue by the sums paid in those ages to the persons who administered justice.

The penalty by which the spiritual courts enforced their sentences added great weight and terror to

<sup>38</sup> Giannone Hist. of Naples, book xix. § 3.

<sup>39</sup> Centum Gravum. § 9. 56. 64.

their jurisdiction. The censure of excommunication was instituted originally for preserving the purity of the church; that obstinate offenders, whose impious tenets or profane lives were a reproach to Christianity, might be cut off from the society of the faithful: this, ecclesiastics did not scruple to convert into an engine for promoting their own power; and they inflicted it on the most frivolous occasions. Whoever despised any of their decisions, even concerning civil matters, immediately incurred this dreadful censure, which not only excluded them from all the privileges of a Christian, but deprived them of their rights as men and citizens<sup>40</sup>, and the dread of this rendered even the most fierce and turbulent spirits obsequious to the authority of the church.

Nor did the clergy neglect the proper methods of preserving the wealth and power which they had acquired with such industry and address. The possessions of the church, being consecrated to God, were declared to be unalienable; so that the funds of a society which was daily gaining, and could never lose, grew to be immense. In Germany it was computed that the ecclesiastics had got into their hands more than one half of the national property<sup>41</sup>. In other countries the proportion varied; but the share belonging to the church was every where prodigious. These vast possessions were not subject to the burdens imposed on the lands of the laity. The German clergy were exempted by law from all taxes<sup>42</sup>; and if, on an extraordinary emergence, ecclesiastics were pleased to grant some aid towards supplying the public exigencies, this was

<sup>40</sup> *Centum Gravam.* § 34.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* § 28.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* Goldasti *Const. Imper.* ii. 79, 108. *Pfeffel Hist. du Droit Publ.* 350. 371.

considered as a free gift flowing from their own generosity, which the civil magistrate had no title to demand, far less to exact. In consequence of this strange solecism in government; the laity in Germany had the mortification to find themselves loaded with excessive impositions, because such as possessed the greatest property were freed from any obligation to support or to defend the state.

Grievous, however, as the exorbitant wealth and numerous privileges of the clerical order were to the other members of the Germanic body, they would have reckoned it some mitigation of the evil if these had been possessed only by ecclesiastics residing among themselves, who would have been less apt to make an improper use of their riches, or to exercise their rights with unbecoming rigour. But the Bishops of Rome having early put in a claim, the boldest that ever human ambition suggested, of being supreme and infallible heads of the Christian church; they, by their profound policy and unwearyed perseverance; by their address in availing themselves of every circumstance which occurred; by taking advantage of the superstition of some princes, of the necessities of others, and of the credulity of the people, at length established their pretensions in opposition both to the interest and common sense of mankind. Germany was the country which these ecclesiastical sovereigns governed with most absolute authority. They excommunicated and deposed some of its most illustrious Emperors, and excited their subjects, their ministers, and even their children to take arms against them. Amidst these contests, the Popes continually extended their own immunities, spoiling the secular princes gradually of their most valuable prerogatives, and the German church

felt all the rigour of that oppression which flows from subjection to foreign dominion and foreign exactions.

The right of conferring benefices, which the Popes usurped during that period of confusion, was an acquisition of great importance, and exalted the ecclesiastical power upon the ruins of the temporal. The Emperors and other Princes of Germany had long been in possession of this right, which served to increase both their authority and their revenue. But by wresting it out of their hands, the Popes were enabled to fill the empire with their own creatures; they accustomed a great body of every Prince's subjects to depend not upon him but upon the Roman See; they bestowed upon strangers the richest benefices in every country, and drained their wealth to supply the luxury of a foreign court. Even the patience of the most superstitious ages could no longer bear such oppression; and so loud and frequent were the complaints and murmurs of the Germans, that the Popes, afraid of irritating them too far, consented, contrary to their usual practice, to abate somewhat of their pretensions, and to rest satisfied with the right of nomination to such benefices as happened to fall vacant during six months in the year, leaving the disposal of the remainder to the princes and other legal patrons<sup>43</sup>.

But the court of Rome easily found expedients for eluding an agreement which put such restraints on its power. The practice of reserving certain benefices in every country to the Pope's immediate nomination, which had been long known, and often complained of, was extended far beyond its ancient

<sup>43</sup> F. Paul, *Hist. of Eccles. Benef.* 204. *Gold. Constit. Imper.* i. 408.

bounds. All the benefices possessed by cardinals, or any of the numerous officers in the Roman court; those held by persons who happened to die at Rome; or within forty miles of that city on their journey to or from it; such as became vacant by translation, with many others, were included in the number of *reserved* benefices. Julius II. and Leo X. stretching the matter to the utmost, often collated to benefices where the right of reservation had not been declared, on pretence of having mentally reserved this privilege to themselves. The right of reservation, however, even with this extension, had certain limits, as it could be exercised only where the benefice was actually vacant; and therefore, in order to render the exertion of papal power unbounded, *expectative* *graces*, or mandates nominating a person to succeed to a benefice upon the first vacancy that should happen, were brought into use. By means of these, Germany was filled with persons who were servilely dependent on the court of Rome, from which they had received such reversionary grants; princes were defrauded, in a great degree of their prerogatives; the rights of lay patrons were preoccupied, and rendered almost entirely vain<sup>41</sup>.

The manner in which these extraordinary powers were exercised rendered them still more odious and intolerable. The avarice and extortion of the court of Rome were become excessive almost to a proverb. The practice of selling benefices was so notorious that no pains were taken to conceal or to disguise it. Companies of merchants openly purchased the benefices of different districts in Germany from the

<sup>41</sup> Centum Gravam. § 21. Fascic. Rerum expet. &c. 334. Gold. Const. Imper. i. 391. 404, 405. F. Paul, Hist. of Eeck. Benef. 167. 199.

Pope's ministers, and retailed them at an advanced price<sup>45</sup>. Pious men beheld with deep regret these simoniacal transactions, so unworthy the ministers of a Christian church; while politicians complained of the loss sustained by the exportation of so much wealth in that irreligious traffic.

The sums, indeed, which the court of Rome drew by its stated and legal impositions from all the countries acknowledging its authority, were so considerable that it is not strange that Princes, as well as their subjects, murmured at the smallest addition made to them by unnecessary or illicit means. Every ecclesiastical person, upon his admission to his benefice, paid *annats*, or one year's produce of his living, to the Pope; and as that tax was exacted with great rigour, its amount was very great. To this must be added, the frequent demands made by the Popes of free gifts from the clergy, together with the extraordinary levies of tenths upon ecclesiastical benefices, on pretence of expeditions against the Turks, seldom intended, or carried into execution; and from the whole, the vast proportion of the revenues of the church, which flowed continually to Rome, may be estimated.

Such were the dissolute manners, the exorbitant wealth, the enormous power and privileges of the clergy, before the Reformation; such the oppressive rigour of that dominion which the Popes had established over the Christian world; and such the sentiments concerning them that prevailed in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Nor has this sketch been copied from the controversial writers of that age, who, in the heat of disputation, may be suspected of having exaggerated the errors, or of

<sup>45</sup> Fascic. Rer. expet. i. 359.

having misrepresented the conduct of that church which they laboured to overturn ; it is formed upon more authentic evidence, upon the memorials and remonstrances of the Imperial diets, enumerating the grievances under which the Empire groaned, in order to obtain the redress of them. Dissatisfaction must have arisen to a great height among the people, when these grave assemblies expressed themselves with that degree of acrimony which abounds in their remonstrances ; and if they demanded the abolition of these enormities with so much vehemence, the people, we may be assured, uttered their sentiments and desires in bolder and more virulent language.

To men thus prepared for shaking off the yoke, Luther addressed himself with certainty of success. As they had long felt its weight, and had borne it with impatience, they listened with joy to the first offer of procuring them deliverance. Hence proceeded the fond and eager reception that his doctrines met with, and the rapidity with which they spread over all the provinces of Germany. Even the impetuosity and fierceness of Luther's spirit, his confidence in asserting his own opinions, and the arrogance as well as contempt wherewith he treated all who differed from it, which, in ages of greater moderation and refinement, have been reckoned defects in the character of that Reformer, did not appear excessive to his contemporaries, whose minds were strongly agitated by those interesting controversies which he carried on, and who had themselves endured the rigour of papal tyranny, and seen the corruptions in the church against which he exclaimed.

Nor were they offended at that gross scurrility with which his polemical writings are filled, or at

the low buffoonery which he sometimes introduces into his gravest discourses. No dispute was managed in those rude times without a large portion of the former ; and the latter was common, even on the most solemn occasions, and in treating the most sacred subjects. So far were either of these from doing hurt to his cause, that invective and ridicule had some effect, as well as more laudable arguments, in exposing the errors of popery, and in determining mankind to abandon them.

Besides all these causes of Luther's rapid progress, arising from the nature of his enterprise, and the juncture at which he undertook it, he reaped advantage from some foreign and adventitious circumstances, the beneficial influence of which none of his forerunners in the same course had enjoyed. Among these may be reckoned the invention of the art of printing, about half a century before his time. By this fortunate discovery, the facility of acquiring and of propagating knowledge was wonderfully increased ; and Luther's books, which must otherwise have made their way slowly and with uncertainty into distant countries, spread at once all over Europe. Nor were they read only by the rich and the learned, who alone had access to books before that invention ; they got into the hands of the people, who, upon this appeal to them as judges, ventured to examine and to reject many doctrines which they had formerly been required to believe, without being taught to understand them.

The revival of learning at the same period was a circumstance extremely friendly to the Reformation. The study of the ancient Greek and Roman authors, by enlightening the human mind with liberal and sound knowledge, roused it from that profound

lethargy in which it had been sunk during several centuries. Mankind seem, at that period, to have recovered the powers of inquiring and of thinking for themselves, faculties of which they had long lost the use ; and fond of the acquisition, they exercised them with great boldness upon all subjects. They were not now afraid of entering an uncommon path, or of embracing a new opinion. Novelty appears rather to have been a recommendation of a doctrine ; and instead of being startled when the daring hand of Luther drew aside or tore the veil which covered and established errors, the genius of the age applauded and aided the attempt. Luther, though a stranger to elegance in taste or composition, zealously promoted the cultivation of ancient literature ; and sensible of its being necessary to the right understanding of the Scriptures, he himself had acquired considerable knowledge both in the Hebrew and Greek tongues. Melancthon and some other of his disciples were eminent proficient in the polite arts ; and as the same ignorant monks, who opposed the introduction of learning into Germany, set themselves with equal fierceness against Luther's opinions, and declared the good reception of the latter to be the effect of the progress which the former had made, the cause of learning and of the Reformation came to be considered as closely connected with each other, and, in every country, had the same friends and the same enemies. This enabled the Reformers to carry on the contest at first with great superiority. Erudition, industry, accuracy of sentiment, purity of composition, even wit and railery, were almost wholly on their side, and triumphed with ease over illiterate monks, whose rude arguments, expressed in a perplexed and barbarous style,

were found insufficient for the defence of a system, the errors of which, all the art and ingenuity of its later and more learned advocates have not been able to palliate.

That bold spirit of inquiry, which the revival of learning excited in Europe, was so favourable to the Reformation that Luther was aided in his progress, and mankind were prepared to embrace his doctrines, by persons who did not wish success to his undertaking. The greater part of the ingenious men who applied to the study of ancient literature towards the close of the fifteenth century, and the beginning of the sixteenth, though they had no intention, and perhaps no wish, to overturn the established system of religion, had discovered the absurdity of many tenets and practices authorized by the church, and perceived the futility of those arguments by which illiterate monks endeavoured to defend them. Their contempt of these advocates for the received errors led them frequently to expose the opinions which they supported, and to ridicule their ignorance with great freedom and severity. By this men were prepared for the more serious attacks made upon them by Luther, and their reverence both for the doctrines and persons against whom he inveighed was considerably abated. This was particularly the case in Germany. When the first attempts were made to revive a taste for ancient learning in that country, the ecclesiastics there, who were still more ignorant than their brethren on the other side of the Alps, set themselves to oppose its progress with more active zeal; and the patrons of the new studies, in return, attacked them with greater violence. In the writings of Reuchlin, Hutten, and the other revivers of learning in Ger-

many, the corruptions of the church of Rome are censured with an acrimony of style little inferior to that of Luther himself<sup>46</sup>.

From the same cause proceeded the frequent strictures of Erasmus upon the errors of the church, as well as upon the ignorance and vices of the clergy. His reputation and authority were so high in Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and his works were read with such universal admiration, that the effect of these deserves to be mentioned as one of the circumstances which contributed considerably towards Luther's success. Erasmus having been destined for the church, and trained up in the knowledge of ecclesiastical literature, applied himself more to theological inquiries than any of the revivers of learning in that age. His acute judgment and extensive erudition enabled him to discover many errors both in the doctrine and worship of the Romish church. Some of these he confuted with great solidity of reasoning and force of eloquence. Others he treated as objects of ridicule, and turned against them that irresistible torrent of popular and satirical wit, of which he had the command. There was hardly any opinion or practice of the Romish church which Luther endeavoured to reform but what had been previously animadverted upon by Erasmus, and had afforded him subject either of censure or of raillery. Accordingly, when Luther first began his attack upon the church, Erasmus seemed to applaud his conduct; he courted the friendship of several of his disciples and patrons, and condemned the behaviour and spirit of his adver-

<sup>46</sup> Gerdesius, *Hist. Evang. Renov.* vol. i. p. 141. 157. Seckend, lib. i. p. 103. Vonder Hardt, *Hist. Literar. Reform.* pars ii.

saries<sup>47</sup>. He concurred openly with him in inveighing against the school divines, as the teachers of a system equally unedifying and obscure. He joined him in endeavouring to turn the attention of men to the study of the Holy Scriptures, as the only standard of religious truth<sup>48</sup>.

Various circumstances, however, prevented Erasmus from holding the same course with Luther. The natural timidity of his temper; his want of that strength of mind which alone can prompt a man to assume the character of a reformer<sup>49</sup>; his excessive deference for persons in high stations; his dread of losing the pensions and other emoluments which their liberality had conferred upon him; his extreme love of peace, and hopes of reforming abuses gradually, and by gentle methods, all concurred in determining him not only to repress and to moderate the zeal with which he had once been animated against the errors of the church<sup>50</sup>, but to assume the character of a mediator between Luther and his opponents. But though Erasmus soon began to censure Luther as too daring and impetuous, and was at last prevailed upon to write against him, he must, nevertheless, be considered as his forerunner

<sup>47</sup> Seckend. lib. i. p. 140. 96.

<sup>48</sup> Vonder Hardt, *Hist. Literar. Reform. pars i. Gerdes. Hist. Evang. Renov. i. 147.*

<sup>49</sup> Erasmus himself is candid enough to acknowledge this: "Luther," says he, "has given us many a wholesome doctrine, and many a good counsel. I wish he had not defeated the effect of them by intolerable faults. But if he had written every thing in the most unexceptionable manner, I had no inclination to die for the sake of truth. Every man hath not the courage requisite to make a martyr; and I am afraid, that if I were put to the trial, I should imitate St. Peter." *Epist. Erasmi in Jortin's Life of Eras. vol. i. p. 273.*

<sup>50</sup> *Jortin's Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 258.*

and auxiliary in this war upon the church. He first scattered the seeds, which Luther cherished and brought to maturity. His railery and oblique censures prepared the way for Luther's invectives and more direct attacks. In this light Erasmus appeared to the zealous defenders of the Romish church in his own times<sup>51</sup>. In this light he must be considered by every person conversant in the history of that period.

In this long enumeration of the circumstances which combined in favouring the progress of Luther's opinions, or in weakening the resistance of his adversaries, I have avoided entering into any discussion of the theological doctrines of popery, and have not attempted to show how repugnant they are to the spirit of Christianity, and how destitute of any foundation in reason, in the word of God, or in the practice of the primitive church, leaving those topics entirely to ecclesiastical historians, to whose province they peculiarly belong. But when we add the effect of these religious considerations to the influence of political causes, it is obvious that the united operation of both on the human mind must have been sudden and irresistible. Though to Luther's contemporaries, who were too near perhaps to the scene, or too deeply interested in it, to trace causes with accuracy, or to examine them with coolness, the rapidity with which his opinions spread appeared to be so unaccountable, that some of them imputed it to a certain uncommon and malignant position of the stars, which scattered the spirit of giddiness and innovation over the world<sup>52</sup>; it is evident that the success of the Reformation was the

<sup>51</sup> Vonder Hardt, *Hist. Literar. Reform.* pars i. p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> *Jovii Historia*, Lut. 1553, fol. p. 134.

natural effect of many powerful causes prepared by peculiar Providence, and happily conspiring to that end. This attempt to investigate these causes, and to throw light on an event so singular and important, will not, perhaps, be deemed an unnecessary digression.—I return from it to the course of the history.

1521.] The Diet at Worms conducted its deliberations with that slow formality peculiar to such assemblies. Much time was spent in establishing some regulations with regard to the internal police of the Empire. The jurisdiction of the Imperial chamber was confirmed, and the forms of its proceeding rendered more fixed and regular. A council of regency was appointed to assist Ferdinand in the government of the Empire during any occasional absence of the Emperor; which, from the extent of the Emperor's dominions, as well as the multiplicity of his affairs, was an event that might be frequently expected<sup>53</sup>. The state of religion was then taken into consideration. There were not wanting some plausible reasons which might have induced Charles to have declared himself the protector of Luther's cause, or at least to have connived at its progress. If he had possessed no other dominions but those which belonged to him in Germany, and no other crown besides the Imperial, he might have been disposed, perhaps, to favour a man, who asserted so boldly the privileges and immunities for which the Empire had struggled so long with the Popes. But the vast and dangerous schemes which Francis I. was forming against Charles made it necessary for him to regulate his conduct by views more ex-

<sup>53</sup> Pont. Heuter. Rerum Austr. lib. viii. cap. 11. p. 195. Prefet Abrégé Chronol. p. 598.

tensive than those which would have suited a German Prince; and it being of the utmost importance to secure the Pope's friendship, this determined him to treat Luther with great severity, as the most effectual method of soothing Leo into a concurrence with his measures. His eagerness to accomplish this rendered him not unwilling to gratify the papal legates in Germany, who insisted that, without any delay or formal deliberation, the diet ought to condemn a man whom the Pope had already excommunicated as an incorrigible heretic. Such an abrupt manner of proceeding, however, being deemed unprecedented and unjust, by the members of the diet, they made a point of Luther's appearing in person, and declaring whether he adhered or not to those opinions which had drawn upon him the censures of the church<sup>54</sup>. Not only the Emperor, but all the Princes through whose territories he had to pass, granted him a safe conduct; and Charles wrote to him at the same time [March 6], requiring his immediate attendance on the diet, and renewing his promises of protection from any injury or violence<sup>55</sup>. Luther did not hesitate one moment about yielding obedience, and set out for Worms, attended by the herald who had brought the Emperor's letter and safe conduct. While on his journey many of his friends, whom the fate of Huss under similar circumstances, and notwithstanding the same security of an Imperial safe conduct, filled with solicitude, advised and entreated him not to rush wantonly into the midst of danger. But Luther superior to such terrors, silenced them with this reply: "I am lawfully called," said he, "to appear in that city, and thither will I go in the name of th

<sup>54</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 722.

<sup>55</sup> Luth. Oper. ii. 411.

Lord, though as many devils as there are tiles on the houses were there combined against me<sup>56</sup>."

The reception which he met with at Worms was such as he might have reckoned a full reward of all his labours, if vanity and the love of applause had been the principles by which he was influenced. Greater crowds assembled to behold him than had appeared at the Emperor's public entry; his apartments were daily filled with Princes and personages of the highest rank<sup>57</sup>, and he was treated with all the respect paid to those who possess the power of directing the understanding and sentiments of other men; an homage more sincere, as well as more flattering, than any which preeminence in birth or condition can command. At his appearance before the diet, he behaved with great decency, and with equal firmness. He readily acknowledged an excess of vehemence and acrimony in his controversial writings, but refused to retract his opinions, unless he were convinced of their falsehood; or to consent to their being tried by any other rule than the word of God. When neither threats nor entreaties could prevail on him to depart from this resolution, some of the ecclesiastics proposed to imitate the example of the council of Constance, and by punishing the author of this pestilent heresy, who was now in their power, to deliver the church at once from such an evil. But the members of the diet refusing to expose the German integrity to fresh reproach by a second violation of public faith; and Charles being no less unwilling to bring a stain upon the beginning of his administration by such an ignominious action,

<sup>56</sup> Luth. Oper. ii. 412.

<sup>57</sup> Seckend. 156. Luth. Oper. ii. 414.

Luther was permitted to depart in safety<sup>58</sup>. A few days after he left the city [April 26], a severe edict was published in the Emperor's name, and by authority of the diet, depriving him, as an obstinate and excommunicated criminal, of all the privileges which he enjoyed as a subject of the Empire, forbidding any Prince to harbour or protect him, and requiring all to concur in seizing his person as soon as the term specified in his safe conduct was expired<sup>59</sup>.

But this rigorous decree had no considerable effect, the execution of it being prevented, partly by the multiplicity of occupations which the commotions in Spain, together with the wars in Italy and the Low Countries, created to the Emperor; and partly by a prudent precaution employed by the Elector of Saxony, Luther's faithful and discerning patron. As Luther, on his return from Worms, was passing near Altenstein in Thuringia, a number of horsemen in masks rushed suddenly out of a wood, where the Elector had appointed them to lie in wait for him, and, surrounding his company, carried him, after dismissing all his attendants, to Whartburg, a strong castle not far distant. There the Elector ordered him to be supplied with every thing necessary or agreeable; but the place of his retreat was carefully concealed, until the fury of the present storm against him began to abate, upon a change in the political situation of Europe. In this solitude, where he remained nine months, and which he frequently called his Patmos, after the name of that island to which the apostle John was banished, he exerted his usual vigour and industry in defence of his doctrines, or in confutation of his adversaries.

<sup>58</sup> Paul, *Hist. of Conne.* p. 13. Seeckend. 160.

<sup>59</sup> Gold. *Const. Imperial.* ii. 401.

publishing several treatises, which revived the spirit of his followers, astonished to a great degree, and disheartened, at the sudden disappearance of their leader.

During his confinement, his opinions continued to gain ground, acquiring the ascendant in almost every city in Saxony. At this time, the Augustinians of Wittemberg, with the approbation of the university, and the connivance of the Elector, ventured upon the first step towards an alteration in the established forms of public worship, by abolishing the celebration of private masses, and by giving the cup as well as the bread to the laity, in administering the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

Whatever consolation the courage and success of his disciples, or the progress of his doctrines in his own country, afforded Luther in his retreat, he there received information of two events which considerably damped his joy, as they seemed to lay insuperable obstacles in the way of propagating his principles in the two most powerful kingdoms of Europe. One was a solemn decree, condemning his opinions, published by the university of Paris, the most ancient, and, at that time, the most respectable of the learned societies in Europe. The other was the answer written to his book concerning the Babylonish captivity by Henry VIII. of England. That monarch, having been educated under the eye of a suspicious father, who, in order to prevent his attending to business, kept him occupied in the study of literature, still retained a greater love of learning, and stronger habits of application to it than are common among Princes of so active a disposition and such violent passions. Being ambitious of acquiring glory of every kind, as well as zealously

attached to the Romish church, and highly exasperated against Luther, who had treated Thomas Aquinas, his favourite author, with great contempt, Henry did not think it enough to exert his royal authority in opposing the opinions of the Reformer, but resolved likewise to combat them with scholastic weapons. With this view he published his treatise on the Seven Sacraments, which, though forgotten at present, as books of controversy always are when the occasion that produced them is past, is not destitute of polemical ingenuity and acuteness, and was represented, by the flattery of his courtiers, to be a work of such wonderful science and learning, as exalted him no less above other authors in merit than he was distinguished among them by his rank. The Pope, to whom it was presented with the greatest formality in full consistory, spoke of it in such terms, as if it had been dictated by immediate inspiration; and, as a testimony of the gratitude of the church for his extraordinary zeal, conferred on him the title of *Defender of the Faith*, an appellation which Henry soon forfeited in the opinion of those from whom he derived it, and which is still retained by his successors, though the avowed enemies of those opinions, by contending for which he merited that honourable distinction. Luther, who was not overawed, either by the authority of the university or the dignity of the monarch, soon published his animadversions on both, in a style no less vehement and severe than he would have used in confuting his meanest antagonist.—This indecent boldness, instead of shocking his contemporaries, was considered by them as a new proof of his undaunted spirit. A controversy managed by disputants so illustrious drew universal attention.

and such was the contagion of the spirit of innovation, diffused through Europe in that age, and so powerful the evidence which accompanied the doctrines of the Reformers on their first publication, that, in spite both of the civil and ecclesiastical powers combined against them, they daily gained converts both in France and in England.

How desirous soever the Emperor might be to put a stop to Luther's progress, he was often obliged, during the diet at Worms, to turn his thoughts to matters still more interesting, and which demanded more immediate attention. A war was ready to break out between him and the French King in Navarre, in the Low Countries, and in Italy; and it required either great address to avert the danger, or timely and wise precautions to resist it. Every circumstance, at that juncture, inclined Charles to prefer the former measure. Spain was torn with intestine commotions. In Italy he had not hitherto secured the assistance of any one ally. In the Low Countries, his subjects trembled at the thoughts of a rupture with France, the fatal effects of which on their commerce they had often experienced.— From these considerations, as well as from the solicitude of Chievres, during his whole administration, to maintain peace between the two monarchs, proceeded the Emperor's backwardness to commence hostilities. But Francis and his ministers did not breathe the same pacific spirit. He easily foresaw that concord could not long subsist, where interest, emulation, and ambition conspired to dissolve it; and he possessed several advantages which flattered him with the hopes of surprising his rival, and of overpowering him before he could put himself in a posture of defence. The French King's dominions,

from their compact situation, from their subjection to the royal authority, from the genius of the people, fond of war, and attached to their sovereign by every tie of duty and affection, were more capable of a great or sudden effort than the larger but dis-united territories of the Emperor, in one part of which the people were in arms against his ministers, and in all his prerogative was more limited than that of his rival.

The only Princes, in whose power it was to have kept down or to have extinguished this flame on its first appearance, either neglected to exert themselves, or were active in kindling and spreading it. Henry VIII. though he affected to assume the name of mediator, and both parties made frequent appeals to him, had laid aside the impartiality which suited that character. Wolsey, by his artifices, had estranged him so entirely from the French King that he secretly fomented the discord which he ought to have composed, and waited only for some decent pretext to join his arms to those of the Emperor<sup>60</sup>.

Leo's endeavours to excite discord between the Emperor and Francis were more avowed, and had greater influence. Not only his duty, as the common father of Christendom, but his interest as an Italian potentate, called upon the Pope to act as the guardian of the public tranquillity, and to avoid any measure that might overturn the system, which after much bloodshed and many negotiations was now established in Italy. Accordingly Leo, who instantly discerned the propriety of this conduct, had formed a scheme, upon Charles's promotion to the Imperial dignity, of rendering himself the umpire

<sup>60</sup> Herbert. Fiddes's Life of Wolsey, 258.

between the rivals, by soothing them alternately, while he entered into no close confederacy with either; and a Pontiff less ambitious and enterprising might have saved Europe from many calamities by adhering to this plan. But this high spirited prelate, who was still in the prime of life, longed passionately to distinguish his pontificate by some splendid action. He was impatient to wash away the infamy of having lost Parma and Placentia, the acquisition of which reflected so much lustre on the administration of his predecessor Julius. He beheld, with the indignation natural to Italians in that age, the dominion which the Transalpine, or, as they, in imitation of the Roman arrogance, denominated them, the barbarous nations, had attained in Italy. He flattered himself that, after assisting the one monarch to strip the other of his possessions in that country, he might find means of driving out the victor in his turn, and acquire the glory of restoring Italy to the liberty and happiness which it had enjoyed before the invasion of Charles VIII. when every state was governed by its native Princes or its own laws, and unacquainted with a foreign yoke. Extravagant and chimerical as this project may seem, it was the favourite object of almost every Italian eminent for genius or enterprise during great part of the sixteenth century. They vainly hoped that, by superior skill in the artifices and refinements of negotiation, they should be able to baffle the efforts of nations less polished, indeed, than themselves, but much more powerful and warlike. So alluring was the prospect of this to Leo, that, notwithstanding the gentleness of his disposition, and his fondness for the pleasures of a refined and luxurious ease, he hastened to disturb the peace of

Europe, and to plunge himself into a dangerous war, with an impetuosity scarcely inferior to that of the turbulent and martial Julius<sup>61</sup>.

It was in Leo's power, however, to choose which of the monarchs he would take for his confederate against the other. Both of them courted his friendship; he wavered for some time between them, and at first concluded an alliance with Francis. The object of this treaty was the conquest of Naples, which the confederates agreed to divide between them. The Pope, it is probable, flattered himself that the brisk and active spirit of Francis, seconded by the same qualities in his subjects, would get the start of the slow and wary councils of the Emperor, and that they might overrun with ease this detached portion of his dominions, ill provided for defence, and always the prey of every invader. But whether the French King, by discovering too openly his suspicion of Leo's sincerity, disappointed these hopes; whether the treaty was only an artifice of the Pope's, to cover the more serious negotiations which he was carrying on with Charles; whether he was enticed by the prospect of reaping greater advantages from a union with that Prince; or whether he was soothed by the zeal which Charles had manifested for the honour of the church in condemning Luther; certain it is that he soon deserted his new ally, and made overtures of friendship, though with great secrecy, to the Emperor<sup>62</sup>. Don John Manuel, the same man who had been the favourite of Philip, and whose address had disconcerted all Ferdinand's schemes, having been delivered, upon the death of that monarch, from the prison in which

<sup>61</sup> Guic. lib. xiv. p. 173.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. p. 175. Mém. de Bellay, Par. 1573, p. 24.

he had been confined, was now the Imperial ambassador at Rome, and fully capable of improving this favourable disposition in the Pope to his master's advantage<sup>63</sup>. To him the conduct of this negotiation was entirely committed; and being carefully concealed from Chievres, whose aversion to a war with France would have prompted him to retard or to defeat it, an alliance between the Pope and Emperor was quickly concluded<sup>64</sup> [May 8]. The chief articles in this treaty, which proved the foundation of Charles's grandeur in Italy, were that the Pope and Emperor should join their forces to expel the French out of the Milanese, the possession of which should be granted to Francis Sforza, a son of Ludovico the Moor, who had resided at Trent since the time that his brother Maximilian had been dispossessed of his dominions by the French King; that Parma and Placentia should be restored to the church; that the Emperor should assist the Pope in conquering Ferrara; that the annual tribute paid by the kingdom of Naples to the Holy See should be increased; that the Emperor should take the family of Medici under his protection; that he should grant to the Cardinal of that name a pension of ten thousand ducats upon the archbishopric of Toledo; and should settle lands in the kingdom of Naples to the same value upon Alexander the natural son of Lorenzo de Medici.

The transacting an affair of such moment without his participation appeared to Chievres so decisive a proof of his having lost the ascendant which he had hitherto maintained over the mind of his

<sup>63</sup> Jovii Vita Leonis, lib. iv. p. 89.

<sup>64</sup> Ggic. l. xiv. 181. Mém. de Bellay, p. 24. Du Mont, Corps Diplom. tom. iv. suppl. p. 96.

pupil, that his chagrin on this account, added to the melancholy with which he was overwhelmed on taking a view of the many and unavoidable calamities attending a war against France, is said to have shortened his days<sup>65</sup>. But though this, perhaps, may be only the conjecture of historians, fond of attributing every thing that befalls illustrious personages to extraordinary causes, and of ascribing even their diseases and death to the effect of political passions, which are more apt to disturb the enjoyment than to abridge the period of life, it is certain that his death, at this critical juncture, extinguished all hopes of avoiding a rupture with France<sup>66</sup>. This event, too, delivered Charles from a minister, to whose authority he had been accustomed from his infancy to submit with such implicit deference, as checked and depressed his genius, and retained him in a state of pupilage, unbecoming his years as well as his rank. But this restraint being removed, the native powers of his mind were permitted to unfold themselves, and he began to display such great talents both in council and in action, as exceeded the hopes of his contemporaries<sup>67</sup>, and command the admiration of posterity.

While the Pope and Emperor were preparing, in consequence of their secret alliance, to attack Milan, hostilities commenced in another quarter. The children of John d'Albert, King of Navarre, having often demanded the restitution of their hereditary dominions, in terms of the treaty of Noyon, and Charles having as often eluded their requests upon very frivolous pretexts, Francis thought himself au-

<sup>65</sup> Belcarii Comment. de Reb. Gallic. 483.

<sup>66</sup> P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. viii. c. 11. p. 197.

<sup>67</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 735.

thorized by that treaty to assist the exiled family. The juncture appeared extremely favourable for such an enterprise. Charles was at a distance from that part of his dominions; the troops usually stationed there had been called away to quell the commotions in Spain; the Spanish malecontents warmly solicited him to invade Navarre<sup>68</sup>, in which a considerable faction was ready to declare for the descendants of their ancient monarchs. But in order to avoid, as much as possible, giving offence to the Emperor, or King of England, Francis directed forces to be levied, and the war to be carried on, not in his own name, but in that of Henry d'Albret. The conduct of these troops was committed to Andrew de Foix de l'Esparre, a young nobleman, whom his near alliance to the unfortunate King whose battles he was to fight, and, what was still more powerful, the interest of his sister, Madame de Chateaubriand, Francis's favourite mistress, recommended to that important trust, for which he had neither talents nor experience. But as there was no army in the field to oppose him, he became master, in a few days, of the whole kingdom of Navarre, without meeting with any obstruction but from the citadel of Pampeluna. The additional works to this fortress, begun by Ximenes, were still unfinished; nor would its slight resistance have deserved notice, if Ignatio Loyola, a Biscayan gentleman, had not been dangerously wounded in its defence. During the progress of a lingering cure, Loyola happened to have no other amusement than what he found in reading the lives of the saints: the effect of this on his mind, naturally enthusiastic but ambitious and daring, was to inspire him with such

<sup>68</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 721.

a desire of emulating the glory of these fabulous worthies of the Roman church, as led him into the wildest and most extravagant adventures, which terminated at last in instituting the society of Jesuits, the most political and best regulated of all the monastic orders, and from which mankind have derived more advantages, and received greater injury, than from any other of those religious fraternities.

If, upon the reduction of Pampeluna, L'Esparre had been satisfied with taking proper precautions for securing his conquest, the kingdom of Navarre might still have remained annexed to the crown of France, in reality as well as in title. But, pushed on by youthful ardour, and encouraged by Francis, who was too apt to be dazzled with success, he ventured to pass the confines of Navarre, and to lay siege to Logroño, a small town in Castile. This roused the Castilians, who had hitherto beheld the rapid progress of his arms with great unconcern: and the dissensions in that kingdom (of which a full account shall be given) being almost composed, both parties exerted themselves with emulation in defence of their country; the one, that it might efface the memory of past misconduct by its present zeal; the other, that it might add to the merit of having subdued the Emperor's rebellious subjects, that of repulsing his foreign enemies. The sudden advance of their troops, together with the gallant defence made by the inhabitants of Logroño, obliged the French general to abandon his rash enterprise. The Spanish army, which increased every day, harassing him during his retreat, he, instead of taking shelter under the cannon of Pampeluna, or waiting the arrival of some troops which were marching to join him, attacked the Spaniards, though far supe-

rior to him in number, with great impetuosity, but with so little conduct that his forces were totally routed, he himself, together with his principal officers, was taken prisoner, and Spain recovered possession of Navarre in still shorter time than the French had spent in the conquest of it.<sup>69</sup>

While Francis endeavoured to justify his invasion of Navarre, by carrying it on in the name of Henry d'Albert, he had recourse to an artifice much of the same kind, in attacking another part of the Emperor's territories. Robert de la Mark, lord of the small but independent territory of Bouillon, situated on the frontiers of Luxembourg and Champagne, having abandoned Charles's service on account of an encroachment which the Aulic Council had made on his jurisdiction, and having thrown himself upon France for protection, was easily persuaded, in the heat of his resentment, to send a herald to Worms, and to declare war against the Emperor in form. Such extravagant insolence in a petty Prince surprised Charles, and appeared to him a certain proof of his having received promises of powerful support from the French King. The justness of this conclusion soon became evident. Robert entered the duchy of Luxembourg with troops levied in France, by the King's connivance, though seemingly in contradiction to his orders, and, after ravaging the open country, laid siege to Vireton. Of this Charles complained loudly, as a direct violation of the peace subsisting between the two crowns, and summoned Henry VIII., in terms of the treaty concluded at London in the year 1518, to turn his arms against Francis as the first aggressor. Francis pretended that he was not answerable for Robert's conduct,

<sup>69</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 21. *P. Mart. Ep.* 726.

whose army fought under his own standards and in his own quarrel; and affirmed, that, contrary to an express prohibition, he had seduced some subjects of France into his service: but Henry paid so little regard to this evasion, that the French King, rather than irritate a Prince whom he still hoped to gain, commanded De la Mark to disband his troops<sup>70</sup>.

The Emperor, meanwhile, was assembling an army to chastise Robert's insolence. Twenty thousand men, under the Count of Nassau, invaded his little territories, and in a few days became masters of every place in them but Sedan. After making him feel so sensibly the weight of his master's indignation, Nassau advanced towards the frontiers of France; and Charles, knowing that he might presume so far on Henry's partiality in his favour, as not to be overawed by the same fears which had restrained Francis, ordered his General to besiege Mouson. The cowardice of the garrison having obliged the Governor to surrender almost without resistance, Nassau invested Mezieres, a place at that time of no considerable strength, but so advantageously situated, that, by getting possession of it, the Imperial army might have penetrated into the heart of Champagne, in which there was hardly any other town capable of obstructing its progress. Happily for France, its monarch, sensible of the importance of this fortress, and of the danger to which it was exposed, committed the defence of it to the Chevalier Bayard, distinguished among his contemporaries by the appellation of *The knight without fear and without reproach*<sup>71</sup>. This man,

<sup>70</sup> Mém. de Bellay, p. 22, &c. Mém. de Fleuranges, p. 335. &c.

<sup>71</sup> Oeuvres de Brantome, tom. vi. 114.

whose prowess in combat, whose punctilious honour and formal gallantry bear a nearer resemblance than any thing recorded in history, to the character ascribed to the heroes of chivalry, possessed all the talents which form a great general. These he had many occasions of exerting in the defence of Mezieres: partly by his valour, partly by his conduct, he protracted the siege to a great length, and in the end obliged the Imperialists to raise it, with disgrace and loss<sup>72</sup>. Francis, at the head of a numerous army, soon retook Mouson, and, entering the Low Countries, made several conquests of small importance. In the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, through an excess of caution, an error with which he cannot be often charged, he lost an opportunity of cutting off the whole Imperial army<sup>73</sup>; and, what was still more unfortunate, he disgusted Charles Duke of Bourbon, high constable of France, by giving the command of the van to the Duke d'Alençon, though this post of honour belonged to Bourbon, as a prerogative of his office.

During these operations in the field, a congress was held at Calais [August], under the mediation of Henry VIII. in order to bring all differences to an amicable issue; and if the intentions of the mediator had corresponded in any degree to his professions, it could hardly have failed of producing some good effect. But Henry committed the sole management of the negotiation, with unlimited powers, to Wolsey; and this choice alone was sufficient to have rendered it abortive. That prelate, bent on attaining the papal crown, the great object of his ambition, and ready to sacrifice every thing in order to gain

<sup>72</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 25, &c.

<sup>73</sup> *P. Mart. Ep. 747. Mém. de Bellay*, 35.

the Emperor's interest, was so little able to conceal his partiality that, if Francis had not been well acquainted with his haughty and vindictive temper, he would have declined his mediation. Much time was spent in inquiring who had begun hostilities, which Wolsey affected to represent as the principal point; and by throwing the blame of that on Francis, he hoped to justify, by the treaty of London, any alliance into which his master should enter with Charles. The conditions on which hostilities might be terminated came next to be considered; but with regard to these, the Emperor's proposals were such as discovered either that he was utterly averse to peace, or that he knew Wolsey would approve of whatever terms should be offered in his name. He demanded the restitution of the duchy of Burgundy, a province, the possession of which would have given him access into the heart of France; and required to be released from the homage due to the crown of France for the counties of Flanders and Artois, which none of his ancestors had ever refused, and which he had bound himself by the treaty of Noyon to renew. These terms, to which a high-spirited Prince would scarcely have listened, after the disasters of an unfortunate war, Francis rejected with great disdain; and Charles showing no inclination to comply with the more equal and moderate propositions of the French monarch, that he should restore Navarre to its lawful Prince, and withdraw his troops from the siege of Tournay, the congress broke up without any other effect than that which attends unsuccessful negotiations, the exasperating of the parties whom it was intended to reconcile<sup>74</sup>.

During the continuance of the congress, Wolsey,

<sup>74</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 739. Herbert.

on pretence that the Emperor himself would be more willing to make reasonable concessions than his ministers, made an excursion to Bruges, to meet that monarch. He was received by Charles, who knew his vanity, with as much respect and magnificence as if he had been King of England. But instead of advancing the treaty of peace by this interview, Wolsey, in his master's name, concluded a league with the Emperor against Francis; in which it was stipulated, that Charles should invade France on the side of Spain, and Henry in Picardy, each with an army of forty thousand men; and that, in order to strengthen their union, Charles should espouse the Princess Mary, Henry's only child, and the apparent heir of his dominions<sup>75</sup>. Henry produced no better reasons for this measure, equally unjust and impolitic, than the article in the treaty of London, by which he pretended that he was bound to take arms against the French King as the first aggressor; and the injury which he alleged Francis had done him, in permitting the Duke of Albany, the head of a faction in Scotland, which opposed the interest of England, to return into that kingdom. He was influenced, however, by other considerations. The advantages which accrued to his subjects from maintaining an exact neutrality, or the honour that resulted to himself from acting as the arbiter between the contending Princes, appeared to his youthful imagination so inconsiderable, when compared with the glory which might be reaped from leading armies or conquering provinces, that he determined to remain no longer in a state of inactivity. Having once taken this resolution, his inducements to prefer an alliance with Charles were obvious.

<sup>75</sup> Rymer, *Fœder.* xiii. Herbert.

He had no claim upon any part of that Prince's dominions, most of which were so situated that he could not attack them without great difficulty and disadvantage; whereas several maritime provinces of France had been long in the hands of the English monarchs, whose pretensions even to the crown of that kingdom were not as yet altogether forgotten; and the possession of Calais not only gave him easy access into some of those provinces, but, in case of any disaster, afforded him a secure retreat. While Charles attacked France on one frontier, Henry flattered himself that he should find little resistance on the other, and that the glory of reannexing to the crown of England the ancient inheritance of its monarchs on the continent was reserved for his reign. Wolsey artfully encouraged these vain hopes, which led his master into such measures as were most subservient to his own secret schemes; and the English, whose hereditary animosity against the French was apt to rekindle on every occasion, did not disapprove of the martial spirit of their sovereign.

Meanwhile the league between the Pope and the Emperor produced great effects in Italy, and rendered Lombardy the chief theatre of war. There was, at that time, such contrariety between the character of the French and the Italians, that the latter submitted to the government of the former with greater impatience than they expressed under the dominion of other foreigners. The phlegm of the Germans and gravity of the Spaniards suited their jealous temper and ceremonious manners better than the French gaiety, too prone to gallantry, and too little attentive to decorum. Lewis XII., however, by the equity and gentleness of his administration, and by granting the Milanese more extensive privi-

leges than those they had enjoyed under their native Princes, had overcome, in a great measure, their prejudices, and reconciled them to the French government. Francis, on recovering that duchy, did not imitate the example of his predecessor. Though too generous himself to oppress his people, his boundless confidence in his favourites, and his negligence in examining into the conduct of those whom he intrusted with power, imboldened them to venture upon any acts of oppression. The government of Milan was committed by him to Odet de Foix, Marechal de Lautrec, another brother of Madame de Chateau-Briand, an officer of great experience and reputation, but haughty, imperious, rapacious, and incapable either of listening to advice or of bearing contradiction. His insolence and exactions totally alienated the affections of the Milanese from France, drove many of the considerable citizens into banishment, and forced others to retire for their own safety. Among the last was Jerome Moroné, vice-chancellor of Milan, a man whose genius for intrigue and enterprise distinguished him in an age and country where violent factions, as well as frequent revolutions, affording great scope for such talents, produced or called them forth in great abundance. He repaired to Francis Sforza, whose brother Maximilian he had betrayed; and suspecting the Pope's intention of attacking the Milanese, although his treaty with the Emperor was not yet made public, he proposed to Leo, in the name of Sforza, a scheme for surprising several places in that duchy by means of the exiles, who, from hatred to the French, and from attachment to their former masters, were ready for any desperate enterprise. Leo not only encouraged the attempt, but advanced a considerable sum

towards the execution of it; and when, through unforeseen accidents, it failed of success in every part, he allowed the exiles, who had assembled in a body, to retire to Reggio, which belonged at that time to the church. The Marechal de Foix, who commanded at Milan in absence of his brother Lautrec, who was then in France, tempted with the hopes of catching at once, as in a snare, all the avowed enemies of his master's government in that country, ventured to march into the ecclesiastical territories [June 24], and to invest Reggio. But the vigilance and good conduct of Guicciardini, the historian, governor of that place, obliged the French general to abandon the enterprise with disgrace<sup>76</sup>. Leo on receiving this intelligence, with which he was highly pleased, as it furnished him a decent pretence for a rupture with France, immediately assembled the consistory of Cardinals. After complaining bitterly of the hostile intentions of the French King, and magnifying the Emperor's zeal for the church, of which he had given a recent proof by his proceedings against Luther, he declared that he was constrained in self-defence, and as the only expedient for the security of the ecclesiastical state to join his arms to those of that Prince. For this purpose he now pretended to conclude a treaty with Don John Manuel, although it had really been signed some months before this time; and he publicly excommunicated De Foix, as an impious invader of St. Peter's patrimony.

Leo had already begun preparations for war by taking into pay a considerable body of Swiss; but the Imperial troops advanced so slowly from Naples and Germany, that it was the middle of autumn

<sup>76</sup> Guic. lib. xiv. 183. *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 38, &c.

before the army took the field under the command of Prosper Colonna, the most eminent of the Italian generals, whose extreme caution, the effect of long experience in the art of war, was opposed with great propriety to the impetuosity of the French. In the mean time, De Foix dispatched courier after courier to inform the King of the danger which was approaching. Francis, whose forces were either employed in the Low Countries, or assembling on the frontiers of Spain, and who did not expect so sudden an attack in that quarter, sent ambassadors to his allies the Swiss, to procure from them the immediate levy of an additional body of troops; and commanded Lautrec to repair forthwith to his government. That general, who was well acquainted with the great neglect of economy in the administration of the King's finances, and who knew how much the troops in the Milanese had already suffered from the want of their pay, refused to set out, unless the sum of three hundred thousand crowns was immediately put into his hands. But the King, Louise of Savoy, his mother, and Semblancy, the superintendant of finances, having promised, even with an oath, that on his arrival at Milan he should find remittances for the sum which he demanded; upon the faith of this he departed. Unhappily for France, Louise, a woman deceitful, vindictive, rapacious, and capable of sacrificing any thing to the gratification of her passions, but who had acquired an absolute ascendant over her son by her maternal tenderness, her care of his education, and her great abilities, was resolved not to perform this promise. Lautrec having incurred her displeasure by his haughtiness in neglecting to pay court to her, and by the freedom with which he had talked concerning some

of her adventures in gallantry, she, in order to deprive him of the honour which he might have gained by a successful defence of the Milanese, seized the three hundred thousand crowns destined for the service, and detained them for her own use.

Lautrec, notwithstanding this cruel disappointment, found means to assemble a considerable army though far inferior in number to that of the confederates. He adopted the plan of defence most suitable to his situation, avoiding a pitched battle with the greatest care, while he harassed the enemy continually with his light troops, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, and covered or relieved every place which they attempted to attack. By this prudent conduct he not only retarded their progress, but would have soon wearied out the Pope who had hitherto defrayed almost the whole expense of the war, as the Emperor, whose revenue in Spain were dissipated during the commotions of that country, and who was obliged to support a numerous army in the Netherlands, could not make any considerable remittances into Italy. But an unforeseen accident disconcerted all his measures and occasioned a fatal reverse in the French affair. A body of twelve thousand Swiss served in Lautrec's army under the banners of the republic, with which France was in alliance. In consequence of a law no less political than humane, established among the cantons, their troops were never hired out by public authority to both the contending parties in any war. This law, however, the love of gain had sometimes eluded, and private persons had been allowed to enlist in what service they pleased, though not under the public banners, but under those of their particular officers. The Cardinal of Sion, who still pre-

served his interest among his countrymen, and his enmity to France, having prevailed on them to connive at a levy of this kind, twelve thousand Swiss, instigated by him, joined the army of the confederates. But the leaders in the cantons, when they saw so many of their countrymen marching under the hostile standards, and ready to turn their arms against each other, became so sensible of the infamy to which they would be exposed by permitting this, as well as the loss they might suffer, that they dispatched couriers, commanding their people to leave both armies, and to return forthwith into their own country. The Cardinal of Sion, however, had the address, by corrupting the messengers appointed to carry this order, to prevent it from being delivered to the Swiss in the service of the confederates; but being intimated in due form to those in the French army, they, fatigued with the length of the campaign, and murmuring for want of pay, instantly yielded obedience, in spite of Lautrec's remonstrances and entreaties.

After the desertion of a body which formed the strength of his army, Lautrec durst no longer face the confederates. He retired towards Milan, encamped on the banks of the Adda, and placed his chief hopes of safety in preventing the enemy from passing that river; an expedient for defending a country so precarious, that there are few instances of its being employed with success against any general of experience or abilities. Accordingly Colonna, notwithstanding Lautrec's vigilance and activity, passed the Adda with little loss, and obliged him to shut himself up within the walls of Milan, which the confederates were preparing to besiege, when an unknown person, who never afterwards

appeared either to boast of this service or to claim a reward for it, came from the city, and acquainted Moroné, that if the army would advance that night, the Ghibelline or Imperial faction would put them in possession of one of the gates. Colonna, though no friend to rash enterprises, allowed the Marquis de Pescara to advance with the Spanish infantry, and he himself followed with the rest of his troops. About the beginning of night, Pescara, arriving at the Roman gate in the suburbs, surprised the soldiers whom he found there; those posted in the fortifications adjoining to it immediately fled: the Marquis seizing the works which they abandoned, and pushing forward incessantly, though with no less caution than vigour, became master of the city with little bloodshed, and almost without resistance; the victors being as much astonished as the vanquished at the facility and success of the attempt. Lautrec retired precipitately towards the Venetian territories with the remains of his shattered army; the cities of the Milanese, following the fate of the capital, surrendered to the confederates; Parma and Placentia were united to the ecclesiastical state; and of all their conquests in Lombardy only the town of Cremona, the castle of Milan, and a few inconsiderable forts, remained in the hands of the French<sup>77</sup>.

Leo received the accounts of this rapid succession of prosperous events with such transports of joy as brought on (if we may believe the French historians) a slight fever, which being neglected occasioned his death on the second of December, while he was still

<sup>77</sup> Guic. l. xiv. 190, &c. *Mém. de Bellay*, 42, &c. Galeacii Capella de reb. gest. pro restitut. Fran. Sfortia Comment ap. Scardium, vol. ii. 180, &c.

of a vigorous age and at the height of his glory. By this unexpected accident, the spirit of the confederacy was broken, and its operation suspended. The Cardinals of Sion and Medici left the army that they might be present in the conclave; the Swiss were recalled by their superiors; some other mercenaries disbanded for want of pay; and only the Spaniards, and a few Germans in the Emperor's service, remained to defend the Milanese. But Lautrec, destitute both of men and of money, was unable to improve this favourable opportunity in the manner which he would have wished. [1522.] The vigilance of Moroné, and the good conduct of Colonna, disappointed his feeble attempts on the Milanese. Guicciardini, by his address and valour repulsed a bolder and more dangerous attack which he made on Parma<sup>74</sup>.

Great discord prevailed in the conclave, which followed upon Leo's death, and all the arts natural to men grown old in intrigue, when contending for the highest prize an ecclesiastic can obtain, were practised. Wolsey's name, notwithstanding all the Emperor's magnificent promises to favour his pretensions, of which that prelate did not fail to remind him, was hardly mentioned in the conclave. Julio Cardinal de Medici, Leo's nephew, who was more eminent than any other member of the sacred college for his abilities, his wealth, and his experience in transacting great affairs, had already secured fifteen voices, a number sufficient, according to the forms of the conclave, to exclude any other candidate, though not to carry his own election. As he was still in the prime of life, all the aged Cardinals combined against him, without being united in favour

<sup>74</sup> Guic. l. xiv. 214.

of any other person. While these factions were endeavouring to gain, to corrupt, or to weary out each other, Medici and his adherents voted one morning at the scrutiny, which according to form was made every day, for Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, who at that time governed Spain in the Emperor's name. This they did merely to protract time. But the adverse party instantly closing with them, to their own amazement and that of all Europe, a stranger to Italy, unknown to the persons who gave their suffrages in his favour, and unacquainted with the manners of the people, or the interest of the state, the government of which they conferred upon him, was unanimously raised to the papal throne [Jan. 9, 1522], at a juncture so delicate and critical, as would have demanded all the sagacity and experience of one of the most able prelates in the sacred college. The cardinals themselves, unable to give a reason for this strange choice, on account of which, as they marched in procession from the conclave, they were loaded with insults and curses by the Roman people, ascribed it to an immediate impulse of the Holy Ghost. It may be imputed with greater certainty to the influence of Don John Manuel, the Imperial ambassador, who by his address and intrigues facilitated the election of a person devoted to his master's service, from gratitude, from interest, and from inclination<sup>79</sup>.

Beside the influence which Charles acquired by Adrian's promotion, it threw great lustre on his administration. To bestow on his preceptor such a noble recompense, and to place on the papal throne one whom he had raised from obscurity, were acts

<sup>79</sup> Heam. *Moringi Vita Hadriani*, ap. Casp. Burman. in *Annect. de Hadr.* p. 52. *Conclave Hadr.* Ibid. p. 144, &c.

of uncommon magnificence and power. Francis observed, with the sensibility of a rival, the pre-eminence which the Emperor was gaining, and resolved to exert himself with fresh vigour in order to wrest from him his late conquests in Italy. The Swiss, that they might make some reparation to the French King, for having withdrawn their troops from his army so unseasonably as to occasion the loss of the Milanese, permitted him to levy ten thousand men in the republic. Together with this reinforcement, Lautrec received from the King a small sum of money, which enabled him once more to take the field; and, after seizing by surprise, or force, several places in the Milanese, to advance within a few miles of the capital. The confederate army was in no condition to obstruct his progress; for though the inhabitants of Milan, by the artifices of Moroné, and by the popular declamations of a monk whom he employed, were inflamed with such enthusiastic zeal against the French government that they consented to raise extraordinary contributions; Colonna must soon have abandoned the advantageous camp which he had chosen at Bicocca, and have dismissed his troops for want of pay, if the Swiss in the French service had not once more extricated him out of his difficulties.

The insolence or caprice of those mercenaries was often no less fatal to their friends than their valour and discipline were formidable to their enemies. Having now served some months without pay, of which they complained loudly, a sum destined for their use was sent from France under a convoy of horse: but Moroné, whose vigilant eye nothing escaped, posted a body of troops in their way, so

that the party which escorted the money durst not advance. On receiving intelligence of this, the Swiss lost all patience, and officers as well as soldiers, crowding around Lautrec, threatened with one voice instantly to retire, if he did not either advance the pay which was due, or promise to lead them next morning to battle. In vain did Lautrec remonstrate against these demands, representing to them the impossibility of the former, and the rashness of the latter, which must be attended with certain destruction, as the enemy occupied a camp naturally of great strength, and which by art they had rendered almost inaccessible. The Swiss, deaf to reason, and persuaded that their valour was capable of surmounting every obstacle, renewed their demand with great fierceness, offering themselves to form the vanguard, and to begin the attack. Lautrec, unable to overcome their obstinacy, complied with their request, hoping, perhaps, that some of those unforeseen accidents which so often determine the fate of battles might crown this rash enterprise with undeserved success; and convinced that the effects of a defeat could not be more fatal than those which would certainly follow upon the retreat of a body which composed one half of his army. Next morning [May], the Swiss were early in the field, and marched with the greatest intrepidity against an enemy deeply intrenched on every side, surrounded with artillery, and prepared to receive them. As they advanced, they sustained a furious cannonade with great firmness; and, without waiting for their own artillery, rushed impetuously upon the intrenchments. But after incredible efforts of valour, which were seconded with great spirit by the French, hav-

ing lost their bravest officers and best soldiers, and finding that they could make no impression on the enemy's works, they sounded a retreat; leaving the field of battle, however, like men repulsed, but not vanquished, in close array, and without receiving any molestation from the enemy.

Next day, such as survived set out for their own country; and Lautrec, despairing of being able to make any further resistance, retired into France, after throwing garrisons into Cremona and a few other places; all which, except the citadel of Cremona, Colonna soon obliged to surrender.

Genoa, however, and its territories, remaining subject to France, still gave Francis considerable footing in Italy, and made it easy for him to execute any scheme for the recovery of the Milanese. But Colonna, rendered enterprising by continual success, and excited by the solicitations of the faction of the Adorni, the hereditary enemies of the Fregosi, who, under the protection of France, possessed the chief authority in Genoa, determined to attempt the reduction of that state; and accomplished it with amazing facility. He became master of Genoa by an accident as unexpected as that which had given him possession of Milan: and, almost without opposition or bloodshed, the power of the Adorni and the authority of the Emperor were established in Genoa<sup>80</sup>.

Such a cruel succession of misfortunes affected Francis with deep concern, which was not a little augmented by the unexpected arrival of an English herald [May 29], who, in the name of his sovereign, declared war in form against France. This step

<sup>80</sup> Jovii Vita Ferdin. Davali, p. 344. Guic. l. xiv. 233.

was taken in consequence of the treaty which Wolsey had concluded with the Emperor at Bruges, and which had hitherto been kept secret. Francis, though he had reason to be surprised with this denunciation, after having been at such pains to sooth Henry and to gain his minister, received the herald with great composure and dignity<sup>81</sup>; and, without abandoning any of the schemes which he was forming against the Emperor, began vigorous preparations for resisting this new enemy. His treasury, however, being exhausted by the efforts which he had already made, as well as by the sums he expended on his pleasures, he had recourse to extraordinary expedients for supplying it. Several new offices were created and exposed to sale; the royal demesnes were alienated; unusual taxes were imposed; and the tomb of St. Martin was stripped of a rail of massive silver, with which Louis XI, in one of his fits of devotion, had encircled it. By means of these expedients he was enabled to levy a considerable army, and to put the frontier towns in a good posture of defence.

The Emperor, meanwhile, was no less solicitous to draw as much advantage as possible from the accession of such a powerful ally; and the prosperous situation of his affairs, at this time, permitting him to set out for Spain, where his presence was extremely necessary, he visited the court of England in his way to that country. He proposed by this interview not only to strengthen the bonds of friendship which united him with Henry, and to excite him to push the war against France with vigour, but hoped to remove any disgust or resent-

<sup>81</sup> *Journal de Louise de Savoie*, p. 119.

ment that Wolsey might have conceived on account of the mortifying disappointment which he had met with in the late conclave. His success exceeded his most sanguine expectations; and by his artful address, during a residence of six weeks in England, he gained not only the King and the minister, but the nation itself. Henry, whose vanity was sensibly flattered by such a visit, as well as by the studied respect with which the Emperor treated him on every occasion, entered warmly into all his schemes. The Cardinal foreseeing, from Adrian's age and infirmities, a sudden vacancy in the papal see, dissembled or forgot his resentment; and as Charles, besides augmenting the pensions which he had already settled on him, renewed his promise of favouring his pretensions to the papacy with all his interest, he endeavoured to merit the former, and to secure the accomplishment of the latter by fresh services. The nation, sharing in the glory of its monarch, and pleased with the confidence which the Emperor placed in the English, by creating the Earl of Surrey his high-admiral, discovered no less inclination to commence hostilities than Henry himself.

In order to give Charles, before he left England, a proof of this general ardour, Surrey sailed with such forces as were ready, and ravaged the coasts of Normandy. He then made a descent on Bretagne, where he plundered and burnt Morlaix, and some other places of less consequence. After these slight excursions, attended with greater dishonour than damage to France, he repaired to Calais, and took the command of the principal army, consisting of sixteen thousand men; with which, having joined the Flemish troops under the Count de Buren, he

advanced into Picardy. The army which Francis had assembled was far inferior in number to these united bodies. But during the long wars between the two nations, the French had discovered the proper method of defending their country against the English. They had been taught by their misfortunes to avoid a pitched battle with the utmost care, and to endeavour by throwing garrisons into every place capable of resistance, by watching all the enemy's motions, by intercepting their convoys, attacking their advanced posts, and harassing them continually with their numerous cavalry, to ruin them with the length of the war, or to beat them by piecemeal. This plan the Duke of Vendôme, the French General in Picardy, pursued with no less prudence than success; and not only prevented Surrey from taking any town of importance, but obliged him to retire with his army greatly reduced by fatigue, by want of provisions, and by the loss which it had sustained in several unsuccessful skirmishes.

Thus ended the second campaign, in a war the most general that had hitherto been kindled in Europe; and though Francis, by his mother's ill timed resentment, by the disgusting insolence of his General, and the caprice of the mercenary troops which he employed, had lost his conquests in Italy, yet all the powers combined against him had not been able to make any impression on his hereditary dominions; and wherever they either intended or attempted an attack, he was well prepared to receive them.

While the Christian Princes were thus wasting each other's strength, Solyman the Magnificent en-

tered Hungary with a numerous army, and investing Belgrade, which was deemed the chief barrier of that kingdom against the Turkish arms, soon forced it to surrender. Encouraged by this success, he turned his victorious arms against the island of Rhodes, the seat, at that time, of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This small state he attacked with such a numerous army, as the Lords of Asia have been accustomed, in every age, to bring into the field. Two hundred thousand men, and a fleet of four hundred sail, appeared against a town defended by a garrison consisting of five thousand soldiers, and six hundred Knights, under the command of Villiers de L'Isle Adam, the Grand Master, whose wisdom and valour rendered him worthy of that station at such a dangerous juncture. No sooner did he begin to suspect the destination of Solymán's vast armaments, than he dispatched messengers to all the Christian courts, imploring their aid against the common enemy. But though every Prince, in that age, acknowledged Rhodes to be the great bulwark of Christendom in the east, and trusted to the gallantry of its Knights as the best security against the progress of the Ottoman arms; though Adrian, with a zeal which became the head and father of the church, exhorted the contending powers to forget their private quarrels, and, by uniting their arms, to prevent the Infidels from destroying a society which did honour to the Christian name; yet so violent and implacable was the animosity of both parties, that, regardless of the danger to which they exposed all Europe, and unmoved by the entreaties of the Grand Master, or the admonitions of the Pope, they suffered Solymán to carry

on his operations against Rhodes without disturbance. The Grand Master, after incredible efforts of courage, of patience, and of military conduct, during a siege of six months ; after sustaining many assaults, and disputing every post with amazing obstinacy, was obliged at last to yield to numbers; and, having obtained an honourable capitulation from the Sultan, who admired and respected his virtue, he surrendered the town, which was reduced to a heap of rubbish, and destitute of every resource<sup>82</sup>. Charles and Francis, ashamed of having occasioned such a loss to Christendom by their ambitious contests, endeavoured to throw the blame of it on each other, while all Europe, with greater justice, imputed it equally to both. The Emperor, by way of reparation, granted the Knights of St. John the small island of Malta, in which they fixed their residence, retaining, though with less power and splendour, their ancient spirit, and implacable enmity to the Infidels.

<sup>82</sup> Fontanus de Bello Rhodio, ap. Scard. Script. Rer. German. vol. ii. p. 88. P. Barre. Hist. d'Allem. tome viii. 57.

## BOOK III.

1522.

CHARLES, having had the satisfaction of seeing hostilities begun between France and England, took leave of Henry and arrived in Spain on the 17th of June. He found that country just beginning to recover order and strength after the miseries of a civil war, to which it had been exposed during his absence; an account of the rise and progress of which, as it was but little connected with the other events which happened in Europe, hath been reserved to this place.

No sooner was it known that the Cortes assembled in Galicia had voted the Emperor a *free gift*, without obtaining the redress of any one grievance, than it excited universal indignation. The citizens of Toledo, who considered themselves, on account of the great privileges which they enjoyed, as guardians of the liberties of the Castilian commons, finding that no regard was paid to the remonstrances of their deputies against that unconstitutional grant, took arms with tumultuary violence [May, 1520], and seizing the gates of the city, which were fortified, attacked the Al-cazar, or castle, which they soon obliged the governor to surrender. Emboldened by this success, they deprived of all authority every person whom they suspected of any attachment to the Court, established a popular form of government, composed of deputies from the several parishes in the city, and levied troops in their own defence. The chief leader of the people, in these

insurrections, was Don John de Padilla, the eldest son of the commendator of Castile, a young nobleman of a generous temper, of undaunted courage, and possessed of the talents, as well as of the ambition, which in times of civil discord raise men to power and eminence<sup>1</sup>.

The resentment of the citizens of Segovia produced effects still more fatal. Tordesillas, one of their representatives in the late Cortes, had voted for the Donative; and, being a bold and haughty man, ventured, upon his return, to call together his fellow citizens in the great church, that he might give them, according to custom, an account of his conduct in that assembly. But the multitude, unable to bear his insolence, in attempting to justify what they thought inexcusable, burst open the gates of the church with the utmost fury, and, seizing the unhappy Tordesillas, dragged him through the streets, with a thousand curses and insults, towards the place of public execution. In vain did the deans and canons come forth in procession with the holy sacrament in order to appease their rage. In vain did the monks of those monasteries by which they passed, conjure them on their knees to spare his life, or at least to allow him time to confess, and to receive absolution of his sins. Without listening to the dictates either of humanity or religion, they cried out, "That the hangman alone could absolve such a traitor to his country:" they then hurried him along with greater violence; and perceiving that he had expired under their hands, they hung him up with his head downwards on the common gibbet<sup>2</sup>. The same spirit seized the inhabitants of Burgos, Zamora, and several other cities; and though their

<sup>1</sup> Sandov. p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 671.

representatives, taking warning from the fate of Tor-desillas, had been so wise as to save themselves by a timely flight, they were burnt in effigy, their houses razed to the ground, and their effects consumed with fire; and such was the horror which the people had conceived against them, as betrayers of the public liberty, that not one in those licentious multitudes would touch any thing, however valuable, which had belonged to them<sup>3</sup>.

Adrian, at that time Regent of Spain, had scarcely fixed the seat of his government at Valladolid, when he was alarmed with an account of these insurrections. He immediately assembled the privy council [June 5, 1520], to deliberate concerning the proper method of suppressing them. The counsellors differed in opinion; some insisting that it was necessary to check this audacious spirit in its infancy by a severe execution of justice; others advising to treat with lenity a people who had some reason to be incensed, and not to drive them beyond all the bounds of duty by an ill timed rigour. The sentiments of the former being warmly supported by the Archbishop of Granada, president of the council, a person of great authority, but choleric and impetuous, were approved by Adrian, whose zeal to support his master's authority hurried him into a measure, to which, from his natural caution and timidity, he would otherwise have been averse. He commanded Ronquillo, one of the King's judges, to repair instantly to Segovia, which had set the first example of mutiny, and to proceed against the delinquents according to law; and lest the people should be so outrageous as to resist his authority, a considerable body of troops was appointed to attend

<sup>3</sup> Sandov. 103. P. Mart. Ep. 674.

him. The Segovians, foreseeing what they might expect from a judge so well known for his austere and unforgiving temper, took arms with one consent, and, having mustered twelve thousand men, shut their gates against him. Ronquillo, enraged at this insult, denounced them rebels and outlaws, and, his troops seizing all the avenues to the town, hoped that it would soon be obliged to surrender for want of provisions. The inhabitants, however, defended themselves with vigour; and, having received a considerable reinforcement from Toledo, under the command of Padilla, attacked Ronquillo, and forced him to retire with the loss of his baggage and military chest<sup>4</sup>.

Upon this, Adrian ordered Antonio de Fonseca, whom the Emperor had appointed commander in chief of the forces in Castile, to assemble an army, and to besiege Segovia in form. But the inhabitants of Medina del Campo, where Cardinal Ximenes had established a vast magazine of military stores, would not suffer him to draw from it a train of battering cannon, or to destroy their countrymen with those arms which had been prepared against the enemies of the kingdom. Fonseca, who could not execute his orders without artillery, determined to seize the magazine by force; and the citizens standing on their defence, he assaulted the town with great briskness [Aug. 21]; but his troops were so warmly received, that, despairing of carrying the place, he set fire to some of the houses, in hopes that the citizens would abandon the walls in order to save their families and effects. Instead of that, the expedient to which he had recourse served only to increase their fury, and he was repulsed with

<sup>4</sup> Sandov. 112. P. Mart. Ep. 679. Miniana, Contin. p. 13.

great disgrace; while the flames, spreading from street to street, reduced to ashes almost the whole town, one of the most considerable at that time in Spain, and the great mart for the manufactories of Segovia and several other cities. As the warehouses were then filled with goods for the approaching fair, the loss was immense, and was felt universally. This, added to the impression which such a cruel action made on a people long unaccustomed to the horrors of civil war, enraged the Castilians almost to madness. Fonseca became the object of general hatred, and was branded with the name of incendiary, and enemy to his country. Even the citizens of Valladolid, whom the presence of the Cardinal had hitherto restrained, declared that they could no longer remain inactive spectators of the sufferings of their countrymen. Taking arms with no less fury than the other cities, they burnt Fonseca's house to the ground, elected new magistrates, raised soldiers, appointed officers to command them, and guarded their walls with as much diligence as if an enemy had been ready to attack them.

The Cardinal, though virtuous and disinterested, and capable of governing the kingdom with honour in times of tranquillity, possessed neither the courage nor the sagacity necessary at such a dangerous juncture. Finding himself unable to check these outrages committed under his own eye, he attempted to appease the people, by protesting that Fonseca had exceeded his orders, and had by his rash conduct offended him as much as he had injured them. This condescension, the effect of irresolution and timidity, rendered the malecontents bolder and more insolent; and the Cardinal having soon after recalled Fonseca, and dismissed his troops, which he could

no longer afford to pay, as the treasury, drained by the rapaciousness of the Flemish ministers, had received no supply from the great cities, which were all in arms, the people were left at full liberty to act without control, and scarcely any shadow of power remained in his hands.

Nor were the proceedings of the commons the effect merely of popular and tumultuary rage; they aimed at obtaining redress of their political grievances, and an establishment of public liberty on a secure basis, objects worthy of all the zeal which they discovered in contending for them. The feudal government in Spain was at that time in a state more favourable to liberty than in any other of the great European kingdoms. This was owing chiefly to the number of great cities in that country; a circumstance I have already taken notice of, and which contributes more than any other to mitigate the rigour of the feudal institutions, and to introduce a more liberal and equal form of government. The inhabitants of every city formed a great corporation, with valuable immunities and privileges; they were delivered from a state of subjection and vassalage; they were admitted to a considerable share in the legislature; they had acquired the arts of industry, without which cities cannot subsist; they had accumulated wealth, by engaging in commerce; and, being free and independent themselves, were ever ready to act as the guardians of the public freedom and independence. The genius of the internal government established among the inhabitants of cities, which, even in countries where despotic power prevails most, is democratical and republican, rendered the idea of liberty familiar and dear to them. Their representatives in the Cortes were accustomed, with

equal spirit, to check the encroachments of the King and the oppression of the Nobles. They endeavoured to extend the privileges of their own order; they laboured to shake off the remaining incumbrances with which the spirit of feudal policy, favourable only to the nobles, had burthened them; and conscious of being one of the most considerable orders in the state, were ambitious of becoming the most powerful.

The present juncture appeared favourable for pushing any new claim. Their sovereign was absent from his dominions; by the ill conduct of his ministers he had lost the esteem and affection of his subjects; the people exasperated by many injuries had taken arms, though without concert, almost by general consent; they were animated with rage capable of carrying them to the most violent extremes; the royal treasury was exhausted; the kingdom destitute of troops; and the government committed to a stranger, of great virtue indeed, but of abilities unequal to such a trust. The first care of Padilla, and the other popular leaders who observed and determined to improve these circumstances, was to establish some form of union or association among the malecontents, that they might act with greater regularity, and pursue one common end; and as the different cities had been prompted to take arms by the same motives, and were accustomed to consider themselves as a distinct body from the rest of the subjects, they did not find this difficult. A general convention was appointed to be held at Avila. Deputies appeared there in name of almost all the cities entitled to have representatives in the Cortes. They all bound themselves, by solemn oath, to live and die in the service of the King, and in defence of

the privileges of their order ; and assuming the name of the Holy *Junta*, or Association, proceeded to deliberate concerning the state of the nation, and the proper method of redressing its grievances. The first that naturally presented itself was the nomination of a foreigner to be Regent ; this they declared with one voice to be a violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and resolved to send a deputation of their members to Adrian, requiring him in their name to lay aside all the ensigns of his office, and to abstain for the future from the exercise of a jurisdiction which they had pronounced illegal<sup>5</sup>.

While they were preparing to execute this bold resolution, Padilla accomplished an enterprise of the greatest advantage to the cause. After relieving Segovia, he marched suddenly to Tordesillas [Aug. 29], the place where the unhappy Queen Joanna had resided since the death of her husband, and being favoured by the inhabitants was admitted into the town, and became master of her person, for the security of which Adrian had neglected to take proper precautions<sup>6</sup>. Padilla waited immediately upon the Queen, and, accosting her with that profound respect which she exacted from the few persons whom she deigned to admit into her presence, acquainted her at large with the miserable condition of her Castilian subjects under the government of her son, who being destitute of experience himself, permitted his foreign ministers to treat them with such rigour as had obliged them to take arms in defence of the liberties of their country. The

<sup>5</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 691.

<sup>6</sup> Vita dell' Imper. Car. V. dell' Alf. Ulloa. Ven. 1509, p. 67. Miniana, Contin. p. 17.

Queen, as if she had been awakened out of a lethargy, expressed great astonishment at what he said, and told him, that as she had never heard, until that moment, of the death of her father, or known the sufferings of her people, no blame could be imputed to her, but that now she would take care to provide a sufficient remedy; "and in the mean time (added she) let it be your concern to do what is necessary for the public welfare." Padilla, too eager in forming a conclusion agreeable to his wishes, mistook this lucid interval of reason for a perfect return of that faculty; and, acquainting the Junta with what had happened, advised them to remove to Tordesillas, and to hold their meetings in that place. This was instantly done; but though Joanna received very graciously an address of the Junta, beseeching her to take upon herself the government of the kingdom, and, in token of her compliance, admitted all the deputies to kiss her hand; though she was present at a tournament held on that occasion, and seemed highly satisfied with both these ceremonies, which were conducted with great magnificence in order to please her; she soon relapsed into her former melancholy and sullenness, and could never be brought, by any arguments or entreaties, to sign any one paper necessary for the despatch of business<sup>7</sup>.

The Junta, concealing as much as possible this last circumstance, carried on all their deliberations in the name of Joanna; and as the Castilians, who idolized the memory of Isabella, retained a wonderful attachment to her daughter, no sooner was it known that she had consented to assume the reins of government, than the people expressed the most universal and immoderate joy; and, believing her

<sup>7</sup> Sandov. 164. P. Mart. Ep. 685, 686.

recovery to be complete, ascribed it to a miraculous interposition of Heaven, in order to rescue their country from the oppression of foreigners. The Junta, conscious of the reputation and power which they had acquired by seeming to act under the royal authority, were no longer satisfied with requiring Adrian to resign the office of Regent; they detached Padilla to Valladolid with a considerable body of troops, ordering him to seize such members of the council as were still in that city, to conduct them to Tordesillas, and to bring away the seals of the kingdom, the public archives, and treasury books. Padilla, who was received by the citizens as the deliverer of his country, executed his commission with great exactness; permitting Adrian, however, still to reside in Valladolid, though only as a private person, and without any shadow of power<sup>a</sup>.

The Emperor, to whom frequent accounts of these transactions were transmitted while he was still in Flanders, was sensible of his own imprudence, and that of his ministers, in having despised too long the murmurs and remonstrances of the Castilians. He beheld, with deep concern, a kingdom the most valuable of any he possessed, and in which lay the strength and sinews of his power, just ready to disown his authority, and on the point of being plunged in all the miseries of civil war. But though his presence might have averted this calamity, he could not, at that time, visit Spain without endangering the Imperial crown, and allowing the French King full leisure to execute his ambitious schemes. The only point now to be deliberated upon was, whether he should attempt to gain the malecontents by indulgence and concessions, or prepare directly to sup-

<sup>a</sup> Sandov. 174. P. Mart. Ep. 791.

press them by force; and he resolved to make trial of the former, while, at the same time, if that should fail of success, he prepared for the latter. For this purpose, he issued circular letters to all the cities of Castile, exhorting them in most gentle terms, and with assurances of full pardon, to lay down their arms; he promised such cities as had continued faithful, not to exact from them the subsidy granted in the late Cortes, and offered the same favour to such as returned to their duty; he engaged that no office should be conferred for the future upon any but native Castilians. On the other hand, he wrote to the nobles, exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, and those of the crown, against the exorbitant claims of the commons; he appointed the High Admiral Don Fadrique Enriquez, and the High Constable of Castile, Don Inigo de Valasco, two noblemen of great abilities as well as influence, Regents of the kingdom in conjunction with Adrian; and he gave them full power and instructions, if the obstinacy of the malecontents should render it necessary, to vindicate the royal authority by force of arms<sup>9</sup>.

These concessions, which, at the time of his leaving Spain, would have fully satisfied the people, came now too late to produce any effect. The Junta, relying on the unanimity with which the nation submitted to their authority, elated with the success which hitherto had accompanied all their undertakings, and seeing no military force collected to defeat or obstruct their designs, aimed at a more thorough reformation of political abuses. They had been employed for some time in preparing a remonstrance, containing a large enumeration not only of

<sup>9</sup> P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. viii. c. 6. p. 158.

the grievances of which they craved redress, but of such new regulations as they thought necessary for the security of their liberties. This remonstrance, which is divided into many articles, relating to all the different members of which the constitution was composed, as well as the various departments in the administration of government, furnishes us with more authentic evidence concerning the intentions of the Junta, than can be drawn from the testimony of the later Spanish historians, who lived in times when it became fashionable, and even necessary, to represent the conduct of the malecontents in the worst light, and as flowing from the worst motives. After a long preamble concerning the various calamities under which the nation groaned, and the errors and corruption in government to which these were to be imputed, they take notice of the exemplary patience wherewith the people had endured them, until self-preservation, and the duty which they owed to their country, had obliged them to assemble, in order to provide in a legal manner for their own safety, and that of the constitution: for this purpose they demanded that the King would be pleased to return to his Spanish dominions and reside there, as all their former monarchs had done; that he would not marry but with consent of the Cortes; that if he should be obliged at any time to leave the kingdom, it shall not be lawful to appoint any foreigner to be Regent; that the present nomination of Cardinal Adrian to that office shall instantly be declared void; that he would not, at his return, bring along with him any Flemings or other strangers; that no foreign troops shall, on any pretence whatever, be introduced into the kingdom; that none but natives shall be capable of holding any office or benefice either in church or state; that no foreigner shall be naturalized; that

free quarters shall not be granted to soldiers, nor to the members of the King's household, for any longer time than six days, and that only when the court is in a progress; that all the taxes shall be reduced to the same state they were in at the death of Queen Isabella; that all alienations of the royal demesnes or revenues since the Queen's death shall be resumed; that all new offices created since that period shall be abolished; that the subsidy granted by the late Cortes in Galicia shall not be exacted; that in all future Cortes each city shall send one representative of the clergy, one of the gentry, and one of the commons, each to be elected by his own order; that the crown shall not influence or direct any city with regard to the choice of its representatives; that no member of the Cortes shall receive an office or pension from the King, either for himself or for any of his family, under pain of death, and confiscation of his goods; that each city or community shall pay a competent salary to its representative for his maintenance during his attendance on the Cortes; that the Cortes shall assemble once in three years at least, whether summoned by the King or not, and shall then inquire into the observation of the articles now agreed upon, and deliberate concerning public affairs; that the rewards which have been given or promised to any of the members of the Cortes held in Galicia, shall be revoked; that it shall be declared a capital crime to send gold, silver, or jewels out of the kingdom; that judges shall have fixed salaries assigned them, and shall not receive any share of the fines and forfeitures of persons condemned by them; that no grant of the goods of persons accused shall be valid, if given before sentence was pronounced against them; that all privileges which the nobles have at any time obtained,

to the prejudice of the commons, shall be revoked that the government of cities or towns shall not be put into the hands of noblemen; that the possessions of the nobility shall be subject to all public taxes in the same manner as those of the commons; that an inquiry be made into the conduct of such as have been intrusted with the management of the royal patrimony since the accession of Ferdinand; and if the King do not within thirty days appoint persons properly qualified for that service, it shall be lawful for the Cortes to nominate them; that indulgences shall not be preached or dispersed in the kingdom until the cause of publishing them be examined and approved of by the Cortes; that all the money arising from the sale of indulgences shall be faithfully employed in carrying on war against the Infidels; that such prelates as do not reside in their dioceses six months in the year shall forfeit their revenues during the time they are absent; that the ecclesiastical judges and their officers shall not exact greater fees than those which are paid in the secular courts; that the present Archbishop of Toledo, being a foreigner, be compelled to resign that dignity, which shall be conferred upon a Castilian; that the King shall ratify and hold, as good service done to him and to the kingdom, all the proceedings of the Junta, and pardon any irregularities which the cities may have committed from an excess of zeal in a good cause: that he shall promise and swear in the most solemn manner to observe all these articles, and on no occasion attempt either to elude or to repeal them; and that he shall never solicit the Pope or any other prelate to grant him a dispensation or absolution from this oath and promise<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Sandov. 206. P. Mart. Ep. 686.

Such were the chief articles presented by the Junta to their sovereign. As the feudal institutions in the several kingdoms of Europe were originally the same, the genius of those governments which arose from them bore a strong resemblance to each other, and the regulations which the Castilians attempted to establish on this occasion differ little from those which other nations have laboured to procure in their struggles with their monarchs for liberty. The grievances complained of, and the remedies proposed by the English commons, in their contests with the Princes of the house of Stuart, particularly resemble those upon which the Junta now insisted. But the principles of liberty seem to have been better understood, at this period, by the Castilians than by any other people in Europe; they had acquired more liberal ideas with respect to their own rights and privileges; they had formed more bold and generous sentiments concerning government; and discovered an extent of political knowledge to which the English themselves did not attain until more than a century afterwards.

It is not improbable, however, that the spirit of reformation among the Castilians, hitherto unrestrained by authority, and emboldened by success, became too impetuous, and prompted the Junta to propose innovations which by alarming the other members of the constitution, proved fatal to their cause. The nobles, who, instead of obstructing, had favoured or connived at their proceedings, while they confined their demands of redress to such grievances as had been occasioned by the King's want of experience, and by the imprudence and rapaciousness of his foreign ministers, were filled with indignation when the Junta began to touch the

privileges of their order, and plainly saw that the measures of the commons tended no less to break the power of the aristocracy than to limit the prerogatives of the crown. The resentment which they had conceived on account of Adrian's promotion to the regency, abated considerably upon the Emperor's raising the Constable and Admiral to joint power with him in that office; and as their pride and dignity were less hurt by suffering the Prince to possess an extensive prerogative, than by admitting the high pretensions of the people, they determined to give their sovereign the assistance which he had demanded of them, and began to assemble their vassals for that purpose.

The Junta, meanwhile, expected with impatience the Emperor's answer to their remonstrance, which they had appointed some of their number to present. The members intrusted with this commission set out immediately for Germany [Oct. 20]; but having received at different places certain intelligence from court, that they could not venture to appear there without endangering their lives, they stopped short in their journey, and acquainted the Junta of the information which had been given them<sup>11</sup>. This excited such violent passions as transported the whole party beyond all bounds of prudence or of moderation. That a King of Castile should deny his subjects access into his presence, or refuse to listen to their humble petitions, was represented as an act of tyranny so unprecedented and intolerable, that nothing now remained but with arms in their hands to drive away that ravenous band of foreigners which encompassed the throne, who, after having devoured the wealth of the kingdom, found it ne-

<sup>11</sup> Sandov. 113.

cessary to prevent the cries of an injured people from reaching the ears of their sovereign. Many insisted warmly on approving a motion which had formerly been made for depriving Charles, during the life of his mother, of the regal titles and authority which had been too rashly conferred upon him from a false supposition of her total inability for government. Some proposed to provide a proper person to assist her in the administration of public affairs, by marrying the Queen to the Prince of Calabria, the heir of the Aragonese Kings of Naples, who had been detained in prison since the time that Ferdinand had dispossessed his ancestors of their crown. All agreed that, as the hopes of obtaining redress and security merely by presenting their requests to their sovereign had kept them too long in a state of inaction, and prevented them from taking advantage of the unanimity with which the nation declared in their favour, it was now necessary to collect their whole force, and to exert themselves with vigour in opposing this fatal combination of the King and the nobility against their liberties<sup>12</sup>.

They soon took the field with twenty thousand men. Violent disputes arose concerning the command of this army. Padilla, the darling of the people and soldiers, was the only person whom they thought worthy of this honour. But Don Pedro de Giron, the eldest son of the Conde de Urueña, a young nobleman of the first order, having lately joined the commons out of private resentment against the Emperor, the respect due to his birth, together with a secret desire of disappointing Padilla, of whose popularity many members of the Junta had become jealous, procured him the office of general;

<sup>12</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 688.

[Nov. 23] though he soon gave them a fatal proof that he possessed neither the experience, the abilities, nor the steadiness which that important station required.

The Regents, meanwhile, appointed Rioseco as the place of rendezvous for their troops, which, though far inferior to those of the commons in number, excelled them greatly in discipline and in valour. They had drawn a considerable body of regular and veteran infantry out of Navarre. Their cavalry, which formed the chief strength of their army, consisted mostly of gentlemen accustomed to the military life, and animated with the martial spirit peculiar to their order in that age. The infantry of the Junta was formed entirely of citizens and mechanics, little acquainted with the use of arms. The small body of cavalry which they had been able to raise was composed of persons of ignoble birth, and perfect strangers to the service into which they entered. The character of the Generals differed no less than that of their troops. The royalists were commanded by the Conde de Haro, the Constable's eldest son, an officer of great experience and of distinguished abilities.

Giron marched with his army directly to Rioseco, and, seizing the villages and passes around it, hoped that the royalists would be obliged either to surrender for want of provisions, or to fight with disadvantage before all their troops were assembled. But he had not the abilities, nor his troops the patience and discipline, necessary for the execution of such a scheme. The Conde de Haro found little difficulty in conducting a considerable reinforcement through all his posts into the town; and Giron, despairing of being able to reduce it, advanced sud-

denly to Villapanda a place belonging to the Constable, in which the enemy had their chief magazine of provisions. By this ill judged motion he left Tordesillas open to the royalists, whom the Conde de Haro led thither in the night with the utmost secrecy and dispatch; and attacking the town [Dec. 5], in which Giron had left no other garrison than a regiment of priests, raised by the Bishop of Zamora, he, by break of day forced his way into it after a desperate resistance, became master of the Queen's person, took prisoners many members of the Junta, and recovered the great seal, with the other ensigns of government.

By this fatal blow, the Junta lost all the reputation and authority which they had derived from seeming to act by the Queen's commands; such of the nobles as had hitherto been wavering or undetermined in their choice, now joined the Regents, with all their forces; and a universal consternation seized the partisans of the commons. This was much increased by the suspicions they began to entertain of Giron, whom they loudly accused of having betrayed Tordesillas to the enemy; and though that charge seems to have been destitute of foundation, the success of the royalists being owing to Giron's ill conduct rather than to his treachery, he so entirely lost credit with his party, that he resigned his commission, and retired to one of his castles<sup>13</sup>.

Such members of the Junta as had escaped the enemy's hands at Tordesillas fled to Valladolid; and as it would have required long time to supply the places of those who were prisoners by a new election, they made choice among themselves of a

<sup>13</sup> *Miscellaneous Tracts, by Dr. Mich. Geddes, vol. i. p. 278.*

small number of persons, to whom they committed the supreme direction of affairs. Their army, which grew stronger every day by the arrival of troops from different parts of the kingdom, marched likewise to Valladolid; and Padilla being appointed commander in chief, the spirits of the soldiery revived; and the whole party, forgetting the late misfortune, continued to express the same ardent zeal for the liberties of their country, and the same implacable animosity against their oppressors.

What they stood most in need of was money to pay their troops. A great part of the current coin had been carried out of the kingdom by the Flemings; the stated taxes levied in times of peace were inconsiderable; commerce of every kind being interrupted by the war, the sum which it yielded, decreased daily; and the Junta were afraid of disgusting the people by burdening them with new impositions, to which, in that age, they were little accustomed. But from this difficulty they were extricated by Donna Maria Pacheco, Padilla's wife, a woman of noble birth, of great abilities, of boundless ambition, and animated with the most ardent zeal in support of the cause of the Junta. She, with a boldness superior to those superstitious fears which often influence her sex, proposed to seize all the rich and magnificent ornaments in the cathedral of Toledo; but lest that action, by its appearance of impiety, might offend the people, she and her retinue marched to the church in solemn procession, in mourning habits, with tears in their eyes, beating their breasts, and, falling on their knees, implored the pardon of the saints whose shrines she was about to violate. By this artifice, which screened her from the imputation of sacrilege, and persuaded

the people that necessity and zeal for a good cause had constrained her, though with reluctance, to venture upon this action, she stripped the cathedral of whatever was valuable, and procured a considerable sum of money for the Junta<sup>14</sup>. The Regents, no less at a loss how to maintain their troops, the revenues of the crown having either been dissipated by the Flemings or seized by the commons, were obliged to take the Queen's jewels, together with the plate belonging to the nobility, and apply them to that purpose; and when those failed, they obtained a small sum by way of loan from the King of Portugal<sup>15</sup>.

The nobility discovered great unwillingness to proceed to extremities with the Junta. They were animated with no less hatred than the commons against the Flemings; they approved much of several articles in the remonstrance; they thought the juncture favourable, not only for redressing past grievances, but for rendering the constitution more perfect and secure by new regulations; they were afraid, that while the two orders, of which the legislature was composed, wasted each other's strength by mutual hostilities, the crown would rise to power on the ruin or weakness of both, and encroach no less on the independence of the nobles than on the privileges of the commons. To this disposition were owing the frequent overtures of peace which the Regents made to the Junta, and the continual negotiations they carried on during the progress of their military operations. Nor were the terms which they offered unreasonable; for, on condition that the Junta would pass from a few articles most sub-

<sup>14</sup> Sandov. 308. Dict. de Bayle, art. Padilla.

<sup>15</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 718.

versive of the royal authority, or inconsistent with the rights of the nobility, they engaged to procure the Emperor's consent to their other demands; which if he, through the influence of evil counsellors, should refuse, several of the nobles promised to join with the commons in their endeavours to extort it<sup>10</sup>. Such divisions, however, prevailed among the members of the Junta, as prevented their deliberating calmly, or judging with prudence. Some of the cities which had entered into the confederacy were filled with that mean jealousy and distrust of each other, which rivalry in commerce or in grandeur is apt to inspire; the Constable, by his influence and promises, had prevailed on the inhabitants of Burgos to abandon the Junta, and other noblemen had shaken the fidelity of some of the lesser cities; no person had arisen among the commons of such superior abilities or elevation of mind as to acquire the direction of their affairs; Padilla, their general, was a man of popular qualities, but distrusted for that reason by those of highest rank who adhered to the Junta; the conduct of Giron led the people to view with suspicion every person of noble birth who joined their party; so that the strongest marks of irresolution, mutual distrust, and mediocrity of genius, appeared in all their proceedings at this time. After many consultations held concerning the terms proposed by the Regents, they suffered themselves to be so carried away by resentment against the nobility, that, rejecting all thoughts of accommodation, they threatened to strip them of the crown lands, which they or their ancestors had usurped, and to reannex these to the royal domain. Upon this preposterous scheme, which would at

<sup>10</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 695, 713. Geddes's Tracts, i. 261.

once have annihilated all the liberties for which they had been struggling, by rendering the Kings of Castile absolute and independent on their subjects, they were so intent, that they now exclaimed with less vehemence against the exactions of the foreign ministers, than against the exorbitant power and wealth of the nobles, and seemed to hope that they might make peace with Charles, by offering to enrich him with their spoils.

The success which Padilla had met with in several small rencounters, and in reducing some considerable towns, helped to precipitate the members of the Junta into this measure, filling them with such confidence in the valour of their troops that they hoped for an easy victory over the royalists. Padilla, that his army might not remain inactive while flushed with good fortune, laid siege to Torrelobaton, a place of greater strength and importance than any that he had hitherto ventured to attack, and which was defended by a sufficient garrison; and though the besieged made a desperate resistance and the Admiral attempted to relieve them, he took the town by storm [March 1, 1521], and gave it up to be plundered by his soldiers. If he had marched instantly with his victorious army to Tordesillas, the head-quarters of the royalists, he could hardly have failed of making an effectual impression on their troops, whom he would have found in astonishment at the briskness of his operations, and far from being of sufficient strength to give him battle. But the fickleness and imprudence of the Junta prevented his taking this step. Incapable, like all popular associations, either of carrying on war or making peace, they listened again to overtures of accommodation, and even agreed to a short

suspension of arms. This negotiation terminated in nothing; but while it was carrying on, many of Padilla's soldiers, unacquainted with the restraints of discipline, went off with the booty which they had got at Torrelobaton; and others, wearied out by the unusual length of the campaign, deserted<sup>17</sup>. The Constable too had leisure to assemble his forces at Burgos, and to prepare every thing for taking the field; and as soon as the truce expired, he effected a junction with the Conde de Haro, in spite of all Padilla's efforts to prevent it. They advanced immediately towards Torrelobaton; and Padilla, finding the number of his troops so diminished that he durst not risk a battle, attempted to retreat to Toro; which if he could have accomplished, the invasion of Navarre at that juncture by the French, and the necessity which the Regents must have been under of detaching men to that kingdom, might have saved him from danger. But Haro, sensible how fatal the consequences would be of suffering him to escape, marched with such rapidity at the head of his cavalry, that he came up with him near Villalar [April 23], and, without waiting for his infantry, advanced to the attack. Padilla's army, fatigued and disheartened by their precipitant retreat, which they could not distinguish from a flight, happened at that time to be passing over a ploughed field, on which such a violent rain had fallen, that the soldiers sunk almost to their knees at every step, and remained exposed to the fire of some field-pieces which the royalists had brought along with them. All these circumstances so disconcerted and intimidated raw soldiers, that without facing the enemy, or making any resistance, they fled in the utmost confusion.

<sup>17</sup> Sandov. 336.

Padilla exerted himself with extraordinary courage and activity in order to rally them, though in vain; fear rendering them deaf both to his threats and entreaties: upon which, finding matters irretrievable, and resolving not to survive the disgrace of that day, and the ruin of his party, he rushed into the thickest of the enemy; but being wounded and dismounted, he was taken prisoner. His principal officers shared the same fate; the common soldiers were allowed to depart unhurt, the nobles being too generous to kill men who threw down their arms<sup>18</sup>.

The resentment of his enemies did not suffer Padilla to linger long in expectation of what should befall him. Next day he was condemned to lose his head, though without any regular trial, the notoriety of the crime being supposed sufficient to supersede the formality of a legal process. He was led instantly to execution, together with Don John Bravo, and Don Francis Maldonada, the former commander of the Segovians, and the latter of the troops of Salamanca. Padilla viewed the approach of death with calm but undaunted fortitude; and when Bravo, his fellow sufferer, expressed some indignation at hearing himself proclaimed a traitor, he checked him, by observing, "That yesterday was the time to have displayed the spirit of gentlemen, this day to die with the meekness of Christians." Being permitted to write to his wife and to the community of Toledo, the place of his nativity, he addressed the former with a manly and virtuous tenderness, and the latter with the exultation natural to one who considered himself as a martyr for the liberties of

<sup>18</sup> Sandov. 345, &c. P. Mart. Ep. 720. Miniana, Contin. p. 26. Epitome de la Vida y Hechos del Emper. Carlos V. por D. Juan Anton. de Vera y Zuniga. 4to. Madr. 1627. p. 19.

his country<sup>19</sup>. After this, he submitted quietly to his fate. Most of the Spanish historians, accustomed to ideas of government, and of regal power, very different from those upon which he acted, have been so eager to testify their disapprobation of the cause in which he was engaged, that they have neglected, or have been afraid, to do justice to his virtues; and, by blackening his memory, have endeavoured to deprive him of that pity which is seldom denied to illustrious sufferers.

The victory at Villalar proved as decisive as it was complete. Valladolid, the most zealous of all the associated cities, opened its gates immediately to the conquerors; and being treated with great clemency by the Regents, Medina del Campo, Segovia, and many other towns, followed its example.

<sup>19</sup> The strain of these letters is so eloquent and high spirited that I have translated them for the entertainment of my readers.

THE LETTER OF DON JOHN PADILLA TO HIS WIFE.

“ SENORA,

“ IF your grief did not afflict me more than my own death, I should deem myself perfectly happy. For the end of life being certain to all men, the Almighty confers a mark of distinguishing favour upon that person, for whom he appoints a death such as mine, which, though lamented by many, is nevertheless acceptable unto him. It would require more time than I now have, to write any thing that could afford you consolation. That my enemies will not grant me, nor do I wish to delay the reception of that crown which I hope to enjoy. You may bewail your own loss, but not my death, which, being so honourable, ought not to be lamented by any. My soul, for nothing else is left to me, I bequeath to you. You will receive it, as the thing in this world which you value most. I do not write to my father Pero Lopez, because I dare not; for though I have shown myself to be his son in daring to lose my life, I have not been the heir of his good fortune. I will not attempt to say any thing more, that I may not tire the executioner, who waits for me; and that I may not excite a suspicion, that, in order to prolong my life, I lengthen out my letter. My servant Sosia, an eyewitness, and to whom

This sudden dissolution of a confederacy, formed not upon slight disgusts or upon trifling motives, into which the whole body of the people had entered, and which had been allowed time to acquire a considerable degree of order and consistence by establishing a regular plan of government, is the strongest proof either of the inability of its leaders, or of some secret discord reigning among its members. Though part of that army by which they had been subdued, was obliged, a few days after the battle, to march towards Navarre, in order to check the progress of the French in that kingdom, nothing could prevail on the dejected commons of Castile to take arms

I have communicated my most secret thoughts, will inform you of what I cannot now write ; and thus I rest, expecting the instrument of your grief, and of my deliverance."

HIS LETTER TO THE CITY OF TOLEDO.

" To thee, the crown of Spain, and the light of the whole world, free from the time of the mighty Goths : to thee, who, by shedding the blood of strangers, as well as thy own blood, hast recovered liberty for thyself and thy neighbouring cities, thy legitimate son, Juan de Padilla, gives information, how by the blood of his body thy ancient victories are to be refreshed. If fate hath not permitted my actions to be placed among your successful and celebrated exploits, the fault hath been in my ill fortune, not in my good will. This I request of thee, as of a mother, to accept, since God hath given me nothing more to lose for thy sake, than that which I am now to relinquish. I am more solicitous about thy good opinion than about my own life. The shiftings of fortune, which never stands still, are many. But this I see with infinite consolation, that I, the least of thy children, suffer death for thee ; and that thou hast nursed at thy breasts such as may take vengeance for my wrongs. Many tongues will relate the manner of my death, of which I am still ignorant, though I know it to be near. My end will testify what was my desire. My soul I recommend to thee as to the patroness of Christianity. Of my body I say nothing, for it is not mine. I can write nothing more, for at this very moment I feel the knife at my throat, with greater dread of thy displeasure, than apprehension of my own pain." Sandov. Hist. vol. i. p. 478.

again, and to embrace such a favourable opportunity of acquiring those rights and privileges for which they had appeared so zealous. The city of Toledo alone, animated by Donna Maria Pacheco, Padilla's widow, who, instead of bewailing her husband with a womanish sorrow, prepared to revenge his death, and to prosecute that cause in defence of which he had suffered, must be excepted. Respect for her sex, or admiration for her courage and abilities, as well as sympathy with her misfortunes, and veneration for the memory of her husband, secured her the same ascendant over the people which he had possessed. The prudence and vigour with which she acted, justified that confidence they placed in her. She wrote to the French General in Navarre, encouraging him to invade Castile by the offer of powerful assistance. She endeavoured by her letters and emissaries to revive the spirit and hopes of the other cities. She raised soldiers, and exacted a great sum from the clergy belonging to the cathedral, in order to defray the expense of keeping them on foot<sup>20</sup>. She employed every artifice that could interest or inflame the populace. For this purpose she ordered crucifixes to be used by her troops instead of colours, as if they had been at war with the infidels and enemies of religion; she marched through the streets of Toledo with her son, a young child clad in deep mourning seated on a mule, having a standard carried before him representing the manner of his father's execution<sup>21</sup>. By all these means she kept the minds of the people in such perpetual agitation as prevented their passions from subsiding, and rendered them insensible of the dangers to which they were exposed by standing

<sup>20</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 727.

<sup>21</sup> Sandov. 375.

alone in opposition to the royal authority. While the army was employed in Navarre, the Regents were unable to attempt the reduction of Toledo by force; and all their endeavours, either to diminish Donna Maria's credit with the people, or to gain her by large promises and the solicitations of her brother the Marquis de Mondejar, proved ineffectual. Upon the expulsion of the French out of Navarre, part of the army returned into Castile, and invested Toledo. Even this made no impression on the intrepid and obstinate courage of Donna Maria. She defended the town with vigour, her troops in several sallies beat the royalists, and no progress was made towards reducing the place until the clergy, whom she had highly offended by invading their property, ceased to support her. As soon as they received information of the death of William de Croy, Archbishop of Toledo, whose possession of that see was their chief grievance, and that the Emperor had named a Castilian to succeed him, they openly turned against her, and persuaded the people that she had acquired such influence over them by the force of enchantments, that she was assisted by a familiar demon which attended her in the form of a Negro maid; and that by its suggestions she regulated every part of her conduct<sup>22</sup>. The credulous multitude, whom their impatience of a long blockade, and despair of obtaining succours either from the cities formerly in confederacy with them, or from the French, rendered desirous of peace, took arms against her, and driving her out of the city, surrendered it to the royalists [Oct. 26]. She retired to the citadel, which she defended with amazing fortitude four months longer; and when reduced to the last extremities, she made

<sup>22</sup> P. Mart. Ep. 727.

her escape in disguise [Feb. 10], and fled to Portugal, where she had many relations<sup>23</sup>.

Upon her flight the citadel surrendered. Tranquillity was reestablished in Castile; and this bold attempt of the commons, like all unsuccessful insurrections, contributed to confirm and extend the power of the crown, which it was intended to moderate and abridge. The Cortes still continued to make a part of the Castilian constitution, and was summoned to meet whenever the King stood in need of money; but instead of adhering to their ancient and cautious form of examining and redressing public grievances before they proceeded to grant any supply, the more courtly custom of voting a donative in the first place was introduced, and the sovereign, having obtained all that he wanted, never allowed them to enter into any inquiry, or to attempt any reformation injurious to his authority. The privileges which the cities had enjoyed were gradually circumscribed or abolished: their commerce began from this period to decline; and becoming less wealthy and less populous, they lost that power and influence which they had acquired in the Cortes.

While Castile was exposed to the calamities of civil war, the kingdom of Valencia was torn by intestine commotions still more violent. The association which had been formed in the city of Valencia in the year 1520, and which was distinguished by the name of the Germanada, continued to subsist after the Emperor's departure from Spain. The members of it, upon pretext of defending the coasts against the descents of the corsairs of Barbary, and under sanction of that permission, which Charles had rashly granted them, refused to lay down their

<sup>23</sup> Sandov. 375. P. Mart. Ep. 754. Ferrer. viii. 563.

arms. But as the grievances, which the Valencians aimed at redressing, proceeded from the arrogance and exactions of the nobility, rather than from any unwarrantable exercise of the royal prerogative, their resentment turned chiefly against the former. As soon as they were allowed the use of arms, and became conscious of their own strength, they grew impatient to take vengeance of their oppressors. They drove the nobles out of most of the cities, plundered their houses, wasted their lands, and assaulted their castles. They then proceeded to elect thirteen persons, one from each company of tradesmen established at Valencia, and committed the administration of government to them, under pretext that they would reform the laws, establish one uniform mode of dispensing justice, without partiality or regard to the distinction of ranks, and thus restore men to some degree of their original equality.

The nobles were obliged to take arms in self-defence. Hostilities began, and were carried on with all the rancour with which resentment at oppression inspired the one party, and the idea of insulted dignity animated the other. As no person of honourable birth, or of liberal education, joined the Germanada, the councils as well as troops of the confederacy were conducted by low mechanics, who acquired the confidence of an enraged multitude chiefly by the fierceness of their zeal and the extravagance of their proceedings. Among such men, the laws introduced in civilized nations, in order to restrain or moderate the violence of war, were unknown or despised; and they ran into the wildest excesses of cruelty and outrage.

The Emperor, occupied with suppressing the insurrection in Castile, which more immediately threat-

ened the subversion of his power and prerogative was unable to give much attention to the tumults in Valencia, and left the nobility of that kingdom to fight their own battles. His viceroy, the Conde de Melito, had the supreme command of the forces which the nobles raised among the vassals. The Germanada carried on the war during the years 1520 and 1521, with a more persevering courage than could have been expected from a body so tumultuary under the conduct of such leaders. They defeated the nobility in several actions, which, though not considerable, were extremely sharp. They repulsed them in their attempts to reduce different towns. But the nobles, by their superior skill in war, and at the head of troops more accustomed to service, gained the advantage in most of the encounters. At length they were joined by a body of Castilian cavalry, which the Regents dispatched towards Valencia, soon after their victory over Padilla at Villalar, and by their assistance the Valencian nobles acquired such superiority that they entirely broke and ruined the Germanada. The leaders of the party were put to death, almost without any formality of legal trial, and suffered such cruel punishments as the sense of recent injuries prompted their adversaries to inflict. The government of Valencia was reestablished in its ancient form<sup>24</sup>.

In Aragon violent symptoms of the same spirit of disaffection and sedition, which reigned in the other kingdoms of Spain, began to appear; but by the prudent conduct of the viceroy, Don John de Lanusa, they were so far composed as to prevent

<sup>24</sup> Argensola *Annales de Aragon*, cap. 75. 90. 99. 118. *Says* *Annales de Aragon*, cap. 5. 12, &c. P. Mart. Ep. lib. xxxiii. et xxxiv. passim. Ferrer. *Hist. d'Espagne*, viii. 512. 564, &c.

their breaking out into an open insurrection. But in the island of Majorca, annexed to the crown of Aragon, the same causes which had excited the commotions in Valencia, produced effects no less violent. The people, impatient of the hardships which they had endured under the rigid jurisdiction of the nobility, took arms in a tumultuary manner [March 19, 1521]; deposed their viceroy; drove him out of the island; and massacred every gentleman who was so unfortunate as to fall into their hands. The obstinacy with which the people of Majorca persisted in their rebellion was equal to the rage with which they began it. Many and vigorous efforts were requisite in order to reduce them to obedience; and tranquillity was reestablished in every part of Spain, before the Majorcans could be brought to submit to their sovereign<sup>25</sup>.

While the spirit of disaffection was so general among the Spaniards, and so many causes concurred in precipitating them into such violent measures, in order to obtain the redress of their grievances, it may appear strange, that the malecontents in the different kingdoms should have carried on their operations without any mutual concert, or even any intercourse with each other. By uniting their councils and arms, they might have acted both with greater force and with more effect. The appearance of a national confederacy would have rendered it no less respectable among the people than formidable to the crown; and the Emperor, unable to resist such a combination, must have complied with any terms which the members of it should have

<sup>25</sup> Argensola *Annales de Aragon*, c. 113. Ferrer. *Hist.* viii. 642. Savas *Annales de Aragon*, cap. 7. 11. 14. 76. 81. Ferreras *Hist. d'Espagne*, viii. 579. &c. 609.

thought fit to prescribe. Many things, however, prevented the Spaniards from forming themselves into one body, and pursuing common measures. The people of the different kingdoms in Spain, though they were become the subjects of the same sovereign, retained, in full force, their national antipathy to each other. The remembrance of their ancient rivalry and hostilities was still lively, and the sense of reciprocal injuries so strong as to prevent them from acting with confidence and concert. Each nation chose rather to depend on its own efforts, and to maintain the struggle alone, than to implore the aid of neighbours whom they distrusted and hated. At the same time, the forms of government in the several kingdoms of Spain were so different, and the grievances of which they complained, as well as the alterations and amendments in policy which they attempted to introduce, so various, that it was not easy to bring them to unite in any common plan. To this disunion Charles was indebted for the preservation of the Spanish crowns; and while each of the kingdoms followed separate measures, they were all obliged at last to conform to the will of their sovereign.

The arrival of the Emperor in Spain filled his subjects who had been in arms against him with deep apprehensions, from which he soon delivered them by an act of clemency no less prudent than generous. After a rebellion so general, scarcely twenty persons, among so many criminals obnoxious to the law, had been punished capitally in Castile. Though strongly solicited by his council, Charles refused to shed any more blood by the hands of the executioner; and published a general pardon [Oct. 28], extending to all crimes committed since the

commencement of the insurrections, from which only fourscore persons were excepted. Even these he seems to have named rather with an intention to intimidate others, than from any inclination to seize them; for, when an officious courtier offered to inform him where one of the most considerable among them was concealed, he avoided it by a good natured pleasantry:—"Go," says he, "I have now no reason to be afraid of that man; but he has some cause to keep at a distance from me, and you would be better employed in telling him that I am here, than in acquainting me with the place of his retreat<sup>66</sup>." By this appearance of magnanimity, as well as by his care to avoid every thing which had disgusted the Castilians during his former residence among them; by his address in assuming their manners, in speaking their language, and in complying with all their humours and customs, he acquired an ascendant over them which hardly any of their native monarchs had ever attained, and brought them to support him in all his enterprises with a zeal and valour to which he owed much of his success and grandeur<sup>67</sup>.

About the time that Charles landed in Spain, Adrian set out for Italy to take possession of his new dignity. But though the Roman people longed extremely for his arrival, they could not, on his first appearance, conceal their surprise and disappointment. After being accustomed to the princely magnificence of Julius, and the elegant splendour of Leo, they beheld with contempt an old man of an humble deportment, of austere manners, an enemy to pomp,

<sup>66</sup> Sandov. 377, &c. *Vita del Emper. Carlos, por Don Juan Anton. de Vera y Zuniga*, p. 30.

<sup>67</sup> Ulloa *Vita de Carlo V.* p. 85.

destitute of taste in the arts, and unadorned with any of the external accomplishments which the vulgar expect in those raised to eminent stations<sup>28</sup>. Nor did his political views and maxims seem less strange and astonishing to the pontifical ministers. He acknowledged and bewailed the corruptions which abounded in the church as well as in the court of Rome, and prepared to reform both; he discovered no intention of aggrandizing his family; he even scrupled at retaining such territories as some of his predecessors had acquired by violence or fraud, rather than by any legal title; and for that reason he invested Francesco Maria de Rovere anew in the duchy of Urbino, of which Leo had stripped him, and surrendered to the Duke of Ferrara several places wrested from him by the church<sup>29</sup>. To men little habituated to see princes regulate their conduct by the maxims of morality and the principles of justice, these actions of the new Pope appeared incontestable proofs of his weakness or inexperience. Adrian, who was a perfect stranger to the complex and intricate system of Italian politics, and who could place no confidence in persons whose subtle refinements in business suited so ill with the natural simplicity and candour of his own character, being often embarrassed and irresolute in his deliberations, the opinion of his incapacity daily increased, until both his person and government became objects of ridicule among his subjects<sup>30</sup>.

Adrian, though devoted to the Emperor, endea-

<sup>28</sup> Guic. l. xv. 238. Jovii Vita Adriani, 117. Bellefor. Epit. des Princ. 84.

<sup>29</sup> Guic. lib. 240.

<sup>30</sup> Jov. Vita Adr. 118. P. Martyr, Ep. 771. Rascelli Lettere de Princ. vol. i. 87. 96. 101.

voured to assume the impartiality which became the common father of Christendom, and laboured to reconcile the contending Princes, in order that they might unite in a league against Solyman, whose conquest of Rhodes rendered him more formidable than ever to Europe<sup>31</sup>. But this was an undertaking far beyond his abilities. To examine such a variety of pretensions, to adjust such a number of interfering interests, to extinguish the passions which ambition, emulation, and mutual injuries had kindled, to bring so many hostile powers to pursue the same scheme with unanimity and vigour, required not only uprightness of intention, but great superiority both of understanding and address.

The Italian states were no less desirous of pence than the Pope. The Imperial army under Colonna was still kept on foot; but as the Emperor's revenues in Spain, in Naples, and in the Low Countries, were either exhausted or applied to some other purpose, it depended entirely for pay and subsistence on the Italians. A great part of it was quartered in the ecclesiastical state, and monthly contributions were levied upon the Florentines, the Milanese, the Genoese, and Lucchese, by the Viceroy of Naples; and though all exclaimed against such oppression, and were impatient to be delivered from it, the dread of worse consequences from the rage of the army, or the resentment of the Emperor, obliged them to submit<sup>32</sup>.

1523.] So much regard, however, was paid to the Pope's exhortations, and to a bull which he issued, requiring all Christian Princes to consent to a truce for three years, that the Imperial, the French, and English ambassadors at Rome were empowered

<sup>31</sup> Bellefor. Epitr. p. 86.

<sup>32</sup> Guic. l. xv. 238.

by their respective courts to treat of that matter; but while they wasted their time in fruitless negotiation, their masters continued their preparations for war. The Venetians, who had hitherto adhered with great firmness to their alliance with Francis, being now convinced that his affairs in Italy were in a desperate situation, entered into a league against him with the Emperor [June 28]; to which Adrian, at the instigation of his countryman and friend Charles de Lannoy, Viceroy of Naples, who persuaded him that the only obstacles to peace arose from the ambition of the French King, soon after acceded. The other Italian states followed their example; and Francis was left without a single ally to resist the efforts of so many enemies, whose armies threatened, and whose territories encompassed, his dominions on every side<sup>33</sup>.

The dread of this powerful confederacy, it was thought, would have obliged Francis to keep wholly on the defensive, or at least have prevented his entertaining any thoughts of marching into Italy. But it was the character of that Prince, too apt to become remiss and even negligent on ordinary occasions, to rouse at the approach of danger, and not only to encounter it with spirit and intrepidity, qualities which never forsook him, but to provide against it with diligence and industry. Before his enemies were ready to execute any of their schemes, Francis had assembled a numerous army. His authority over his own subjects was far greater than that which Charles or Henry possessed over theirs. They depended on their diets, their cortes, and their parliaments for money, which was usually granted them in small sums, very slowly, and with much reluc-

<sup>33</sup> Guic. l. xv. 211. 248.

tance. The taxes he could impose were more considerable, and levied with greater dispatch; so that, on this as well as on other occasions, he brought his armies into the field while they were only devising ways and means for raising theirs. Sensible of this advantage, Francis hoped to disconcert all the Emperor's schemes by marching in person into the Milanese; and this bold measure, the more formidable because unexpected, could scarcely have failed of producing that effect. But when the vanguard of his army had already reached Lyons, and he himself was hastening after it with a second division of his troops, the discovery of a domestic conspiracy, which threatened the ruin of the kingdom, obliged him to stop short, and to alter his measures.

The author of this dangerous plot was Charles Duke of Bourbon, Lord High Constable, whose noble birth, vast fortune, and high office, raised him to be the most powerful subject in France, as his great talents, equally suited to the field or the council, and his signal services to the crown, rendered him the most illustrious and deserving. The near resemblance between the King and him in many of their qualities, both being fond of war, and ambitious to excel in manly exercises, as well as their equality in age, and their proximity of blood, ought naturally to have secured to him a considerable share in that monarch's favour. But unhappily Louise, the King's mother, had contracted a violent aversion to the house of Bourbon, for no better reason than because Anne of Bretagne, the Queen of Louis the Twelfth, with whom she lived in perpetual enmity, had discovered a peculiar attachment to that branch of the royal family; and had taught her son, who was too susceptible of any impression which

his mother gave him, to view all the Constable's actions with a mean and unbecoming jealousy. His distinguished merit at the battle of Marignano had not been sufficiently rewarded; he had been recalled from the government of Milan upon very frivolous pretences, and had met with a cold reception, which his prudent conduct in that difficult station did not deserve; the payment of his pensions had been suspended without any good cause; and during the campaign of 1521, the King, as has already been related, had affronted him in presence of the whole army, by giving the command of the van to the Duke of Alençon. The Constable, at first, bore these indignities with greater moderation than could have been expected from a high spirited Prince, conscious of what was due to his rank and to his services. Such a multiplicity of injuries, however, exhausted his patience; and inspiring him with thoughts of revenge, he retired from court, and began to hold a secret correspondence with some of the Emperor's ministers.

About that time the Duchess of Bourbon happened to die without leaving any children. Louise, of a disposition no less amorous than vindictive, and still susceptible of the tender passions at the age of forty-six, began to view the Constable, a Prince as amiable as he was accomplished, with other eyes; and notwithstanding the great disparity of their years, she formed the scheme of marrying him. Bourbon, who might have expected every thing to which an ambitious mind can aspire, from the doting fondness of a woman who governed her son and the kingdom, being incapable either of imitating the Queen in her sudden transition from hatred to love, or of dissembling so meanly as to pretend affection

for one who had persecuted him so long with unprovoked malice, not only rejected the match, but imbibited his refusal by some severe raillery on Louise's person and character. She finding herself not only contemned, but insulted, her disappointed love turned into hatred, and since she could not marry, she resolved to ruin Bourbon.

For this purpose she consulted with the Chancellor Du Prat, a man, who, by a base prostitution of great talents and of superior skill in his profession, had risen to that high office. By his advice a lawsuit was commenced against the Constable, for the whole estate belonging to the house of Bourbon. Part of it was claimed in the King's name, as having fallen to the crown; part in that of Louise, as the nearest heir in blood of the deceased Duchess. Both these claims were equally destitute of any foundation in justice; but Louise, by her solicitations and authority, and Du Prat, by employing all the artifices and chicanery of law, prevailed on the judges to order the estate to be sequestered. This unjust decision drove the Constable to despair, and to measures which despair alone could have dictated. He renewed his intrigues in the Imperial court; and flattering himself that the injuries which he had suffered would justify his having recourse to any means in order to obtain revenge, he offered to transfer his allegiance from his natural sovereign to the Emperor, and to assist him in the conquest of France. Charles, as well as the King of England, to whom the secret was communicated<sup>34</sup>, expecting prodigious advantages from his revolt, were ready to receive him with open arms, and spared neither promises nor allurements which might help to confirm him in his

<sup>34</sup> Rymer's *Fœder.* xiii. 794.

resolution. The Emperor offered him in marriage his sister Eleanor, the widow of the King of Portugal, with an ample portion. He was included as a principal in the treaty between Charles and Henry. The counties of Provence and Dauphiné were to be settled on him, with the title of King. The Emperor engaged to enter France by the Pyrenees, and Henry, supported by the Flemings, to invade Picardy; while twelve thousand Germans, levied at their common charge, were to penetrate into Burgundy, and to act in concert with Bourbon, who undertook to raise six thousand men among his friends and vassals in the heart of the kingdom. The execution of this deep laid and dangerous plot was suspended until the King should cross the Alps with the only army capable of defending his dominions; and as he was far advanced in his march for that purpose, France was on the brink of destruction<sup>35</sup>.

Happily for that kingdom, a negotiation which had now been carrying on for several months, though conducted with the most profound secrecy, and communicated only to a few chosen confidants, could not altogether escape the observation of the rest of the Constable's numerous retainers, rendered more inquisitive by finding that they were distrusted. Two of these gave the King some intimation of a mysterious correspondence between their master and the Count de Roeux, a Flemish nobleman of great confidence with the Emperor. Francis, who could not bring himself to suspect that the first Prince of the blood would be so base as to betray the kingdom to its enemies, immediately repaired to Moulins, where

<sup>35</sup> Thuani Hist. lib. i. c. 10. Heuter. Rerum Austr. lib. viii. c. 18. p. 207.

the Constable was in bed, feigning indisposition that he might not be obliged to accompany the King into Italy, and acquainted him of the intelligence which he had received. Bourbon, with great solemnity and the most imposing affectation of ingenuity and candour, asserted his own innocence; and as his health, he said, was now more confirmed, he promised to join the army within a few days. Francis, open and candid himself, and too apt to be deceived by the appearance of those virtues in others, gave such credit to what he said, that he refused to arrest him, although advised to take that precaution by his wisest counsellors; and, as if the danger had been over, he continued to march towards Lyons. The Constable set out soon after [Sept.], seemingly with an intention to follow him; but turning suddenly to the left he crossed the Rhone, and, after infinite fatigue and peril, escaped all the parties which the King, who became sensible too late of his own credulity, sent out to intercept him, and reached Italy in safety<sup>36</sup>.

Francis took every possible precaution to prevent the bad effects of the irreparable error which he had committed. He put garrisons in all the places of strength in the Constable's territories. He seized all the gentlemen whom he could suspect of being his associates; and as he had not hitherto discovered the whole extent of the conspirators' schemes, nor knew how far the infection had spread among his subjects, he was afraid that his absence might encourage them to make some desperate attempt, and for that reason relinquished his intention of leading his army in person into Italy.

<sup>36</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 64, &c. *Pasquier Recherches de la France*, p. 181.

He did not, however, abandon his design on the Milanese; but appointed Admiral Bonnavet to take the supreme command in his stead, and to march into that country with an army thirty thousand strong. Bonnavet did not owe this preferment to his abilities as a general; for of all the talents requisite to form a great commander, he possessed only personal courage, the lowest and the most common. But he was the most accomplished gentleman in the French court, of agreeable manners and insinuating address, and a sprightly conversation; and Francis, who lived in great familiarity with his courtiers, was so charmed with these qualities, that he honoured him, on all occasions, with the most partial and distinguished marks of his favour. He was, besides, the implacable enemy of Bourbon; and as the King hardly knew whom to trust at that juncture, he thought the chief command could be lodged no where so safely as in his hands.

Colonna, who was intrusted with the defence of the Milanese, his own conquest, was in no condition to resist such a formidable army. He was destitute of money sufficient to pay his troops, which were reduced to a small number by sickness or desertion, and had, for that reason, been obliged to neglect every precaution necessary for the security of the country. The only plan which he formed was to defend the passage of the river Tessino against the French; and as if he had forgotten how easily he himself had disconcerted a similar scheme formed by Lautrec, he promised with great confidence on its being effectual. But in spite of all his caution, it succeeded no better with him than with Lautrec. Bonnavet passed the river without loss, at a ford which had been neglected, and the impe-

realists retired to Milan, preparing to abandon the town as soon as the French should appear before it. By an unaccountable negligence, which Guicciardini imputes to infatuation<sup>37</sup>, Bonnivet did not advance for three or four days, and lost the opportunity with which his good fortune presented him. The citizens recovered from their consternation; Colonna, still active at the age of fourscore, and Moroné, whose enmity to France rendered him indefatigable, were employed night and day in repairing the fortifications, in amassing provisions, in collecting troops from every quarter; and, by the time the French approached, had put the city in a condition to stand a siege. Bonnivet, after some fruitless attempts on the town, which harassed his own troops more than the enemy, was obliged, by the inclemency of the season, to retire into winter quarters.

During these transactions, Pope Adrian died; an event so much to the satisfaction of the Roman people, whose hatred or contempt of him augmented every day, that the night after his decease they adorned the door of his chief physician's house with garlands, adding this inscription: TO THE DELIVERER OF HIS COUNTRY<sup>38</sup>. The Cardinal de Medici instantly renewed his pretensions to the papal dignity, and entered the conclave with high expectations on his own part, and a general opinion of the people that they would be successful. But though supported by the Imperial faction, possessed of great personal interest, and capable of all the artifices, refinements, and corruption, which reign in those assemblies, the obstinacy and intrigues of his rivals protracted the conclave to the unusual length of fifty days. The address and perseverance

<sup>37</sup> Guic. lib. xv. 254.

<sup>38</sup> Jovii Vit. Adr. 127.

of the Cardinal at last surmounted every obstacle. He was raised to the head of the church [Nov. 28], and resumed the government of it by the name of Clement VII. The choice was universally approved of. High expectations were conceived of a Pope, whose great talents and long experience in business seemed to qualify him no less for defending the spiritual interests of the church, exposed to imminent danger by the progress of Luther's opinions, than for conducting its political operations with the prudence requisite at such a difficult juncture; and who, besides these advantages, rendered the ecclesiastical state more respectable, by having in his hands the government of Florence, together with the wealth of the family of Medici<sup>39</sup>.

Cardinal Wolsey, not disheartened by the disappointment of his ambitious views at the former election, had entertained more sanguine hopes of success on this occasion. Henry wrote to the Emperor, reminding him of his engagements to second the pretensions of his minister. Wolsey bestirred himself with activity suitable to the importance of the prize for which he contended, and instructed his agents at Rome to spare neither promises nor bribes in order to gain his end. But Charles had either amused him with vain hopes which he never intended to gratify, or he judged it impolitic to oppose a candidate who had such a prospect of succeeding as Medici; or perhaps the Cardinals durst not venture to provoke the people of Rome, while their indignation against Adrian's memory was still fresh, by placing another *Ultra-montane* on the papal throne. Wolsey, after all his expectations and endeavours, had the mortification to see a Pope elected

<sup>39</sup> Guic. l. xv. 263.

of such an age, and of so vigorous a constitution, that he could not derive much comfort to himself from the chance of surviving him. This second proof fully convinced Wolsey of the Emperor's insincerity, and it excited in him all the resentment which a haughty mind feels on being at once disappointed and deceived; and though Clement endeavoured to sooth his vindictive nature by granting him a commission to be legate in England during life, with such ample powers as vested in him almost the whole papal jurisdiction in that kingdom, the injury he had now received made such an impression as entirely dissolved the tie which had united him to Charles, and from that moment he meditated revenge. It was necessary, however, to conceal his intention from his master, and to suspend the execution of it, until, by a dexterous improvement of the incidents which might occur, he should be able gradually to alienate the King's affections from the Emperor. For this reason he was so far from expressing any uneasiness on account of the repulse which he had met with, that he abounded on every occasion, private as well as public, in declarations of his high satisfaction with Clement's promotion<sup>40</sup>.

Henry had, during the campaign, fulfilled, with great sincerity, whatever he was bound to perform by the league against France, though more slowly than he could have wished. His thoughtless profusion, and total neglect of economy, reduced him often to great straits for money. The operations of war were now carried on in Europe in a manner very different from that which had long prevailed. Instead of armies suddenly assembled, which under distinct chieftains followed their prince into the field

<sup>40</sup> Fiddes's *Life of Wolsey*, 294, &c. Herbert.

for a short space, and served at their own cost, troops were now levied at great charge, and received regularly considerable pay. Instead of impatience on both sides to bring every quarrel to the issue of a battle, which commonly decided the fate of open countries, and allowed the barons, together with their vassals, to return to their ordinary occupations; towns were fortified with great art, and defended with much obstinacy; war, from a very simple, became a very intricate science; and campaigns grew of course to be more tedious and less decisive. The expense which these alterations in the military system necessarily created, appeared intolerable to nations hitherto unaccustomed to the burthen of heavy taxes. Hence proceeded the frugal and even parsimonious spirit of the English Parliaments in that age, which Henry, with all his authority, was seldom able to overcome. The commons, having refused at this time to grant him the supplies which he demanded, he had recourse to the ample and almost unlimited prerogative which the Kings of England then possessed, and, by a violent and unusual exertion of it, raised the money he wanted. This, however, wasted so much time, that it was late in the season [Sept. 20] before his army, under the Duke of Suffolk, could take the field. Being joined by a considerable body of Flemings, Suffolk marched into Picardy; and Francis, from his extravagant eagerness to recover the Milanese, having left that frontier almost unguarded, he penetrated as far as the banks of the river Oyse, within eleven leagues of Paris, filling that capital with consternation. But the arrival of some troops detached by the King, who was still at Lyons; the active gallantry of the French officers, who allowed the allies

no respite night or day; the rigour of a most unnatural season, together with scarcity of provisions, compelled Suffolk to retire [Nov.]; and La Tramoille, who commanded in those parts, had the glory not only of having checked the progress of a formidable army with a handful of men, but of driving them with ignominy out of the French territories<sup>41</sup>.

The Emperor's attempts upon Burgundy and Guienne were not more fortunate, though in both these provinces Francis was equally ill prepared to resist them. The conduct and valour of his generals supplied his want of foresight; the Germans, who made an eruption into one of these provinces, and the Spaniards, who attacked the other, were repulsed with great disgrace.

Thus ended the year 1523, during which Francis's good fortune and success had been such as gave all Europe a high idea of his power and resources. He had discovered and disconcerted a dangerous conspiracy, the author of which he had driven into exile almost without an attendant; he had rendered abortive all the schemes of the powerful confederacy formed against him; he had protected his dominions when attacked on three different sides; and though his army in the Milanese had not made such progress as might have been expected from its superiority to the enemy in number, he had recovered, and still kept possession of one half of that duchy.

1524.] The ensuing year opened with events more disastrous to France. Fontarabia was lost by the cowardice or treachery of its governor [Feb. 27]. In Italy, the allies resolved on an early and vigorous effort in order to dispossess Bonnivet of that

<sup>41</sup> Herbert. *Mém. de Bellay*, 73, &c.

part of the Milanese which lies beyond the Tessino; Clement, who, under the pontificates of Leo and Adrian, had discovered an implacable enmity to France, began now to view the power which the Emperor was daily acquiring in Italy with so much jealousy that he refused to accede, as his predecessors had done, to the league against Francis, and, forgetting private passions and animosities, laboured with the zeal which became his character, to bring about a reconciliation among the contending parties. But all his endeavours were ineffectual; a numerous army, to which each of the allies furnished their contingent of troops, was assembled at Milan by the beginning of March. Lannoy, Viceroy of Naples, took the command of it upon Colonna's death, though the chief direction of military operations was committed to Bourbon and the Marquis de Pescara,—the latter the ablest and most enterprising of the Imperial generals; the former inspired by his resentment with new activity and invention, and acquainted so thoroughly with the characters of the French commanders, the genius of their troops, and the strength as well as weakness of their armies, as to be of infinite service to the party which he had joined. But all these advantages were nearly lost, through the Emperor's inability to raise money sufficient for executing the various and extensive plans which he had formed. When his troops were commanded to march, they mutinied against their leaders, demanding the pay which was due to them for some months; and, disregarding both the menaces and entreaties of their officers, threatened to pillage the city of Milan, if they did not instantly receive satisfaction. Out of this difficulty the generals of the allies were extricated by Moroné, who pre-

vailing on his countrymen, over whom his influence was prodigious, to advance the sum that was requisite, the army took the field<sup>42</sup>.

Bonnivet was destitute of troops to oppose this army, and still more of the talents which could render him an equal match for its leaders. After various movements and encounters, described with great accuracy by the contemporary historians, a detail of which would now be equally uninteresting and un instructive, he was forced to abandon the strong camp in which he had entrenched himself at Biagrassa. Soon after, partly by his own misconduct, partly by the activity of the enemy, who harassed and ruined his army by continual skirmishes, while they carefully declined a battle, which he often offered them; and partly by the caprice of six thousand Swiss, who refused to join his army, though within a day's march of it; he was reduced to the necessity of attempting a retreat into France through the valley of Aost. Just as he arrived on the banks of the Sessia, and began to pass that river, Bourbon and Pescara appeared with the vanguard of the allies, and attacked his rear with great fury. At the beginning of the charge, Bonnivét, while exerting himself with much valour, was wounded so dangerously that he was obliged to quit the field; and the conduct of the rear was committed to the Chevalier Bayard, who, though so much a stranger to the arts of a court that he never rose to the chief command, was always called, in times of real danger, to the post of greatest difficulty and importance. He put himself at the head of the men at arms; and animating them by his presence and example to sustain the whole shock of

<sup>42</sup> Gaic. l. xv. 267. Capella. 190.

the enemy's troops, he gained time for the rest of his countrymen to make good their retreat. But in this service he received a wound which he immediately perceived to be mortal; and being unable to continue any longer on horseback, he ordered one of his attendants to place him under a tree, with his face towards the enemy; then fixing his eyes on the guard of his sword, which he held up instead of a cross, he addressed his prayers to God, and in this posture, which became his character both as a soldier and as a Christian, he calmly awaited the approach of death. Bourbon, who led the foremost of the enemy's troops, found him in this situation, and expressed regret and pity at the sight. "Pity not me," cried the high-spirited Chevalier, "I die as a man of honour ought in the discharge of my duty: they, indeed, are objects of pity, who fight against their King, their country, and their oath." The Marquis de Pescara, passing soon after, manifested his admiration of Bayard's virtues, as well as his sorrow for his fate, with the generosity of a gallant enemy; and, finding that he could not be removed with safety from that spot, ordered a tent to be pitched there, and appointed proper persons to attend him. He died, notwithstanding their care, as his ancestors for several generations had done, in the field of battle. Pescara ordered his body to be embalmed, and sent to his relations; and such was the respect paid to military merit in that age, that the Duke of Savoy commanded it to be received with royal honours in all the cities of his dominions; in Dauphiné, Bayard's native country, the people of all ranks came out in a solemn procession to meet it<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>43</sup> Bellefor. Epitr. p. 73. Mém. de Bellay, 75. Œuv. de Brant. tom. vi. 168, &c. Pasquier Recherches, p. 526.

Bonnivet led back the shattered remains of his army into France; and in one short campaign Francis was stripped of all he had possessed in Italy, and left without one ally in that country.

While the war, kindled by the emulation of Charles and Francis, spread over so many countries of Europe, Germany enjoyed a profound tranquillity, extremely favourable to the Reformation, which continued to make progress daily. During Luther's confinement in his retreat at Wartburg, Carlostadius, one of his disciples, animated with the same zeal, but possessed of less prudence and moderation than his master, began to propagate wild and dangerous opinions, chiefly among the lower people. Encouraged by his exhortations, they rose in several villages of Saxony, broke into the churches with tumultuary violence, and threw down and destroyed the images with which they were adorned. Those irregular and outrageous proceedings were so repugnant to all the Elector's cautious maxims, that, if they had not received a timely check, they could hardly have failed of alienating from the Reformers a Prince, no less jealous of his own authority than afraid of giving offence to the Emperor, and other patrons of the ancient opinions. Luther, sensible of the danger, immediately quitted his retreat, without waiting for Frederic's permission, and returned to Wittemberg. [March 6, 1522.] Happily for the Reformation, the veneration for his person and authority was still so great that his appearance alone suppressed that spirit of extravagance which began to seize his party. Carlostadius and his fanatical followers, struck dumb by his rebukes, submitted at once, and declared that they heard the voice of an angel, not of a man<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Sleid Hist. 51. Beckend. 195.

Before Luther left his retreat, he had begun to translate the Bible into the German tongue, an undertaking of no less difficulty than importance, of which he was extremely fond, and for which he was well qualified: he had a competent knowledge of the original languages; a thorough acquaintance with the style and sentiments of the inspired writers; and though his compositions in Latin were rude and barbarous, he was reckoned a great master of the purity of his mother tongue, and could express himself with all the elegance of which it is capable. By his own assiduous application, together with the assistance of Melancthon and several other of his disciples, he finished part of the New Testament in the year 1522; and the publication of it proved more fatal to the church of Rome than that of all his own works. It was read with wonderful avidity and attention by persons of every rank. They were astonished at discovering how contrary the precepts of the Author of our religion are, to the inventions of those priests who pretended to be his vicegerents; and having now in their hand the rule of faith, they thought themselves qualified, by applying it, to judge of the established opinions, and to pronounce when they were conformable to the standard, or when they departed from it. The great advantages arising from Luther's translation of the Bible encouraged the advocates for Reformation in the other countries of Europe, to imitate his example, and to publish versions of the Scriptures in their respective languages.

About this time Nuremberg, Frankfort, Ham-  
burgh, and several other free cities in Germany, of the first rank, openly embraced the reformed religion, and by the authority of their magistrates abolished the mass, and the other superstitious rites of

popery<sup>45</sup>. The Elector of Brandenburg, the Dukes of Brunswick and Lunenburgh, and Prince of Anhalt, became avowed patrons of Luther's opinions, and countenanced the preaching of them among their subjects.

The court of Rome beheld this growing defection with great concern; and Adrian's first care, after his arrival in Italy, had been to deliberate with the Cardinals concerning the proper means of putting a stop to it. He was profoundly skilled in scholastic theology; and having been early celebrated on that account, he still retained such an excessive admiration of the science to which he was first indebted for his reputation and success in life, that he considered Luther's invectives against the schoolmen, particularly Thomas Aquinas, as little less than blasphemy. All the tenets of that doctor appeared to him so clear and irrefragable that he supposed every person who called in question or contradicted them, to be either blinded by ignorance or to be acting in opposition to the conviction of his own mind. Of course, no Pope was ever more bigoted or inflexible with regard to points of doctrine than Adrian; he not only maintained them as Leo had done, because they were ancient, or because it was dangerous for the church to allow of innovations, but he adhered to them with the zeal of a theologian, and with the tenaciousness of a disputant. At the same time his own manners being extremely simple, and uninfected with any of the vices which reigned in the court of Rome, he was as sensible of its corruptions as the Reformers themselves, and viewed them with no less indignation. The brief which he addressed to the Diet of the Empire as-

<sup>45</sup> Seckend, 241. Chytræi Contin. Krantzii, 203.

sembled at Nuremberg [Nov. 1522], and the instructions which he gave Cheregato, the nuncio whom he sent thither, were framed agreeably to these views. On the one hand, he condemned Luther's opinions with more asperity and rancour of expression than Leo had ever used; he severely censured the Princes of Germany for suffering him to spread his pernicious tenets, by their neglecting to execute the edict of the diet at Worms; and required them, if Luther did not instantly retract his errors, to destroy him with fire as a gangrened and incurable member, in like manner as Dathan and Abiram had been cut off by Moses, Ananias and Sapphira by the Apostles, and John Huss and Jerome of Prague by their ancestors<sup>46</sup>. On the other hand, he with great candour, and in the most explicit terms, acknowledged the corruptions of the Roman court to be the source from which had flowed most of the evils that the church now felt or dreaded; he promised to exert all his authority towards reforming these abuses, with as much dispatch as the nature and inveteracy of the disorders would admit; and he requested of them to give him their advice with regard to the most effectual means of suppressing that new heresy which had sprung up among them<sup>47</sup>.

The members of the diet, after praising the Pope's pious and laudable intentions, excused themselves for not executing the edict of Worms, by alleging that the prodigious increase of Luther's followers, as well as the aversion to the court of Rome among their other subjects on account of its innumerable exactions, rendered such an attempt not only dangerous, but impossible. They affirmed that the

<sup>46</sup> Fascic. Rer. expet. et fugiend. 342.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 345.

grievances of Germany, which did not arise from imaginary injuries, but from impositions no less real than intolerable, as His Holiness would learn from a catalogue of them which they intended to lay before him, called now for some new and efficacious remedy; and, in their opinion, the only remedy adequate to the disease, or which afforded them any hopes of seeing the church restored to soundness and vigour, was a General Council. Such a council, therefore, they advised him, after obtaining the Emperor's consent, to assemble, without delay, in one of the great cities of Germany, that all who had right to be present might deliberate with freedom, and propose their opinions with such boldness as the dangerous situation of religion at this juncture required<sup>48</sup>.

The nuncio, more artful than his master, and better acquainted with the political views and interests of the Roman court, was startled at the proposition of a council, and easily foresaw how dangerous such an assembly might prove, at a time when many openly denied the papal authority, and the reverence and submission yielded to it visibly declined among all. For that reason he employed his utmost address in order to prevail on the members of the diet to proceed themselves with greater severity against the Lutheran heresy, and to relinquish their proposal concerning a General Council to be held in Germany. They, perceiving the nuncio to be more solicitous about the interests of the Roman court than the tranquillity of the Empire, or purity of the church, remained inflexible, and continued to prepare the catalogue of their grievances to be presented to the Pope<sup>49</sup>. The nuncio, that he might

<sup>48</sup> *Fascic. Rer. expet. et faciend.* p. 346.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* 349.

not be the bearer of a remonstrance so disagreeable to his court, left Nuremberg abruptly, without taking leave of the diet<sup>50</sup>.

The secular princes accordingly (for the ecclesiastics, although they gave no opposition, did not think it decent to join with them) drew up the list (so famous in the German annals) of a hundred grievances, which the Empire imputed to the iniquitous dominion of the papal see. This list contained grievances much of the same nature with that prepared under the reign of Maximilian. It would be tedious to enumerate each of them; they complained of the sums exacted for dispensations, absolutions, and indulgences; of the expense arising from the lawsuits carried by appeal to Rome; of the innumerable abuses occasioned by reservations, commendams, and annates; of the exemption from civil jurisdiction which the clergy had obtained; of the arts by which they brought all secular causes under the cognizance of the ecclesiastical judges; of the indecent and profligate lives which not a few of the clergy led; and of various other particulars, many of which have already been mentioned among the circumstances that contributed to the favourable reception, or to the quick progress, of Luther's doctrines. In the end they concluded, that if the Holy See did not speedily deliver them from those intolerable burdens, they had determined to endure them no longer, and would employ the power and authority with which God had intrusted them, in order to procure relief<sup>51</sup>.

Instead of such severities against Luther and his followers as the nuncio had recommended, the *recess* or edict of the diet [March 6, 1523] contained only

<sup>50</sup> *Pascic. Rer. expet. et fugiend.* p. 370.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* 351.

a general injunction to all ranks of men to wait with patience for the determinations of the council which was to be assembled, and in the mean time not to publish any new opinions contrary to the established doctrines of the church; together with an admonition to all preachers to abstain from matters of controversy in their discourses to the people, and to confine themselves to the plain and instructive truths of religion<sup>52</sup>.

The Reformers derived great advantage from the transactions of this diet, as they afforded them the fullest and most authentic evidence that gross corruptions prevailed in the court of Rome, and that the Empire was loaded by the clergy with insupportable burdens. With regard to the former, they had now the testimony of the Pope himself, that their invectives and accusations were not malicious or ill founded. As to the latter, the representatives of the Germanic body, in an assembly where the patrons of the new opinions were far from being the most numerous or powerful, had pointed out, as the chief grievances of the Empire, those very practices of the Romish church against which Luther and his disciples were accustomed to declaim. Accordingly, in all their controversial writings after this period, they often appealed to Adrian's declaration, and to the hundred grievances, in confirmation of whatever they advanced concerning the dissolute manners, or insatiable ambition and rapaciousness, of the papal court.

At Rome, Adrian's conduct was considered as a proof of the most childish simplicity and imprudence. Men trained up amidst the artifices and corruptions of the papal court, and accustomed to judge

<sup>52</sup> Fascic. Rer. expet. et fugiend. 348.

of actions not by what was just, but by what was useful, were astonished at a pontiff, who departing from the wise maxims of his predecessors, acknowledged disorders which he ought to have concealed; and, forgetting his own dignity, asked advice of those to whom he was entitled to prescribe. By such an excess of impolitic sincerity, they were afraid that, instead of reclaiming the enemies of the church, he would render them more presumptuous, and, instead of extinguishing heresy, would weaken the foundations of the papal power, or stop the chief sources from which wealth flowed into the church<sup>53</sup>. For this reason, the Cardinals and other high ecclesiastics of greatest eminence in the papal court industriously opposed all his schemes of reformation, and, by throwing objections and difficulties in his way, endeavoured to retard or to defeat the execution of them. Adrian, amazed, on the one hand, at the obstinacy of the Lutherans, disgusted, on the other, with the manners and maxims of the Italians, and finding himself unable to correct either the one or the other, often lamented his own situation, and often looked back with pleasure on that period of his life when he was only Dean of Louvain, a more humble but happier station, in which little was expected from him, and there was nothing to frustrate his good intentions<sup>54</sup>.

Clement VII., his successor, excelled Adrian as much in the arts of government as he was inferior to him in purity of life or uprightness of intention. He was animated not only with the aversion which all Popes naturally bear to a council, but having gained his own election by means very uncanonical,

<sup>53</sup> F. Paul, *Hist. of Councils*, p. 28. *Pallavic. Hist.* 58.

<sup>54</sup> *Jovii Vit. Adr.* p. 118.

he was afraid of an assembly that might subject it to a scrutiny which it could not stand. He determined, therefore, by every possible means, to elude the demands of the Germans, both with respect to the calling of a council, and reforming abuses in the papal court, which the rashness and incapacity of his predecessor had brought upon him. For this purpose he made choice of Cardinal Campeggio, an artful man, often intrusted by his predecessors with negotiations of importance, as his nuncio to the diet of the Empire assembled again at Nuremberg.

Campeggio, without taking any notice of what had passed in the last meeting, exhorted the diet [Feb.], in a long discourse, to execute the edict of Worms with vigour, as the only effectual means of suppressing Luther's doctrines. The diet in return desired to know the Pope's intentions concerning the council, and the redress of the hundred grievances. The former the nuncio endeavoured to elude by general and unmeaning declarations of the Pope's resolution to pursue such measures as would be for the greatest good of the church. With regard to the latter, as Adrian was dead before the catalogue of grievances reached Rome, and of consequence it had not been regularly laid before the present Pope, Campeggio took advantage of this circumstance to decline making any definitive answer to them in Clement's name; though, at the same time, he observed that their catalogue of grievances contained many particulars extremely indecent and undutiful, and that the publishing it by their own authority was highly disrespectful to the Roman See. In the end, he renewed his demand of their proceeding with vigour against Luther and his adherents. But though an ambassador from the Emperor, who was at that time very

solicitous to gain the Pope, warmly seconded the nuncio, with many professions of his master's zeal for the honour and dignity of the papal see, the *recess* of the diet was conceived in terms of almost the same import with the former, without enjoining any additional severity against Luther and his party<sup>55</sup>.

Before he left Germany, Campeggio, in order to amuse and soothe the people, published certain articles for the amendment of some disorders and abuses which prevailed among the inferior clergy; but this partial reformation, which fell so far short of the expectations of the Lutherans, and of the demands of the diet, gave no satisfaction, and produced little effect. The nuncio, with a cautious hand, tenderly lopped a few branches; the Germans aimed a deeper blow, and by striking at the root wished to exterminate the evil<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> Seckend. 286. Sleid. Hist. 66.

<sup>56</sup> Seckend. 292.

## BOOK IV.

1524.

THE expulsion of the French, both out of the Milanese and the republic of Genoa, was considered by the Italians as the termination of the war between Charles and Francis; and as they began immediately to be apprehensive of the Emperor, when they saw no power remaining in Italy capable either to control or oppose him, they longed ardently for the reestablishment of peace. Having procured the restoration of Sforza to his paternal dominions, which had been their chief motive for entering into confederacy with Charles, they plainly discovered their intention to contribute no longer towards increasing the Emperor's superiority over his rival, which was already become the object of their jealousy. The Pope especially, whose natural timidity increased his suspicions of Charles's designs, endeavoured by his remonstrances to inspire him with moderation, and incline him to peace.

But the Emperor, intoxicated with success, and urged on by his own ambition, no less than by Bourbon's desire of revenge, contemned Clement's admonitions, and declared his resolution of ordering his army to pass the Alps, and to invade Provence, a part of his rival's dominions, where as he least dreaded an attack, he was least prepared to resist it. His most experienced ministers dissuaded him from undertaking such an enterprise with a feeble army and an exhausted treasury; but he relied so much on having obtained the concurrence of the

King of England, and on the hopes which Bourbon, with the confidence and credulity natural to exiles, entertained of being joined by a numerous body of his partisans as soon as the Imperial troops should enter France, that he persisted obstinately in the measure. Henry undertook to furnish a hundred thousand ducats towards defraying the expense of the expedition during the first month, and had it in his choice either to continue the payment of that sum monthly, or to invade Picardy before the end of July with an army capable of acting with vigour. The Emperor engaged to attack Guienne at the same time with a considerable body of men; and if these enterprises proved successful, they agreed, that Bourbon, besides the territories which he had lost, should be put in possession of Provence, with the title of King, and should do homage to Henry, as the lawful King of France, for his new dominions. Of all the parts of this extensive but extravagant project, the invasion of Provence was the only one which was executed. For although Bourbon, with a scrupulous delicacy, altogether unexpected after the part which he had acted, positively refused to acknowledge Henry's title to the crown of France, and thereby absolved him from any obligation to promote the enterprise, Charles's eagerness to carry his own plan into execution did not in any degree abate. The army which he employed for that purpose amounted only to eighteen thousand men; the command of which was given to the Marquis de Pescara, with instructions to pay the greatest deference to Bourbon's advice in all his operations. Pescara passed the Alps without opposition, and, entering Provence [Aug. 19], laid siege to Marseilles. Bourbon had advised him rather to march towards

Lyons, in the neighbourhood of which city his territories were situated, and where of course his influence was most extensive; but the Emperor was so desirous to get possession of a port which would, at all times, secure him an easy entrance into France, that by his authority he overruled the Constable's opinion, and directed Pescara to make the reduction of Marseilles his chief object<sup>1</sup>.

Francis, who foresaw, but was unable to prevent this attempt, took the most proper precautions to defeat it. He laid waste the adjacent country, in order to render it more difficult for the enemy to subsist their army; he rased the suburbs of the city, strengthened its fortifications, and threw into it a numerous garrison under the command of brave and experienced officers. To these, nine thousand of the citizens, whom their dread of the Spanish yoke inspired with contempt of danger, joined themselves: by their united courage and industry, all the efforts of Pescara's military skill, and of Bourbon's activity and revenge, were rendered abortive. Francis, meanwhile, had leisure to assemble a powerful army under the walls of Avignon, and no sooner began to advance towards Marseilles than the Imperial troops, exhausted by the fatigues of a siege which had lasted forty days, weakened by diseases, and almost destitute of provisions, retired [Sept. 10] with precipitation towards Italy<sup>2</sup>.

If, during these operations of the army in Provence, either Charles or Henry had attacked France in the manner which they had projected, that kingdom must have been exposed to the most imminent danger. But on this, as well as on many other oc-

<sup>1</sup> Guic. l. xv. 273, &c. *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 80.

<sup>2</sup> Guic. l. xv. 277. *Ullon Vita dell' Carlo V.* p. 93.

casions, the Emperor found that the extent of his revenues was not adequate to the greatness of his schemes, or the ardour of his ambition, and the want of money obliged him, though with much reluctance, to circumscribe his plan, and to leave part of it unexecuted. Henry, disgusted at Bourbon's refusing to recognise his right to the crown of France; alarmed at the motions of the Scots, whom the solicitations of the French King had persuaded to march towards the borders of England; and no longer incited by his minister, who was become extremely cool with regard to all the Emperor's interests, took no measures to support an enterprise of which, as of all new undertakings, he had been at first excessively fond<sup>3</sup>.

If the King of France had been satisfied with having delivered his subjects from this formidable invasion, if he had thought it enough to show all Europe the facility with which the internal strength of his dominions enabled him to resist the invasion of a foreign enemy, even when seconded by the abilities and powerful efforts of a rebellious subject, the campaign, notwithstanding the loss of the Milanese, would have been far from ending ingloriously. But Francis, animated with courage more becoming a soldier than a general; pushed on by ambition, enterprising rather than considerate; and too apt to be elated with success; was fond of every undertaking that seemed bold and adventurous. Such an undertaking the situation of his affairs at that juncture naturally presented to his view. He had under his command one of the most powerful and best appointed armies France had ever brought into the field, which he could not think of disbanding with-

<sup>3</sup> Fiddes's *Life of Wolsey*, Append. No. 70, 71, 72.

out having employed it in any active service. The Imperial troops had been obliged to retire, almost ruined by hard duty, and disheartened with ill success; the Milanese had been left altogether without defence; it was not impossible to reach that country before Pescara, with his shattered forces, could arrive there; or, if fear should add speed to their retreat, they were in no condition to make head against his fresh and numerous troops; and Milan would now, as in former instances, submit without resistance to a bold invader. These considerations, which were not destitute of plausibility, appeared to his sanguine temper to be of the utmost weight. In vain did his wisest ministers and generals represent to him the danger of taking the field at a season so far advanced, with an army composed chiefly of Swiss and Germans, to whose caprices he would be subject in all his operations, and on whose fidelity his safety must absolutely depend. In vain did Louise of Savoy advance by hasty journeys towards Provence, that she might exert all her authority in dissuading her son from such a rash enterprise. Francis disregarded the remonstrances of his subjects; and that he might save himself the pain of an interview with his mother, whose counsels he had determined to reject, he began his march before her arrival; appointing her, however, by way of atonement for that neglect, to be Regent of the kingdom during his absence. Bonnivet, by his persuasions, contributed not a little to confirm Francis in this resolution. That favourite, who strongly resembled his master in all the defective parts of his character, was led by his natural impetuosity, warmly to approve of such an enterprise; and being prompted, besides, by his impatience to revisit a Milanese lady,

of whom he had been deeply enamoured during his late expedition, he is said, by his flattering descriptions of her beauty and accomplishments, to have inspired Francis, who was extremely susceptible of such passions, with an equal desire of seeing her<sup>4</sup>.

The French passed the Alps at Mount Cenis; and as their success depended on dispatch, they advanced with the greatest diligence. Pescara, who had been obliged to take a longer and more difficult route by Monaco and Final, was soon informed of their intention; and being sensible that nothing but the presence of his troops could save the Milanese, marched with such rapidity that he reached Alva on the same day that the French army arrived at Vercelli. Francis, instructed by Bonnivet's error in the former campaign, advanced directly towards Milan, where the unexpected approach of an enemy so powerful occasioned such consternation and disorder that, although Pescara entered the city with some of his best troops, he found that the defence of it could not be undertaken with any probability of success; and, having thrown a garrison into the citadel, retired through one gate while the French were admitted at another<sup>5</sup>.

The brisk motions of the French monarch disconcerted all the schemes of defence which the Imperialists had formed. Never, indeed, did generals attempt to oppose a formidable invasion under such circumstances of disadvantage. Though Charles possessed dominions more extensive than any other Prince in Europe, and had, at this time, no other army but that which was employed in Lombardy, which did not amount to sixteen thousand men, his

<sup>4</sup> *Œuv. de Brant.* tom. vi. 253.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 81. *Guic. l. xv.* 278.

prerogative in all his different states was so limited, and his subjects, without whose consent he could raise no taxes, discovered such unwillingness to burden themselves with new or extraordinary impositions, that even this small body of troops was in want of pay, of ammunition, of provisions, and of clothing. In such a situation, it required all the wisdom of Lannoy, the intrepidity of Pescara, and the implacable resentment of Bourbon, to preserve them from sinking under despair, and to inspire them with resolution to attempt, or sagacity to discover, what was essential to their safety. To the efforts of their genius, and the activity of their zeal, the Emperor was more indebted for the preservation of its Italian dominions than to his own power. Lannoy, by mortgaging the revenues of Naples, procured some money, which was immediately applied towards providing the army with whatever was most necessary<sup>6</sup>. Pescara, who was beloved and almost adored by the Spanish troops, exhorted them to show the world, by their engaging to serve the Emperor in that dangerous exigency without making any immediate demand of pay, that they were animated with sentiments of honour very different from those of mercenary soldiers: to which proposition that gallant body of men, with an unexampled generosity, gave their consent<sup>7</sup>. Bourbon having raised a considerable sum, by pawning his jewels, set out for Germany, where his influence was great, that by his presence he might hasten the levying of troops for the Imperial service<sup>8</sup>.

Francis, by a fatal error, allowed the Emperor's

<sup>6</sup> Guic. l. xv. 280.

<sup>7</sup> Jovii Vit. Davali, lib. xv. p. 386. Sandov. vol. i. 621. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 94, &c. Vita dell' Emperor Carlos V. per Vera y Zuniga, p. 36.

<sup>8</sup> Mem. de Bellay, p. 83.

generals time to derive advantage from all these operations. Instead of pursuing the enemy, who retired to Lodi on the Adda, an untenable post, which Pescara had resolved to abandon on the approach of the French, he, in compliance with the opinion of Bonnivet, though contrary to that of his other generals, laid siege to Pavia on the Tesino [Oct. 28]; a town, indeed, of great importance; the possession of which would have opened to him all the fertile country lying on the banks of that river. But the fortifications of the place were strong; it was dangerous to undertake a difficult siege at so late a season; and the Imperial generals, sensible of its consequence, had thrown into the town a garrison composed of six thousand veterans, under the command of Antonio de Leyva, an officer of high rank; of great experience; of a patient, but enterprising courage; fertile in resources; ambitious of distinguishing himself; and capable, for that reason, as well as from his having been long accustomed both to obey and to command, of suffering or performing any thing in order to procure success.

Francis prosecuted the siege with obstinacy equal to the rashness with which he had undertaken it. During three months, every thing known to the engineers of that age, or that could be effected by the valour of his troops, was attempted, in order to reduce the place; while Lannoy and Pescara, unable to obstruct his operations, were obliged to remain in such an ignominious state of inaction that a pasquinade was published at Rome, offering a reward to any person who could find the Imperial army, lost in the month of October in the mountains between France and Lombardy, and which had not been heard of since that time<sup>9</sup>.

• <sup>9</sup> Sandov. i. 608.

Leyva, well acquainted with the difficulties under which his countrymen laboured, and the impossibility of their facing, in the field, such a powerful army as formed the siege of Pavia, placed his only hopes of safety in his own vigilance and valour. The efforts of both were extraordinary, and in proportion to the importance of the place with the defence of which he was intrusted. He interrupted the approaches of the French by frequent and furious sallies. Behind the breaches made by their artillery, he erected new works, which appeared to be scarcely inferior in strength to the original fortifications. He repulsed the besiegers in all their assaults; and, by his own example, brought not only the garrison, but the inhabitants, to bear the most severe fatigues, and to encounter the greatest dangers, without murmuring. The rigour of the season conspired with his endeavours in retarding the progress of the French. Francis attempting to become master of the town, by diverting the course of the Tesino, which is its chief defence on one side, a sudden inundation of the river destroyed in one day, the labour of many weeks, and swept away all the mounds which his army had raised with infinite toil, as well as at great expense<sup>10</sup>.

Notwithstanding the slow progress of the besiegers, and the glory which Leyva acquired by his gallant defence, it was not doubted but that the town would at last be obliged to surrender. The Pope, who already considered the French arms as superior in Italy, became impatient to disengage himself from his connexions with the Emperor, of whose designs he was extremely jealous, and to enter into terms of friendship with Francis. As

<sup>10</sup> Guic. l. xv. 280. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 95.

Clement's timid and cautious temper rendered him incapable of following the bold plan which Leo had formed, of delivering Italy from the yoke of both the rivals, he returned to the more obvious and practicable scheme of employing the power of the one to balance and to restrain that of the other. For this reason, he did not dissemble his satisfaction at seeing the French King recover Milan, as he hoped that the dread of such a neighbour would be some check upon the Emperor's ambition, which no power in Italy was now able to control. He laboured hard to bring about a peace that would secure Francis in the possession of his new conquests; and as Charles, who was always inflexible in the prosecution of his schemes, rejected the proposition with disdain, and with bitter exclamations against the Pope, by whose persuasions, while Cardinal de Medici, he had been induced to invade the Milanese, Clement immediately concluded a treaty of neutrality with the King of France, in which the republic of Florence was included<sup>11</sup>.

Francis having, by this transaction, deprived the Emperor of his two most powerful allies, and at the same time having secured a passage for his own troops through their territories, formed a scheme of attacking the kingdom of Naples, hoping either to overrun that country, which was left altogether without defence, or that at least such an unexpected invasion would oblige the Viceroy to recall part of the Imperial army out of the Milanese. For this purpose, he ordered six thousand men to march under the command of John Stuart Duke of Albany. But Pescara, foreseeing that the effect of this diversion would depend entirely upon the operations of the

<sup>11</sup> Guic. l. xv. 282. 285.

armies in the Milanese, persuaded Lannoy to disregard Albany's motions<sup>12</sup>, and to bend his whole force against the King himself; so that Francis not only weakened his army very unseasonably by this great detachment, but incurred the reproach of engaging too rashly in chimerical and extravagant projects.

By this time the garrison of Pavia was reduced to extremity; their ammunition and provisions began to fail; the Germans, of whom it was chiefly composed, having received no pay for seven months<sup>13</sup>, threatened to deliver the town into the enemy's hands, and could hardly be restrained from mutiny by all Leyva's address and authority. The Imperial generals, who were no strangers to his situation, saw the necessity of marching without loss of time to his relief. [1525.] This they had now in their power; twelve thousand Germans, whom the zeal and activity of Bourbon taught to move with unusual rapidity, had entered Lombardy under his command, and rendered the Imperial army nearly equal to that of the French, greatly diminished by the absence of the body under Albany, as well as by the fatigues of the siege and the rigour of the season. But the more their troops increased in number, the more sensibly did the Imperialists feel the distress arising from want of money. Far from having funds for paying a powerful army, they had scarcely what was sufficient for defraying the charges of conducting their artillery, and of carrying their ammunition and provisions. The abilities of the generals, however, supplied every defect. By their own example, as well as by magnificent promises in name of the Emperor, they prevailed on the troops of all the different

<sup>12</sup> Guic. l. xv, 285.

<sup>13</sup> Gold. Polit. Imperial. 875.

nations which composed their army, to take the field without pay; they engaged to lead them directly towards the enemy; and flattered them with the certain prospect of victory, which would at once enrich them with such royal spoils as would be an ample reward for all their services. The soldiers, sensible that, by quitting the army, they would forfeit the great arrears due to them, and eager to get possession of the promised treasures, demanded a battle with all the impatience of adventurers who fight only for plunder<sup>14</sup>.

The Imperial generals, without suffering the ardour of their troops to cool, advanced immediately towards the French camp [Feb. 3]. On the first intelligence of their approach, Francis called a council of war, to deliberate what course he ought to take. All his officers of greatest experience were unanimous in advising him to retire, and to decline a battle with an enemy who courted it from despair. The Imperialists, they observed, would either be obliged in a few weeks to disband an army, which they were unable to pay, and which they kept together only by the hope of plunder; or the soldiers, enraged at the nonperformance of the promises to which they had trusted, would rise in some furious mutiny, which would allow their generals to think of nothing but their own safety; that, meanwhile, he might encamp in some strong post; and waiting in safety the arrival of fresh troops from France and Switzerland, might, before the end of spring, take possession of all the Milanese without danger or bloodshed. But in opposition to them, Bonnivet, whose destiny it was to give counsels fatal to France

<sup>14</sup> Eryci Peuteani Hist. Cisalpina, ap. Grævii Thes. Antiquit. Ital. ii. p. 1170. 1179.

during the whole campaign, represented the ignominy that it would reflect on their sovereign, if he should abandon a siege which he had prosecuted so long, or turn his back before an enemy to whom he was still superior in number; and insisted on the necessity of fighting the Imperialists, rather than relinquish an undertaking, on the success of which the King's future fame depended. Unfortunately, Francis's notions of honour were delicate to an excess that bordered on what was romantic. Having often said that he would take Pavia, or perish in the attempt, he thought himself bound not to depart from that resolution; and rather than expose himself to the slightest imputation he chose to forego all the advantages which were the certain consequences of a retreat, and determined to wait for the Imperialists before the walls of Pavia<sup>15</sup>.

The Imperial generals found the French so strongly entrenched, that, notwithstanding the powerful motives which urged them on, they hesitated long before they ventured to attack them; but at last the necessities of the besieged, and the murmurs of their own soldiers, obliged them to put every thing to hazard [Feb. 24]. Never did armies engage with greater ardour, or with a higher opinion of the importance of the battle which they were going to fight; never were troops more strongly animated with emulation, national antipathy, mutual resentment, and all the passions which inspire obstinate bravery. On the one hand, a gallant young monarch, seconded by a generous nobility, and followed by subjects to whose natural impetuosity, indignation at the opposition which they had encountered, added new force, contended for victory

<sup>15</sup> Guic. l. xv. 291.

and honour. On the other side, troops more completely disciplined, and conducted by generals of greater abilities, fought from necessity, with courage heightened by despair. The Imperialists, however, were unable to resist the first efforts of the French valour, and their firmest battalions began to give way. But the fortune of the day was quickly changed. The Swiss in the service of France, unmindful of the reputation of their country for fidelity and martial glory, abandoned their post in a cowardly manner. Leyva, with his garrison, sallied out and attacked the rear of the French, during the heat of the action, with such fury as threw it into confusion; and Pescara falling on their cavalry with the Imperial horse, among whom he had prudently intermingled a considerable number of Spanish foot, armed with the heavy muskets then in use, broke this formidable body by an unusual method of attack, against which they were wholly unprovided. The rout became universal; and resistance ceased in almost every part, but where the King was in person, who fought now, not for fame or victory, but for safety. Though wounded in several places, and thrown from his horse, which was killed under him, Francis defended himself on foot with an heroic courage. Many of his bravest officers gathering round him, and endeavouring to save his life at the expense of their own, fell at his feet. Among these was Bonnivet, the author of this great calamity, who alone died unlamented. The King, exhausted with fatigue, and scarcely capable of further resistance, was left almost alone, exposed to the fury of some Spanish soldiers, strangers to his rank, and enraged at his obstinacy. At that moment came up Pomperant, a French gentleman, who had entered

together with Bourbon into the Emperor's service, and, placing himself by the side of the monarch against whom he had rebelled, assisted in protecting him from the violence of the soldiers; at the same time beseeching him to surrender to Bourbon, who was not far distant. Imminent as the danger was which now surrounded Francis, he rejected with indignation the thoughts of an action which would have afforded such matter of triumph to his traitorous subject; and calling for Lannoy, who happened likewise to be near at hand, gave up his sword to him; which he, kneeling to kiss the King's hand, received with profound respect; and taking his own sword from his side, presented it to him, saying, That it did not become so great a monarch to remain disarmed in the presence of one of the Emperor's subjects<sup>16</sup>.

Ten thousand men fell on this day, one of the most fatal France had ever seen. Among these were many noblemen of the highest distinction, who chose rather to perish than to turn their backs with dishonour. Not a few were taken prisoners, of whom the most illustrious was Henry d'Albert the unfortunate King of Navarre. A small body of the rearguard made its escape under the command of the Duke of Alençon; the feeble garrison of Milan, on the first news of the defeat, retired, without being pursued, by another road; and in two weeks after the battle not a Frenchman remained in Italy.

Lannoy, though he treated Francis with all the outward marks of honour due to his rank and cha-

<sup>16</sup> Guic. l. xv. 292. Œuv. de Brant. vi. 355. Mém. de Bellay, p. 90. Sandov. Hist. 638, &c. P. Mart. Ep. 805. 810. Ruscelli Lettere de Principi, ii. p. 70. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 98.

racter, guarded him with the utmost attention. He was solicitous, not only to prevent any possibility of his escaping, but afraid that his own troops might seize his person, and detain it as the best security for the payment of their arrears. In order to provide against both these dangers, he conducted Francis, the day after the battle, to the strong castle of Pizzichitonè near Cremona, committing him to the custody of Don Ferdinand Alarcon, General of the Spanish infantry, an officer of great bravery and of strict honour, but remarkable for that severe and scrupulous vigilance which such a trust required.

Francis, who formed a judgment of the Emperor's dispositions by his own, was extremely desirous that Charles should be informed of his situation, fondly hoping that from his generosity or sympathy he should obtain speedy relief. The Imperial generals were no less impatient to give their sovereign an early account of the decisive victory which they had gained, and to receive his instructions with regard to their future conduct. As the most certain and expeditious method of conveying intelligence to Spain, at that season of the year, was by land, Francis gave the commendador Pennalosa, who was charged with Lannoy's dispatches, a passport to travel through France.

Charles received the account of this signal and unexpected success that had crowned his arms, with a moderation, which, if it had been real, would have done him more honour than the greatest victory. Without uttering one word expressive of exultation, or of intemperate joy, he retired immediately into his chapel [March 10], and having spent an hour in offering up his thanksgivings to Heaven, returned to the presence-chamber, which by that time was

filled with grandees and foreign ambassadors assembled in order to congratulate him. He accepted of their compliments with a modest deportment; he lamented the misfortune of the captive King, as a striking example of the sad reverse of fortune, to which the most powerful monarchs are subject; he forbade any public rejoicings, as indecent in a war carried on among Christians, reserving them until he should obtain a victory equally illustrious over the Infidels; and seemed to take pleasure in the advantage which he had gained, only as it would prove the occasion of restoring peace to Christendom<sup>17</sup>.

Charles, however, had already begun to form schemes in his own mind, which little suited such external appearances. Ambition, not generosity, was the ruling passion in his mind; and the victory at Pavia opened such new and unbounded prospects of gratifying it, as allured him with irresistible force: but it being no easy matter to execute the vast designs which he meditated, he thought it necessary, while proper measures were taking for that purpose, to affect the greatest moderation, hoping under that veil to conceal his real intentions from the other princes of Europe.

Meanwhile France was filled with consternation. The King himself had early transmitted an account of the rout at Pavia, in a letter to his mother, delivered by Pennalosa, which contained only these words:—"Madam, all is lost, except our honour." The officers who made their escape, when they arrived from Italy, brought such a melancholy detail of particulars as made all ranks of men sensibly feel the greatness and extent of the calamity. France,

<sup>17</sup> Sandov. Hist. i. 641. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 110.

without its sovereign, without money in her treasury, without an army, without generals to command it, and encompassed on all sides by a victorious and active enemy, seemed to be on the very brink of destruction. But on that occasion the great abilities of Louise the Regent saved the kingdom, which the violence of her passions had more than once exposed to the greatest danger. Instead of giving herself up to such lamentations as were natural to a woman so remarkable for her maternal tenderness, she discovered all the foresight, and exerted all the activity, of a consummate politician. She assembled the nobles at Lyons, and animated them, by her example no less than by her words, with such zeal in defence of their country as its present situation required. She collected the remains of the army which had served in Italy, ransomed the prisoners, paid the arrears, and put them in a condition to take the field. She levied new troops, provided for the security of the frontiers, and raised sums sufficient for defraying these extraordinary expenses. Her chief care, however, was to appease the resentment, or to gain the friendship, of the King of England; and from that quarter the first ray of comfort broke in upon the French.

Though Henry, in entering into alliances with Charles or Francis, seldom followed any regular or concerted plan of policy, but was influenced chiefly by the caprice of temporary passions, such occurrences often happened as recalled his attention towards that equal balance of power which it was necessary to keep between the two contending potentates, the preservation of which he always boasted to be his peculiar office. He had expected that his union with the Emperor might afford him an oppor-

tunity of recovering some part of those territories in France which had belonged to his ancestors, and for the sake of such an acquisition he did not scruple to give his assistance towards raising Charles to a considerable preeminence above Francis. He had never dreamt, however, of any event so decisive and so fatal as the victory of Pavia, which seemed not only to have broken but to have annihilated the power of one of the rivals : so that the prospect of the sudden and entire revolution which this would occasion in the political system filled him with the most disquieting apprehensions. He saw all Europe in danger of being overrun by an ambitious Prince, to whose power there now remained no counterpoise; and though he himself might at first be admitted, in quality of an ally, to some share in the spoils of the captive monarch, it was easy to discern, that with regard to the manner of making the partition, as well as his security for keeping possession of what should be allotted him, he must absolutely depend upon the will of a confederate, to whose forces his own bore no proportion. He was sensible that, if Charles were permitted to add any considerable part of France to the vast dominions of which he was already master, his neighbourhood would be much more formidable to England than that of the ancient French Kings; while, at the same time, the proper balance on the continent, to which England owed both its safety and importance, would be entirely lost. Concern for the situation of the unhappy monarch cooperated with these political considerations; his gallant behaviour in the battle of Pavia had excited a high degree of admiration, which never fails of augmenting sympathy; and Henry, naturally susceptible of generous senti-

ments, was fond of appearing as the deliverer of a vanquished enemy from a state of captivity. The passions of the English minister seconded the inclinations of the monarch. Wolsey, who had not forgotten the disappointment of his hopes in two successive conclaves, which he imputed chiefly to the Emperor, thought this a proper opportunity of taking revenge; and Louise courting the friendship of England with such flattering submissions as were no less agreeable to the King than to the Cardinal, Henry gave her secret assurances that he would not lend his aid towards oppressing France in its present helpless state, and obliged her to promise that she would not consent to dismember the kingdom even in order to procure her son's liberty<sup>18</sup>.

But as Henry's connexions with the Emperor made it necessary to act in such a manner as to save appearances, he ordered public rejoicings to be made in his dominions for the success of the Imperial arms; and as if he had been eager to seize the present opportunity of ruining the French monarchy, he sent ambassadors to Madrid, to congratulate with Charles upon his victory; to put him in mind, that he, as his ally, engaged in one common cause, was entitled to partake in the fruits of it; and to require that, in compliance with the terms of their confederacy, he would invade Guienne with a powerful army, in order to give him possession of that province. At the same time he offered to send the Princess Mary into Spain or the Low Countries, that she might be educated under the Emperor's direction, until the conclusion of the marriage agreed on between them; and in return for that mark of his confidence, he insisted that Francis should be

<sup>18</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, 94. *Gaie*. l. xvi. 318. *Herbert*.

delivered to him in consequence of that article in the treaty of Bruges, whereby each of the contracting parties was bound to surrender all usurpers to him whose rights they had invaded. It was impossible that Henry could expect that the Emperor would listen to these extravagant demands, which it was neither his interest nor in his power to grant. They appear evidently to have been made with no other intention than to furnish him with a decent pretext for entering into such engagements with France as the juncture required<sup>19</sup>.

It was among the Italian states, however, that the victory at Pavia occasioned the greatest alarm and terror. That balance of power on which they relied for their security, and which it had been the constant object of all their negotiations and refinements to maintain, was destroyed in a moment. They were exposed by their situation to feel the first effects of the uncontrolled authority which Charles had acquired. They observed many symptoms of a boundless ambition in that young Prince, and were sensible that, as Emperor, or King of Naples, he might not only form dangerous pretensions upon each of their territories, but might invade them with great advantage. They deliberated, therefore, with much solicitude concerning the means of raising such a force as might obstruct his progress<sup>20</sup>. But their consultations, conducted with little union, and executed with less vigour, had no effect. Clement, instead of pursuing the measures which he had concerted with the Venetians for securing the liberty of Italy, was so intimidated by Lannoy's threats, or

<sup>19</sup> Herbert, p. 64.

<sup>20</sup> Guic. l. xvi. 300. Ruscelli *Lettere de Princ.* ii. 74. 76, &c. Thuani *Hist. lib. i. c. 11*.

overcome by his promises, that he entered into a separate treaty [April 1], binding himself to advance a considerable sum to the Emperor, in return for certain emoluments which he was to receive from him. The money was instantly paid; but Charles afterwards refused to ratify the treaty; and the Pope remained exposed at once to infamy and to ridicule: to the former, because he had deserted the public cause for his private interest; to the latter, because he had been a loser by that unworthy action<sup>21</sup>.

How dishonourable soever the artifice might be which was employed in order to defraud the Pope of this sum, it came very seasonably into the Viceroy's hands, and put it in his power to extricate himself out of an imminent danger. Soon after the defeat of the French army, the German troops, which had defended Pavia with such meritorious courage and perseverance, growing insolent upon the fame that they had acquired, and impatient of relying any longer on fruitless promises, with which they had been so often amused, rendered themselves masters of the town, with a resolution to keep possession of it as a security for the payment of their arrears; and the rest of the army discovered a much stronger inclination to assist than to punish the mutineers. By dividing among them the money exacted from the Pope, Lannoy quieted the tumultuous Germans; but though this satisfied their present demands, he had so little prospect of being able to pay them or his other forces regularly for the future, and was under such continual apprehensions of their seizing the person of the captive King,

<sup>21</sup> Guic. lib. xti. 305. Manroccini Histor. Venet. ap. Istorichi dell' case Venez. V. 131. 136.

that, not long after, he was obliged to dismiss all the Germans and Italians in the Imperial service<sup>22</sup>. Thus, from a circumstance that now appears very singular, but arising naturally from the constitution of most European governments in the sixteenth century, while Charles was suspected by all his neighbours of aiming at universal monarchy; and while he was really forming vast projects of this kind, his revenues were so limited that he could not keep on foot his victorious army, though it did not exceed twenty-four thousand men.

During these transactions, Charles, whose pretensions to moderation and disinterestedness were soon forgotten, deliberated, with the utmost solicitude, how he might derive the greatest advantages from the misfortunes of his adversary. Some of his counsellors advised him to treat Francis with the magnanimity that became a victorious Prince, and instead of taking advantage of his situation to impose rigorous conditions, to dismiss him on such equal terms as would bind him for ever to his interest by the ties of gratitude and affection, more forcible as well as more permanent than any which could be formed by extorted oaths and involuntary stipulations. Such an exertion of generosity is not, perhaps, to be expected in the conduct of political affairs, and it was far too refined for that Prince to whom it was proposed. The more obvious, but less splendid scheme, of endeavouring to make the utmost of Francis's calamity, had a greater number in the council to recommend it, and suited better with the Emperor's genius. But though Charles adopted this plan, he seems not to have executed it in the most proper manner. Instead of making one

<sup>22</sup> Guic. l. xvi, p. 302.

great effort to penetrate into France, with all the forces of Spain and the Low Countries; instead of crushing the Italian states before they recovered from the consternation which the success of his arms had occasioned, he had recourse to the artifices of intrigue and negotiation. This proceeded partly from necessity, partly from the natural disposition of his mind. The situation of his finances at that time rendered it extremely difficult to carry on any extraordinary armament; and he himself having never appeared at the head of his armies, the command of which he had hitherto committed to his generals, was averse to bold and martial counsels, and trusted more to the arts with which he was acquainted. He laid, besides, too much stress upon the victory of Pavia, as if by that event the strength of France had been annihilated, its resources exhausted, and the kingdom itself, no less than the person of its monarch, had been subjected to his power.

Full of this opinion, he determined to set the highest price upon Francis's freedom; and having ordered the Count de Roeux to visit the captive King in his name, he instructed him to propose the following articles, as the conditions on which he would grant him his liberty: That he should restore Burgundy to the Emperor, from whose ancestors it had been unjustly wrested; that he should surrender Provence and Dauphiné, that they might be erected into an independent kingdom for the Constable Bourbon; that he should make full satisfaction to the King of England for all his claims, and finally renounce the pretensions of France to Naples, Milan, or any other territory in Italy. When Francis, who had hitherto flattered himself that he should

be treated by the Emperor with the generosity becoming one great Prince towards another, heard these rigorous conditions, he was so transported with indignation, that, drawing his dagger hastily, he cried out, "Twere better that a King should die thus." Alarcon, alarmed at his vehemence, laid hold on his hand; but though he soon recovered greater composure, he still declared in the most solemn manner, that he would rather remain a prisoner during life than purchase liberty by such ignominious concessions<sup>23</sup>.

This mortifying discovery of the Emperor's intentions greatly augmented Francis's chagrin and impatience under his confinement, and must have driven him to absolute despair, if he had not laid hold of the only thing which could still administer any comfort to him. He persuaded himself that the conditions which Roeux had proposed did not flow originally from Charles himself, but were dictated by the rigorous policy of his Spanish council; and therefore that he might hope, in one personal interview with him, to do more towards hastening his own deliverance than could be effected by long negotiations passing through the subordinate hands of his ministers. Relying on this supposition, which proceeded from too favourable an opinion of the Emperor's character, he offered to visit him in Spain, and was willing to be carried thither as a spectacle to that haughty nation. Lannoy employed all his address to confirm him in these sentiments, and concerted with him in secret the manner of executing this resolution. Francis was so eager on a scheme which seemed to open some prospect of liberty, that he furnished the galleys necessary for conveying

<sup>23</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, 94. *Ferreras Hist.* ix. 43.

him to Spain, Charles being at this time unable to fit out a squadron for that purpose. The Viceroy, without communicating his intentions either to Bourbon or Pescara, conducted his prisoner towards Genoa, under pretence of transporting him by sea to Naples; though, soon after they set sail, he ordered the pilots to steer directly for Spain; but the wind happening to carry them near the French coast, the unfortunate monarch had a full prospect of his own dominions, towards which he cast many a sorrowful and desiring look. They landed, however, in a few days, at Barcelona, and soon after Francis was lodged [Aug. 24], by the Emperor's command, in the Alcazar of Madrid, under the care of the vigilant Alarcon, who guarded him with as much circumspection as ever<sup>23</sup>.

A few days after Francis's arrival at Madrid, and when he began to be sensible of his having relied, without foundation, on the Emperor's generosity, Henry VIII. concluded a treaty with the Regent of France, which afforded him some hope of liberty from another quarter. Henry's extravagant demands had been received at Madrid with that neglect which they deserved, and which he probably expected. Charles, intoxicated with prosperity, no longer courted him in that respectful and submissive manner which pleased his haughty temper. Wolsey, no less haughty than his master, was highly irritated at the Emperor's discontinuing his wonted caresses and professions of friendship to himself. These slight offences, added to the weighty considerations formerly mentioned, induced Henry to enter into a defensive alliance with Louise, in which all the dif-

<sup>23</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, 95. *P. Mart. Ep. ult. Guic. lib. xvi. 323.*

ferences between him and her son were adjusted; at the same time he engaged that he would employ his best offices in order to procure the deliverance of his new ally from a state of captivity<sup>25</sup>.

While the open defection of such a powerful confederate affected Charles with deep concern, a secret conspiracy was carrying on in Italy, which threatened him with consequences still more fatal. The restless and intriguing genius of Moronè, Chancellor of Milan, gave rise to this. His revenge had been amply gratified by the expulsion of the French out of Italy, and his vanity no less soothed by the re-establishment of Sforza, to whose interest he had attached himself in the duchy of Milan. The delays, however, and evasions of the Imperial court, in granting Sforza the investiture of his new acquired territories, had long alarmed Moronè; these were repeated so often, and with such apparent artifice, as became a full proof to his suspicious mind, that the Emperor intended to strip his master of that rich country which he had conquered in his name. Though Charles, in order to quiet the Pope and Venetians, no less jealous of his designs than Moronè, gave Sforza, at last, the investiture which had been so long desired; the charter was clogged with so many reservations, and subjected him to such grievous burdens as rendered the Duke of Milan a dependent on the Emperor, rather than a vassal of the Empire, and afforded him hardly any other security for his possessions than the good pleasure of an ambitious superior. Such an accession of power as would have accrued from the addition of the Milanese to the kingdom of Naples, was considered by Moronè as fatal to the liberties of Italy, no less than to his own importance. Full of this idea,

<sup>25</sup> Herbert. *Fiddes's Life of Wolsey*, 327.

he began to revolve in his mind the possibility of rescuing Italy from the yoke of foreigners; the darling scheme, as has been already observed, of the Italian politicians in that age, and which it was the great object of their ambition to accomplish. If to the glory of having been the chief instrument of driving the French out of Milan, he could add that of delivering Naples from the dominion of the Spaniards, he thought that nothing would be wanting to complete his fame. His fertile genius soon suggested to him a project for that purpose; a difficult, indeed, and daring one, but for that very reason more agreeable to his bold and enterprising temper.

Bourbon and Pescara were equally enraged at Lannoy's carrying the French King into Spain without their knowledge. The former, being afraid that the two monarchs might, in his absence, conclude some treaty in which his interest would be entirely sacrificed, hastened to Madrid, in order to guard against that danger. The latter, on whom the command of the army now devolved, was obliged to remain in Italy; but, in every company, he gave vent to his indignation against the Viceroy, in expressions full of rancour and contempt; he accused him, in a letter to the Emperor, of cowardice in the time of danger, and of insolence after a victory, towards the obtaining of which he had contributed nothing either by his valour or his conduct; nor did he abstain from bitter complaints against the Emperor himself, who had not discovered, as he imagined, a sufficient sense of his merit, nor bestowed any adequate reward on his services. It was on this disgust of Pescara that Moronè founded his whole system. He knew the boundless ambition of his nature, the great extent of his abilities in peace as well as war, and the intrepidity of his mind, capable

alike of undertaking and of executing the most desperate designs. The cantonment of the Spanish troops on the frontier of the Milanese gave occasion to many interviews between him and Moronè, in which the latter took care frequently to turn the conversation to the transactions subsequent to the battle of Pavia, a subject upon which the Marquis always entered willingly and with passion; and Moronè, observing his resentment to be uniformly violent, artfully pointed out and aggravated every circumstance that could increase its fury. He painted, in the strongest colours, the Emperor's want of discernment, as well as of gratitude, in preferring Lannoy to him, and in allowing that presumptuous Fleming to dispose of the captive King, without consulting the man to whose bravery and wisdom Charles was indebted for the glory of having a formidable rival in his power. Having warmed him by such discourses, he then began to insinuate that now was the time to be avenged for these insults, and to acquire immortal renown as the deliverer of his country from the oppression of strangers; that the states of Italy, weary of the ignominious and intolerable dominion of barbarians, were at last ready to combine in order to vindicate their own independence; that their eyes were fixed on him as the only leader whose genius and good fortune could ensure the happy success of that noble enterprise; that the attempt was no less practicable than glorious, it being in his power so to disperse the Spanish infantry, the only body of the Emperor's troops that remained in Italy, through the villages of the Milanese, that in one night they might be destroyed by the people, who, having suffered much from their exactions and insolence, would gladly undertake this

service; that he might then, without opposition, take possession of the throne of Naples, the station destined for him, and a reward not unworthy the restorer of liberty to Italy; that the Pope, of whom that kingdom held, and whose predecessors had disposed of it on many former occasions, would willingly grant him the right of investiture; that the Venetians, the Florentines, the Duke of Milan, whom he had communicated the scheme, together with the French, would be the guarantees of his right; that the Neapolitans would naturally prefer the government of one of their countrymen, whom they loved and admired, to that odious dominion of strangers, to which they had been so long subjected; and that the Emperor, astonished at a blow so unexpected, would find that he had neither troops nor money to resist such a powerful confederacy<sup>36</sup>.

Pescara, amazed at the boldness and extent of the scheme, listened attentively to Moronè, but with the countenance of a man lost in profound and anxious thought. On the one hand, the infamy of betraying his sovereign, under whom he bore such high command, deterred him from the attempt; on the other, the prospect of obtaining a crown allured him to venture upon it. After continuing a short space in suspense, the least commendable motives, as is usual after such deliberations, prevailed, and ambition triumphed over honour. In order, however, to throw a colour of decency on his conduct, he insisted that some learned casuists should give their opinion, "Whether it was lawful for a subject to take arms against his immediate sovereign, in obe-

<sup>36</sup> Guic. l. xvi. 325. Jovii Vita Davali, p. 417. Oeuv. de Brantome, iv. 171. Ruscelli Lettre de Princ. ii. 91. Thuanus Hist. lib. i. c. 11. P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. ix. c. 3. p. 207.

dience to the lord paramount of whom the kingdom itself was held?" Such a resolution of the case as he expected was soon obtained from the divines and civilians both of Rome and Milan; the negotiation went forward; and measures seemed to be taking with great spirit for the speedy execution of the design.

During this interval, Pescara, either shocked at the treachery of the action that he was going to commit, or despairing of its success, began to entertain thoughts of abandoning the engagements which he had come under. The indisposition of Sforza, who happened at that time to be taken ill of a distemper which was thought mortal, confirmed his resolution, and determined him to make known the whole conspiracy to the Emperor, deeming it more prudent to expect the duchy of Milan from him as the reward of this discovery, than to aim at a kingdom to be purchased by a series of crimes. This resolution, however, proved the source of actions hardly less criminal and ignominious. The Emperor, who had already received full information concerning the conspiracy from other hands, seemed to be highly pleased with Pescara's fidelity, and commanded him to continue his intrigues for some time with the Pope and Sforza, both that he might discover their intentions more fully, and that he might be able to convict them of the crime with greater certainty. Pescara, conscious of guilt, as well as sensible how suspicious his long silence must have appeared at Madrid, durst not decline that dishonourable office; and was obliged to act the meanest and most disgraceful of all parts, that of seducing with a purpose to betray. Considering the abilities of the persons with whom he had to deal, the part

was scarcely less difficult than base; but he acted it with such address as to deceive even the penetrating eye of Moronè, who, relying with full confidence on his sincerity, visited him at Novara, in order to put the last hand to their machinations. Pescara received him in an apartment where Antonior de Leyva was placed behind the tapestry, that he might overhear and bear witness to their conversation: as Moronè was about to take leave, that officer suddenly appeared, and to his astonishment arrested him prisoner in the Emperor's name. He was conducted to the castle of Pavia; and Pescara, who had so lately been his accomplice, had now the assurance to interrogate him as his judge. At the same time, the Emperor declared Sforza to have forfeited all right to the duchy of Milan, by his engaging in a conspiracy against the sovereign of whom he held; Pescara, by his command, seized on every place in the Milanese, except the castles of Cremona and Milan, which the unfortunate Duke attempting to defend, were closely blockaded by the Imperial troops<sup>27</sup>.

But though this unsuccessful conspiracy, instead of stripping the Emperor of what he already possessed in Italy, contributed to extend his dominions in that country, it showed him the necessity of coming to some agreement with the French King, unless he chose to draw on himself a confederacy of all Europe, which the progress of his arms and his ambition, now as undisguised as it was boundless, filled with general alarm. He had not hitherto treated Francis with the generosity which that monarch expected, and hardly with the decency due to his station. Instead of displaying the sentiments becoming

<sup>27</sup> Gaic. l. xvi. 329. Jovii Hist. 319. Capella, lib. v. p. 200.

a great Prince, Charles, by his mode of treating Francis, seems to have acted with the mercenary art of a corsair, who, by the rigorous usage of his prisoners, endeavours to draw from them a higher price for their ransom. The captive King was confined in an old castle, under a keeper whose formal austerity of manners rendered his vigilance still more disgusting. He was allowed no exercise but that of riding on a mule, surrounded with armed guards on horseback. Charles, on pretence of its being necessary to attend the Cortes assembled in Toledo, had gone to reside in that city, and suffered several weeks to elapse without visiting Francis, though he solicited an interview with the most pressing and submissive importunity. So many indignities made a deep impression on a highspirited Prince; he began to lose all relish for his usual amusements; his natural gaiety of temper forsook him; and after languishing for some time he was seized with a dangerous fever, during the violence of which he complained constantly of the unexpected and unprincipely rigour with which he had been treated, often exclaiming, that now the Emperor would have the satisfaction of his dying a prisoner in his hands, without having once deigned to see his face. The physicians, at last, despaired of his life, and informed the Emperor that they saw no hope of his recovery, unless he were gratified with regard to that point on which he seemed to be so strongly bent. Charles, solicitous to preserve a life with which all his prospects of further advantage from the victory of Pavia must have terminated, immediately consulted his ministers concerning the course to be taken. In vain did the Chancellor Gattinara, the most able among them, represent to him the indecency of his

visiting Francis, if he did not intend to set him at liberty immediately upon equal terms ; in vain did he point out the infamy to which he would be exposed, if avarice or ambition should prevail on him to give the captive monarch this mark of attention and sympathy, for which humanity and generosity had pleaded so long without effect. The Emperor, less delicate or less solicitous about reputation, than his minister, set out for Madrid to visit his prisoner [Sept. 28]. The interview was short: Francis being too weak to bear a long conversation, Charles accosted him in terms full of affection and respect, and gave him such promises of speedy deliverance and princely treatment, as would have reflected the greatest honour upon him if they had flowed from another source. Francis grasped at them with the eagerness natural in his situation ; and, cheered with this gleam of hope, began to revive from that moment, recovering rapidly his wonted health<sup>28</sup>.

He had soon the mortification to find, that his confidence in the Emperor was not better founded than formerly. Charles returned instantly to Toledo ; all negotiations were carried on by his ministers ; and Francis was kept in as strict custody as ever. A new indignity, and that very galling, was added to all those he had already suffered. Bourbon arriving in Spain about this time, Charles, who had so long refused to visit the King of France, received his rebellious subject with the most studied respect [Nov. 15]. He met him without the gates of Toledo, embraced him with the greatest affection, and, placing him on his left hand, conducted him to his apartment. These marks of honour to him were so many insults to the unfortunate monarch, which

<sup>28</sup> Guic. l. xvi. 339. Sandov. Hist. i. 666.

he felt in a very sensible manner. It afforded him some consolation, however, to observe, that the sentiments of the Spaniards differed widely from those of their sovereign. That generous people detested Bourbon's crime. Notwithstanding his great talents and important services; they shunned all intercourse with him, to such a degree that Charles having desired the Marquis de Villena to permit Bourbon to reside in his palace while the Court remained at Toledo, he politely replied, "That he could not refuse gratifying his sovereign in that request;" but added, with a Castilian dignity of mind, that the Emperor must not be surprised, if, the moment the Constable departed, he should burn to the ground a house which, having been polluted by the presence of a traitor, became an unfit habitation for a man of honour<sup>29</sup>.

Charles himself, nevertheless, seemed to have it much at heart to reward Bourbon's services in a signal manner. But as he insisted, in the first place, on the accomplishment of the Emperor's promise of giving him in marriage his sister Eleanora, Queen Dowager of Portugal, the honour of which alliance had been one of his chief inducements to rebel against his lawful sovereign; as Francis, in order to prevent such a dangerous union, had offered, before he left Italy, to marry that Princess; and as Eleanora herself discovered an inclination rather to match with a powerful monarch than with his exiled subject; all these interfering circumstances created great embarrassment to Charles, and left him hardly any hope of extricating himself with decency. But the death of Pescara, who, at the age of thirty-six, left behind him the reputation of being one of the

<sup>29</sup> Guic. l. xvi. 335.

greatest generals and ablest politicians of that century, happened opportunely at this juncture [December] for his relief. By that event, the command of the army in Italy became vacant; and Charles, always fertile in resources, persuaded Bourbon, who was in no condition to dispute his will, to accept the office of General in Chief there, together with a grant of the duchy of Milan forfeited by Sforza; and in return for these to relinquish all hopes of marrying the Queen of Portugal<sup>30</sup>.

The chief obstacle that stood in the way of Francis's liberty was the Emperor's continuing to insist so peremptorily on the restitution of Burgundy, as a preliminary to that event. Francis often declared that he would never consent to dismember his kingdom; and that, even if he should so far forget the duties of a monarch as to come to such a resolution, the fundamental laws of the nation would prevent its taking effect. On his part he was willing to make an absolute cession to the Emperor of all his pretensions in Italy and the Low Countries; he promised to restore to Bourbon all his lands which had been confiscated; he renewed his proposal of marrying the Emperor's sister, the Queen Dowager of Portugal; and engaged to pay a great sum by way of ransom for his own person. But all mutual esteem and confidence between the two monarchs were now entirely lost; there appeared, on the one hand, a rapacious ambition, labouring to avail itself of every favourable circumstance; on the other, suspicion and resentment, standing perpetually on their guard; so that the prospect of bringing their negotiations to an issue seemed to be far distant. The Duchess of Alençon, the French King's sister,

<sup>30</sup> Sandov. Hist. i. 676. Œuv. de Brant. iv. 249.

whom Charles permitted to visit her brother in his confinement, employed all her address, in order to procure his liberty on more reasonable terms. Henry of England interposed his good offices to the same purpose; but both with so little success that Francis, in despair, took suddenly the resolution of resigning his crown, with all its rights and prerogatives, to his son, the Dauphin, determining rather to end his days in prison than to purchase his freedom by concessions unworthy of a king. The deed for this purpose he signed with legal formality in Madrid, empowering his sister to carry it into France, that it might be registered in all the parliaments of the kingdom; and at the same time intimating his intention to the Emperor, he desired him to name the place of his confinement, and to assign him a proper number of attendants during the remainder of his days<sup>31</sup>.

The resolution of the French King had great effect; Charles began to be sensible, that by pushing rigour to excess he might defeat his own measures; and instead of the vast advantages which he hoped to draw from ransoming a powerful monarch, he might at last find in his hands a prince without dominions or revenues. About the same time, one of the King of Navarre's domestics happened, by an extraordinary exertion of fidelity, courage, and address, to procure his master an opportunity of escaping from the prison in which he had been confined ever since the battle of Pavia. This convinced the Emperor that the most vigilant attention of his officers might be eluded by the ingenuity or boldness of Francis or his attendants, and one unlucky hour

<sup>31</sup> This paper is published in *Mémoires Historiques, &c.* par M. l'Abbe Raynal, tom. ii. p. 151.

might deprive him of all the advantages which he had been so solicitous to obtain. By these considerations, he was induced to abate somewhat of his former demands. On the other hand, Francis's impatience under confinement daily increased; and having received certain intelligence of a powerful league forming against his rival in Italy, he grew more compliant with regard to his concessions, trusting that, if he could once obtain his liberty, he would soon be in a condition to resume whatever he had yielded.

1526.] Such being the views and sentiments of the two monarchs, the treaty which procured Francis his liberty was signed at Madrid, on the 14th of January, 1526. The article with regard to Burgundy, which had hitherto created the greatest difficulty, was compromised, Francis engaging to restore that duchy with all its dependencies in full sovereignty to the Emperor; and Charles consenting that this restitution should not be made until the King was set at liberty. In order to secure the performance of this, as well as the other conditions in the treaty, Francis agreed that, at the same instant when he himself should be released, he would deliver as hostages to the Emperor, his eldest son the Dauphin, his second son the Duke of Orleans, or, in lieu of the latter, twelve of his principal nobility, to be named by Charles. The other articles swelled to a great number, and, though not of such importance, were extremely rigorous. Among these the most remarkable were, that Francis should renounce all his pretensions in Italy; that he should disclaim any title which he had to the sovereignty of Flanders and Artois; that, within six weeks after his release, he should restore to Bourbon, and his ad-

herents, all their goods, movable and immovable, and make them full reparation for the dagers which they had sustained by the confiscation of them; that he should use his interest with Henry d'Albert to relinquish his pretensions to the crown of Navarre, and should not, for the future, assist him in any attempt to recover it; that there should be established between the Emperor and Francis a league of perpetual friendship and confederacy, with a promise of mutual assistance in every case of necessity; that, in corroboration of this union, Francis should marry the Emperor's sister, the Queen Dowager of Portugal; that Francis should cause all the articles of his treaty to be ratified by the States, and registered in the parliaments of his kingdom; that, upon the Emperor's receiving this ratification, the hostages should be set at liberty; but, in their place, the Duke of Angouleme, the King's third son, should be delivered to Charles; that, in order to manifest, as well as to strengthen the amity between the two monarchs, he might be educated at the Imperial court; and that if Francis did not, within the time limited, fulfil the stipulations in the treaty, he should promise, upon his honour and oath, to return to Spain, and to surrender himself again a prisoner to the Emperor<sup>32</sup>.

By this treaty, Charles flattered himself that he had not only effectually humbled his rival, but that he had taken such precautions as would for ever prevent his reattaining any formidable degree of power. The opinion which the wisest politicians formed concerning it, was very different; they could not persuade themselves that Francis, after obtaining his

<sup>32</sup> *Recueil des Trait.* tom. ii. 112. *Ullon Vita del Carlo V.* p. 102, &c.

liberty, would execute articles against which he had struggled so long, and to which, notwithstanding all that he felt during a long and rigorous confinement he had consented with the utmost reluctance. Ambition and resentment, they knew, would conspire in prompting him to violate the hard conditions to which he had been constrained to submit; nor would arguments and casuistry be wanting to represent that which was so manifestly advantageous to be necessary and just. If one part of Francis's conduct had been known at that time, this opinion might have been founded, not in conjecture, but in certainty. A few hours before he signed the treaty, he assembled such of his counsellors as were then at Madrid; and having, exacted from them a solemn oath of secrecy, he made a long enumeration, in their presence, of the dishonourable arts, as well as unprincipely rigour, which the Emperor had employed in order to ensnare or intimidate him. For that reason, he took a formal protest in the hands of notaries, that his consent to the treaty should be considered as an involuntary deed, and be deemed null and void<sup>33</sup>. By this disingenuous artifice, for which even the treatment that he had met with was no apology, Francis endeavoured to satisfy his honour and conscience in signing the treaty, and to provide, at the same time, a pretext on which to break it.

Great, meanwhile, were the outward demonstrations of love and confidence between the two monarchs; they appeared often together in public; they frequently had long conferences in private; they travelled in the same litter, and joined in the same amusements. But, amidst these signs of peace and friendship, the Emperor still harboured suspi-

<sup>36</sup> *Recueil des Trait.* tom. ii. p. 107.

cion in his mind. Though the ceremonies of the marriage between Francis and the Queen of Portugal were performed soon after the conclusion of the treaty, Charles would not permit him to consummate it until the return of the ratification from France. Even then Francis was not allowed to be at full liberty; his guards were still continued; though caressed as a brother-in-law, he was still watched like a prisoner; and it was obvious to attentive observers, that a union, in the very beginning of which there might be discerned such symptoms of jealousy and distrust, could not be cordial, or of long continuance<sup>31</sup>.

About a month after the signing of the treaty, the Regent's ratification of it was brought from France; and that wise Princess, preferring, on this occasion, the public good to domestic affection, informed her son, that, instead of the twelve noblemen named in the treaty, she had sent the Duke of Orleans along with his brother the Dauphin, to the frontier, as the kingdom could suffer nothing by the absence of a child, but must be left almost incapable of defence, if deprived of its ablest statesmen and most experienced generals, whom Charles had artfully included in his nomination. At last Francis took leave of the Emperor, whose suspicion of the King's sincerity increasing, as the time of putting it to the proof approached, he endeavoured to bind him still faster by exacting new promises, which, after those he had already made, the French Monarch was not slow to grant. He set out from Madrid, a place which the remembrance of many afflicting circumstances rendered peculiarly odious to him, with the joy natural on such an occasion, and began the long wished for

<sup>31</sup> Guic. l. xvi. 353.

journey towards his own dominions. He was escorted by a body of horse under the command of Alarcon, who, as the King drew near the frontiers of France, guarded him with more scrupulous exactness than ever. When he arrived at the river Andaye, which separates the two kingdoms, Lautrec appeared on the opposite bank with a guard of horse equal in number to Alarcon's. An empty bark was moored in the middle of the stream; the attendants drew up in order on the opposite banks: at the same instant, Lannoy, with eight gentlemen, put off from the Spanish, and Lautrec with the same number from the French side of the river; the former had the King in his boat; the latter, the Dauphin and Duke of Orleans; they met in the empty vessel; the exchange was made in a moment: Francis, after a short embrace of his children, leaped into Lautrec's boat, and reached the French shore. He mounted at that instant a Turkish horse, waved his hand over his head, and with a joyful voice crying aloud several times, "I am yet a King," galloped full speed to St. John de Luz, and from thence to Bayonne. This event, no less impatiently desired by the French nation than by their Monarch, happened on the 18th of March, a year and twenty-two days after the fatal battle of Pavia<sup>35</sup>.

Soon after the Emperor had taken leave of Francis, and permitted him to begin his journey towards his own dominions, he set out for Seville, in order to solemnize his marriage with Isabella, the daughter of Emanuel, the late King of Portugal, and the sister of John III, who had succeeded him in the throne of that kingdom. Isabella was a Princess of uncommon beauty and accomplishments; and as

<sup>35</sup> Sandov. Hist. i. 735. Guic. l. xvi. 355.

the Cortes, both in Castile and Aragon, had warmly solicited their sovereign to marry, the choice of a wife so nearly allied to the royal blood of both kingdoms was extremely acceptable to his subjects. The Portuguese, fond of this new connexion with the first monarch in Christendom, granted him an extraordinary dowry with Isabella, amounting to nine hundred thousand crowns, a sum which, from the situation of his affairs at that juncture, was of no small consequence to the Emperor. The marriage was celebrated [March 12] with that splendour and gaiety which became a great and youthful Prince. Charles lived with Isabella in perfect harmony, and treated her on all occasions with much distinction and regard<sup>30</sup>.

During these transactions, Charles could hardly give any attention to the affairs of Germany, though it was torn in pieces by commotions which threatened the most dangerous consequences. By the feudal institutions, which still subsisted almost unimpaired in the Empire, the property of lands was vested in the princes and free barons. Their vassals held of them by the strictest and most limited tenures; while the great body of the people was kept in a state but little removed from absolute servitude. In some places of Germany, people of the lowest class were so entirely in the power of their masters, as to be subject to personal and domestic slavery, the most rigorous form of that wretched state. In other provinces, particularly in Bohemia and Lusatia, the peasants were bound to remain on the lands to which they belonged, and, making part

<sup>30</sup> Ulloa Vita di Carlo V. p. 106, Belcarius Com. Rerum Gallic. p. 565. Spalatius ap. Struv. Corp. Hist. Germ. ii. 1081.

of the estate, were transferred like any other property from one hand to another. Even in Suabia, and the countries on the banks of the Rhine, where their condition was most tolerable, the peasants not only paid the full rent of their farms to the landlord; but if they chose either to change the place of their abode, or to follow a new profession, before they could accomplish what they desired, they were obliged to purchase this privilege at a certain price. Besides this, all grants of lands to peasants expired at their death, without descending to their posterity. Upon that event, the landlord had a right to the best of their cattle, as well as of their furniture; and their heirs, in order to obtain a renewal of the grant, were obliged to pay large sums by way of fine. These exactions, though grievous, were borne with patience, because they were customary and ancient: but when the progress of elegance and luxury, as well as the changes introduced into the art of war, came to increase the expense of government, and made it necessary for princes to levy occasional or stated taxes on their subjects, such impositions, being new, appeared intolerable; and in Germany, these duties being laid chiefly upon beer, wine, and other necessities of life, affected the common people in the most sensible manner. The addition of such a load to their former burdens drove them to despair. It was to the valour inspired by resentment against impositions of this kind, that the Swiss owed the acquisition of their liberty in the fourteenth century. The same cause had excited the peasants in several other provinces of Germany to rebel against their superiors towards the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries; and though these insurrections

were not attended with like success, they could not, however, be quelled without much difficulty and bloodshed<sup>37</sup>.

By these checks, the spirit of the peasants was overawed rather than subdued; and their grievances multiplying continually, they ran to arms, in the year 1526, with the most frantic rage. Their first appearance was near Ulm, in Suabia. The peasants in the adjacent country flocked to their standard with the ardour and impatience natural to men who, having groaned long under oppression, beheld at last some prospect of deliverance; and the contagion, spreading from province to province, reached almost every part of Germany. Wherever they came, they plundered the monasteries; wasted the lands of their superiors; rased their castles, and massacred without mercy all persons of noble birth who were so unhappy as to fall into their hands<sup>38</sup>. Having intimidated their oppressors, as they imagined, by the violence of these proceedings, they began to consider what would be the most proper and effectual method of securing themselves for the future from their tyrannical exactions. With this view, they drew up and published a memorial, containing all their demands, and declared, that while arms were in their hands, they would either persuade or oblige the nobles to give them full satisfaction with regard to these. The chief articles were, that they might have liberty to choose their own pastors; that they might be freed from the payment of all tithes, except those of corn; that they might no longer be considered as the slaves or bond-

<sup>37</sup> Seeckend. lib. ii. p. 2. 6.

<sup>38</sup> Petr. Crinitus de Bello Rusticano, ap. Freher. Script. Rer. Germ. Argent. 1717, vol. iii. p. 243.

men of their superiors; that the liberty of hunting and fishing might be common; that the great forests might not be regarded as private property, but be open for the use of all; that they might be delivered from the unusual burden of taxes under which they laboured; that the administration of justice might be rendered less rigorous and more impartial; that the encroachments of the nobles upon meadows and commons might be restrained<sup>39</sup>.

Many of these demands were extremely reasonable; and, being urged by such formidable numbers, should have met with some redress. But those unwieldy bodies, assembled in different places, had neither union, nor conduct, nor vigour. Being led by persons of the lowest rank, without skill in war, or knowledge of what was necessary for accomplishing their designs; all their exploits were distinguished only by a brutal and unmeaning fury. To oppose this, the princes and nobles of Suabia and the lower Rhine raised such of their vassals as still continued faithful, and attacking some of the mutineers with open force, and others by surprise, cut to pieces or dispersed all who infested those provinces; so that the peasants, after ruining the open country and losing upwards of twenty thousand of their associates in the field, were obliged to return to their habitations with less hope than ever of relief from their grievances<sup>40</sup>.

These commotions happened at first in provinces of Germany where Luther's opinions had made little progress; and, being excited wholly by political causes, had no connexion with the disputed points

<sup>39</sup> Sleid. Hist. p. 90.

<sup>40</sup> Seckend. lib. ii. p. 10. Petr. Gnodalins de Rusticanorum Tumultu in Germania, ap. Scard. Script. vol. ii. p. 131, &c.

in religion. But the frenzy reached at last those countries in which the Reformation was established, derived new strength from circumstances peculiar to them, and rose to a still greater pitch of extravagance. The Reformation, wherever it was received, increased that bold and innovating spirit to which it owed its birth. Men who had the courage to overturn a system supported by every thing which can command respect or reverence, were not to be overawed by any authority, how great or venerable soever. After having been accustomed to consider themselves as judges of the most important doctrines in religion, to examine these freely, and to reject without scruple what appeared to them erroneous, it was natural for them to turn the same daring and inquisitive eye towards government, and to think of rectifying whatever disorders or imperfections were discovered there. As religious abuses had been reformed in several places without the permission of the magistrate, it was an easy transition to attempt the redress of political grievances in the same manner.

No sooner, then, did the spirit of revolt break out in Thuringia, a province subject to the Elector of Saxony, the inhabitants of which were mostly converts to Lutheranism, than it assumed a new and more dangerous form. Thomas Muncer, one of Luther's disciples, having established himself in that country, had acquired a wonderful ascendancy over the minds of the people. He propagated among them the wildest and most enthusiastic notions, but such as tended manifestly to inspire them with boldness, and lead them to sedition. "Luther," he told them, "had done more hurt than service to religion. He had, indeed, rescued the church from the yoke

of Popery, but his doctrines encouraged, and his life set an example of, the utmost licentiousness of manners. In order to avoid vice," says he, "men must practise perpetual mortification. They must put on a grave countenance, speak little, wear a plain garb, and be serious in their whole deportment. Such as prepare their hearts in this manner may expect that the Supreme Being will direct all their steps, and by some visible sign discover his will to them: if that illumination be at any time withheld, we may expostulate with the Almighty, who deals with us so harshly, and remind him of his promises. This expostulation and anger will be highly acceptable to God, and will at last prevail on him to guide us with the same unerring hand which conducted the patriarchs of old. Let us beware, however, of offending him by our arrogance; but as all men are equal in his eye, let them return to that condition of equality in which he formed them; and, having all things in common, let them live together like brethren, without any marks of subordination or preeminence<sup>41</sup>."

Extravagant as these tenets were, they flattered so many passions in the human heart as to make a deep impression. To aim at nothing more than abridging the power of the nobility, was now considered as a trifling and partial reformation, not worth the contending for; it was proposed to level every distinction among mankind, and, by abolishing property to reduce them to their natural state of equality, in which all should receive their subsistence from one common stock. Muncer assured them that the design was approved of by Heaven, and that the Almighty had in a dream ascertained

<sup>41</sup> Seeckend. lib. ii. p. 13. Sleid. Hist. p. 83.

him of its success. The peasants set about the execution of it, not only with the rage which animated those of their order in other parts of Germany, but with the ardour which enthusiasm inspires. They deposed the magistrates in all the cities of which they were masters; seized the lands of the nobles, and obliged such of them as they got into their hands, to put on the dress commonly worn by peasants, and, instead of their former titles, to be satisfied with the appellation given to people in the lowest class of life. Great numbers engaged in this wild undertaking; but Muncer, their leader and their prophet, was destitute of the abilities necessary for conducting it. He had all the extravagance, but not the courage, which enthusiasts usually possess. It was with difficulty he could be persuaded to take the field; and though he soon drew together eight thousand men, he suffered himself to be surrounded by a body of cavalry under the command of the Elector of Saxony, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Duke of Brunswick. These princes, unwilling to shed the blood of their deluded subjects, sent a young nobleman to their camp, with the offer of a general pardon, if they would immediately lay down their arms, and deliver up the authors of the sedition. Muncer, alarmed at this, began to harangue his followers with his usual vehemence, exhorting them not to trust these deceitful promises of their oppressors, nor to desert the cause of God, and of Christian liberty.

But the sense of present danger making a deeper impression on the peasants than his eloquence, confusion and terror were visible in every face, when a rainbow, which was the emblem that the mutineers had painted on their colours, happening to appear

in the clouds, Muncer, with admirable presence of mind, laid hold of that incident, and suddenly raising his eyes and hands towards heaven,—“Behold,” cries he, with an elevated voice, “the sign which God has given. There is the pledge of your safety, and a token that the wicked shall be destroyed.” The fanatical multitude set up instantly a great shout, as if victory had been certain; and, passing in a moment from one extreme to another, massacred the unfortunate nobleman who had come with the offer of pardon, and demanded to be led towards the enemy. The princes, enraged at this shocking violation of the laws of war, advanced with no less impetuosity, and began the attack [May 15]: but the behaviour of the peasants in the combat was not such as might have been expected either from their ferocity or confidence of success; an undisciplined rabble was no equal match for well trained troops; above five thousand were slain in the field, almost without making resistance; the rest fled, and among the foremost Muncer their general. He was taken next day; and being condemned to such punishments as his crimes had deserved, he suffered them with a poor and dastardly spirit. His death put an end to the insurrections of the peasants, which had filled Germany with such terror<sup>42</sup>; but the enthusiastic notions which he had scattered were not extirpated, and produced, not long after, effects more memorable as well as more extravagant.

During these commotions, Luther acted with exemplary prudence and moderation; like a common parent, solicitous about the welfare of both parties, without sparing the faults or errors of either. On

<sup>42</sup> Sleid. Hist. p. 84. Seckend. lib. ii, p. 12. Gualdus Tamult. Rustican. 155.

the one hand, he addressed a monitory discourse to the nobles, exhorting them to treat their dependents with greater humanity and indulgence. On the other, he severely censured the seditious spirit of the peasants, advising them not to murmur at hardships inseparable from their condition, nor to seek for redress by any but legal means<sup>43</sup>.

Luther's famous marriage with Catherine a Boria, a nun of a noble family, who, having thrown off the veil, had fled from the cloister, happened this year, and was far from meeting with the same approbation. Even his most devoted followers thought this step indecent, at a time when his country was involved in so many calamities; while his enemies never mentioned it with any softer appellation than that of incestuous or profane. Luther himself was sensible of the impression which it had made to his disadvantage; but being satisfied with his own conduct, he bore the censure of his friends, and the reproaches of his adversaries, with his usual fortitude<sup>44</sup>.

This year [May 5] the Reformation lost its first protector, Frederic, Elector of Saxony; but the blow was the less sensibly felt, as he was succeeded by his brother John, a more avowed and zealous, though less able patron of Luther and his doctrines.

Another event happened about the same time, which, as it occasioned a considerable change in the state of Germany, must be traced back to its source. While the frenzy of the Crusades possessed all Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, several orders of religious knighthood were founded in defence of the Christian faith against Heathens and Infidels. Among these, the Teutonic

<sup>43</sup> Sleid. Hist. p. 87.

<sup>44</sup> Seckend. lib. ii. p. 15.

order in Germany was one of the most illustrious, the knights of which distinguished themselves greatly in all the enterprises carried on in the Holy Land. Being driven at last from their settlements in the east, they were obliged to return to their native country. Their zeal and valour were too impetuous to remain long inactive. They invaded, on very slight pretences, the province of Prussia, the inhabitants of which were still idolaters; and, having completed the conquest of it about the middle of the thirteenth century, held it many years as a fief depending on the crown of Poland. Fierce contests arose, during this period, between the Grand Masters of the order and the Kings of Poland; the former struggling for independence, while the latter asserted their right of sovereignty with great firmness. Albert, a Prince of the house of Brandenburg, who was elected Grand Master in the year 1511, engaging keenly in this quarrel, maintained a long war with Sigismund, King of Poland; but having become an early convert to Luther's doctrines, this gradually lessened his zeal for the interests of his fraternity, so that he took the opportunity of the confusions in the Empire, and the absence of the Emperor, to conclude a treaty with Sigismund, greatly to his own private emolument. By it, that part of Prussia, which belonged to the Teutonic order, was erected into a secular and hereditary duchy, and the investiture of it granted to Albert, who, in return, bound himself to do homage for it to the Kings of Poland as their vassal. Immediately after this, he made public profession of the reformed religion, and married a Princess of Denmark. The Teutonic knights exclaimed so loudly against the treachery of their Grand Master that he was put

under the ban of the Empire; but he still kept possession of the province which he had usurped, and transmitted it to his posterity. In process of time, this rich inheritance fell to the Electoral branch of the family; all dependence on the crown of Poland was shaken off; and the Margraves of Brandenburg, having assumed the title of Kings of Prussia, have not only risen to an equality with the first Princes in Germany, but take their rank among the great Monarchs of Europe<sup>45</sup>.

Upon the return of the French King to his dominions, the eyes of all the powers in Europe were fixed upon him, that, by observing his first motions, they might form a judgment concerning his subsequent conduct. They were not held long in suspense. Francis, as soon as he arrived at Bayonne, wrote to the King of England, thanking him for the zeal and affection wherewith he had interposed in his favour, to which he acknowledged that he owed the recovery of his liberty. Next day, the Emperor's ambassadors demanded audience, and, in their master's name, required him to issue such orders as were necessary for carrying the treaty of Madrid into immediate and full execution. He coldly answered, that though, for his own part, he determined religiously to perform all that he had promised, the treaty contained so many articles relative not to himself alone, but affecting the interests of the French monarchy, that he could not take any further step without consulting the States of his kingdom, and that some time would be necessary, in order to reconcile their minds to the hard conditions which he had consented to ratify<sup>46</sup>. This reply was considered

<sup>45</sup> Sleid. Hist. p. 98. Plessel Abrégé de l'Hist. de Droit Publ. p. 603, &c.

<sup>46</sup> Mem. de Bellay, p. 97.

as no obscure discovery of his being resolved to elude the treaty; and the compliment paid to Henry appeared a very proper step towards securing the assistance of that monarch in the war with the Emperor, to which such a resolution would certainly give rise. These circumstances, added to the explicit declarations which Francis made in secret to the ambassadors from several of the Italian powers, fully satisfied them that their conjectures with regard to his conduct had been just; and that, instead of intending to execute an unreasonable treaty, he was eager to seize the first opportunity of revenging those injuries which had compelled him to feign an approbation of it. Even the doubts, and fears, and scruples, which used on other occasions to hold Clement in a state of uncertainty, were dissipated by Francis's seeming impatience to break through all his engagements with the Emperor. The situation, indeed, of affairs in Italy at that time did not allow the Pope to hesitate long. Sforza was still besieged by the Imperialists in the castle of Milan. That feeble Prince, deprived now of Moronè's advice, and unprovided with every thing necessary for defence, found means to inform Clement and the Venetians, that he must soon surrender, if they did not come to his relief. The Imperial troops, as they had received no pay since the battle of Pavia, lived at discretion in the Milanese, levying such exorbitant contributions in that duchy, as amounted, if we may rely on Guicciardini's calculation, to no less a sum than five thousand ducats a day<sup>47</sup>; nor was it to be doubted but that the soldiers, as soon as the castle should submit, would choose to leave a ruined country which hardly afforded them subsistence, that

<sup>47</sup> Guic. lib. xvii. 360.

they might take possession of more comfortable quarters in the fertile and untouched territories of the Pope and Venetians. The assistance of the French King was the only thing which could either save Sforza, or enable him to protect their own dominions from the insults of the Imperial troops.

For these reasons, the Pope, the Venetians, and Duke of Milan, were equally impatient to come to an agreement with Francis, who, on his part, was no less desirous of acquiring such a considerable accession both of strength and reputation as such a confederacy would bring along with it. The chief objects of this alliance, which was concluded at Cognac on the 22d of May, though kept secret for some time, were to oblige the Emperor to set at liberty the French King's sons, upon payment of a reasonable ransom; and to reestablish Sforza in the quiet possession of the Milanese. If Charles should refuse either of these, the contracting parties bound themselves to bring into the field an army of thirty-five thousand men, with which, after driving the Spaniards out of the Milanese, they would attack the kingdom of Naples. The King of England was declared protector of this league, which they dignified with the name of *Holy*, because the Pope was at the head of it; and in order to allure Henry more effectually, a principality in the kingdom of Naples, of thirty thousand ducats yearly revenue, was to be settled on him; and lands to the value of ten thousand ducats on Wolsey his favourite<sup>46</sup>.

No sooner was this league concluded than Clement, by the plenitude of his papal power, absolved Francis from the oath which he had taken to observe

<sup>46</sup> P. Heuter. *Rer. Austr. lib. ix. c. 3. p. 217.* *Recueil des Trait. ii. 121.*

the treaty of Madrid<sup>40</sup>. This right, how pernicious soever in its effects, and destructive of that integrity which is the basis of all transactions among men, was the natural consequence of the powers which the Popes arrogated as the infallible vicegerents of Christ upon earth. But as, in virtue of this pretended prerogative, they had often dispensed with obligations which were held sacred, the interest of some men, and the credulity of others, led them to imagine that the decisions of a sovereign pontiff authorized or justified actions which would, otherwise, have been criminal and impious.

The discovery of Francis's intention to elude the treaty of Madrid filled the Emperor with a variety of disquieting thoughts. He had treated an unfortunate Prince in the most ungenerous manner; he had displayed an insatiable ambition in all his negotiations with his prisoner; he knew what censures the former had drawn upon him, and what apprehensions the latter had excited in every court of Europe; nor had he reaped from the measures which he pursued any of those advantages which politicians are apt to consider as an excuse for the most criminal conduct, and a compensation for the severest reproaches. Francis was now out of his hands, and not one of all the mighty consequences, which he had expected from the treaty that set him at liberty, was likely to take place. His rashness in relying so far on his own judgment as to trust to the sincerity of the French King, in opposition to the sentiments of his wisest ministers, was now apparent; and he easily conjectured, that the same confederacy, the dread of which had induced him to set Francis at liberty, would now be formed against

<sup>40</sup> Goldast. *Polit. Imperial.* p. 1002. Pallav. *Hist.* p. 70.

him with that gallant and incensed monarch at its head. Self-condemnation and shame, on account of what was past, with anxious apprehensions concerning what might happen, were the necessary result of these reflections on his own conduct and situation. Charles, however, was naturally firm and inflexible in all his measures. To have receded suddenly from any article in the treaty of Madrid would have been a plain confession of imprudence, and a palpable symptom of fear; he determined, therefore, that it was most suitable to his dignity to insist, whatever might be the consequences, on the strict execution of the treaty, and particularly not to accept of any thing which might be offered as an equivalent for the restitution of Burgundy<sup>30</sup>.

In consequence of this resolution, he appointed Lannoy and Alarcon to repair, as his ambassadors, to the court of France, and formally to summon the King, either to execute the treaty with the sincerity that became him, or to return; according to his oath, a prisoner to Madrid. Instead of giving them an immediate answer, Francis admitted the deputies of the states of Burgundy to an audience in their presence. They humbly represented to him, that he had exceeded the powers vested in a King of France, when he consented to alienate their country from the crown, the domains of which he was bound by his coronation oath to preserve entire and unimpaired. Francis, in return, thanked them for their attachment to his crown, and entreated them, though very faintly, to remember the obligations which he lay under to fulfil his engagements with the Emperor. The deputies, assuming a higher tone, declared that they would not obey commands which they consi-

<sup>30</sup> Guic. l. xvii. 266.

dered as illegal; and, if he should abandon them to the enemies of France, they had resolved to defend themselves to the best of their power, with a firm purpose rather to perish than submit to a foreign dominion. Upon which Francis, turning towards the Imperial ambassadors, represented to them the impossibility of performing what he had undertaken, and offered in lieu of Burgundy, to pay the Emperor two millions of crowns. The Viceroy and Alarcon, who easily perceived that the scene to which they had been witnesses was concerted between the King and his subjects in order to impose upon them, signified to him their master's fixed resolution not to depart in the smallest point from the terms of the treaty, and withdrew<sup>51</sup>. Before they left the kingdom they had the mortification to hear the holy league against the Emperor published with great solemnity [June 11].

Charles no sooner received an account of this confederacy than he exclaimed, in the most public manner, and in the harshest terms, against Francis, as a prince void of faith and of honour. He complained no less of Clement, whom he solicited in vain to abandon his new allies; he accused him of ingratitude: he taxed him with an ambition unbecoming his character; he threatened him not only with all the vengeance which the power of an Emperor can inflict, but, by appealing to a general council, called up before his eyes all the terrors arising from the authority of those assemblies so formidable to the papal see. It was necessary, however, to oppose something else than reproaches and threats to the powerful combination formed against

<sup>51</sup> Belcar. *Comment. de Reb. Gal.* 573. *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 97.

him; and the Emperor, prompted by so many passions, did not fail to exert himself with unusual vigour, in order to send supplies, not only of men but of money, which was still more needed, into Italy.

On the other hand, the efforts of the confederates bore no proportion to that animosity against the Emperor, with which they seemed to enter into the holy league. Francis, it was thought, would have infused spirit and vigour into the whole body. He had his lost honour to repair, many injuries to revenge, and the station among the princes of Europe, from which he had fallen, to recover. From all these powerful incitements, added to the natural impetuosity of his temper, a war more fierce and bloody than any that he had hitherto made upon his rival, was expected. But Francis had gone through such a scene of distress, and the impression it had made was still so fresh in his memory that he was become diffident himself, distrustful of fortune, and desirous of tranquillity. To procure the release of his sons, and to avoid the restitution of Burgundy by paying some reasonable equivalent, were his chief objects; and for the sake of these, he would willingly have sacrificed Sforza, and the liberties of Italy, to the Emperor. He flattered himself, that the dread of the confederacy which he had formed would of itself induce Charles to listen to what was equitable; and was afraid of employing any considerable force for the relief of the Milanese, lest his allies, whom he had often found to be more attentive to their own interest than punctual in fulfilling their engagements, should abandon him as soon as the Imperialists were driven out of that country, and deprive his negotiations with the Emperor of that weight which they derived from his being at the

head of a powerful league. In the mean time the castle of Milan was pressed more closely than ever, and Sforza was now reduced to the last extremity. The Pope and Venetians, trusting to Francis's concurrence, commanded their troops to take the field, in order to relieve him; and an army more than sufficient for that service was soon formed. The Milanese, passionately attached to their unfortunate Duke, and no less exasperated against the Imperialists, who had oppressed them so cruelly, were ready to aid the confederates in all their enterprises. But the Duke d'Urbino, their general, naturally slow and indecisive, and restrained, besides, by his ancient enmity to the family of Medici, from taking any step that might aggrandize or add reputation to the Pope<sup>52</sup>, lost some opportunities of attacking the Imperialists, and raising the siege; and refused to improve others. These delays gave Bourbon time to bring up a reinforcement of fresh troops, and a supply of money. He immediately took the command of the army [July 24], and pushed on the siege with such vigour, as quickly obliged Sforza to surrender; who, retiring to Lodi, which the confederates had surprised, left Bourbon in full possession of the rest of the duchy, the investiture of which the Emperor had promised to grant him<sup>53</sup>.

The Italians began now to perceive the game which Francis had played, and to be sensible that, notwithstanding all their address and refinements in negotiation, which they boasted of as talents peculiarly their own, they had for once been overreached in those very arts by a *tramontane* prince. He had hitherto thrown almost the whole burden of the war upon them, taking advantage of their efforts, in

<sup>52</sup> Gaic. l. xvii. 382.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. l. xvii. 376, &c.

enforce the proposals which he often renewed at the court of Madrid for obtaining the liberty of his sons. The Pope and Venetians expostulated and complained<sup>54</sup>; but as they were not able to rouse Francis from his inactivity, their own zeal and vigour gradually abated; and Clement, having already gone farther than his timidity usually permitted him, began to accuse himself of rashness, and to relapse into his natural state of doubt and uncertainty.

All the Emperor's motions, depending on himself alone, were more brisk and better concerted. The narrowness of his revenues, indeed, did not allow him to make any sudden or great effort in the field, but he abundantly supplied that defect by his intrigues and negotiations. The family of Colonna, the most powerful of all the Roman barons, had adhered uniformly to the Ghibeline or Imperial faction, during those fierce contentions between the Popes and Emperors, which for several ages filled Italy and Germany with discord and bloodshed. Though the causes which at first gave birth to these destructive factions existed no longer, and the rage with which they had been animated was in a great measure spent, the Colonnas still retained their attachment to the Imperial interest, and, by placing themselves under the protection of the Emperors, secured the quiet possession of their own territories and privileges. The Cardinal Pompeo Colonna, a man of a turbulent and ambitious temper, at that time the head of the family, had long been Clement's rival, to whose influence in the last conclave he imputed the disappointment of all his schemes for attaining the papal dignity, of which, from his known con-

<sup>54</sup> *Rascelli Lettere de Principi*, ii. 157, &c. 159, 160—166.

nexion with the Emperor, he thought himself secure. To an aspiring mind, this was an injury too great to be forgiven; and though he had dissembled his resentment so far as to vote for Clement at his election, and to accept of great offices in his court, he waited with the utmost impatience for an opportunity of being revenged. Don Hugo de Moncada, the Imperial ambassador at Rome, who was no stranger to these sentiments, easily persuaded him that now was the time, while all the papal troops were employed in Lombardy, to attempt something, which would at once avenge his own wrongs, and be of essential service to the Emperor his patron. The Pope, however, whose timidity rendered him quick-sighted, was so attentive to their operations, and began to be alarmed so early, that he might have drawn together troops sufficient to have disconcerted all Colonna's measures. But Moncada amused him so artfully with negotiations, promises, and false intelligence, that he lulled asleep all his suspicions, and prevented his taking any of the precautions necessary for his safety; and, to the disgrace of a prince possessed of great power, as well as renowned for political wisdom, Colonna, at the head of three thousand men, seized one of the gates of his capital [Sept. 29], while he, imagining himself to be in perfect security, was altogether unprepared for resisting such a feeble enemy. The inhabitants of Rome permitted Colonna's troops, from whom they apprehended no injury, to advance without opposition; the Pope's guards were dispersed in a moment; and Clement himself, terrified at the danger, ashamed of his own credulity, and deserted by almost every person, fled with precipitation into the castle of St. Angelo, which was im-

mediately invested. The palace of the Vatican, the church of St. Peter, and the houses of the Pope's ministers and servants, were plundered in the most licentious manner. The rest of the city was left unmolested. Clement, destitute of every thing necessary either for subsistence or defence, was soon obliged to demand a capitulation; and Moncada, being admitted into the castle, prescribed to him, with all the haughtiness of a conqueror, conditions which it was not in his power to reject. The chief of these was, That Clement should not only grant a full pardon to the Colonnas, but receive them into favour, and immediately withdraw all the troops in his pay from the army of the confederates in Lombardy<sup>33</sup>.

The Colonnas, who talked of nothing less than of deposing Clement, and of placing Pompeo, their kinsman, in the vacant chair of St. Peter, exclaimed loudly against a treaty which left them at the mercy of a pontiff justly incensed against them. But Moncada, attentive only to his master's interest, paid little regard to their complaints, and, by this fortunate measure, broke entirely the power of the confederates.

While the army of the confederates suffered such a considerable diminution, the Imperialists received two great reinforcements; one from Spain under the command of Lannoy and Alarcon, which amounted to six thousand men; the other was raised in the empire by George Fronsperg, a German nobleman, who having served in Italy with great reputation, had acquired such influence and popularity that multitudes of his countrymen, fond, on every occasion of engaging in military enterprises, and impatient at

<sup>33</sup> Jovii Vita Pomp. Colos. Guic. l. xvii. 407. Ruscelli Lettere de Principi, i. p. 104.

that juncture to escape from the oppression which they felt in religious as well as civil matters, crowded to his standard; so that, without any other gratuity than the payment of a crown to each man, fourteen thousand enlisted in his service. To these the Archduke Ferdinand added two thousand horse, levied in the Austrian dominions. But although the Emperor had raised troops, he could not remit the sums necessary for their support. His ordinary revenues were exhausted; the credit of princes, during the infancy of commerce, was not extensive; and the Cortes of Castile, though every art had been tried to gain them, and some innovations had been made in the constitution in order to secure their concurrence, peremptorily refused to grant Charles any extraordinary supply<sup>50</sup>; so that the more his army increased in number, the more were his generals embarrassed and distressed. Bourbon, in particular, was involved in such difficulties that he stood in need of all his address and courage in order to extricate himself. Large sums were due to the Spanish troops already in the Milanese, when Fronsperg arrived with sixteen thousand hungry Germans destitute of every thing. Both made their demands with equal fierceness; the former claiming their arrears, and the latter, the pay which had been promised them on their entering Lombardy. Bourbon was altogether incapable of giving satisfaction to either. In this situation, he was constrained to commit acts of violence extremely shocking to his own nature, which was generous and humane. He seized the principal citizens of Milan, and by threats, and even by torture, forced from them a considerable sum; he rifled the churches of all their plate and ornaments; the inadequate supply which these af-

<sup>50</sup> Sandov. i. 811.

forled, he distributed among the soldiers, with so many soothing expressions of his sympathy and affection, that, though it fell far short of the sums due to them, it appeased their present murmurs<sup>57</sup>.

Among other expedients for raising money, Bourbon granted his life and liberty to Moronè, who having been kept in prison since his intrigue with Pescara, had been condemned to die by the Spanish judges empowered to try him. For this remission he paid twenty thousand ducats; and such were his singular talents, and the wonderful ascendant which he always acquired over the minds of those to whom he had access, that, in a few days, from being Bourbon's prisoner, he became his prime confidant, with whom he consulted in all affairs of importance. To his insinuations must be imputed the suspicions which Bourbon began to entertain, that the Emperor had never intended to grant him the investiture of Milan, but had appointed Leyva, and the other Spanish generals, rather to be spies on his conduct, than to cooperate heartily towards the execution of his schemes. To him likewise, as he still retained, at the age of fourscore, all the enterprising spirit of youth, may be attributed the bold and unexpected measure on which Bourbon soon after ventured<sup>58</sup>.

Such, indeed, were the exigencies of the Imperial troops in the Milanese that it became indispensably necessary to take some immediate step for their relief. The arrears of the soldiers increased daily; the Emperor made no remittances to his generals; and the utmost rigour of military extortion could draw nothing more from a country entirely drained and ruined. In this situation there was no choice

<sup>57</sup> Ripamond. *Hist. Mediol.* lib. ix. p. 717.

<sup>58</sup> *Gut.* l. xiv. 419.

left, but either to disband the army, or to march for subsistence into the enemy's country. The territories of the Venetians lay nearest at hand; but they, with their usual foresight and prudence, had taken such precautions as secured them from any insult. Nothing, therefore, remained but to invade the dominions of the church, or of the Florentines; and Clement had of late acted such a part as merited the severest vengeance from the Emperor. No sooner did the papal troops return to Rome after the insurrection of the Colonnas, than, without paying any regard to the treaty with Moncada, he degraded the Cardinal Colonna, excommunicated the rest of the family, seized their places of strength, and wasted their lands with all the cruelty which the smart of a recent injury naturally excites. After this he turned his arms against Naples, and as his operations were seconded by the French fleet, he made some progress towards the conquest of that kingdom; the Viceroy being no less destitute than the other Imperial generals of the money requisite for a vigorous defence<sup>59</sup>.

1527.] These proceedings of the Pope justified, in appearance, the measures which Bourbon's situation rendered necessary; and he set about executing them under such disadvantages, as furnish the strongest proof both of the despair to which he was reduced, and of the greatness of his abilities which were able to surmount so many obstacles. Having committed the government of Milan to Leyva, whom he was not unwilling to leave behind, he began his march in the depth of winter [Jan. 30], at the head of twenty-five thousand men, composed of nations differing from each other in language and manners;

<sup>59</sup> Jovii Vita Pomp. Colon. Guic. l. xviii. 424.

without money, without magazines, without artillery, without carriages; in short, without any of those things which are necessary to the smallest party, and which seem essential to the existence and motions of a great army. His route lay through a country cut by rivers and mountains, in which the roads were almost impracticable; as an addition to his difficulties, the enemy's army, superior to his own in number, was at hand to watch all his motions, and to improve every advantage. But his troops, impatient of their present hardships, and allured by the hopes of immense booty, without considering how ill prepared they were for a march, followed him with great cheerfulness. His first scheme was to have made himself master of Placentia, and to have gratified his soldiers by the plunder of that city; but the vigilance of the confederate generals rendered the design abortive; nor had he better success in his project for the reduction of Bologna, which was seasonably supplied with as many troops as secured it from the insults of an army which had neither artillery nor ammunition. Having failed in both these attempts to become master of some great city, he was under a necessity of advancing. But he had now been two months in the field; his troops had suffered every calamity that a long march, together with the uncommon rigour of the season, could bring upon men destitute of all necessary accommodations in an enemy's country; the magnificent promises to which they trusted had hitherto proved altogether vain; they saw no prospect of relief; their patience, tried to the utmost, failed at last, and they broke out into open mutiny. Some officers, who rashly attempted to restrain them, fell victims to their fury. Bourbon himself, not daring to appear

during the first transports of their rage, was obliged to fly secretly from his quarters<sup>60</sup>. But this sudden ebullition of wrath began at last to subside; when Bourbon, who possessed, in a wonderful degree, the art of governing the minds of soldiers, renewed his promises with more confidence than formerly, and assured them that they would be soon accomplished. He endeavoured to render their hardships more tolerable, by partaking of them himself; he fared no better than the meanest sentinel; he marched along with them on foot; he joined them in singing their camp ballads, in which, with high praises of his valour, they mingled many strokes of military raillery on his poverty; and wherever they came, he allowed them, as a foretaste of what he had promised, to plunder the adjacent villages at discretion. Encouraged by all these soothing arts, they entirely forgot their sufferings and complaints, and followed him with the same implicit confidence as formerly<sup>61</sup>.

Bourbon, meanwhile, carefully concealed his intentions. Rome and Florence, not knowing on which the blow would fall, were held in the most disquieting state of suspense. Clement, equally solicitous for the safety of both, fluctuated in more than his usual uncertainty; and while the rapid approach of danger called for prompt and decisive measures, he spent the time in deliberations which came to no issue, or in taking resolutions, which, next day, his restless mind, more sagacious in discerning than in obviating difficulties, overturned, without being able to fix on what should be substituted in their place. At one time he determined to

<sup>60</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 434. Jovii Vit. Colon. 163.

<sup>61</sup> Œuvres de Brant. vol. iv. p. 246, &c.

unite himself more closely than ever with his allies, and to push on the war with vigour; at another, he inclined to bring all differences to a final accommodation by a treaty with Lannoy, who, knowing his passion for negotiation, solicited him incessantly with proposals for that purpose. His timidity at length prevailed, and led him to conclude an agreement with Lannoy [March 15], of which the following were the chief articles: That a suspension of arms should take place between the Pontifical and Imperial troops for eight months: that Clement should advance sixty thousand crowns towards satisfying the demands of the Imperial army: that the Colonnas should be absolved from censure, and their former dignities and possessions be restored to them: that the Viceroy should come to Rome, and prevent Bourbon from approaching nearer to that city, or to Florence<sup>61</sup>. On this hasty treaty, which deprived him of all hopes of assistance from his allies, without affording him any solid foundation of security, Clement relied so firmly that, like a man extricated at once out of all difficulties, he was at perfect ease, and in the fullness of his confidence disbanded all his troops except as many as were sufficient to guard his own person. This amazing confidence of Clement, who on every other occasion was fearful and suspicious to excess, appeared so unaccountable to Guicciardini, who, being at that time the pontifical commissary general and resident in the confederate army, had great opportunities, as well as great abilities, for observing how chimerical all his hopes were, that he imputes the Pope's conduct, at this juncture, wholly to infatuation, which those who are doomed to ruin cannot avoid<sup>62</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 436.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 446.

Lannoy, it would seem, intended to have executed the treaty with great sincerity; and having detached Clement from the confederacy, wished to turn Bourbon's arms against the Venetians, who, of all the powers at war with the Emperor, had exerted the greatest vigour. With this view he dispatched a courier to Bourbon, informing him of the suspension of arms, which, in the name of their common master, he had concluded with the Pope. Bourbon had other schemes, and he had prosecuted them now too far to think of retreating. To have mentioned a retreat to his soldiers would have been dangerous; his command was independent of Lannoy; he was fond of mortifying a man whom he had many reasons to hate: for these reasons, without paying the least regard to the message, he continued to ravage the ecclesiastical territories, and to advance towards Florence. Upon this, all Clement's terror and anxiety returning with new force, he had recourse to Lannoy, and entreated and conjured him to put a stop to Bourbon's progress. Lannoy accordingly set out for his camp, but durst not approach it; Bourbon's soldiers having got notice of the truce, raged and threatened, demanding the accomplishment of the promises to which they had trusted; their general himself could hardly restrain them; every person in Rome perceived that nothing remained but to prepare for resisting a storm which it was now impossible to dispel. Clement alone, relying on some ambiguous and deceitful professions which Bourbon made of his inclination towards peace, sunk back into his former security<sup>64</sup>.

Bourbon, on his part, was far from being free from solicitude. All his attempts on any place of

<sup>64</sup> Gue. l. xviii. 137, &c. *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 100.

importance had hitherto miscarried; and Florence, towards which he had been approaching for some time, was, by the arrival of the Duke d'Urbino's army, put in a condition to set his power at defiance. As it now became necessary to change his route, and to take instantly some new resolution, he fixed, without hesitation, on one which was no less daring in itself than it was impious according to the opinion of that age. This was to assault and plunder Rome. Many reasons, however, prompted him to it. He was fond of thwarting Lannoy, who had undertaken for the safety of that city; he imagined that the Emperor would be highly pleased to see Clement, the chief author of the league against him, humbled; he flattered himself, that by gratifying the rapacity of his soldiers with such immense booty, he would attach them for ever to his interest; or (which is still more probable than any of these) he hoped that, by means of the power and fame which he would acquire from the conquest of the first city in Christendom, he might lay the foundation of an independent power; and that, after shaking off all connexion with the Emperor, he might take possession of Naples, or of some of the Italian states, in his own name<sup>65</sup>.

Whatever his motives were, he executed his resolution with rapidity equal to the boldness with which he had formed it. His soldiers, now that they had their prey full in view, complained neither of fatigue, nor famine, nor want of pay. No sooner did they begin to move from Tuscany towards Rome than the Pope, sensible at last how fallacious the hopes had been on which he reposed, started from his security. But no time now remained, even

<sup>65</sup> Brant. iv. 271. vi. 189. Belcarii Comment. 594.

for a bold and decisive pontiff, to have taken proper measures, or to have formed any effectual plan of defence. Under Clement's feeble conduct, all was consternation, disorder, and irresolution. He collected, however, such of his disbanded soldiers as still remained in the city; he armed the artificers of Rome, and the footmen and train-bearers of the cardinals; he repaired the breaches in the walls; he began to erect new works; he excommunicated Bourbon and all his troops, branding the Germans with the name of Lutherans, and the Spaniards with that of Moors<sup>66</sup>. Trusting to these ineffectual military preparations, or to his spiritual arms, which were still more despised by rapacious soldiers, he seems to have laid aside his natural timidity, and contrary to the advice of all his counsellors, determined to wait the approach of an enemy whom he might easily have avoided by a timely retreat.

Bourbon, who saw the necessity of dispatch, now that his intentions were known, advanced with such speed that he gained several marches on the Duke d'Urbino's army, and encamped in the plains of Rome on the evening of the 5th of May. From thence he showed his soldiers the palaces and churches of that city, into which, as the capital of the Christian commonwealth, the riches of all Europe had flowed during many centuries, without having been once violated by any hostile hand; and commanding them to refresh themselves that night, as a preparation for the assault next day, promised them, in reward of their toils and valour, the possession of all the treasures accumulated there.

Early in the morning Bourbon, who had determined to distinguish that day either by his death or

<sup>66</sup> Seckend. lib. ii. 68.

the success of his enterprise, appeared at the head of his troops clad in complete armour, above which he wore a vest of white tissue, that he might be more conspicuous both to his friends and to his enemies; and as all depended on one bold impression, he led them instantly to scale the walls. Three distinct bodies one of Germans, another of Spaniards, and the last of Italians, the three different nations of whom the army was composed, were appointed to this service; a separate attack was assigned to each; and the whole army advanced to support them as occasion should require. A thick mist concealed their approach until they reached almost the brink of the ditch which surrounded the suburbs: having planted their ladders in a moment, each brigade rushed on the assault with an impetuosity heightened by national emulation. They were received at first with fortitude equal to their own; the Swiss in the Pope's guards, and the veteran soldiers who had been assembled, fought with a courage becoming men to whom the defence of the noblest city in the world was intrusted. Bourbon's troops, notwithstanding all their valour, gained no ground, and even began to give way; when their leader, perceiving that on this critical moment the fate of the day depended, leaped from his horse, pressed to the front, snatched a scaling-ladder from a soldier, planted it against the wall, and began to mount it, encouraging his men with his voice and hand to follow him. But at that very instant, a musket bullet from the ramparts pierced his groin with a wound, which he immediately felt to be mortal; but he retained so much presence of mind as to desire those who were near him to cover his body with a cloak, that his death might not dishearten

his troops; and soon after he expired with a courage worthy of a better cause, and which would have entitled him to the highest praise, if he had thus fallen in defence of his country, and not at the head of its enemies<sup>67</sup>.

This fatal event could not be concealed from the army; the soldiers soon missed their general, whom they were accustomed to see in every time of danger: but instead of being disheartened by their loss, it animated them with new valour; the name of Bourbon resounded along the line, accompanied with the cry of *blood* and *revenge*. The veterans who defended the walls were soon overpowered by numbers; the untrained body of city recruits fled at the sight of danger; and the enemy, with irresistible violence, rushed into the town.

During the combat, Clement was employed at the high altar of St. Peter's church in offering up to Heaven unavailing prayers for victory. No sooner was he informed that his troops began to give way than he fled with precipitation; and with an infatuation still more amazing than any thing already mentioned, instead of making his escape by the opposite gate, where there was no enemy to oppose it, he shut himself up, together with thirteen cardinals, the foreign ambassadors, and many persons of distinction, in the castle of St. Angelo, which, from his late misfortune, he might have known to be an insecure retreat. In his way from the Vatican to that fortress, he saw his troops flying before an enemy, who pursued without giving quarter; he heard the cries and lamentations of the Roman citizens, and beheld the beginning of those calamities which his

<sup>67</sup> Mém. de Bellay, 101. Guic. l. xviii. p. 445, &c. Ouvr. de Brant. iv. 257. &c.

own credulity and ill conduct had brought upon his subjects<sup>68</sup>.

It is impossible to describe, or even to imagine, the misery and horror of that scene which followed. Whatever a city taken by storm can dread from military rage, unrestrained by discipline; whatever excesses the ferocity of the Germans, the avarice of the Spaniards, or the licentiousness of the Italians could commit, these the wretched inhabitants were obliged to suffer. Churches, palaces, and the houses of private persons were plundered without distinction. No age, or character, or sex, was exempt from injury. Cardinals, nobles, priests, matrons, virgins, were all the prey of soldiers, and at the mercy of men deaf to the voice of humanity. Nor did these outrages cease, as is usual in towns which are carried by assault, when the first fury of the storm was over; the Imperialists kept possession of Rome several months; and, during all that time, the insolence and brutality of the soldiers hardly abated. Their booty in ready money alone amounted to a million of ducats; what they raised by ransoms and exactions far exceeded that sum. Rome, though taken several different times by the northern nations, who overran the Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries, was never treated with so much cruelty by the barbarous and heathen Huns, Vandals, or Goths, as now by the bigoted subjects of a Catholic monarch<sup>69</sup>.

After Bourbon's death, the command of the Imperial army devolved on Philibert de Chalons Prince

<sup>68</sup> *Jov. Vit. Colon.* 165.

<sup>69</sup> *Jov. Vit. Colon.* 166. *Gaio. l. xviii.* 440, &c. *Comment. de Capta Urbe Rom.* ap. *Scardium*, ii. 230. *Ullon Vita del Carlo V.* p. 110, &c. *Giannone Hist. of Nap.* b. xxxi. c. 3. p. 507.

of Orange, who with difficulty prevailed on as many of his soldiers to desist from the pillage as were necessary to invest the castle of St. Angelo. Clement was immediately sensible of his error in having retired into that ill provided and untenable fort. But as the Imperialists, scorning discipline and intent only on plunder, pushed the siege with little vigour, he did not despair of holding out until the Duke d'Urbino could come to his relief. That general advanced at the head of an army composed of Venetians, Florentines, and Swiss, in the pay of France, of sufficient strength to have delivered Clement from the present danger. But d'Urbino preferring the indulgence of his hatred against the family of Medici to the glory of delivering the capital of Christendom, and the head of the church, pronounced the enterprise to be too hazardous; and, from an exquisite refinement in revenge, having marched forward so far, that his army being seen from the ramparts of St. Angelo flattered the Pope with the prospect of certain relief, he immediately wheeled about and retired<sup>70</sup>. Clement, deprived of every resource, and reduced to such extremity of famine as to feed on asses flesh<sup>71</sup>, was obliged to capitulate [June 6] on such conditions as the conquerors were pleased to prescribe. He agreed to pay four hundred thousand ducats to the army; to surrender to the Emperor all the places of strength belonging to the church; and, besides giving hostages, to remain a prisoner himself until the chief articles were performed. He was committed to the care of Alarcon, who, by his severe vigilance in guarding Francis, had given full proof of his being qualified for that office; and thus, by a singular

<sup>70</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 150.

<sup>71</sup> Jov. Vit. Colon. 167.

accident, the same man had the custody of the two most illustrious personages who had been made prisoners in Europe during several ages.

The account of this extraordinary and unexpected event was no less surprising than agreeable to the Emperor. But in order to conceal his joy from his subjects, who were filled with horror at the success and crimes of their countrymen, and to lessen the indignation of the rest of Europe, he declared that Rome had been assaulted without any order from him. He wrote to all the Princes with whom he was in alliance, disclaiming his having had any knowledge of Bourbon's intention<sup>72</sup>. He put himself and court into mourning; commanded the rejoicings which had been ordered for the birth of his son Philip to be stopped; and employing an artifice no less hypocritical than gross, he appointed prayers and processions throughout all Spain for the recovery of the Pope's liberty, which, by an order to his generals, he could have immediately granted him<sup>73</sup>.

The good fortune of the House of Austria was no less conspicuous in another part of Europe. Solymán having invaded Hungary with an army of three hundred thousand men, Lewis II. King of that country and of Bohemia, a weak and unexperienced Prince, advanced rashly to meet him with a body of men which did not amount to thirty thousand. With an imprudence still more unpardonable, he gave the command of these troops to Paul Tomorri, a Franciscan monk, Archbishop of Golocza. This awkward general, in the dress of his order, girt with

<sup>72</sup> Ruscelli *Lettere di Principi*, ii. 234.

<sup>73</sup> Sleid. 109. Sandov. i. 822. Mauroc. *Hist. Veneta*, lib. iii  
220

its cord, marched at the head of the troops; and hurried on by his own presumption, as well as by the impetuosity of nobles who despised danger, but were impatient of long service, he fought the fatal battle of Mohacz [Aug. 29, 1526], in which the King, the flower of the Hungarian nobility, and upwards of twenty thousand men, fell the victims of his folly and ill conduct. Solyman, after his victory, seized and kept possession of several towns of the greatest strength in the southern provinces of Hungary, and, overrunning the rest of the country, carried near two hundred thousand persons into captivity. As Lewis was the last male of the royal family of Jagellon, the Archduke Ferdinand claimed both his crowns. This claim was founded on a double title; the one derived from the ancient pretensions of the House of Austria to both kingdoms; the other, from the right of his wife, the only sister of the deceased monarch. The feudal institutions, however, subsisted both in Hungary and Bohemia in such vigour, and the nobles possessed such extensive power, that the crowns were still elective, and Ferdinand's rights, if they had not been powerfully supported, would have met with little regard. But his own personal merit; the respect due to the brother of the greatest monarch in Christendom; the necessity of choosing a Prince able to afford his subjects some additional protection against the Turkish arms, which, as they had recently felt their power, they greatly dreaded; together with the intrigues of his sister, who had been married to the late King, overcame the prejudices which the Hungarians had conceived against the Archduke as a foreigner; and, though a considerable party voted for the Vaywode of Transylvania, at length secured

Ferdinand the throne of that kingdom. The states of Bohemia imitated the example of their neighbour kingdom; but in order to ascertain and secure their own privileges, they obliged Ferdinand, before his coronation, to subscribe a deed which they term a *Reverse*, declaring that he held that crown not by any previous right, but by their gratuitous and voluntary election. By such a vast accession of territories, the hereditary possession of which they secured in process of time to their family, the Princes of the House of Austria attained that preeminence in power which hath rendered them so formidable to the rest of Germany<sup>74</sup>.

The dissensions between the Pope and Emperor proved extremely favourable to the progress of Lutheranism. Charles, exasperated by Clement's conduct, and fully employed in opposing the league which he had formed against him, had little inclination, and less leisure, to take any measures for suppressing the new opinions in Germany. In a diet of the Empire held at Spires [June 25, 1526], the state of religion came to be considered; and all that the Emperor required of the Princes was, that they would wait patiently, and without encouraging innovations, for the meeting of a general council which he had demanded of the Pope. They, in return, acknowledged the convocation of a council to be the proper and regular step towards reforming abuses in the church; but contended, that a national council held in Germany would be more effectual for that purpose than what he had proposed. To his advice, concerning the discouragement of innovations, they

<sup>74</sup> Steph. Broderick *Procuratorii Hungar. Clades in Campo Mohacz ap. Scardium*, ii. 218. P. Barre *Hist. d'Allemagne*, tom. viii. part. i. p. 128.

paid so little regard that, even during the meeting of the diet at Spires, the divines who attended the Elector of Saxony and Landgrave of Hesse Cassel thither preached publicly, and administered the sacraments according to the rites of the Reformed Church<sup>75</sup>. The Emperor's own example imboldened the Germans to treat the Papal authority with little reverence. During the heat of his resentment against Clement, he had published a long reply to an angry brief which the Pope had intended as an apology for his own conduct. In this manifesto, the Emperor, after having enumerated many instances of that pontiff's ingratitude, deceit, and ambition, all which he painted in the strongest and most aggravated colours, appealed from him to a general council. At the same time he wrote to the college of cardinals, complaining of Clement's partiality and injustice; and requiring them if he refused or delayed to call a council, to show their concern for the peace of the Christian church, so shamefully neglected by its chief pastor, by summoning that assembly in their own name<sup>76</sup>. This manifesto, little inferior in virulence to the invectives of Luther himself, was dispersed over Germany with great industry; and, being eagerly read by persons of every rank, did much more than counterbalance the effect of all Charles's declarations against the new opinions.

<sup>75</sup> Sleid. 103.

<sup>76</sup> Goldast. Polit. Imper. p. 984.

## BOOK V.

1527.

THE account of the cruel manner in which the Pope had been treated filled all Europe with astonishment or horror. To see a Christian Emperor, who, by possessing that dignity, ought to have been the protector and advocate of the Holy See, lay violent hands on him who represented Christ on earth, and detain his sacred person in a rigorous captivity, was considered as an impiety that merited the severest vengeance, and which called for the immediate interposition of every dutiful son of the church. Francis and Henry, alarmed at the progress of the Imperial arms in Italy, had, even before the taking of Rome, entered into a closer alliance; and, in order to give some check to the Emperor's ambition, had agreed to make a vigorous diversion in the Low Countries. The force of every motive, which had influenced them at that time, was now increased; and to these was added the desire of rescuing the Pope out of the Emperor's hands, a measure no less politic than it appeared to be pious. This, however, rendered it necessary to abandon their hostile intentions against the Low Countries, and to make Italy the seat of war, as it was by vigorous operations there they might contribute most effectually towards delivering Rome, and setting Clement at liberty. Francis being now sensible, that, in his system with regard to the affairs of Italy, the spirit of refinement had carried him too far; and that by an excess of remissness, he had allowed Charles to attain advan-

tages which he might easily have prevented, was eager to make reparation for an error, of which he was not often guilty, by an activity more suitable to his temper. Henry thought his interposition necessary, in order to hinder the Emperor from becoming master of all Italy, and acquiring by that means such superiority of power as would enable him, for the future, to dictate without control to the other princes of Europe. Wolsey, whom Francis had taken care to secure by flattery and presents, the certain methods of gaining his favour, neglected nothing that could incense his master against the Emperor. Besides all these public considerations, Henry was influenced by one of a more private nature: having begun, about this time, to form his great scheme of divorcing Catherine of Aragon, towards the execution of which he knew that the sanction of Papal authority would be necessary, he was desirous to acquire as much merit as possible with Clement, by appearing to be the chief instrument of his deliverance.

The negotiation, between Princes thus disposed, was not tedious. Wolsey himself conducted it, on the part of his sovereign, with unbounded powers. Francis treated with him in person at Amiens [July 11], where the Cardinal appeared, and was received with royal magnificence. A marriage between the Duke of Orleans and the Princess Mary was agreed to as the basis of the confederacy; it was resolved that Italy should be the theatre of war; the strength of the army which should take the field, as well as the contingent of troops or of money, which each Prince should furnish, were settled; and if the Emperor did not accept of the proposals which they were jointly to make him, they bound themselves

immediately to declare war, and to begin hostilities [Aug. 18]. Henry, who took every resolution with impetuosity, entered so eagerly into this new alliance that, in order to give Francis the strongest proof of his friendship and respect, he formally renounced the ancient claim of the English monarchs to the crown of France, which had long been the pride and ruin of the nation; as a full compensation for which he accepted a pension of fifty thousand crowns, to be paid annually to himself and his successors<sup>1</sup>.

The Pope, being unable to fulfil the conditions of his capitulation, still remained a prisoner under the severe custody of Alarcon. The Florentines no sooner heard what had happened at Rome, than they ran to arms in a tumultuous manner; expelled the Cardinal di Cortona, who governed their city in the Pope's name; defaced the arms of the Medici; broke in pieces the statues of Leo and Clement; and, declaring themselves a free state, reestablished their ancient popular government. The Venetians, taking advantage of the calamity of their ally the Pope, seized Ravenna, and other places belonging to the church, under pretext of keeping them in deposit. The Dukes of Urbino and Ferrara laid hold likewise on part of the spoils of the unfortunate Pontiff, whom they considered as irretrievably ruined<sup>2</sup>.

Lannoy, on the other hand, laboured to derive some solid benefit from that unforeseen event, which gave such splendour and superiority to his master's arms. For this purpose he marched to Rome, together with Moncada and the Marquis del Guasto, at the head of all the troops which they could assem-

<sup>1</sup> Herbert, 83, &c. Rym. Fœd. xiv. 203

<sup>2</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 453.

ble in the kingdom of Naples. The arrival of this reinforcement brought new calamities on the unhappy citizens of Rome; for the soldiers, envying the wealth of their companions, imitated their licence, and with the utmost rapacity gathered the gleanings which had escaped the avarice of the Spaniards and Germans. There was not now any army in Italy capable of making head against the Imperialists; and nothing more was requisite to reduce Bologna, and the other towns in the ecclesiastical state, than to have appeared before them. But the soldiers having been so long accustomed, under Bourbon, to an entire relaxation of discipline, and having tasted the sweets of living at discretion in a great city, almost without the control of a superior, were become so impatient of military subordination, and so averse to service, that they refused to leave Rome, unless all their arrears were paid; a condition which they knew to be impossible. At the same time they declared that they would not obey any other person than the Prince of Orange, whom the army had chosen general. Lannoy, finding that it was no longer safe for him to remain among licentious troops, who despised his dignity and hated his person, returned to Naples; soon after the Marquis del Guasto, and Moncada, thought it prudent to quit Rome for the same reason. The Prince of Orange, a general only in name, and by the most precarious of all tenures, the good will of soldiers, whom success and licence had rendered capricious, was obliged to pay more attention to their humours than they did to his commands. Thus the Emperor, instead of reaping any of the advantages which he might have expected from the reduction of Rome, had the mortification to see the most formidable

body of troops that he had ever brought into the field, continue in a state of inactivity from which it was impossible to rouse them<sup>3</sup>.

This gave the King of France and the Venetians leisure to form new schemes, and to enter into new engagements for delivering the Pope, and preserving the liberties of Italy. The newly restored republic of Florence very imprudently joined with them, and Lautrec, of whose abilities the Italians entertained a much more favourable opinion than his own master, was, in order to gratify them, appointed generalissimo of the league. It was with the utmost reluctance he undertook that office, being unwilling to expose himself a second time to the difficulties and disgraces which the negligence of the King, or the malice of his favourites, might bring upon him. The best troops in France marched under his command; and the King of England, though he had not yet declared war against the Emperor, advanced a considerable sum towards carrying on the expedition. Lautrec's first operations were prudent, vigorous, and successful. By the assistance of Andrew Doria, the ablest sea officer of that age, he rendered himself master of Genoa, and reestablished in that republic the faction of the Fregosi, together with the dominion of France. He obliged Alexandria to surrender after a short siege, and reduced all the country on that side of the Tesino. He took Pavia, which had so long resisted the arms of his sovereign, by assault, and plundered it with that cruelty, which the memory of the fatal disaster that had befallen the French nation before its walls naturally inspired. All the Milanese, which Antonio de Leyva defended with a small body of troops kept together and sup-

<sup>3</sup> Gaic. l. xviii. 454.

ported by his own address and industry, must have soon submitted to his power, if he had continued to bend the force of his arms against that country. But Lautrec durst not complete a conquest which would have been so honourable to himself, and of such advantage to the league. Francis knew his confederates to be more desirous of circumscribing the Imperial power in Italy than of acquiring new territories for him; and was afraid that, if Sforza were once reestablished in Milan, they would second but coldly the attack which he intended to make on the kingdom of Naples. For this reason he instructed Lautrec not to push his operations with too much vigour in Lombardy; and happily the importunities of the Pope, and the solicitations of the Florentines, the one for relief, and the other for protection, were so urgent as to furnish him with a decent pretext for marching forward, without yielding to the entreaties of the Venetians and Sforza, who insisted on his laying siege to Milan<sup>4</sup>.

While Lautrec advanced slowly towards Rome, the Emperor had time to deliberate concerning the disposal of the Pope's person, who still remained a prisoner in the castle of St. Angelo. Notwithstanding the specious veil of religion, with which he usually endeavoured to cover his actions, Charles, in many instances, appears to have been but little under the influence of religious considerations, and had frequently on this occasion, expressed an inclination to transport the Pope into Spain, that he might indulge his ambition with the spectacle of the two most illustrious personages in Europe successively prisoners in his court. But the fear of giving new

<sup>4</sup> Gaic. l. xviii. 461. Bellay, 107, &c. Mauroc. Hist. Venet. lib. iii. 238.

offence to all Christendom, and of filling his own subjects with horror, obliged him to forego that satisfaction<sup>5</sup>. The progress of the confederates made it now necessary, either to set the Pope at liberty, or to remove him to some place of confinement more secure than the castle of St. Angelo. Many considerations induced him to prefer the former, particularly his want of the money requisite as well for recruiting his army, as for paying off the vast arrears due to it. In order to obtain this, he had assembled the Cortes of Castile at Valladolid about the beginning of the year; and having laid before them the state of his affairs, and represented the necessity of making great preparations to resist the enemies, whom envy at the success which had crowned his arms would unite against him, he demanded a large supply in the most pressing terms [Feb. 11]; but the Cortes, as the nation was already exhausted by extraordinary donatives, refused to load it with any new burden, and, in spite of all his endeavours to gain or to intimidate the members, persisted in this resolution<sup>6</sup>. No resource, therefore, remained, but the extorting from Clement, by way of ransom, a sum sufficient for discharging what was due to his troops, without which it was vain to mention to them their leaving Rome.

Nor was the Pope inactive on his part, or his intrigues unsuccessful towards hastening such a treaty. By flattery, and the appearance of unbounded confidence, he disarmed the resentment of Cardinal Colonna, and wrought upon his vanity, which made him desirous of showing the world, that as his power had at first depressed the Pope, it could now raise him to his former dignity. By favours and pro-

<sup>5</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 157.

<sup>6</sup> Sandov. i. p. 814.

mises he gained Moronè, who, by one of those whimsical revolutions which occur so often in his life, and which so strongly display his character, had now recovered his credit and authority with the Imperialists. The address and influence of two such men easily removed all the obstacles which retarded an accommodation, and brought the treaty for Clement's liberty to a conclusion, upon conditions hard indeed, but not more severe than a Prince in his situation had reason to expect. He was obliged to advance, in ready money, a hundred thousand crowns for the use of the army; to pay the same sum at the distance of a fortnight; and, at the end of three months, a hundred and fifty thousand more. He engaged not to take part in the war against Charles, either in Lombardy or in Naples; he granted him a bull of cruzado, and the tenth of ecclesiastical revenues in Spain; and he not only gave hostages, but put the Emperor in possession of several towns, as a security for the performance of these articles<sup>1</sup>. Having raised the first moiety by a sale of ecclesiastical dignities and benefices, and other expedients equally uncanonical, a day was fixed for delivering him from imprisonment [Dec. 6]. But Clement, impatient to be free, after a tedious confinement of six months, as well as full of the suspicion and distrust natural to the unfortunate, was so much afraid that the Imperialists might still throw in obstacles to put off his deliverance, that he disguised himself, on the night preceding the day when he was to be set free, in the habit of a merchant; and Alarcon having remitted somewhat of his vigilance upon the conclusion of the treaty, he made his escape undiscovered. He arrived before next morning at Orvieto, without any attendants but a

<sup>1</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 167, &c.

single officer; and from thence wrote a letter of thanks to Lautrec, as the chief instrument of procuring him liberty<sup>8</sup>.

During these transactions, the ambassadors of France and England repaired to Spain, in consequence of the treaty which Wolsey had concluded with the French King. The Emperor, unwilling to draw on himself the united forces of the two monarchs, discovered an inclination to relax somewhat the rigour of the treaty at Madrid, to which, hitherto, he had adhered inflexibly. He offered to accept of the two millions of crowns, which Francis had proposed to pay as an equivalent for the duchy of Burgundy, and to set his sons at liberty, on condition that he would recall his army out of Italy, and restore Genoa, together with the other conquests which he had made in that country. With regard to Sforza, he insisted that his fate should be determined by the judges appointed to inquire into his crimes. These propositions being made to Henry, he transmitted them to his ally the French King, whom it more nearly concerned to examine and to answer them; and if Francis had been sincerely solicitous, either to conclude peace or preserve consistency in his own conduct, he ought instantly to have closed with overtures which differed but little from the propositions which he himself had formerly made<sup>9</sup>. But his views were now much changed; his alliance with Henry, Lautrec's progress in Italy, and the superiority of his army there above that of the Emperor, hardly left him room to doubt of the success of his enterprise against Naples. Full of those san-

<sup>8</sup> Guic. l. xviii. 467, &c. Jov. Vit. Colon. 169. Mauroc. Hist. Venet. lib. iii. 252.

<sup>9</sup> Recueil des Traités. ii. 219.

guine hopes, he was at no loss to find pretexts for rejecting or evading what the emperor had proposed. Under the appearance of sympathy with Sforza, for whose interests he had not hitherto discovered much solicitude, he again demanded the full and unconditional reestablishment of that unfortunate Prince in his dominions. Under colour of its being imprudent to rely on the Emperor's sincerity, he insisted that his sons should be set at liberty before the French troops left Italy, or surrendered Genoa. The unreasonableness of these demands, as well as the reproachful insinuation with which they were accompanied, irritated Charles to such a degree that he could hardly listen to them with patience; and, repenting of his moderation which had made so little impression on his enemies, declared that he would not depart in the smallest article from the conditions which he had now offered. Upon this the French and English ambassadors (for Henry had been drawn unaccountably to concur with Francis in these strange propositions) demanded and obtained their audience of leave<sup>10</sup>.

1528.] Next day [Jan. 22], two heralds who had accompanied the ambassadors on purpose, though they had hitherto concealed their character, having assumed the ensigns of their office, appeared in the Emperor's court; and being admitted into his presence, they, in the name of their respective masters, and with all the solemnities customary on such occasions, denounced war against him. Charles received both with a dignity suitable to his own rank, but spoke to each in a tone adapted to the sentiments which he entertained of their sovereigns. He accepted the defiance of the English monarch with a

<sup>10</sup> Rym. xiv. 200. Herbert, 83. Guic. l. xviii. 171

firmness tempered by some degree of decency and respect. His reply to the French King abounded with that acrimony of expression, which personal rivalry, exasperated by the memory of many injuries inflicted as well as suffered, naturally suggests. He desired the French herald to acquaint his sovereign, that he would henceforth consider him not only as a base violater of public faith, but as a stranger to the honour and integrity becoming a gentleman. Francis, too high spirited to bear such an imputation, had recourse to an uncommon expedient in order to vindicate his character. He instantly sent back the herald with a *cartel* of defiance, in which he gave the Emperor the lie in form, challenged him to single combat, requiring him to name the time and place for the encounter, and the weapons with which he chose to fight. Charles, as he was not inferior to his rival in spirit or bravery, readily accepted the challenge; but, after several messages concerning the arrangement of all the circumstances relative to the combat, accompanied with mutual reproaches, bordering on the most indecent scurrility, all thoughts of this duel, more becoming the heroes of romance than the two greatest monarchs of their age, were entirely laid aside<sup>11</sup>.

The example of two personages so illustrious drew such general attention, and carried with it so much authority, that it had considerable influence in producing an important change in manners all over Europe. Duels, as has already been observed, had long been permitted by the laws of all the European nations, and, forming a part of their jurisprudence, were authorized by the magistrate, on many occa-

<sup>11</sup> Recueil des Traitéz, 2. Mém. de Bellay, 103, &c. Sandov. Hist. i. 837.

sions, as the most proper method of terminating questions with regard to property, or of deciding those which respected crimes. But single combats being considered as solemn appeals to the omniscience and justice of the Supreme Being, they were allowed only in public causes, according to the prescription of law, and carried on in a judicial form. Men accustomed to this manner of decisions in courts of justice were naturally led to apply it to personal and private quarrels. Duels, which at first could be appointed by the civil judge alone, were fought without the interposition of his authority, and in cases to which the laws did not extend. The transaction between Charles and Francis strongly countenanced this practice. Upon every affront or injury, which seemed to touch his honour, a gentleman thought himself entitled to draw his sword, and to call on his adversary to give him satisfaction. Such an opinion becoming prevalent among men of fierce courage, of high spirit, and of rude manners, when offence was often given, and revenge was always prompt, produced most fatal consequences. Much of the best blood in Christendom was shed; many useful lives were sacrificed; and at some periods, war itself hath hardly been more destructive than these private contests of honour. So powerful, however, is the dominion of fashion, that neither the terror of penal laws, nor reverence for religion, have been able entirely to abolish a practice unknown among the ancients, and not justifiable by any principle of reason; though at the same time it must be admitted, that to this absurd custom we must ascribe in some degree the extraordinary gentleness and complaisance of modern manners, and that respectful attention of one man to another, which at present

render the social intercourses of life far more agreeable and decent, than among the most civilized nations of antiquity.

While the two monarchs seemed so eager to terminate their quarrel, by a personal combat, Lautrec continued his operations, which promised to be more decisive. His army, which was now increased to thirty-five thousand men, advanced by great marches towards Naples [Feb]. The terror of their approach, as well as the remonstrances and the entreaties of the Prince of Orange, prevailed at last on the Imperial troops, though with difficulty, to quit Rome, of which they had kept possession during ten months. But of that flourishing army which had entered the city, scarcely one half remained; the rest, cut off by the plague, or wasted by disease, the effects of their inactivity, intemperance, and debauchery, fell victims to their own crimes<sup>12</sup>. Lautrec made the greatest efforts to attack them in their retreat towards the Neapolitan territories, which would have finished the war at one blow. But the prudence of their leaders disappointed all his measures, and conducted them with little loss to Naples. The people of that kingdom, extremely impatient to shake off the Spanish yoke, received the French with open arms, wherever they appeared to take possession; and, Gaeta and Naples excepted, hardly any place of importance remained in the hands of the Imperialists. The preservation of the former was owing to the strength of its fortifications; that of the latter, to the presence of the Imperial army. Lautrec, however, sat down before Naples; but finding it vain to think of reducing a city by force while defended by a whole army, he was obliged to employ

<sup>12</sup> Gaic. l. xviii. 178.

the slower but less dangerous method of blockade; and having taken measures which appeared to him effectual, he confidently assured his master that famine would soon compel the besieged to capitulate. These hopes were strongly confirmed by the defeat of a vigorous attempt made by the enemy in order to recover the command of the sea. The galleys of Andrew Doria, under the command of his nephew Philippino, guarded the mouth of the harbour. Moncada, who had succeeded Lannoy in the viceroyalty, rigged out a number of galleys superior to Doria's, manned them with a chosen body of Spanish veterans, and going on board himself, together with the Marquis del Guasto, attacked Philippino before the arrival of the Venetian and French fleets. But the Genoese Admiral, by his superior skill in naval operations, easily triumphed over the valour and number of the Spaniards. The Viceroy was killed, most of his fleet destroyed, and Guasto, with many officers of distinction, being taken prisoners, were put on board the captive galleys, and sent by Philippino as trophies of his victory to his uncle<sup>13</sup>.

Notwithstanding this flattering prospect of success, many circumstances concurred to frustrate Lantrec's expectations. Clement, though he always acknowledged his being indebted to Francis for the recovery of his liberty, and often complained of the cruel treatment which he had met with from the Emperor, was not influenced at this juncture by principles of gratitude, nor which is more extraordinary, was he swayed by the desire of revenge. His past misfortunes rendered him more cautious than ever, and his recollection of the errors which he had com-

<sup>13</sup> Guic. l. xiv. 487. P. Heuter. lib. x. c. 2. p. 231.

mitted, increased the natural irresolution of his mind. While he amused Francis with promises, he secretly negotiated with Charles; and being solicitous, above all things, to reestablish his family in Florence with their ancient authority, which he could not expect from Francis, who had entered into strict alliance with the new republic, he leaned rather to the side of his enemy than to that of his benefactor, and gave Lautrec no assistance towards carrying on his operations. The Venetians, viewing with jealousy the progress of the French arms, were intent only upon recovering such maritime towns in the Neapolitan dominions as were to be possessed by their republic, while they were altogether careless about the reduction of Naples, on which the success of the common cause depended<sup>14</sup>. The King of England, instead of being able, as had been projected, to embarrass the Emperor by attacking his territories in the Low Countries, found his subjects so averse to an unnecessary war, which would have ruined the trade of the nation, that, in order to silence their clamours, and put a stop to the insurrections ready to break out among them, he was compelled to conclude a truce for eight months with the Governess of the Netherlands<sup>15</sup>. Francis himself, with the same unpardonable inattention of which he had formerly been guilty, and for which he had suffered so severely, neglected to make proper remittances to Lautrec for the support of his army<sup>16</sup>.

These unexpected events retarded the progress of the French, discouraging both the general and his troops; but the revolt of Andrew Doria proved a fatal blow to all their measures. That gallant officer,

<sup>14</sup> Gaic. l. xix. 491.

<sup>15</sup> Herbert, 90. Rymer, 14 258.

<sup>16</sup> Gaic. l. xviii. 478.

the citizen of a republic, and trained up from his infancy in the sea service, retained the spirit of independence natural to the former, together with the plain liberal manners peculiar to the latter. A stranger to the arts of submission or flattery necessary in courts, but conscious at the same time of his own merit and importance, he always offered his advice with freedom, and often preferred his complaints and remonstrances with boldness. The French ministers, unaccustomed to such liberties, determined to ruin a man who treated them with so little deference; and though Francis himself had a just sense of Doria's services, as well as a high esteem for his character, the courtiers, by continually representing him as a man haughty, intractable, and more solicitous to aggrandize himself than to promote the interest of France, gradually undermined the foundations of his credit, and filled the King's mind with suspicion and distrust. From thence proceeded several affronts and indignities put upon Doria. His appointments were not regularly paid; his advice, even in naval affairs, was often slighted; an attempt was made to seize the prisoners taken by his nephew in the seafight off Naples; all which he bore with abundance of ill humour. But an injury offered to his country transported him beyond all bounds of patience. The French began to fortify Savona, to clear its harbour, and, removing thither some branches of trade carried on at Genoa, plainly showed that they intended to render that town, which had been long the object of jealousy and hatred to the Genoese, their rival in wealth and commerce. Doria, animated with a patriotic zeal for the honour and interest of his country, remonstrated against this in the highest tone, not without

threats, if the measure were not instantly abandoned. This bold action, aggravated by the malice of the courtiers, and placed in the most odious light, irritated Francis to such a degree that he commanded Barbesieux, whom he appointed Admiral of the Levant, to sail directly to Genoa with the French fleet, to arrest Doria, and to seize his galleys. This rash order, the execution of which could have been secured only by the most profound secrecy, was concealed with so little care, that Doria got timely intelligence of it, and retired with all his galleys to a place of safety. Guasto his prisoner, who had long observed and fomented his growing discontent, and had often allured him by magnificent promises to enter into the Emperor's service, laid hold on this favourable opportunity. While his indignation and resentment were at their height, he prevailed on him to dispatch one of his officers to the Imperial court with his overtures and demands. The negotiation was not long; Charles, fully sensible of the importance of such an acquisition, granted him whatever terms he required. Doria sent back his commission, together with the collar of St. Michael, to Francis, and, hoisting the Imperial colours, sailed with all his galleys towards Naples, not to block up the harbour of that unhappy city, as he had formerly engaged, but to bring them protection and deliverance.

His arrival opened the communication with the sea, and restored plenty in Naples, which was now reduced to the last extremity; and the French, having lost their superiority at sea, were soon reduced to great straits for want of provisions. The Prince of Orange, who succeeded the Viceroy in the command of the Imperial army, showed himself, by his

prudent conduct, worthy of that honour which his good fortune and the death of his generals had twice acquired him. Beloved by the troops, who, remembering the prosperity which they had enjoyed under his command, served him with the utmost alacrity, he let slip no opportunity of harassing the enemy, and by continual alarms or sallies fatigued and weakened them<sup>17</sup>. As an addition to all these misfortunes, the diseases common in that country during the sultry months began to break out among the French troops. The prisoners communicated to them the pestilence which the Imperial army had brought to Naples from Rome; and it raged with such violence that few, either officers or soldiers, escaped the infection. Of the whole army, not four thousand men, a number hardly sufficient to defend the camp, were capable of doing duty<sup>18</sup>; and being now besieged in their turn, they suffered all the miseries from which the Imperialists were delivered. Lautrec, after struggling long with so many disappointments and calamities, which preyed on his mind at the same time that the pestilence wasted his body, died [Aug. 15], lamenting the negligence of his sovereign and the infidelity of his allies, to which so many brave men had fallen victims<sup>19</sup>. By his death and the indisposition of the other generals, the command devolved on the Marquis de Saluces, an officer altogether unequal to such a trust. He, with troops no less dispirited than reduced, retreated in disorder to Aversa; which town being invested by the Prince of Orange, Saluces was under the

<sup>17</sup> Jovii Hist. lib. xxvi. p. 31, &c. Sigonii Vita Dorix, p. 1139. Bellay, 114, &c.

<sup>18</sup> Bellay, 117, &c.

<sup>19</sup> P. Heuter. Rerum Austr. lib. x. c. 2. p. 231.

necessity of consenting, that he himself should remain a prisoner of war, that his troops should lay down their arms and colours, give up their baggage, and march under a guard to the frontiers of France. By this ignominious capitulation, the wretched remains of the French army were saved; and the Emperor, by his own perseverance, and the good conduct of his generals, acquired once more the superiority in Italy<sup>20</sup>.

The loss of Genoa followed immediately upon the ruin of the army in Naples. To deliver his country from the dominion of foreigners was Doria's highest ambition, and had been his principal inducement to quit the service of France, and enter into that of the Emperor. A most favourable opportunity for executing this honourable enterprise now presented itself. The city of Genoa, afflicted by the pestilence, was almost deserted by its inhabitants; the French garrison, being neither regularly paid nor recruited, was reduced to an inconsiderable number; Doria's emissaries found that such of the citizens as remained, being weary alike of the French and Imperial yoke, the rigour of which they had alternately felt, were ready to welcome him as their deliverer, and to second all his measures.

Things wearing this promising aspect, he sailed towards the coast of Genoa: on his approach the French galleys retired; a small body of men which he landed surprised one of the gates of Genoa in the night time; Trivulci, the French governor, with his feeble garrison, shut himself up in the citadel, and Doria took possession of the town without bloodshed or resistance [Sept. 12]. Want of provisions quickly obliged Trivulci to capitulate; the

<sup>20</sup> Bellay, 117, &c. Jovii Hist. lib. xxv. xxvi.

people, eager to abolish such an odious monument of their servitude, ran together with a tumultuous violence, and levelled the citadel with the ground.

It was now in Doria's power to have rendered himself the sovereign of his country, which he had so happily delivered from oppression. The fame of his former actions, the success of his present attempt, the attachment of his friends, the gratitude of his countrymen, together with the support of the Emperor, all conspired to facilitate his attaining the supreme authority, and invited him to lay hold of it. But with a magnanimity of which there are few examples, he sacrificed all thoughts of aggrandizing himself to the virtuous satisfaction of establishing liberty in his country, the highest object at which ambition can aim. Having assembled the whole body of the people in the court before his palace, he assured them that the happiness of seeing them once more in possession of freedom was to him a full reward for all his services; that, more delighted with the name of citizen than of sovereign, he claimed no preeminence or power above his equals; but remitted entirely to them the right of settling what form of government they would now choose to be established among them. The people listened to him with tears of admiration and of joy. Twelve persons were elected to new model the constitution of the republic. The influence of Doria's virtue and example communicated itself to his countrymen; the factions which had long torn and ruined the state seemed to be forgotten; prudent precautions were taken to prevent their reviving; and the same form of government which has subsisted with little variation since that time in Genoa was established with universal applause. Doria lived to a great age, beloved, respected, and honoured by his coun-

trymen; and, adhering uniformly to his professions of moderation, without arrogating any thing unbecoming a private citizen, he preserved a great ascendant over the councils of the republic, which owed its being to his generosity. The authority which he possessed was more flattering, as well as more satisfactory, than that derived from sovereignty; a dominion founded in love and in gratitude; and upheld by veneration for his virtues, not by the dread of his power. His memory is still revered by the Genoese, and he is distinguished in their public monuments, and celebrated in the works of their historians, by the most honourable of all appellations, **THE FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY, AND THE RESTORER OF ITS LIBERTY**<sup>21</sup>.

1529.] Francis, in order to recover the reputation of his arms, discredited by so many losses, made new efforts in the Milanese. But the Count of St. Pol, a rash and unexperienced officer, to whom he gave the command, was no match for Antonio de Leyva, the ablest of the Imperial generals. He, by his superior skill in war, checked, with a handful of men, the brisk but ill concerted motions of the French; and though so infirm himself that he was carried constantly in a litter, he surpassed them, when occasion required, no less in activity than in prudence. By an unexpected march he surprised, defeated, and took prisoner the Count of St. Pol, ruining the French army in the Milanese as entirely as the Prince of Orange had ruined that which besieged Naples<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Gaic. l. xix. p. 496. Sigonii Vita Doris, p. 1146. Jovii Hist. lib. xxvi. p. 36, &c.

<sup>22</sup> Gaic. l. xix. 520. P. Heuter. Rerum Austr. lib. x. c. 3. p. 233. Mém. de Bellay, p. 121.

Amidst these vigorous operations in the field, each party discovered an impatient desire of peace, and continual negotiations were carried on for that purpose. The French King, discouraged and almost exhausted by so many unsuccessful enterprises, was reduced now to think of obtaining the release of his sons by concessions, not by the terror of his arms: The Pope hoped to recover by a treaty whatever he had lost in war. The Emperor, notwithstanding the advantages which he had gained, had many reasons to make him wish for an accommodation. Solymán, having overrun Hungary, was ready to break in upon the Austrian territories with the whole force of the East. The Reformation gaining ground daily in Germany, the Princes who favoured it had entered into a confederacy which Charles thought dangerous to the tranquillity of the Empire. The Spaniards murmured at a war of such unusual length, the weight of which rested chiefly on them. The variety and extent of the Emperor's operations far exceeded what his revenues could support: his success hitherto had been owing chiefly to his own good fortune and to the abilities of his generals; nor could he flatter himself that they, with troops destitute of every thing necessary, would always triumph over enemies still in a condition to renew their attacks. All parties, however, were at equal pains to conceal or to dissemble their real sentiments. The Emperor, that his inability to carry on the war might not be suspected, insisted on high terms in the tone of a conqueror. The Pope, solicitous not to lose his present allies before he came to any agreement with Charles, continued to make a thousand protestations of fidelity to the former, while he privately negotiated with the latter. Francis, afraid

that his confederates might prevent him by treating for themselves with the Emperor, had recourse to many dishonourable artifices, in order to turn their attention from the measures which he was taking to adjust all differences with his rival.

In this situation of affairs, when all the contending powers wished for peace, but durst not venture too hastily on the steps necessary for attaining it, two ladies undertook to procure this blessing so much desired by all Europe [May]. These were Margaret of Austria, Duchess Dowager of Savoy, the Emperor's aunt; and Louise, Francis's mother. They agreed on an interview at Cambray, and, being lodged in two adjoining houses between which a communication was opened, met together without ceremony or observation, and held daily conferences to which no person whatever was admitted. As both were profoundly skilled in business, thoroughly acquainted with the secrets of their respective courts, and possessed with perfect confidence in each other, they soon made great progress towards a final accommodation; and the ambassadors of all the confederates waited in anxious suspense to know their fate, the determination of which was entirely in the hands of those illustrious negotiators<sup>23</sup>.

But whatever diligence they used to hasten forward a general peace, the Pope had the address and industry to get the start of his allies, by concluding at Barcelona a particular treaty for himself [June 20]. The Emperor, impatient to visit Italy in his way to Germany, and desirous of reestablishing tranquillity in the one country, before he attempted to compose the disorders which abounded in the

<sup>23</sup> P. Heuter. *Rer. Austr. lib. x. c. 3. p. 133.* *Mém. de Bel-lay*, p. 122.

other, found it necessary to secure at least one alliance among the Italian states, on which he might depend. That with Clement, who courted it with unwearied importunity, seemed more proper than any other. Charles, being extremely solicitous to make some reparation for the insults which he had offered to the sacred character of the Pope, and to redeem past offences by new merit, granted Clement, notwithstanding all his misfortunes, terms more favourable than he could have expected after a continued series of success. Among other articles, he engaged to restore all the territories belonging to the ecclesiastical state; to reestablish the dominion of the Medici in Florence; to give his natural daughter in marriage to Alexander the head of that family; and to put it in the Pope's power to decide concerning the fate of Sforza, and the possession of the Milanese. In return for these ample concessions, Clement gave the Emperor the investiture of Naples without the reserve of any tribute, but the present of a white steed, in acknowledgment of his sovereignty; absolved all who had been concerned in assaulting and plundering Rome, and permitted Charles and his brother Ferdinand to levy the fourth of the ecclesiastical revenues throughout their dominions<sup>24</sup>.

The account of this transaction quickened the negotiations at Cambray, and brought Margaret and Louise to an immediate agreement [Aug. 5]. The treaty of Madrid served as the basis of that which they concluded; the latter being intended to mitigate the rigour of the former. The chief articles were: That the Emperor should not, for the present, demand the restitution of Burgundy, reserving, how-

<sup>24</sup> Gaic. l. xix, p. 522.

ever, in full force, his rights and pretensions to that duchy; That Francis should pay two millions of crowns as the ransom of his sons, and, before they were set at liberty, should restore such towns as he still held in the Milanese; That he should resign his pretensions to the sovereignty of Flanders and of Artois; That he should renounce all his pretensions to Naples, Milan, Genoa, and every other place beyond the Alps; That he should immediately consummate the marriage concluded between him and the Emperor's sister Eleanora<sup>25</sup>.

Thus Francis, chiefly from his impatience to procure liberty to his sons, sacrificed every thing which had at first prompted him to take arms, or which had induced him, by continuing hostilities during nine successive campaigns, to protract the war to a length hardly known in Europe before the establishment of standing armies, and the imposition of exorbitant taxes, became universal. The Emperor, by this treaty, was rendered sole arbiter of the fate of Italy; he delivered his territories in the Netherlands from an unpleasant badge of subjection; and after having baffled his rival in the field, he prescribed to him the conditions of peace. The different conduct and spirit with which the two monarchs carried on the operations of war led naturally to such an issue of it. Charles, inclined by temper, as well as obliged by his situation, concerted all his schemes with caution, pursued them with perseverance, and, observing circumstances and events with attention, let none escape that could be improved to advantage. Francis, more enterprising than steady, undertook great designs with warmth, but often executed them

<sup>25</sup> P. Heuter. *Rer. Austr. lib. x. c. 2. p. 234.* Sandov. *Hist. del Emper. Car. V. ii. 28.*

with remissness; and, diverted by his pleasures or deceived by his favourites, he lost on several occasions the most promising opportunities of success. Nor had the character of the two rivals themselves greater influence on the operations of war than the opposite qualities of the generals whom they employed. Among the Imperialists, valour tempered with prudence; fertility of invention aided by experience; discernment to penetrate the designs of their enemies; a provident sagacity in conducting their own measures; in a word, all the talents which form great commanders, and ensure victory, were conspicuous. Among the French, these qualities were either wanting, or the very reverse of them abounded; nor could they boast of one man (unless we except Lautrec, who was always unfortunate) that equalled the merit of Pescara, Leyva, Guasto, the Prince of Orange, and other leaders, whom Charles had to set in opposition to them. Bourbon, Moronè, Doria, who by their abilities and conduct might have been capable of balancing the superiority which the Imperialists had acquired, were induced to abandon the service of France, by the carelessness of the King, and the malice or injustice of his counsellors; and the most fatal blows given to France during the progress of the war proceeded from the despair and resentment of these three persons.

The hard conditions to which Francis was obliged to submit were not the most afflicting circumstances to him in the treaty of Cambray. He lost his reputation, and the confidence of all Europe, by abandoning his allies to his rival. Unwilling to enter into the details necessary for adjusting their interests, or afraid that whatever he claimed for them must have been purchased by further concessions on his own

part, he gave them up in a body; and, without the least provision in their behalf, left the Venetians, the Florentines, the Duke of Ferrara, together with such of the Neapolitan barons as had joined his army, to the mercy of the Emperor. They exclaimed loudly against this base and perfidious action, of which Francis himself was so much ashamed that, in order to avoid the pain of hearing from their ambassadors the reproaches which he justly merited, it was some time before he would consent to allow them an audience. Charles, on the other hand, was attentive to the interest of every person who had adhered to him: the rights of some of his Flemish subjects, who had estates or pretensions in France, were secured; one article was inserted, obliging Francis to restore the blood and memory of the Constable Bourbon; and to grant his heirs the possession of his lands which had been forfeited; another, by which indemnification was stipulated for those French gentlemen who had accompanied Bourbon in his exile<sup>20</sup>. This conduct, laudable in itself, and placed in the most striking light by a comparison with that of Francis, gained Charles as much esteem as the success of his arms had acquired him glory.

Francis did not treat the King of England with the same neglect as his other allies. He communicated to him all the steps of his negotiation at Cambray, and luckily found that monarch in a situation which left him no choice, but to approve implicitly of his measures, and to concur with them. Henry had been soliciting the Pope for some time, in order to obtain a divorce from Catharine of Ara-

<sup>20</sup> Gaic. l. xix. p. 523. P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. x. c. 4. p. 223.

gon his Queen. Several motives combined in prompting the King to urge his suit. As he was powerfully influenced at some seasons by religious considerations, he entertained many scruples concerning the legitimacy of his marriage with his brother's widow; his affections had long been estranged from the Queen, who was older than himself, and had lost all the charms which she possessed in the earlier part of her life; he was passionately desirous of having male issue; Wolsey artfully fortified his scruples, and encouraged his hopes, that he might widen the breach between him and the Emperor, Catharine's nephew; and, what was more forcible perhaps in its operation than all these united, the King had conceived a violent love for the celebrated Anne Boleyn, a young lady of great beauty and of greater accomplishments, whom, as he found it impossible to gain on other terms, he determined to raise to the throne. The papal authority had often been interposed to grant divorces for reasons less specious than those which Henry produced. When the matter was first proposed to Clement, during his imprisonment in the castle of St. Angelo, as his hopes of recovering liberty depended entirely on the King of England and his ally of France, he expressed the warmest inclination to gratify him. But no sooner was he set free than he discovered other sentiments. Charles, who espoused the protection of his aunt with zeal inflamed by resentment, alarmed the Pope on the one hand with threats, which made a deep impression on his timid mind; and allured him on the other with those promises in favour of his family, which he afterwards accomplished. Upon the prospect of these, Clement not only forgot all his obligations to Henry, but ventured to endan-

ger the interest of the Romish religion in England, and to run the risk of alienating that kingdom for ever from the obedience of the Papal see. After amusing Henry during two years, with all the subtleties and chicane which the court of Rome can so dexterously employ to protract or defeat any cause; after displaying the whole extent of his ambiguous and deceitful policy, the intricacies of which the English historians, to whom it properly belongs, have found it no easy matter to trace and unravel; he, at last, recalled the powers of the delegates, whom he had appointed to judge in the point, advocated the cause to Rome, leaving the King no other hope of obtaining a divorce, but from the personal decision of the Pope himself. As Clement was now in strict alliance with the Emperor, who had purchased his friendship by the exorbitant concessions which have been mentioned, Henry despaired of procuring any sentence from the former but what was dictated by the latter. His honour, however, and passions concurred in preventing him from relinquishing his scheme of a divorce, which he determined to accomplish by other means, and at any rate; and the continuance of Francis's friendship being necessary to counterbalance the Emperor's power, he, in order to secure that, not only offered no remonstrances against the total neglect of their allies, in the treaty of Cambray, but made Francis the present of a large sum, as a brotherly contribution towards the payment of the ransom for his sons<sup>27</sup>.

Soon after the treaty of peace was concluded, the Emperor landed in Italy with a numerous train of the Spanish nobility, and a considerable body of

<sup>27</sup> Herbert. *Mém. de Bellay*, 122.

troops [Aug. 12]. He left the government of Spain, during his absence, to the Empress Isabella. By his long residence in that country, he had acquired such thorough knowledge of the character of the people that he could perfectly accommodate the maxims of his government to their genius. He could even assume, upon some occasions, such popular manners as gained wonderfully upon the Spaniards. A striking instance of his disposition to gratify them had occurred a few days before he embarked for Italy: he was to make his public entry into the city of Barcelona; and some doubts having arisen among the inhabitants, whether they should receive him as Emperor, or as Count of Barcelona; Charles instantly decided in favour of the latter, declaring that he was more proud of that ancient title than of his Imperial crown. Soothed with this flattering expression of his regard, the citizens welcomed him with acclamations of joy, and the states of the province swore allegiance to his son Philip, as heir of the county of Barcelona. A similar oath had been taken in all the kingdoms of Spain, with equal satisfaction<sup>28</sup>.

The Emperor appeared in Italy with the pomp and power of a conqueror. Ambassadors from all the princes and states of that country attended his court, waiting to receive his decision with regard to their fate. At Genoa, where he first landed, he was received with the acclamations due to the protector of their liberties. Having honoured Doria with many marks of distinction, and bestowed on the republic several new privileges, he proceeded to Bologna, the place fixed upon for his interview with the Pope [Nov. 5]. He affected to unite in his

<sup>28</sup> Sandov. ii. p. 50. Ferrer. ix. 116.

public entry into that city the state and majesty that suited an Emperor, with the humility becoming an obedient son of the church; and while at the head of twenty thousand veteran soldiers, able to give law to all Italy, he kneeled down to kiss the feet of that very Pope whom he had so lately detained a prisoner. The Italians, after suffering so much from the ferocity and licentiousness of his armies, and after having been long accustomed to form in their imagination a picture of Charles which bore some resemblance to that of the barbarous monarchs of the Goths and Huns, who had formerly afflicted their country with like calamities, were surprised to see a Prince of a graceful appearance, affable and courteous in his deportment, of regular manners, and of exemplary attention to all the offices of religion<sup>29</sup>. They were still more astonished when he settled all the concerns of the princes and states which now depended on him, with a degree of moderation and equity much beyond what they had expected.

Charles himself, when he set out from Spain, far from intending to give any such extraordinary proof of his self-denial, seems to have been resolved to avail himself to the utmost of the superiority which he had acquired in Italy. But various circumstances concurred in pointing out the necessity of pursuing a very different course. The progress of the Turkish Sultan, who, after overrunning Hungary, had penetrated into Austria [Sept. 13], and laid siege to Vienna, with an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, loudly called upon him to collect his whole force to oppose that torrent; and though the valour of the Germans, the prudent conduct of Ferdinand, together with the treachery of the

<sup>29</sup> Sandov. *Hist. del Emp. Carl. V.* ii. 50. 53, &c.

Vizier, soon obliged Solymán to abandon that enterprise with disgrace and loss [Oct. 16], the religious disorders still growing in Germany, rendered the presence of the Emperor highly necessary there<sup>30</sup>. The Florentines, instead of giving their consent to the reestablishment of the Medici, which by the treaty of Barcelona, the Emperor had bound himself to procure, were preparing to defend their liberty by force of arms; the preparations for his journey had involved him in unusual expenses; and on this, as well as many other occasions, the multiplicity of his affairs, together with the narrowness of his revenues, obliged him to contract the schemes which his boundless ambition was apt to form, and to forego present and certain advantages, that he might guard against more remote but unavoidable dangers. Charles, from all these considerations finding it necessary to assume an air of moderation, acted his part with a good grace. He admitted Sforza into his presence, and not only gave him a full pardon of all past offences, but granted him the investiture of the duchy, together with his niece, the King of Denmark's daughter, in marriage. He allowed the Duke of Ferrara to keep possession of all his dominions, adjusting the points in dispute between him and the Pope with an impartiality not very agreeable to the latter. He came to a final accommodation with the Venetians, upon the reasonable condition of their restoring whatever they had usurped during the late war, either in the Neapolitan or Papal territories. In return for so many concessions, he exacted considerable sums from each of the powers with whom he treated, which they paid without reluctance, and which afforded him the means of

<sup>30</sup> Sleidan, 121. Guic. l. xx. 550.

proceeding on his journey towards Germany with a magnificence suitable to his dignity<sup>31</sup>.

1530.] These treaties, which restored tranquillity to Italy after a tedious war, the calamities of which had chiefly affected that country, were published at Bologna with great solemnity on the first day of the year 1530, amidst the universal acclamations of the people, applauding the Emperor, to whose moderation and generosity they ascribed the blessings of peace which they had so long desired. The Florentines alone did not partake of this general joy. Animated with a zeal for liberty more laudable than prudent, they determined to oppose the restoration of the Medici. The imperial army had already entered their territories, and formed the siege of their capital. But though deserted by all their allies, and left without any hope of succour, they defended themselves many months with an obstinate valour worthy of better success; and even when they surrendered, they obtained a capitulation which gave them hopes of securing some remains of their liberty. But the Emperor, from his desire to gratify the Pope, frustrated all their expectations, and, abolishing their ancient form of government, raised Alexander di Medici to the same absolute dominion over that state, which his family have retained to the present times. Philibert de Chalons, Prince of Orange, the Imperial General, was killed during this siege. His estate and titles descended to his sister Claude de Chalons, who was married to René, Count of Nassau, and she transmitted to her posterity of the house of Nassau the title of Princess of Orange, which,

<sup>31</sup> Sandov. n. 55, &c.

by their superior talents and valour, they have rendered so illustrious<sup>32</sup>.

After the publication of the peace at Bologna, and the ceremony of his coronation as King of Lombardy and Emperor of the Romans [Feb. 22 and 24], which the Pope performed with the accustomed formalities, nothing detained Charles in Italy<sup>33</sup>; and he began to prepare for his journey to Germany. His presence became every day more necessary in that country, and was solicited with equal importunity by the Catholics and by the favourers of the new doctrines. During that long interval of tranquillity, which the absence of the Emperor, the contests between him and the Pope, and his attention to the war with France, afforded them, the latter gained much ground. Most of the Princes who had embraced Luther's opinions had not only established in their territories that form of worship which he approved, but had entirely suppressed the rites of the Romish church. Many of the free cities had imitated their conduct. Almost one half of the Germanic body had revolted from the Papal see; and its authority, even in those provinces which had not hitherto shaken off the yoke, was considerably weakened, partly by the example of revolt in the neighbouring states, partly by the secret progress of the reformed doctrine even in those countries where it was not openly embraced. Whatever satisfaction the Emperor, while he was at open enmity with the see of Rome, might have felt in those events which tended

<sup>32</sup> Gaic. l. xx. p. 341. &c. P. Heuter. Rerum Austr. lib. ii. c. 4. p. 236

<sup>33</sup> H. Cornet. Agrippa de duplici coronatione Car. V. ap. Scard. ii. 266.

to mortify and embarrass the Pope, he could not help perceiving now that the religious divisions in Germany would, in the end, prove extremely hurtful to the Imperial authority. The weakness of former Emperors had suffered the great vassals of the Empire to make such successful encroachments upon their power and prerogative that, during the whole course of a war which had often required the exertion of his utmost strength, Charles hardly drew any effectual aid from Germany, and found that magnificent titles or obsolete pretensions were almost the only advantages which he had gained by swaying the Imperial sceptre. He became fully sensible that, if he did not recover in some degree the prerogatives which his predecessors had lost, and acquire the authority as well as possess the name of Head of the Empire, his high dignity would contribute more to obstruct than to promote his ambitious schemes. Nothing, he saw, was more essential towards attaining this than to suppress opinions which might form new bonds of confederacy among the Princes of the Empire, and unite them by ties stronger and more sacred than any political connexion. Nothing seemed to lead more certainly to the accomplishment of his design than to employ zeal for the established religion, of which he was the natural protector, as the instrument of extending his civil authority.

Accordingly, a prospect no sooner opened of coming to an accommodation with the Pope than, by the Emperor's appointment, a diet of the Empire was held at Spires [March 15, 1529], in order to take into consideration the state of religion. The decree of the diet assembled there in the year 1528, which was almost equivalent to a toleration of

Luther's opinions, had given great offence to the rest of Christendom. The greatest delicacy of address, however, was requisite in proceeding to any decision more rigorous. The minds of men kept in perpetual agitation by a controversy carried on, during twelve years, without intermission of debate or abatement of zeal, were now inflamed to a high degree. They were accustomed to innovations, and saw the boldest of them successful. Having not only abolished old rites, but substituted new forms in their place, they were influenced as much by attachment to the system which they had embraced, as by aversion to that which they had abandoned. Luther himself, of a spirit not to be worn out by the length and obstinacy of the combat, or to become remiss upon success, continued the attack with as much vigour as he had begun it. His disciples, of whom many equalled him in zeal, and some surpassed him in learning, were no less capable than their master to conduct the controversy in the properest manner. Many of the laity, some even of the Princes, trained up amidst these incessant disputations, and in the habit of listening to the arguments of the contending parties, who alternately appealed to them as judges, came to be profoundly skilled in all the questions which were agitated, and, upon occasion, could show themselves not inexperienced in any of the arts with which these theological encounters were managed. It was obvious from all these circumstances, that any violent decision of the diet must have immediately precipitated matters into confusion, and have kindled in Germany the flames of a religious war. All, therefore, that the Archduke and the other commissioners appointed by the Emperor demanded of the diet was, to enjoin those

states of the Empire which had hitherto obeyed the decree issued against Luther at Worms, in the year 1524, to persevere in the observation of it, and to prohibit the other states from attempting any further innovation in religion, particularly from abolishing the mass, before the meeting of a general council. After much dispute, a decree to that effect was approved of by a majority of voices<sup>34</sup>.

The Elector of Saxony, the Marquis of Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse, the Dukes of Lunenburg, the Prince of Anhalt, together with the deputies of fourteen Imperial or free cities<sup>35</sup>, entered a solemn protest against this decree, as unjust and impious [April 19]. On that account they were distinguished by the name of PROTESTANTS<sup>36</sup>, an appellation which hath since become better known and more honourable, by its being applied indiscriminately to all the sects, of whatever denomination, which have revolted from the Roman see. Not satisfied with this declaration of their dissent from the decree of the diet, the Protestants sent ambassadors into Italy, to lay their grievances before the Emperor, from whom they met with the most discouraging reception. Charles was at that time in close union with the Pope, and solicitous to attach him inviolably to his interest. During their long residence at Bologna, they held many consultations concerning the most effectual means of extirpating the heresies which had sprung up in Germany. Clement, whose cautious and timid mind the proposal of a general

<sup>34</sup> Sleid. Hist. 117.

<sup>35</sup> The fourteen cities were Strasburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Constance, Reutlingen, Windsheim, Meinengen, Lindau, Kempten, Hailbronn, Iana, Weissenburg, Nordlingen, and St. Gall.

<sup>36</sup> Sleid. Hist. 119. F. Paul. Hist. p. 45. Seebeck. ii. 127.

council filled with horror, even beyond what Popes, the constant enemies of such assemblies, usually feel, employed every argument to dissuade the Emperor from consenting to that measure. He represented general councils as factions, ungovernable, presumptuous, formidable to civil authority, and too slow in their operations to remedy disorders which required an immediate cure. Experience, he said, had now taught both the Emperor and himself that forbearance and lenity, instead of soothing the spirit of innovation, had rendered it more enterprising and presumptuous; it was necessary, therefore, to have recourse to the rigorous methods which such a desperate case required; Leo's sentence of excommunication, together with the decree of the diet at Worms, should be carried into execution; and it was incumbent on the Emperor to employ his whole power in order to overawe those on whom the reverence due either to ecclesiastical or civil authority had no longer any influence. Charles, whose views were very different from the Pope's, and who became daily more sensible how obstinate and deeprooted the evil was, thought of reconciling the Protestants by means less violent, and considered the convocation of a council as no improper expedient for that purpose; but promised, if gentler arts failed of success, that then he would exert himself with rigour to reduce to the obedience of the Holy See those stubborn enemies of the Catholic faith<sup>37</sup>.

Such were the sentiments with which the Emperor set out for Germany, having already appointed a diet of the Empire to be held at Augsburg [March 22, 1530]. In his journey towards that city, he had

<sup>37</sup> F. Paul, *xlvi*. Seck. I. ii. 112. *Hist. de Confess. d'Augsburg.* par D. Chytrous, 1to. Antw. 1572, p. 6.

many opportunities of observing the disposition of the Germans with regard to the points in controversy, and found their minds every where so much irritated and inflamed as convinced him that nothing tending to severity or rigour ought to be attempted until all other measures proved ineffectual. He made his public entry into Augsburg with extraordinary pomp [June 15], and found there such a full assembly of the members of the diet as was suitable both to the importance of the affairs which were to come under their consideration, and to the honour of an Emperor, who, after a long absence, returned to them crowned with reputation and success. His presence seems to have communicated to all parties an unusual spirit of moderation and desire of peace. The Elector of Saxony would not permit Luther to accompany him to the diet, lest he should offend the Emperor by bringing into his presence a person excommunicated by the Pope, and who had been the author of all those dissensions which it now appeared so difficult to compose. At the Emperor's desire, all the Protestant princes forbade the divines who accompanied them to preach in public during their residence at Augsburg. For the same reason they employed Melancthon, the man of the greatest learning, as well as of the most pacific and gentle spirit among the Reformers, to draw up a confession of their faith, expressed in terms as little offensive to the Roman Catholics as a regard for truth would permit. Melancthon, who seldom suffered the rancour of controversy to envenom his style, even in writings purely polemical, executed a task so agreeable to his natural disposition with great moderation and address. The Creed which he composed, known by the name of the *Confession of Augsburg*, from

gave himself up to melancholy and lamentation. But Luther, who during the meeting of the diet had endeavoured to confirm and animate his party by several treatises which he addressed to them, was not disconcerted or dismayed at the prospect of this new danger. He comforted Melancthon and his other desponding disciples, and exhorted the princes not to abandon those truths which they had lately asserted with such laudable boldness<sup>41</sup>. His exhortations made the deeper impression upon them, as they were greatly alarmed at that time by the account of a combination among the Popish Princes of the Empire for the maintenance of the established religion, to which Charles himself had acceded<sup>42</sup>. This convinced them that it was necessary to stand on their guard; and that their own safety, as well as the success of their cause, depended on union. Filled with this dread of the adverse party, and with these sentiments concerning the conduct proper for themselves, they assembled at Smalkalde. There they concluded a league of mutual defence [Dec. 22], against all aggressors<sup>43</sup>, by which they formed the Protestant states of the Empire into one regular body, and, beginning already to consider themselves as such, they resolved to apply to the Kings of France and England, and to implore them to patronise and assist their new confederacy.

An affair not connected with religion furnished them with a pretence for courting the aid of foreign princes. Charles, whose ambitious views enlarged in proportion to the increase of his power and grandeur, had formed a scheme of continuing the Imperial crown in his family, by procuring his brother Ferdinand to be elected King of the Romans. The

<sup>41</sup> Seck. ii. 180. Sleid. 140

<sup>42</sup> Seck. ii. 200. iii. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Sleid. Hist. 142.

present juncture was favourable for the execution of that design. The Emperor's arms had been every where victorious; he had given law to all Europe at the late peace; no rival now remained in a condition to balance or to control him; and the Electors dazzled with the splendour of his success, or overawed by the greatness of his power, durst scarcely dispute the will of a prince whose solicitations carried with them the authority of commands. Nor did he want plausible reasons to enforce the measure. The affairs of his other kingdoms, he said, obliged him to be often absent from Germany; the growing disorders occasioned by the controversies about religion, as well as the formidable neighbourhood of the Turks, who continually threatened to break in with their desolating armies into the heart of the Empire, required the constant presence of a prince endowed with prudence capable of composing the former, and with power as well as valour sufficient to repel the latter. His brother Ferdinand possessed these qualities in an eminent degree; by residing long in Germany, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of its constitution and manners; having been present almost from the first rise of the religious dissensions, he knew what remedies were most proper, what the Germans could bear, and how to apply them; as his own dominions lay on the Turkish frontier, he was the natural defender of Germany against the invasions of the infidels, being prompted by interest no less than he would be bound in duty to oppose them.

These arguments made little impression on the Protestants. Experience taught them that nothing had contributed more to the undisturbed progress of their opinions than the interregnum after Maximilian.

lian's death, the long absence of Charles, and the slackness of the reins of government which these occasioned. Conscious of the advantages which their cause had derived from this relaxation of government, they were unwilling to render it more vigorous, by giving themselves a new and a fixed master. They perceived clearly the extent of Charles's ambition, that he aimed at rendering the Imperial crown hereditary in his family, and would of course establish in the Empire an absolute dominion, to which elective princes could not have aspired with equal facility. They determined therefore to oppose the election of Ferdinand with the utmost vigour, and to rouse their countrymen, by their example and exhortation, to withstand this encroachment on their liberties. The Elector of Saxony, accordingly, not only refused to be present at the electoral college, which the Emperor summoned to meet at Cologne [Jan. 5, 1531], but instructed his eldest son to appear there, and to protest against the election as informal, illegal, contrary to the articles of the golden bull, and subversive of the liberties of the Empire. But the other Electors, whom Charles had been at great pains to gain, without regarding either his absence or protest, chose Ferdinand King of the Romans; who, a few days after, was crowned at Aix-la-Chapelle<sup>44</sup>.

When the Protestants, who were assembled a second time at Smalkalde, received an account of this transaction, and heard, at the same time, that prosecutions were commenced, in the Imperial chamber, against some of their number, on account of their religious principles, they thought it necessary,

<sup>44</sup> Steid. 112. Seck. iii. 1. P. Heuter. Rerum. Austr. lib. x. c. 6. p. 210.

not only to renew their former confederacy, but immediately to despatch their ambassadors into France and England [Feb. 29]. Francis had observed, with all the jealousy of a rival, the reputation which the Emperor had acquired by his seeming disinterestedness and moderation in settling the affairs in Italy; and beheld with great concern the successful step which he had taken towards perpetuating and extending his authority in Germany by the election of a King of the Romans. Nothing, however, would have been more impolitic than to precipitate his kingdom into a new war, when exhausted by extraordinary efforts and discouraged by ill success, before it had got time to recruit its strength or to forget past misfortunes. As no provocation had been given by the Emperor, and hardly a pretext for a rupture had been afforded him, he could not violate a treaty of peace which he himself had so lately solicited, without forfeiting the esteem of all Europe, and being detested as a prince void of probity and honour. He observed with great joy powerful factions beginning to form in the Empire; he listened with the utmost eagerness to the complaints of the Protestant Princes; and, without seeming to countenance their religious opinions, determined secretly to cherish those sparks of political discord which might be afterwards kindled into a flame. For this purpose, he sent William de Bellay, one of the ablest negotiators in France, into Germany, who, visiting the courts of the malecontent Princes, and heightening their ill humour by various arts, concluded an alliance between them and his master<sup>45</sup>, which, though concealed at that time, and productive of no immediate effects, laid the foundation of

<sup>45</sup> Bellay, 129. a. 130. b. Sec. iii. 14.

a union fatal on many occasions to Charles's ambitious projects; and showed the discontented Princes of Germany where for the future they might find a protector no less able than willing to undertake their defence against the encroachments of the Emperor.

The King of England, highly incensed against Charles, in complaisance to whom the Pope had long retarded and now openly opposed his divorce, was no less disposed than Francis to strengthen a league which might be rendered so formidable to the Emperor. But his favourite project of the divorce led him into such a labyrinth of schemes and negotiations, and he was, at the same time, so intent on abolishing the papal jurisdiction in England, that he had no leisure for foreign affairs. This obliged him to rest satisfied with giving general promises, together with a small supply of money to the confederates of Smalkalde<sup>46</sup>.

Meanwhile, many circumstances convinced Charles that this was not a juncture when the extirpation of heresy was to be attempted by violence and rigour; that, in compliance with the Pope's inclinations, he had already proceeded with imprudent precipitation; and that it was more his interest to consolidate Germany into one united and vigorous body than to divide and enfeeble it by a civil war. The Protestants, who were considerable as well by their numbers as by their zeal, had acquired additional weight and importance by their joining in that confederacy into which the rash steps taken at Augsburg had forced them. Having now discovered their own strength, they despised the decisions of the Imperial chamber; and, being secure of foreign protection,

<sup>46</sup> Herbert, 152. 154.

were ready to set the head of the Empire at defiance. At the same time the peace with France was precarious, the friendship of an irresolute and interested pontiff was not to be relied on; and Solymán, in order to repair the discredit and loss which his arms had sustained in the former campaign, was preparing to enter Austria with more numerous forces. On all these accounts, especially the last, a speedy accommodation with the malecontent Princes became necessary, not only for the accomplishment of his future schemes, but for ensuring his present safety. Negotiations were, accordingly, carried on by his direction with the Elector of Saxony and his associates; after many delays, occasioned by their jealousy of the Emperor, and of each other; after innumerable difficulties arising from the inflexible nature of religious tenets, which cannot admit of being altered, modified, or relinquished in the same manner as points of political interest, terms of pacification were agreed upon at Nuremberg [July 23], and ratified solemnly in the diet at Ratisbon [Aug. 3]. In this treaty it was stipulated, That universal peace be established in Germany, until the meeting of a general council, the convocation of which within six months the Emperor shall endeavour to procure; that no person shall be molested on account of religion; that a stop shall be put to all processes begun by the Imperial chamber against Protestants, and the sentences already passed to their detriment shall be declared void. On their part, the Protestants engaged to assist the Emperor with all their forces in resisting the invasion of the Turks<sup>47</sup>. Thus by their firmness in adhering to their

<sup>47</sup> Du Mont Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. ii, 87. 89.

principles, by the unanimity with which they urged all their claims, and by their dexterity in availing themselves of the Emperor's situation, the Protestants obtained terms which amounted almost to a toleration of their religion; all the concessions were made by Charles, none by them; even the favourite point of their approving his brother's election was not mentioned; and the Protestants of Germany, who had hitherto been viewed only as a religious sect, came henceforth to be considered as a political body of no small consequence<sup>48</sup>.

1532.] The intelligence which Charles received of Solymán's having entered Hungary at the head of three hundred thousand men, brought the deliberations of the diet at Ratisbon to a period; the contingent both of troops and money, which each Prince was to furnish towards the defence of the Empire, having been already settled. The Protestants, as a testimony of their gratitude to the Emperor, exerted themselves with extraordinary zeal, and brought into the field forces which exceeded in number the quota imposed on them; the Catholics imitating their example, one of the greatest and best appointed armies that had ever been levied in Germany assembled near Vienna. Being joined by a body of Spanish and Italian veterans under the Marquis del Guasto; by some heavy-armed cavalry from the Low Countries; and by the troops which Ferdinand had raised in Bohemia, Austria, and his other territories, it amounted in all to ninety thousand disciplined foot, and thirty thousand horse, besides a prodigious swarm of irregulars. Of this vast army, worthy the first prince in Christendom, the Emperor took the command in person; and mankind waited in sus-

<sup>48</sup> Steid. 149, &c. Seck. iii. 19.

pense the issue of a decisive battle between the two greatest monarchs in the world. But each of them dreading the other's power and good fortune, they both conducted their operations with such excessive caution, that a campaign, for which such immense preparations had been made, ended without any memorable event [Sept. and Oct.]. Solyman, finding it impossible to gain ground upon an enemy always attentive and on his guard, marched back to Constantinople towards the end of autumn<sup>49</sup>. It is remarkable, that in such a martial age, when every gentleman was a soldier, and every prince a general, this was the first time that Charles, who had already carried on such extensive wars and gained so many victories, appeared at the head of his troops. In this first essay of his arms, to have opposed such a leader as Solyman was no small honour; to have obliged him to retreat merited very considerable praise.

About the beginning of this campaign, the Elector of Saxony died [Aug. 16], and was succeeded by his son John Frederic. The Reformation rather gained than lost by that event; the new Elector, no less attached than his predecessors to the opinions of Luther, occupied the station which they had held at the head of the Protestant party, and defended, with the boldness and zeal of youth, that cause which they had fostered and reared with the caution of more advanced age.

Immediately after the retreat of the Turks, Charles, impatient to revisit Spain, set out, on his way thither, for Italy. As he was extremely desirous of an in-

<sup>49</sup> Jovii Hist. lib. xxx. p. 100, &c. Barre Hist. de l'Empire, i. 8. 347.

terview with the Pope, they met a second time at Bologna, with the same external demonstrations of respect and friendship, but with little of that confidence which had subsisted between them during their late negotiations there. Clement was much dissatisfied with the Emperor's proceedings at Augsburg; his concessions with regard to the speedy convocation of a council having more than cancelled all the merit of the severe decree against the doctrines of the Reformers. The toleration granted to the Protestants at Ratisbon, and the more explicit promise concerning a council with which it was accompanied, had irritated him still further. Charles, however, partly from conviction that the meeting of a council would be attended with salutary effects, and partly from his desire to please the Germans, having solicited the Pope by his ambassadors to call that assembly without delay, and now urging the same thing in person, Clement was greatly embarrassed what reply he should make to a request which it was indecent to refuse, and dangerous to grant. He endeavoured at first to divert Charles from the measure; but, finding him inflexible, he had recourse to artifices which he knew would delay, if not entirely defeat, the calling of that assembly. Under the plausible pretext of its being previously necessary to settle, with all parties concerned, the place of the council's meeting, the manner of its proceedings, the right of the persons who should be admitted to vote, and the authority of their decisions; he dispatched a nuncio, accompanied by an ambassador from the Emperor, to the Elector of Saxony as head of the Protestants. With regard to each of these articles, inextricable difficul-

ties and contests arose. The Protestants demanded a council to be held in Germany; the Pope insisted that it should meet in Italy: they contended, that all points in dispute should be determined by the words of Holy Scripture alone; he considered not only the decrees of the church, but the opinions of fathers and doctors, as of equal authority: they required a free council, in which the divines, commissioned by different churches, should be allowed a voice; he aimed at modelling the council in such a manner as would render it entirely dependent on his pleasure. Above all, the Protestants thought it unreasonable that they should bind themselves to submit to the decrees of a council, before they knew on what principles these decrees were to be founded, by what persons they were to be pronounced, and what forms of proceeding they would observe. The Pope maintained it to be altogether unnecessary to call a council, if those who demanded it did not previously declare their resolution to acquiesce in its decrees. In order to adjust such a variety of points, many expedients were proposed, and the negotiations spun out to such a length as effectually answered Clement's purpose of putting off the meeting of a council, without drawing on himself the whole infamy of obstructing a measure which all Europe deemed so essential to the good of the church<sup>50</sup>.

Together with this negotiation about calling a council, the Emperor carried on another, which he had still more at heart, for securing the peace established in Italy. As Francis had renounced his pretensions in that country with great reluctance, Charles made no doubt but that he would lay hold

<sup>50</sup> F. Paul Hist. 61. Seeckend. iii. 73.

on the first pretext afforded him, or embrace the first opportunity which presented itself, of recovering what he had lost. It became necessary, on this account, to take measures for assembling an army able to oppose him. As his treasury, drained by a long war, could not supply the sums requisite for keeping such a body constantly on foot, he attempted to throw that burden on his allies, and to provide for the safety of his own dominions at their expense, by proposing that the Italian states should enter into a league of defence against all invaders; that, on the first appearance of danger, an army should be raised and maintained at the common charge; and that Antonio de Leyva should be appointed the Generalissimo. Nor was the proposal unacceptable to Clement, though for a reason very different from that which induced the Emperor to make it. He hoped, by this expedient, to deliver Italy from the German and Spanish veterans, which had so long filled all the powers in that country with terror, and still kept them in subjection to the Imperial yoke. A league was accordingly concluded [Feb. 24, 1533]; all the Italian states, the Venetians excepted, acceded to it; the sum which each of the contracting parties should furnish towards maintaining the army was fixed; the Emperor agreed to withdraw the troops which gave so much umbrage to his allies, and which he was unable any longer to support. Having disbanded part of them, and removed the rest to Sicily and Spain, he embarked on board Doria's galleys, and arrived at Barcelona<sup>51</sup> [April 22].

Notwithstanding all his precautions for securing the peace of Germany, and maintaining that system which he had established in Italy, the Emperor be-

<sup>51</sup> Guic. l. xx. 551. Ferreras, ix. 149.

came every day more and more apprehensive that both would be soon disturbed by the intrigues or arms of the French King. His apprehensions were well founded, as nothing but the desperate situation of his affairs could have brought Francis to give his consent to a treaty so dishonourable and disadvantageous as that of Cambray : he, at the very time of ratifying it, had formed a resolution to observe it no longer than necessity compelled him, and took a solemn protest, though with the most profound secrecy, against several articles in the treaty, particularly that whereby he renounced all pretensions to the duchy of Milan, as unjust, injurious to his heirs, and invalid. One of the crown lawyers, by his command, entered a protest to the same purpose, and with the like secrecy, when the ratification of the treaty was registered in the Parliament of Paris<sup>52</sup>. Francis seems to have thought that, by employing an artifice unworthy of a King, destructive of public faith, and of the mutual confidence on which all transactions between nations are founded, he was released from any obligation to perform the most solemn promises, or to adhere to the most sacred engagements. From the moment he concluded the peace of Cambray, he wished and watched for an opportunity of violating it with safety. He endeavoured for that reason to strengthen his alliance with the King of England, whose friendship he cultivated with the greatest assiduity. He put the military force of his own kingdom on a better and more respectable footing than ever. He artfully fomented the jealousy and discontent of the German Princes.

But above all, Francis laboured to break the strict confederacy which subsisted between Charles and

<sup>52</sup> Du Mont Corps Diplom. tom. iv. part ii. p. 52.

Clement; and he had soon the satisfaction to observe appearances of disgust and alienation arising in the mind of that suspicious and interested Pontiff, which gave him hopes that their union would not be lasting. As the Emperor's decision in favour of the Duke of Ferrara had greatly irritated the Pope, Francis aggravated the injustice of that proceeding, and flattered Clement that the papal see would find in him a more impartial and no less powerful protector. As the importunity with which Charles demanded a council was extremely offensive to the Pope, Francis artfully created obstacles to prevent it, and attempted to divert the German Princes, his allies, from insisting so obstinately on that point<sup>53</sup>. As the Emperor had gained such an ascendant over Clement by contributing to aggrandize his family, Francis endeavoured to allure him by the same irresistible bait, proposing a marriage between his second son, Henry Duke of Orleans, and Catharine, the daughter of the Pope's cousin, Laurence di Medici. On the first overture of this match, the Emperor could not persuade himself that Francis really intended to debase the royal blood of France by an alliance with Catharine, whose ancestors had been so lately private citizens and merchants in Florence, and believed that he meant only to flatter or amuse the ambitious Pontiff. He thought it necessary, however, to efface the impression which such a dazzling offer might have made, by promising to break off the marriage which had been agreed on between his own niece the King of Denmark's daughter, and the Duke of Milan, and to substitute Catharine in her place. But the French ambassador producing unexpectedly full powers to conclude the marriage-treaty with the Duke of Orleans, this expedient had no effect. Clement was

<sup>53</sup> Bellay, 111, &c. Seck. iii. 48. F Paul, 63.

so highly pleased with an honour which added such lustre and dignity to the house of Medici, that he offered to grant Catharine the investiture of considerable territories in Italy, by way of portion; he seemed ready to support Francis in prosecuting his ancient claims in that country, and consented to a personal interview with that monarch<sup>54</sup>.

Charles was at the utmost pains to prevent a meeting, in which nothing was likely to pass but what would be of detriment to him; nor could he bear, after he had twice condescended to visit the Pope in his own territories, that Clement should bestow such a mark of distinction on his rival, as to venture on a voyage by sea, at an unfavourable season, in order to pay court to Francis in the French dominions. But the Pope's eagerness to accomplish the match overcame all the scruples of pride, or fear, or jealousy, which would probably have influenced him on any other occasion. The interview, notwithstanding several artifices of the Emperor to prevent it, took place at Marseilles with extraordinary pomp, and demonstrations of confidence on both sides [Oct.]; and the marriage, which the ambition and abilities of Catharine rendered, in the sequel, as pernicious to France as it was then thought dishonourable, was consummated. But whatever schemes may have been secretly concerted by the Pope and Francis in favour of the Duke of Orleans, to whom his father proposed to make over all his rights in Italy, so careful were they to avoid giving any cause of offence to the Emperor, that no treaty was concluded between them<sup>55</sup>; and even in the marriage-articles, Catharine renounced all claims and pretensions in Italy, except to the duchy of Urbino<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>54</sup> Guic. l. xx. 551. 553. Bellay, 138. <sup>55</sup> Guic. l. xx. 555.

<sup>56</sup> Du Mont Corps Diplom. iv. p. ii. 101.

But at the very time when he was carrying on these negotiations, and forming this connexion with Francis, which gave so great umbrage to the Emperor, such was the artifice and duplicity of Clement's character, that he suffered the latter to direct all his proceedings with regard to the King of England, and was no less attentive to gratify him in that particular, than if the most cordial union had subsisted between them. Henry's suit for a divorce had now continued near six years; during all which period the Pope negotiated, promised, retracted, and concluded nothing. After bearing repeated delays and disappointments longer than could have been expected from a Prince of such a choleric and impetuous temper, the patience of Henry was at last so much exhausted that he applied to another tribunal for that decree which he had solicited in vain at Rome. Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, by a sentence founded on the authority of Universities, Doctors, and Rabbies, who had been consulted with respect to the point, annulled the King's marriage with Catharine; her daughter was declared illegitimate; and Anne Boleyn acknowledged as Queen of England. At the same time Henry began not only to neglect and to threaten the Pope, whom he had hitherto courted, but to make innovations in the church, of which he had formerly been such a zealous defender. Clement, who had already seen so many provinces and kingdoms revolt from the Holy See, became apprehensive at last that England might imitate their example; and partly from his solicitude to prevent that fatal blow, partly in compliance with the French King's solicitations, determined to give Henry such satisfaction as might retain him within the bosom of the church. But the violence of the Cardinals, devoted to the Em-

peror, did not allow the Pope leisure for executing this prudent resolution, and hurried him, with a precipitation fatal to the Roman See, to issue a bull [March 23, 1534] rescinding Cranmer's sentence, confirming Henry's marriage with Catharine, and declaring him excommunicated, if, within a time specified, he did not abandon the wife he had taken, and return to her whom he had deserted. Enraged at this unexpected decree, Henry kept no longer any measures with the court of Rome; his subjects seconded his resentment and indignation; an act of parliament was passed, abolishing the papal power and jurisdiction in England; by another, the King was declared supreme head of the church, and all the authority of which the Popes were deprived was vested in him. That vast fabric of ecclesiastical dominion which had been raised with such art, and of which the foundations seem to have been laid so deep, being no longer supported by the veneration of the people, was overturned in a moment. Henry himself, with the caprice peculiar to his character, continued to defend the doctrines of the Romish church as freely as he attacked its jurisdiction. He alternately persecuted the Protestants for rejecting the former, and the Catholics for acknowledging the latter. But his subjects, being once permitted to enter into new paths, did not choose to stop short at the precise point prescribed by him. Having been encouraged by his example to break some of their fetters, they were so impatient to shake off what still remained<sup>37</sup> that in the following reign, with the applause of the greater part of the nation, a total separation was made from the church of

<sup>37</sup> Herbert. Burn. History of Reform.

Rome, in articles of doctrine as well as in matters of discipline and jurisdiction.

A short delay might have saved the see of Rome from all the unhappy consequences of Clement's rashness. Soon after his sentence against Henry, he fell into a languishing distemper, which, gradually wasting his constitution, put an end to his pontificate [Sept. 25], the most unfortunate, both during its continuance, and by its effects, that the church had known for many ages. The very day on which the Cardinals entered the conclave [Oct. 13] they raised to the papal throne Alexander Farnese, Dean of the sacred college, and the oldest member of that body, who assumed the name of Paul III. The account of his promotion was received with extraordinary acclamations of joy by the people of Rome, highly pleased, after an interval of more than a hundred years, to see the crown of St. Peter placed on the head of a Roman citizen. Persons more capable of judging formed a favourable presage of his administration, from the experience which he had acquired under four pontificates, as well as the character of prudence and moderation which he had uniformly maintained in a station of great eminence, and during an active period that required both talents and address<sup>36</sup>.

Europe, it is probable, owed the continuance of its peace to the death of Clement; for although no traces remain in history of any league concluded between him and Francis, it is scarcely to be doubted but that he would have seconded the operations of the French arms in Italy, that he might have gratified his ambition by seeing one of his family possessed of the supreme power in Florence, and another

<sup>36</sup> Guic. l. xx. 556. P. Paul, 64.

in Milan. But upon the election of Paul III, who had hitherto adhered uniformly to the Imperial interest, Francis found it necessary to suspend his operations for some time, and to put off the commencement of hostilities against the Emperor, on which, before the death of Clement, he had been fully determined.

While Francis waited for an opportunity to renew a war which had hitherto proved so fatal to himself and his subjects, a transaction of a very singular nature was carried on in Germany. Among many beneficial and salutary effects of which the Reformation was the immediate cause, it was attended, as must be the case in all actions and events wherein men are concerned, with some consequences of an opposite nature. When the human mind is roused by grand objects, and agitated by strong passions, its operations acquire such force, that they are apt to become irregular and extravagant. Upon any great revolution in religion, such irregularities abound most at that particular period, when men, having thrown off the authority of their ancient principles, do not yet fully comprehend the nature, or feel the obligation of those new tenets which they have embraced. The mind, in that situation, pushing forward with the boldness which prompted it to reject established opinions, and not guided by a clear knowledge of the system substituted in their place, disdains all restraint, and runs into wild notions, which often lead to scandalous or immoral conduct. Thus, in the first ages of the Christian church, many of the new converts, having renounced their ancient systems of religious faith, and being but imperfectly acquainted with the doctrines and precepts of Christianity, broached the most extravagant opinions,

equally subversive of piety and virtue; all which errors disappeared, or were exploded, when the knowledge of religion increased and came to be more generally diffused. In like manner, soon after Luther's appearance, the rashness or ignorance of some of his disciples led them to publish tenets no less absurd than pernicious, which being proposed to men extremely illiterate, but fond of novelty, and at a time when their minds were occupied chiefly with religious speculations, gained too easy credit and authority among them. To these causes must be imputed the extravagancies of Muncer, in the year one thousand five hundred and twenty-five, as well as the rapid progress which his opinions made among the peasants; but though the insurrection excited by that fanatic was soon suppressed, several of his followers lurked in different places, and endeavoured privately to propagate his opinions.

In those provinces of Upper Germany which had already been so cruelly wasted by their enthusiastic rage, the magistrates watched their motions with such severe attention, that many of them found it necessary to retire into other countries; some were punished, others driven into exile, and their errors were entirely rooted out. But in the Netherlands and Westphalia, where the pernicious tendency of their opinions was more unknown and guarded against with less care, they got admittance into several towns, and spread the infection of their principles. The most remarkable of their religious tenets related to the Sacrament of Baptism, which, as they contended, ought to be administered only to persons grown up to years of understanding, and should be performed not by sprinkling them with water, but by dipping them in it: for this reason they cou-

demned the baptism of infants; and rebaptizing all whom they admitted into their society, the sect came to be distinguished by the name of Anabaptists. To this peculiar notion concerning baptism, which has the appearance of being founded on the practice of the church in the apostolic age, and contains nothing inconsistent with the peace and order of human society, they added other principles of a most enthusiastic as well as dangerous nature. They maintained that, among Christians who had the precepts of the gospel to direct, and the Spirit of God to guide them, the office of magistracy was not only unnecessary, but an unlawful encroachment on their spiritual liberty; that the distinctions occasioned by birth, or rank, or wealth, being contrary to the spirit of the gospel, which considers all men as equal, should be entirely abolished; that all Christians, throwing their possessions into one common stock, should live together in that state of equality which becomes members of the same family; that as neither the laws of nature, nor the precepts of the New Testament, had imposed any restraints upon men with regard to the number of wives which they might marry, they should use that liberty which God himself had granted to the Patriarchs.

Such opinions, propagated and maintained with enthusiastic zeal and boldness, were not long without producing the violent effects natural to them. Two Anabaptist prophets, John Matthias, a baker of Haerlem, and John Boccold, or Beukels, a journeyman tailor of Leyden, possessed with the rage of making proselytes, fixed their residence at Munster, an Imperial city in Westphalia, of the first rank, under the sovereignty of its bishop, but governed by its own senate and consuls. As neither

of these fanatics wanted the talents requisite in desperate enterprises—great resolution, the appearance of sanctity, bold pretensions to inspiration, and a confident and plausible manner of discoursing—they soon gained many converts. Among these were Rothman, who had first preached the Protestant doctrine in Munster, and Cnipperdoling, a citizen of good birth and considerable eminence. Imboldened by the countenance of such disciples, they openly taught their opinions; and not satisfied with that liberty, they made several attempts, though without success, to become masters of the town, in order to get their tenets established by public authority. At last, having secretly called in their associates from the neighbouring country, they suddenly took possession of the arsenal and senate-house in the night-time, and running through the streets with drawn swords, and horrible howlings, cried out alternately, “Repent, and be baptized;” and “Depart, ye ungodly.” The senators, the canons, the nobility, together with the more sober citizens, whether Papists or Protestants, terrified at their threats and outcries, fled in confusion, and left the city under the dominion of a frantic multitude, consisting chiefly of strangers [February]. Nothing now remaining to overawe or control them, they set about modeling the government according to their own wild ideas; and though at first they showed so much reverence for the ancient constitution, as to elect senators of their own sect, and to appoint Cnipperdoling and another proselyte Consuls, this was nothing more than form; for all their proceedings were directed by Matthias, who, in the style and with the authority of a prophet, uttered his commands, which it was instant death to disobey.

Having begun with encouraging the multitude to pillage the churches, and deface their ornaments; he enjoined them to destroy all books except the Bible, as useless or impious; he ordered the estates of such as fled to be confiscated, and sold to the inhabitants of the adjacent country; he commanded every man to bring forth his gold, silver, and other precious effects, and to lay them at his feet; the wealth amassed by these means he deposited in a public treasury, and named deacons to dispense it for the common use of all. The members of this commonwealth being thus brought to a perfect equality, he commanded all of them to eat at tables prepared in public, and even prescribed the dishes which were to be served up each day. Having finished his plan of reformation, his next care was to provide for the defence of the city; and he took measures for that purpose with a prudence which savoured nothing of fanaticism. He collected large magazines of every kind; he repaired and extended the fortifications, obliging every person without distinction to work in his turn; he formed such as were capable of bearing arms into regular bodies, and endeavoured to add the stability of discipline to the impetuosity of enthusiasm. He sent emissaries to the Anabaptists in the Low Countries, inviting them to assemble at Munster, which he dignified with the name of Mount Sion, that from thence they might set out to reduce all the nations of the earth under their dominion. He himself was unwearied in attending to every thing necessary for the security or increase of the sect; animating his disciples by his own example to decline no labour, as well as to submit to every hardship; and then enthusiastic passions being kept from subsiding by a perpetual

succession of exhortations, revelations, and prophecies, they seemed ready to undertake or to suffer any thing in maintenance of their opinions.

While they were thus employed, the Bishop of Munster, having assembled a considerable army, advanced to besiege the town. On his approach Matthias sallied out at the head of some chosen troops, attacked one quarter of his camp, forced it, and after great slaughter returned to the city loaded with glory and spoil. Intoxicated with this success, he appeared next day brandishing a spear, and declared, that, in imitation of Gideon, he would go forth with a handful of men and smite the host of the ungodly. [May.] Thirty persons, whom he named, followed him without hesitation in this wild enterprise, and, rushing on the enemy with a frantic courage, were cut off to a man. The death of their prophet occasioned at first great consternation among his disciples; but Buccold, by the same gifts and pretensions which had gained Matthias credit, soon revived their spirits and hopes to such a degree that he succeeded the deceased prophet in the same absolute direction of all their affairs. As he did not possess that enterprising courage which distinguished his predecessor, he satisfied himself with carrying on a defensive war; and, without attempting to annoy the enemy by sallies, he waited for the succours he expected from the Low Countries, the arrival of which was often foretold and promised by their prophets. But though less daring in action than Matthias, he was a wilder enthusiast and of more unbounded ambition. Soon after the death of his predecessor, having, by obscure visions and prophecies, prepared the multitude for some extraordinary event, he stripped himself naked, and, march-

ing through the streets, proclaimed with a loud voice, "That the kingdom of Sion was at hand; that whatever was highest on earth should be brought low, and whatever was lowest should be exalted." In order to fulfil this, he commanded the churches, as the most lofty buildings in the city, to be levelled with the ground; he degraded the senators chosen by Matthias, and depriving Cnipperdoling of the consulship, the highest office in the commonwealth, appointed him to execute the lowest and most infamous, that of common hangman, to which strange transition the other agreed, not only without murmuring, but with the utmost joy; and such was the despotic rigour of Boccold's administration, that he was called almost every day to perform some duty or other of his wretched function. In place of the deposed senators, he named twelve judges, according to the number of tribes in Israel, to preside in all affairs; retaining to himself the same authority which Moses anciently possessed as legislator of that people.

Not satisfied, however, with power or titles which were not supreme, a prophet, whom he had gained and tutored, having called the multitude together, declared it to be the will of God, that John Boccold should be King of Sion, and sit on the throne of David. John, kneeling down, accepted of the heavenly call [June 24], which he solemnly protested had been revealed likewise to himself, and was immediately acknowledged as Monarch by the deluded multitude. From that moment he assumed all the state and pomp of royalty. He wore a crown of gold, and was clad in the richest and most sumptuous garments. A Bible was carried on his one hand, a naked sword on the other. A great

body of guards accompanied him when he appeared in public. He coined money stamped with his own image, and appointed the great officers of his household and kingdom, among whom Cnipperdoling was nominated Governor of the city, as a reward for his former submission.

Having now attained the height of power, Boccold began to discover passions, which he had hitherto restrained, or indulged only in secret. As the excesses of enthusiasm have been observed in every age to lead to sensual gratifications, the same constitution that is susceptible of the former being remarkably prone to the latter, he instructed the prophets and teachers to harangue the people for several days concerning the lawfulness, and even necessity, of taking more wives than one, which they asserted to be one of the privileges granted by God to the saints. When their ears were once accustomed to this licentious doctrine, and their passions inflamed with the prospect of such unbounded indulgence, he himself set them an example of using what he called their Christian liberty, by marrying at once three wives, among which the widow of Matthias, a woman of singular beauty, was one. As he was allured by beauty, or the love of variety, he gradually added to the number of his wives until they amounted to fourteen, though the widow of Matthias was the only one dignified with the title of Queen, or who shared with him the splendour and ornaments of royalty. After the example of their prophet, the multitude gave themselves up to the most licentious and uncontrolled gratification of their desires. No man remained satisfied with a single wife. Not to use their Christian liberty was deemed a crime. Persons were appointed to search

the houses for young women grown up to maturity, whom they instantly compelled to marry. Together with polygamy, freedom of divorce, its inseparable attendant, was introduced, and became a new source of corruption. Every excess was committed, of which the passions of men are capable, when restrained neither by the authority of laws nor the sense of decency<sup>59</sup>; and, by a monstrous and almost incredible conjunction, voluptuousness was engrafted on religion, and dissolute riot accompanied the austerities of fanatical devotion.

Meanwhile the German Princes were highly offended at the insult offered to their dignity by Boccold's presumptuous usurpation of royal honours; and the profligate manners of his followers, which were a reproach to the Christian name, filled men of all professions with horror. Luther, who had testified against this fanatical spirit on its first appearance, now deeply lamented its progress, and having exposed the delusion with great strength of argument, as well as acrimony of style, called loudly on all the states of Germany to put a stop to a frenzy no less pernicious to society than fatal to religion. The Emperor, occupied with other cares and pro-

<sup>59</sup> *Prophete et concionatorum autoritate juxta et exemplo, tota urbe ad rapiendas pulcherrimas quasque feminas discursum est. Nec intra paucos dies, in tantâ hominum turbâ fere ulla reperta est supra annum decimum quartum quæ suprum passa non fuerit. Lamb. Hortens. p. 303.—Vulgò viris quinas esse uxores, pluribus senas, nonnullis septenas et octonas. Puellas supra duodecimum ætatis annum statim amare. Id. 305. Nemo una contentus fuit, neque cuicquam extra effortas et viris immaturas continenti esse licuit. Id. 307.—Tacebo hic, ut sit suus honor auribus, quantâ barbaria et malitia usi sunt in puellis vitandis nondum aptis matrimonio, id quod mihi neque ex vana, neque ex vulgi sermonibus haustum est, sed ex ea vetulâ, cui cura sic vitutorum demandata fuit, auditum. Job. Corvinus, 316.*

jects, had not leisure to attend to such a distant object; but the Princes of the Empire, assembled by the King of the Romans, voted a supply of men and money to the Bishop of Munster, who, being unable to keep a sufficient army on foot, had converted the siege of the town into a blockade [1535.] The forces raised in consequence of this resolution were put under the command of an officer of experience, who approaching the town towards the end of spring, in the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-five, pressed it more closely than formerly; but found the fortifications so strong and so diligently guarded that he durst not attempt an assault. It was now above fifteen months since the Anabaptists had established their dominion in Munster; they had during that time undergone prodigious fatigue in working on the fortifications, and performing military duty. Notwithstanding the prudent attention of their King to provide for their subsistence, and his frugal as well as regular economy in their public meals, they began to feel the approach of famine [May]. Several small bodies of their brethren, who were advancing to their assistance from the Low Countries, had been intercepted and cut to pieces; and, while all Germany was ready to combine against them, they had no prospect of succour. But such was the ascendant which Boccold had acquired over the multitude, and so powerful the fascination of enthusiasm, that their hopes were as sanguine as ever, and they hearkened with implicit credulity to the visions and predictions of their prophets, who assured them that the Almighty would speedily interpose in order to deliver the city. The faith, however, of some few, shaken by the violence and length of their sufferings, began to fail; but

being suspected of an inclination to surrender to the enemy, they were punished with immediate death, as guilty of impiety in distrusting the power of God. One of the King's wives having uttered certain words which implied some doubt concerning his divine mission, he instantly called the whole number together, and commanded the blasphemer, as he called her, to kneel down, cut off her head with his own hands: and so far were the rest from expressing any horror at this cruel deed, that they joined him in dancing with a frantic joy around the bleeding body of their companion.

By this time, the besieged endured the utmost rigour of famine [June 1]; but they chose rather to suffer hardships, the recital of which is shocking to humanity, than to listen to the terms of capitulation offered them by the bishop. At last a deserter, whom they had taken into their service, being either less intoxicated with the fumes of enthusiasm, or unable any longer to bear such distress, made his escape to the enemy. He informed their general of a weak part in the fortifications which he had observed, and assuring him that the besieged, exhausted with hunger and fatigue, kept watch there with little care, he offered to lead a party thither in the night. The proposal was accepted, and a chosen body of troops appointed for the service; who, scaling the walls unperceived, seized one of the gates, and admitted the rest of the army. The Anabaptists, though surprised, defended themselves in the market-place with valour heightened by despair; but being overpowered by numbers, and surrounded on every hand, most of them were slain, and the remainder taken prisoners [June 21]. Among the last were the King and Chipperdoling. The King,

loaded with chains, was carried from city to city as a spectacle to gratify the curiosity of the people, and was exposed to all their insults. His spirit, however, was not broken or humbled by this sad reverse of his condition, and he adhered with unshaken firmness to the distinguishing tenets of his sect. After this he was brought back to Munster, the scene of his royalty and crimes, and put to death with the most exquisite as well as lingering tortures, all which he bore with astonishing fortitude. This extraordinary man, who had been able to acquire such amazing dominion over the minds of his followers, and to excite commotions so dangerous to society, was only twenty-six years of age<sup>60</sup>.

Together with its monarch the kingdom of the Anabaptists came to an end. Their principles having taken deep root in the Low Countries, the party still subsists there under the name of Mennonites; but, by a very singular revolution, this sect, so mutinous and sanguinary at its first origin, hath become altogether innocent and pacific. Holding it unlawful to wage war, or to accept of civil offices, they devote themselves entirely to the duties of private citizens, and by their industry and charity endeavour to make reparation to human society for the violence committed by their founders<sup>61</sup>. A small number of this sect which is settled in England retain its peculiar tenets concerning baptism, but without any dangerous mixture of enthusiasm.

<sup>60</sup> Sleid. 190, &c. *Tumultuum Anabaptistarum Liber unus*. Ant. Lamberto Hortensio Auctore, ap. Scardium, vol. ii. p. 298, &c. *De miserabili Monasteriensium Obudione*, &c. Libellus Antonii Corvini, ap. Sear. 313. *Annales Anabaptistici a Joh. Henrico Ottio, Itō. Basileæ, 1672.* Cor. Heersbachius *Hist. Anab.* edit. 1637. p. 140.

<sup>61</sup> Bayle Diction. art. *Anabaptistes*.

The mutiny of the Anabaptists, though it drew general attention, did not so entirely engross the Princes of Germany as not to allow leisure for other transactions. The alliance between the French King and the confederates at Smalkalde began about this time to produce great effects. Ulric, Duke of Wurtemberg, having been expelled his dominions in the year one thousand five hundred and nineteen, on account of his violent and oppressive administration, the house of Austria had got possession of his duchy. That Prince having now by a long exile atoned for the errors in his conduct, which were the effect rather of inexperience than of a tyrannical disposition, was become the object of general compassion. The Landgrave of Hesse in particular, his near relation, warmly espoused his interest, and used many efforts to recover for him his ancient inheritance. But the King of the Romans obstinately refused to relinquish a valuable acquisition which his family had made with so much ease. The Landgrave, unable to compel him, applied to the King of France, his new ally. Francis, eager to embrace any opportunity of distressing the house of Austria, and desirous of wresting from it a territory, which gave it footing and influence in a part of Germany at a distance from its other dominions, encouraged the Landgrave to take arms, and secretly supplied him with a large sum of money. This he employed to raise troops; and, marching with great expedition towards Wurtemberg, attacked, defeated, and dispersed a considerable body of Austrians intrusted with the defence of the country. All the Duke's subjects hastened with emulation to receive their native Prince, and reinvested him with that authority

which is still enjoyed by his descendants. At the same time the exercise of the Protestant religion was established in his dominions<sup>62</sup>.

Ferdinand, how sensible soever of this unexpected blow, not daring to attack a Prince whom all the Protestant powers in Germany were ready to support, judged it expedient to conclude a treaty with him, by which, in the most ample form, he recognised his title to the duchy. The success of the Landgrave's operations in behalf of the Duke of Wurtemberg having convinced Ferdinand that a rupture with a league so formidable as that of Smalkalde was to be avoided with the utmost care, he entered likewise into a negotiation with the Elector of Saxony, the head of that union; and by some concessions in favour of the Protestant religion, and others of advantage to the Elector himself, he prevailed on him, together with his confederates, to acknowledge his title as King of the Romans. At the same time, in order to prevent any such precipitate or irregular election in times to come, it was agreed that no person should hereafter be promoted to that dignity without the unanimous consent of the Electors; and the Emperor soon after confirmed this stipulation<sup>63</sup>.

These acts of indulgence towards the Protestants, and the close union into which the King of the Romans seemed to be entering with the Princes of that party, gave great offence at Rome. Paul III, though he had departed from a resolution of his predecessor, never to consent to the calling of a general council, and had promised, in the first consistory held after his election, that he would convoke that

<sup>62</sup> Sleid. 172. Bellay, 159, &c.

<sup>63</sup> Sleid. 173. Corps Diplom. tom. iv. p. 2. 119.

assembly so much desired by all Christendom, was no less enraged than Clement at the innovations in Germany, and no less averse to any scheme for reforming either the doctrines of the church or the abuses in the court of Rome. But having been a witness of the universal censure which Clement had incurred by his obstinacy with regard to these points, he hoped to avoid the same reproach by the seeming alacrity with which he proposed a council; flattering himself, however, that such difficulties would arise concerning the time and place of meeting, the persons who had a right to be present, and the order of their proceedings, as would effectually defeat the intention of those who demanded that assembly, without exposing himself to any imputation for refusing to call it. With this view he dispatched nuncios to the several courts, in order to make known his intention, and that he had fixed on Mantua as a proper place in which to hold the council. Such difficulties as the Pope had foreseen, immediately presented themselves in great number. The French King did not approve of the place which Paul had chosen, as the Papal and Imperial influence would necessarily be too great in a town situated in that part of Italy. The King of England not only concurred with Francis in urging that objection, but refused, besides, to acknowledge any council called in the name and by the authority of the Pope. The German Protestants, having met together at Smalkalde [Dec. 12], insisted on their original demand of a council to be held in Germany, and, pleading the Emperor's promise, as well as the agreement at Ratisbon to that effect, declared that they would not consider an assembly held at Mantua as a legal or free representative of the church.

By this diversity of sentiments and views, such a field for intrigue and negotiation opened, as made it easy for the Pope to assume the merit of being eager to assemble a council, while at the same time he could put off its meeting at pleasure. The Protestants, on the other hand, suspecting his designs, and sensible of the importance which they derived from their union, renewed for ten years the league of Smalkale, which now became stronger and more formidable by the accession of several new members<sup>64</sup>.

During these transactions in Germany, the Emperor undertook his famous enterprise against the piratical states in Africa. That part of the African continent lying along the coast of the Mediterranean sea, which anciently formed the kingdoms of Mauritania and Massylia, together with the republic of Carthage, and which is now known by the general name of Barbary, had undergone many revolutions. Subdued by the Romans, it became a province of their Empire. When it was conquered afterwards by the Vandals, they erected a kingdom there. That being overturned by Belisarius, the country became subject to the Greek Emperors, and continued to be so until it was overrun, towards the

<sup>64</sup> This league was concluded December, one thousand five hundred and thirty-five, but not extended or signed in form till September in the following year. The Princes who acceded to it were,—John Elector of Saxony, Ernest Duke of Brunswick, Philip Landgrave of Hesse, Ulric Duke of Wurtemberg, Barnim and Philip, Dukes of Pomerania, John, George, and Joachim, Princes of Anhalt Gebhard and Albert, Counts of Mansfield, William Count of Nassau. The cities,—Strasburg, Nuremberg, Constance, Ulm, Magdeburgh, Bremen, Ruitlingen, Hailbron, Memmingen, Landau, Campen, Isna, Bibrac, Windsheim, Augsburg, Frankfort, Esling, Brunswick, Goslar, Hanover, Gottingen, Lumbek, Hamburg, Minden.

end of the seventh century, by the rapid and irresistible arms of the Arabians. It remained for some time a part of that vast empire, which the Caliphs governed with absolute authority. Its immense distance, however, from the seat of government encouraged the descendants of those leaders who had subdued the country, or the chiefs of the Moors, its ancient inhabitants, to throw off the yoke, and to assert their independence.\* The Caliphs, who derived their authority from a spirit of enthusiasm, more fitted for making conquests than for preserving them, were obliged to connive at acts of rebellion which they could not prevent; and Barbary was divided into several kingdoms, of which Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis were the most considerable. The inhabitants of these kingdoms were a mixed race, Arabs, Negroes from the southern provinces, and Moors, either natives of Africa, or who had been expelled out of Spain; all zealous professors of the Mahometan religion, and inflamed against Christianity with a bigoted hatred proportional to their ignorance and barbarous manners.

Among these people, no less daring, inconstant, and treacherous, than the ancient inhabitants of the same country described by the Roman historians, frequent seditions broke out, and many changes in government took place. These, as they affected only the internal state of a country extremely barbarous, are but little known, and deserve to be so. But about the beginning of the sixteenth century a sudden revolution happened, which, by rendering the states of Barbary formidable to the Europeans, hath made their history worthy of more attention. This revolution was brought about by persons born in a rank of life which entitled them to act no such

illustrious part. Horne and Hayradin, the sons of a potter in the Isle of Lesbos, prompted by a restless and enterprising spirit, forsook their father's trade, ran to sea, and joined a crew of pirates. They soon distinguished themselves by their valour and activity, and, becoming masters of a small brigantine, carried on their infamous trade with such conduct and success that they assembled a fleet of twelve galleys, besides many vessels of smaller force. Of this fleet Horne the elder brother, called Barbarossa from the red colour of his beard, was admiral, and Hayradin second in command, but with almost equal authority. They called themselves the friends of the sea, and the enemies of all who sail upon it; and their names soon became terrible from the Straits of the Dardanelles to those of Gibraltar. Together with their fame and power their ambitious views extended; and while acting as corsairs, they adopted the ideas and acquired the talents of conquerors. They often carried the prizes which they took on the coasts of Spain and Italy into the ports of Barbary; and enriching the inhabitants by the sale of their booty, and the thoughtless prodigality of their crews, were welcome guests in every place at which they touched. The convenient situation of these harbours, lying so near the greatest commercial states at that time in Christendom, made the brothers wish for an establishment in that country. An opportunity of accomplishing this quickly presented itself, which they did not suffer to pass unimproved. Entem, King of Algiers, having attempted several times, without success, to take a fort which the Spanish governors of Oran had built not far from his capital, was so ill advised as to apply for aid to Barbarossa, whose

valour the Africans considered as irresistible. The active corsair gladly accepted of the invitation, and, leaving his brother Hayradin with the fleet [1516], marched at the head of five thousand men to Algiers, where he was received as their deliverer. Such a force gave him the command of the town; and as he perceived that the Moors neither suspected him of any bad intention, nor were capable with their light-armed troops of opposing his disciplined veterans, he secretly murdered the monarch whom he had come to assist, and proclaimed himself King of Algiers in his stead. The authority which he had thus boldly usurped, he endeavoured to establish by arts suited to the genius of the people whom he had to govern; by liberality without bounds to those who favoured his promotion, and by cruelty no less unbounded towards all whom he had any reason to distrust. Not satisfied with the throne which he had acquired, he attacked the neighbouring King of Tremecen, and, having vanquished him in battle, added his dominions to those of Algiers. At the same time, he continued to infest the coast of Spain and Italy with fleets which resembled the armaments of a great monarch, rather than the light squadrons of a corsair. Their frequent and cruel devastations obliged Charles, about the beginning of his reign [1518], to furnish the Marquis de Co-uares, governor of Oran, with troops sufficient to attack him. That officer, assisted by the dethroned King of Tremecen, executed the commission with such spirit that Barbarossa's troops being beat in several encounters, he himself was shut up in Tremecen. After defending it to the last extremity, he was overtaken in attempting to make his escape.

and slain while he fought with an obstinate valour worthy of his former fame and exploits.

His brother Hayradin, known likewise by the name of Barbarossa, assumed the sceptre of Algiers with the same ambition and abilities, but with better fortune. His reign being undisturbed by the arms of the Spaniards, which had full occupation in the wars among the European powers, he regulated with admirable prudence the interior police of his kingdom, carried on his naval operations with great vigour, and extended his conquests on the continent of Africa. But perceiving that the Moors and Arabs submitted to his government with the utmost reluctance, and being afraid that his continual depredations would one day draw upon him the arms of the Christians, he put his dominions under the protection of the Grand Seignior, and received from him a body of Turkish soldiers sufficient for his security against his domestic as well as his foreign enemies. At last, the fame of his exploits daily increasing, Solyman offered him the command of the Turkish fleet, as the only person whose valour and skill in naval affairs entitled him to command against Andrew Doria, the greatest sea officer of that age. Proud of this distinction, Barbarossa repaired to Constantinople; and with a wonderful versatility of mind, mingling the arts of a courtier with the boldness of a corsair, gained the entire confidence both of the Sultan and his Vizier. To them he communicated a scheme which he had formed of making himself master of Tunis, the most flourishing kingdom at that time on the coast of Africa; and this being approved of by them, he obtained whatever he demanded for carrying it into execution.

His hopes of success in this undertaking were founded on the intestine divisions in the kingdom of Tunis. Mahmed, the last King of that country, having thirty-four sons by different wives, appointed Muley Hascen, one of the youngest among them, to be his successor. That weak Prince, who owed this preference, not to his own merit, but to the ascendant which his mother had acquired over a monarch doting with age, first poisoned Mahmed his father in order to prevent him from altering his destination with respect to the succession; and then, with the barbarous policy which prevails wherever polygamy is permitted, and the right of succession is not precisely fixed, he put to death all his brothers whom he could get into his power. Alraschid, one of the eldest, was so fortunate as to escape his rage; and, finding a retreat among the wandering Arabs, made several attempts, by the assistance of some of their chiefs, to recover the throne which of right belonged to him. But these proving unsuccessful, and the Arabs, from their natural levity, being ready to deliver him up to his merciless brother, he fled to Algiers, the only place of refuge remaining, and implored the protection of Barbarossa; who, discerning at once all the advantages which might be gained by supporting his title, received him with every possible demonstration of friendship and respect. Being ready, at that time, to set sail for Constantinople, he easily persuaded Alraschid, whose eagerness to obtain a crown disposed him to believe or undertake any thing, to accompany him thither, promising him effectual assistance from Solymán, whom he represented to be the most generous as well as most powerful monarch in the world. But no sooner were they arrived at Constantinople

than the treacherous corsair, regardless of all his promises to him, opened to the Sultan a plan for conquering Tunis, and annexing it to the Turkish empire, by making use of the name of this exiled Prince, and cooperating with the party in the kingdom which was ready to declare in his favour. Solyman approved, with too much facility, of this perfidious proposal, extremely suitable to the character of its author, but altogether unworthy of a great Prince. A powerful fleet and numerous army were soon assembled ; at the sight of which the credulous Alraschid flattered himself that he should soon enter his capital in triumph.

But just as this unhappy Prince was going to embark, he was arrested by order of the Sultan, shut up in the seraglio, and was never heard of more. Barbarossa sailed with a fleet of two hundred and fifty vessels towards Africa. After ravaging the coasts of Italy, and spreading terror through every part of that country, he appeared before Tunis ; and, landing his men, gave out that he came to assert the right of Alraschid, whom he pretended to have left sick aboard the admiral's galley. The fort of Goletta, which commands the bay, soon fell into his hands, partly by his own address, partly by the treachery of its commander ; and the inhabitants of Tunis, weary of Muley Hascen's government, took arms, and declared for Alraschid with such zeal and unanimity as obliged the former to fly so precipitately that he left all his treasures behind him. The gates were immediately set open to Barbarossa as the restorer of their lawful sovereign. But when Alraschid himself did not appear, and when, instead of his name, that of Solyman alone was heard among the acclamations of the Turkish soldiers marching

into the town, the people of Tunis began to suspect the corsair's treachery. Their suspicions being soon converted into certainty, they ran to arms with the utmost fury, and surrounded the citadel, into which Barbarossa had led his troops. But having foreseen such a revolution, he was not unprepared for it; he immediately turned against them the artillery on the ramparts, and by one brisk discharge dispersed the numerous but undirected assailants, and forced them to acknowledge Solyman as their sovereign, and to submit to himself as his viceroy.

His first care was to put the kingdom, of which he had thus got possession, in a proper posture of defence. He strengthened the citadel which commands the town; and, fortifying the Goletta in a regular manner at vast expense, made it the principal station for his fleet, and his great arsenal for military as well as naval stores. Being now possessed of such extensive territories, he carried on his depredations against the Christian States to a greater extent and with more destructive violence than ever. Daily complaints of the outrages committed by his cruizers were brought to the Emperor by his subjects, both in Spain and Italy. All Christendom seemed to expect from him, as its greatest and most fortunate Prince, that he would put an end to this new and odious species of oppression. At the same time Muley Hascen, the exiled King of Tunis, finding none of the Mahometan Princes in Africa willing or able to assist him in recovering his throne, applied to Charles [April 21, 1535], as the only person who could assert his rights in opposition to such a formidable usurper. The Emperor, equally desirous of delivering his dominions from the dangerous neigh-

bourhood of Barbarossa; of appearing as the protector of an unfortunate Prince; and of acquiring the glory annexed, in that age, to every expedition against the Mahometans, readily concluded a treaty with Muley Hascen, and began to prepare for invading Tunis. Having made trial of his own abilities for war in the late campaign in Hungary, he was now become so fond of the military character that he determined to command, on this occasion, in person. The united strength of his dominions was called out upon an enterprise in which the Emperor was about to hazard his glory, and which drew the attention of all Europe. A Flemish fleet carried, from the ports of the Low Country, a body of German infantry<sup>62</sup>, the galleys of Naples and Sicily took on board the veteran bands of Italians and Spaniards, which had distinguished themselves by so many victories over the French; the Emperor himself embarked at Barcelona with the flower of the Spanish nobility, and was joined by a considerable squadron from Portugal, under the command of the Infant Don Lewis, the Empress's brother; Andrew Doria conducted his own galleys, the best appointed, at that time in Europe, and commanded by the most skilful officers: the Pope furnished all the assistance in his power towards such a pious enterprise; and the Order of Malta, the perpetual enemies of the Infidels, equipped a squadron, which, though small, was formidable by the valour of the knights who served on board it. The port of Cagliari, in Sardinia, was the general place of rendezvous. Doria was appointed High Admiral of the fleet; the command of the land forces under the Emperor was given to the Marquis de Guasto.

<sup>62</sup> Harri. Annales Brabant. i. 599.

On the sixteenth of July, the fleet, consisting of near five hundred vessels, having on board above thirty thousand regular troops, set sail from Cagliari, and after a prosperous navigation landed within sight of Tunis. Barbarossa having received early intelligence of the Emperor's immense armament, and suspecting its destination, prepared with equal prudence and vigour for the defence of his new conquest. He called in all his corsairs from their different stations; he drew from Algiers what forces could be spared; he dispatched messengers to all the African Princes, Moors, as well as Arabs, and, by representing Muley Hascen as an infamous apostate, prompted by ambition and revenge not only to become the vassal of a Christian Prince, but to conspire with him to extirpate the Mahometan faith, he inflamed those ignorant and bigoted chiefs to such a degree that they took arms as in a common cause. Twenty thousand horse, together with a great body of foot, soon assembled at Tunis; and, by a proper distribution of presents among them from time to time, Barbarossa kept the ardour which had brought them together from subsiding. But as he was too well acquainted with the enemy whom he had to oppose, to think that these light troops could resist the heavy armed cavalry and veteran infantry which composed the Imperial army, his chief confidence was in the strength of the Goletta, and in his body of Turkish soldiers, who were armed and disciplined after the European fashion. Six thousand of these, under the command of Sinan, a renegado Jew, the bravest and most experienced of all his corsairs, he threw into that fort, which the Emperor immediately invested. As Charles had the command of the sea, his camp was so plentifully supplied not only with the neces-

saries, but with all the luxuries of life, that Muley Hascen, who had not been accustomed to see war carried on with such order and magnificence, was filled with admiration of the Emperor's power. His troops, animated by his presence, and considering it as meritorious to shed their blood in such a pious cause, contended with each other for the posts of honour and danger. Three separate attacks were concerted, and the Germans, Spaniards, and Italians, having one of these committed to each of them, pushed them forward with the eager courage which national emulation inspires. Sinan displayed resolution and skill becoming the confidence which his master had put in him; the garrison performed the hard service on which they were ordered with great fortitude. But though he interrupted the besiegers by frequent sallies, though the Moors and Arabs alarmed the camp with their continual incursions; the breaches soon became so considerable towards the land, while the fleet battered those parts of the fortifications which it could approach with no less fury and success, that an assault being given on all sides at once, the place was taken by storm [July 25]. Sinan, with the remains of his garrison, retired, after an obstinate resistance, over a shallow part of the bay towards the city. By the reduction of the Goletta, the Emperor became master of Barbarossa's fleet, consisting of eighty-seven galleys and galliots, together with his arsenal, and three hundred cannon, mostly brass, which were planted on the ramparts; a prodigious number in that age, and a remarkable proof of the strength of the fort, as well as of the greatness of the corsair's power. The Emperor marched into the Goletta through the breach, and turning to Muley Hascen, who attended him, "Here," says he, "is a gate open to you, by

which you shall return to take possession of your dominions."

Barbarossa, though he felt the full weight of the blow which he had received, did not, however, lose courage, or abandon the defence of Tunis. But as the walls were of great extent, and extremely weak; as he could not depend on the fidelity of the inhabitants, nor hope that the Moors and Arabs would sustain the hardships of a siege, he boldly determined to advance with his army, which amounted to fifty thousand men<sup>66</sup>, towards the Imperial camp, and to decide the fate of his kingdom by the issue of a battle. This resolution he communicated to his principal officers; and representing to them the fatal consequences which might follow, if ten thousand Christian slaves, whom he had shut up in the citadel, should attempt to mutiny during the absence of the army, he proposed, as a necessary precaution for the public security, to massacre them without mercy before he began his march. They all approved warmly of his intention to fight; but mured as they were, in their piratical depredations, to scenes of bloodshed and cruelty, the barbarity of his proposal concerning the slaves filled them with horror; and Barbarossa, rather from the dread of irritating them, than swayed by motives of humanity, consented to spare the lives of the slaves.

By this time the Emperor had begun to advance towards Tunis; and though his troops suffered inconceivable hardships in their march over burning sands, destitute of water, and exposed to the intolerable heat of the sun, they soon came up with the enemy. The Moors and Arabs, emboldened by

<sup>66</sup> *Epistres des Princes, par Rascelli, p. 119, &c.*

their vast superiority in number, immediately rushed on to the attack with loud shouts, but their undisciplined courage could not stand the shock of regular battalions; and though Barbarossa, with admirable presence of mind, and by exposing his own person to the greatest dangers, endeavoured to rally them, the rout became so general, that he himself was hurried along with them in their flight back to the city. There he found every thing in the utmost confusion; some of the inhabitants flying with their families and effects; others ready to set open their gates to the conqueror; the Turkish soldiers preparing to retreat; and the citadel, which in such circumstances might have afforded him some refuge, already in the possession of the Christian captives. These unhappy men, rendered desperate by their situation, had laid hold on the opportunity which Barbarossa dreaded. As soon as his army was at some distance from the town, they gained two of their keepers, by whose assistance, knocking off their fetters, and bursting open their prisons, they overpowered the Turkish garrison, and turned the artillery of the fort against their former masters. Barbarossa, disappointed and enraged, exclaiming sometimes against the false compassion of his officers, and sometimes condemning his own imprudent compliance with their opinion, fled precipitately to Bona.

Meanwhile Charles, satisfied with the easy and almost bloodless victory which he had gained, and advancing slowly with the precaution necessary in an enemy's country, did not yet know the whole extent of his own good fortune. But at last, a messenger dispatched by the slaves acquainted him with the success of their noble effort for the recovery of

their liberty ; and at the same time deputies arrived from the town, in order to present him the keys of their gates, and to implore his protection from military violence. While he was deliberating concerning the proper measures for this purpose, the soldiers, fearing that they should be deprived of the booty which they had expected, rushed suddenly, and without orders, into the town, and began to kill and plunder without distinction. It was then too late to restrain their cruelty, their avarice, or licentiousness. All the outrages of which soldiers are capable in the fury of a storm, all the excesses of which men can be guilty when their passions are heightened by the contempt and hatred which difference in manners and religion inspires, were committed. Above thirty thousand of the innocent inhabitants perished on that unhappy day, and ten thousand were carried away as slaves. Muley Hascen took possession of a throne surrounded with carnage, abhorred by his subjects, on whom he had brought such calamities, and pitied even by those whose rashness had been the occasion of them. The Emperor lamented the fatal accident which had stained the lustre of his victory ; and amidst such a scene of horror there was but one spectacle that afforded him any satisfaction. Ten thousand Christian slaves, among whom were several persons of distinction, met him as he entered the town ; and, falling on their knees, thanked and blessed him as their deliverer.

At the same time that Charles accomplished his promise to the Moorish King, of reestablishing him in his dominions, he did not neglect what was necessary for bridling the power of the African corsairs, for the security of his own subjects, and for

the interest of the Spanish crown : in order to gain these ends, he concluded a treaty with Muley Hascen on the following conditions :—That he should hold the kingdom of Tunis in fee of the crown of Spain, and do homage to the Emperor as his liege lord ; that all the Christian slaves now within his dominions, of whatever nation, should be set at liberty without ransom ; that no subject of the Emperor's should for the future be detained in servitude ; that no Turkish corsair should be admitted into the ports of his dominions ; that free trade, together with the public exercise of the Christian religion, should be allowed to all the Emperor's subjects ; that the Emperor should not only retain the Goletta, but that all the other seaports in the kingdom which were fortified should be put into his hands ; that Muley Hascen should pay annually twelve thousand crowns for the subsistence of the Spanish garrison in the Goletta ; that he should enter into no alliance with any of the Emperor's enemies, and should present to him every year, as an acknowledgment of his vassalage, six Moorish horses, and as many hawks<sup>67</sup>. Having thus settled the affairs of Africa ; chastised the insolence of the corsairs ; secured a safe retreat for the ships of his subjects, and a proper station to his own fleets, on that coast from which he was most infested by piratical depredations ; Charles embarked again for Europe [Aug. 17], the tempestuous weather and sickness among his troops not permitting him to pursue Barbarossa<sup>68</sup>.

<sup>67</sup> Du Mont Corps Diplomat. ii. 128. Summote Hist. di Napoli, iv. 89.

<sup>68</sup> Joh. Etropii Diarium Expedition. Tunetana, ap. Scard. v. ii. p. 320, &c. Jovii Histor. lib. xxxiv. 153, &c. Sandov.

By this expedition, the merit of which seems to have been estimated in that age rather by the apparent generosity of the undertaking, the magnificence wherewith it was conducted, and the success which crowned it, than by the importance of the consequences that attended it, the Emperor attained a greater height of glory than at any other period of his reign. Twenty thousand slaves whom he freed from bondage, either by his arms or by his treaty with Muley Hascen<sup>69</sup>, each of whom he clothed and furnished with the means of returning to their respective countries, spread all over Europe the fame of their benefactor's munificence, extolling his power and abilities with the exaggeration flowing from gratitude and admiration. In comparison with him, the other monarchs of Europe made an inconsiderable figure. They seemed to be solicitous about nothing but their private and particular interests; while Charles, with an elevation of sentiment which became the chief Prince in Christendom, appeared to be concerned for the honour of the Christian name, and attentive to the public security and welfare.

ii. 154, &c. Vertot, *Hist. de Cheval. de Malthe*. *Epistres des Princes*, par Ruscelli, traduites par Belleforest, p. 119, 120, &c. Anton. Pontii Consentini *Hist. Belli adv. Barbar. ap. Matthæi Analecta*.

<sup>69</sup> Summonte *Hist. de Nap.* vol. iv. p. 103.

## BOOK VI.

1535.

UNFORTUNATELY for the reputation of Francis I. among his contemporaries, his conduct, at this juncture, appeared a perfect contrast to that of his rival, as he laid hold on the opportunity afforded him, by the Emperor's having turned his whole force against the common enemy of Christendom, to revive his pretensions in Italy, and to plunge Europe into a new war. The treaty of Cambray, as has been observed, did not remove the causes of enmity between the two contending Princes; it covered up, but did not extinguish, the flames of discord. Francis in particular, who waited with impatience for a proper occasion of recovering the reputation as well as the territories which he had lost, continued to carry on his negotiations in different courts against the Emperor, taking the utmost pains to heighten the jealousy which many Princes entertained of his power or designs, and to inspire the rest with the same suspicion and fear: among others, he applied to Francis Sforza, who, though indebted to Charles for the possession of the duchy of Milan, had received it on such hard conditions, as rendered him not only a vassal of the Empire, but a tributary dependant upon the Emperor. The honour of having married the Emperor's niece did not reconcile him to this ignominious state of subjection, which became so intolerable even to Sforza, though a weak and poor spirited Prince, that he listened with eagerness to the first proposals Francis made of

rescuing him from the yoke. These proposals were conveyed to him by Maraviglia, or Merveille as he is called by the French historians, a Milanese gentleman residing at Paris; and soon after, in order to carry on the negotiation with greater advantage, Merveille was sent to Milan, on pretence of visiting his relations, but with secret credentials from Francis as his envoy. In this character he was received by Sforza. But, notwithstanding his care to keep that circumstance concealed, Charles, suspecting or having received information of it, remonstrated and threatened in such a high tone, that the Duke and his ministers, equally intimidated, gave the world immediately a most infamous proof of their servile fear of offending the Emperor. As Merveille had neither the prudence nor the temper which the function wherein he was employed required, they artfully decoyed him into a quarrel, in which he happened to kill his antagonist, one of the Duke's domestics, and having instantly seized him, they ordered him to be tried for that crime, and to be beheaded [Dec. 1533]. Francis, no less astonished at this violation of a character held sacred among the most uncivilized nations than enraged at the insult offered to the dignity of his crown, threatened Sforza with the effects of his indignation, and complained to the Emperor, whom he considered as the real author of that unexampled outrage. But receiving no satisfaction from either, he appealed to all the Princes of Europe, and thought himself now entitled to take vengeance for an injury, which it would have been indecent and pusillanimous to let pass with impunity.

Being thus furnished with a pretext for beginning a war, on which he had already resolved, he multi-

plied his efforts in order to draw in other Princes to take part in the quarrel. But all his measures for this purpose were disconcerted by unforeseen events. After having sacrificed the honour of the royal family of France by the marriage of his son with Catharine of Medici, in order to gain Clement, the death of that Pontiff had deprived him of all the advantages which he expected to derive from his friendship.\* Paul, his successor, though attached by inclination to the Imperial interest, seemed determined to maintain the neutrality suitable to his character as the common father of the contending Princes. The King of England, occupied with domestic cares and projects, declined, for once, engaging in the affairs of the continent, and refused to assist Francis, unless he would imitate his example in throwing off the Papal supremacy. These disappointments led him to solicit, with greater earnestness, the aid of the Protestant Princes associated by the league of Smalkalde. That he might the more easily acquire their confidence, he endeavoured to accommodate himself to their predominant passion—zeal for their religious tenets. He affected a wonderful moderation with regard to the points in dispute; he permitted Bellay, his envoy in Germany, to explain his sentiments concerning some of the most important articles, in terms not far different from those used by the Protestants<sup>1</sup>; he even condescended to invite Melancthon, whose gentle manners and pacific spirit distinguished him among the Reformers, to visit Paris, that by his assistance he might concert the most proper measures for reconciling the contending sects which so

<sup>1</sup> Freheri Script. Rer. German. iii. 354, &c. Sleid. Hist. 178. 183. Seckend. lib. iii. 103.

unhappily divided the church<sup>2</sup>. These concessions must be considered rather as arts of policy than the result of conviction; for, whatever impression the new opinions in religion had made on his sisters, the Queen of Navarre and Duchess of Ferrara, the gaiety of Francis's own temper, and his love of pleasure, allowed him little leisure to examine theological controversies.

But soon after he lost all the fruits of this disingenuous artifice, by a step very inconsistent with his declarations to the German Princes. This step, however, the prejudices of the age, and the religious sentiments of his own subjects, rendered it necessary for him to take. His close union with the King of England, an excommunicated heretic; his frequent negotiations with the German Protestants; but, above all, his giving public audience to an envoy from Sultan Solyman, had excited violent suspicions concerning the sincerity of his attachment to religion. To have attacked the Emperor, who on all occasions made high pretensions to zeal in defence of the Catholic faith, and at the very juncture when he was preparing for his expedition against Barbarossa, which was then considered as a pious enterprise, could not have failed to confirm such unfavourable sentiments with regard to Francis, and called on him to vindicate himself by some extraordinary demonstration of his reverence for the established doctrines of the church. The indiscreet zeal of some of his subjects, who had imbibed the Protestant opinions, furnished him with such an occasion as he desired. They had affixed to the gates of the Louvre, and other public places, papers containing indecent reflections on the doctrines and

<sup>2</sup> Camerarii Vita Ph. Melancthonis, 12<sup>o</sup>. Hag. 1665, p. 12.

rites of the Popish church. Six of the persons concerned in this rash action were discovered and seized. The King, in order to avert the judgments which it was supposed their blasphemies might draw down upon the nation, appointed a solemn procession. The holy sacrament was carried through the city in great pomp; Francis walked uncovered before it, bearing a torch in his hand; the Princes of the blood supported the canopy over it; the nobles marched in order behind. In the presence of this numerous assembly, the King, accustomed to express himself on every subject in strong and animated language, declared that if one of his hands were infected with heresy, he would cut it off with the other, and would not spare even his own children, if found guilty of that crime. As a dreadful proof of his being in earnest, the six unhappy persons were publicly burnt before the procession was finished, with circumstances of the most shocking barbarity attending their execution<sup>1</sup>.

The Princes of the league of Smalkalde, filled with resentment and indignation at the cruelty with which their brethren were treated, could not conceive Francis to be sincere, when he offered to protect in Germany those very tenets which he persecuted with such rigour in his own dominions; so that all Bellay's art and eloquence in vindicating his master, or apologizing for his conduct, made but little impression upon them. They considered likewise, that the Emperor, who hitherto had never employed violence against the doctrines of the Reformers, nor even given them much molestation in their progress, was now bound by the agreement at Ratisbon, not to disturb such as had embraced the

<sup>1</sup> Bekam Comment. Rer. Gallie, 616 Sleid. Hist. 175, &c.

new opinions; and the Protestants wisely regarded this as a more certain and immediate security than the precarious and distant hopes with which Francis endeavoured to allure them. Besides, the manner in which he had behaved to his allies at the peace of Cambray was too recent to be forgotten, and did not encourage others to rely much on his friendship or generosity. Upon all these accounts the Protestant Princes refused to assist the French King in any hostile attempt against the Emperor. The Elector of Saxony, the most zealous among them, in order to avoid giving any umbrage to Charles, would not permit Melancthon to visit the court of France, although that Reformer, flattered perhaps by the invitation of so great a monarch, or hoping that his presence there might be of signal advantage to the Protestant cause, discovered a strong inclination to undertake the journey<sup>1</sup>.

But though none of the many Princes who envied or dreaded the power of Charles would second Francis's efforts in order to reduce and circumscribe it, he, nevertheless, commanded his army to advance towards the frontiers of Italy. As his sole pretext for taking arms was that he might chastise the Duke of Milan for his insolent and cruel breach of the law of nations, it might have been expected that the whole weight of his vengeance was to have fallen on his territories. But on a sudden, and at their very commencement, the operations of war took another direction. Charles, Duke of Savoy, one of the least active and able Princes of the line from which he descended, had married Beatrix of Portugal, the sister of the Empress. By her great talents

<sup>1</sup> Camerarii, Vita Melanc. 112, &c. 115. Seebeck, lib. iii. 107.

she soon acquired an absolute ascendant over her husband: and, proud of her affinity to the Emperor, or allured by the magnificent promises with which he flattered her ambition, she formed a union between the Duke and the Imperial court, extremely inconsistent with that neutrality which wise policy, as well as the situation of his dominions, had hitherto induced him to observe in all the quarrels between the contending monarchs. Francis was abundantly sensible of the distress to which he might be exposed, if, when he entered Italy, he should leave behind him the territories of a Prince devoted so obsequiously to the Emperor, that he had sent his eldest son to be educated in the court of Spain, as a kind of hostage for his fidelity. Clement the Seventh, who had represented this danger in a strong light during his interview with Francis at Marseilles, suggested to him, at the same time, the proper method of guarding against it, having advised him to begin his operations against the Milanese, by taking possession of Savoy and Piedmont, as the only certain way of securing a communication with his own dominions. Francis, highly irritated with the Duke on many accounts, particularly for having supplied the Constable Bourbon with the money that enabled him to levy the body of troops which ruined the French army in the fatal battle of Pavia, was not unwilling to let him now feel both how deeply he resented and how severely he could punish these injuries. Nor did he want several pretexts which gave some colour of equity to the violence that he intended. The territories of France and Savoy lying contiguous to each other, and intermingled in many places, various disputes, unavoidable in such a situation, subsisted between the

two sovereigns concerning the limits of their respective property; and besides, Francis, in right of his mother Louise of Savoy, had large claims upon the Duke her brother, for her share in their father's succession. Being unwilling, however, to begin hostilities without some cause of quarrel more specious than these pretensions, many of which were obsolete, and others dubious, he demanded permission to march through Piedmont in his way to the Milanese, hoping that the Duke, from an excess of attachment to the Imperial interest, might refuse this request, and thus give a greater appearance of justice to all his operations against him. But, if we may believe the historians of Savoy, who appear to be better informed with regard to this particular than those of France, the Duke readily, and with a good grace, granted what it was not in his power to deny, promising free passage to the French troops as was desired; so that Francis, as the only method now left of justifying the measures which he determined to take, was obliged to insist for full satisfaction with regard to every thing that either the crown of France or his mother Louise could demand of the house of Savoy<sup>2</sup>. Such an evasive answer as might have been expected being made to this requisition, the French army under the Admiral Brion poured at once into the Duke's territories at different places. The countries of Bresse and Bugey, united at that time to Savoy, were overrun in a moment. Most of the towns in the duchy of Savoy opened their gates at the approach of the enemy; a few which attempted to make resistance were easily taken; and before the end of the campaign the Duke saw himself stripped of all his dominions but the pro-

<sup>2</sup> *Histoire Généalogique de Savoye*, par Guichenon, 2 tom. vol. Lyon 1660, t. 639, &c.

vince of Piedmont, in which there were not many places in a condition to be defended.

To complete the Duke's misfortunes, the city of Geneva, the sovereignty of which he claimed, and in some degree possessed, threw off his yoke, and its revolt drew along with it the loss of the adjacent territories. Geneva was, at that time, an Imperial city; and though under the direct dominion of its own Bishops, and the remote sovereignty of the Dukes of Savoy, the form of its internal constitution was purely republican, being governed by syndics and a council chosen by the citizens. From these distinct and often clashing jurisdictions two opposite parties took their rise, and had long subsisted in the state: the one, composed of the advocates for the privileges of the community, assumed the name of *Eignotz*, or confederates in defence of liberty; and branded the other, which supported the episcopal or ducal prerogatives, with the name of *Mammelukes* or slaves. At length [1532], the Protestant opinions beginning to spread among the citizens, inspired such as embraced them with that bold enterprising spirit which always accompanied or was naturally produced by them in their first operations. As both the Duke and Bishop were from interest, from prejudice, and from political considerations, violent enemies of the Reformation, all the new converts joined with warmth the party of the *Eignotz*; and zeal for religion, mingling with the love of liberty, added strength to that generous passion. The rage and animosity of two factions, shut up within the same walls, occasioned frequent insurrections, which terminating mostly to the advantage of the friends of liberty, they daily became more powerful.

The Duke and Bishop, forgetting their ancient

contests about jurisdiction, had united against their common enemies, and each attacked them with his proper weapons. The Bishop excommunicated the people of Geneva as guilty of a double crime; of impiety in apostatizing from the established religion; and of sacrilege, in invading the rights of his see. The Duke attacked them as rebels against their lawful Prince, and attempted to render himself master of the city, first by surprise and then by open force [1534]. The citizens, despising the thunder of the Bishop's censures, boldly asserted their independence against the Duke; and partly by their own valour, partly by the powerful assistance which they received from the canton of Berne, together with some small supplies both of men and money secretly furnished by the King of France, they defeated all his attempts. Not satisfied with having repulsed him, or with remaining always upon the defensive themselves, they now took advantage of the Duke's inability to resist them, while overwhelmed by the armies of France, and seized several castles and places of strength which he possessed in the neighbourhood of Geneva; thus delivering the city from those odious monuments of its former subjection, and rendering the public liberty more secure for the future. At the same time the canton of Berne invaded and conquered the Pays de Vaud, to which it had some pretensions. The canton of Friburgh, though zealously attached to the Catholic religion, and having no subject of contest with the Duke, laid hold on part of the spoils of that unfortunate Prince. A great portion of these conquests or usurpations being still retained by the two cantons, add considerably to their power, and have become the most valuable part of their territories.

Geneva, notwithstanding many schemes and enterprises of the Dukes of Savoy to reestablish their dominion over it, still keeps possession of its independence; and, in consequence of that blessing, has attained a degree of consideration, wealth, and elegance, which it could not otherwise have reached<sup>6</sup>.

Amidst such a succession of disastrous events, the Duke of Savoy had no other resource but the Emperor's protection, which upon his return from Tunis he demanded with the most earnest importunity; and as his misfortunes were occasioned chiefly by his attachment to the Imperial interest, he had a just title to immediate assistance. Charles, however, was not in a condition to support him with that vigour and despatch which the exigency of his affairs called for. Most of the troops employed in the African expedition, having been raised for that service alone, were disbanded as soon as it was finished; the veteran forces under Antonio de Leyva were hardly sufficient for the defence of the Milanese; and the Emperor's treasury was entirely drained by his extraordinary efforts against the Infidels.

But the death of Francis Sforza [Oct. 24], occasioned, according to some historians, by the terror of a French invasion, which had twice been fatal to his family, afforded the Emperor full leisure to prepare for action. By this unexpected event the nature of the war and the causes of discord were totally changed. Francis's first pretext for taking arms,

<sup>6</sup> Hist. de la Ville de Geneve, par Spon, 12mo. Utr. 1685, p. 99. Hist. de la Reformation de Suisse, par Rouchat, Gen. 1728, tom. iv. p. 294, &c. tom. v. p. 216, &c. Mem. de Bel Jar, 181.

in order to chastise Sforza for the insult offered to the dignity of his crown, was at once cut off; but as that Prince died without issue, all Francis's rights to the duchy of Milan, which he had yielded only to Sforza and his posterity, returned back to him in full force. As the recovery of the Milanese was the favourite object of that monarch, he instantly renewed his claim to it; and if he had supported his pretensions by ordering the powerful army quartered in Savoy to advance without losing a moment towards Milan, he could hardly have failed to secure the important point of possession. But Francis, who became less enterprising as he advanced in years, and who was overawed at some times into an excess of caution by the remembrance of his past misfortunes, endeavoured to establish his rights by negotiation, not by arms; and from a timid moderation, fatal in all great affairs, neglected to improve the favourable opportunity which presented itself. Charles was more decisive in his operations, and, in quality of sovereign, took possession of the duchy as a vacant fief of the Empire. While Francis endeavoured to explain and assert his title to it by arguments and memorials, or employed various arts in order to reconcile the Italian powers to the thoughts of his regaining footing in Italy, his rival was silently taking effectual steps to prevent it. The Emperor, however, was very careful not to discover too early an intention of this kind; but, seeming to admit the equity of Francis's claim, he appeared solicitous only about giving him possession in such a manner as might not disturb the peace of Europe, or overturn the balance of power in Italy, which the politicians of that country were so desirous of preserving. By this artifice he deceived

Francis, and gained so much confidence with the rest of Europe, that, almost without incurring any suspicion, he involved the affair in new difficulties, and protracted the negotiations at pleasure. Sometimes he proposed to grant the investiture of Milan to the Duke of Orleans, Francis's second son; sometimes to the Duke of Angouleme, his third son: as the views and inclinations of the French court varied, he transferred his choice alternately from the one to the other, with such profound and well conducted dissimulation, that neither Francis nor his ministers seem to have penetrated his real intention; and all military operations were entirely suspended, as if nothing had remained but to enter quietly into possession of what they demanded.

1536.] During the interval of leisure gained in this manner, Charles, on his return from Tunis, assembled the states both of Sicily and Naples; and as they thought themselves greatly honoured by the presence of their sovereign, and were no less pleased with the apparent disinterestedness of his expedition into Africa than dazzled by the success which had attended his arms, he prevailed on them to vote him such liberal subsidies as were seldom granted in that age. This enabled him to recruit his veteran troops, to levy a body of Germans, and to take every other proper precaution for executing or supporting the measures on which he had determined. Bellay, the French envoy in Germany, having discovered the intention of raising troops in that country, notwithstanding all the prettexts employed in order to conceal it, first alarmed his master with this evident proof of the Emperor's insincerity<sup>7</sup>. But Francis was so possessed at that time with the rage of nego-

<sup>7</sup> Mém. de Bellay, 192.

tiation, in all the artifices and refinements of which his rival far surpassed him, that instead of beginning his military operations, and pushing them with vigour, or seizing the Milanese before the Imperial army was assembled, he satisfied himself with making new offers to the Emperor, in order to procure the investiture by his voluntary deed. His offers were, indeed, so liberal and advantageous, that if ever Charles had intended to grant his demand, he could not have rejected them with decency. He dexterously eluded them by declaring that, until he consulted the Pope in person, he could not take his final resolution with regard to a point which so nearly concerned the peace of Italy. By this evasion he gained some further time for ripening the schemes which he had in view.

The Emperor at last advanced towards Rome, and made his public entry into that city with extraordinary pomp [April 6]; but it being found necessary to remove the ruins of an ancient temple of Peace, in order to widen one of the streets through which the cavalcade had to pass, all the historians take notice of this trivial circumstance, and they are fond to interpret it is an omen of the bloody war that followed. Charles, it is certain, had by this time banished all thoughts of peace; and at last threw off the mask, with which he had so long covered his designs from the court of France, by a declaration of his sentiments no less singular than explicit. The French ambassadors having in their master's name demanded a definitive reply to his propositions concerning the investiture of Milan, Charles promised to give it next day in presence of the Pope and Cardinals assembled in full consistory. These being accordingly met, and all the foreign

ambassadors invited to attend, the Emperor stood up, and, addressing himself to the Pope, expatiated for some time on the sincerity of his own wishes for the peace of Christendom, as well as his abhorrence of war, the miseries of which he enumerated at great length with studied and elaborate oratory; he complained that all his endeavours to preserve the tranquillity of Europe had hitherto been defeated by the restless and unjust ambition of the French King; that even during his minority he had proofs of the unfriendly and hostile intentions of that monarch; that afterwards he had openly attempted to wrest from him the Imperial crown, which belonged to him by a title no less just than natural; that he had next invaded his kingdom of Navarre; that, not satisfied with this, he had attacked his territories as well as those of his allies both in Italy and the Low Countries; that when the valour of the Imperial troops, rendered irresistible by the protection of the Almighty, had checked his progress, ruined his armies, and seized his person, he continued to pursue by deceit what he had undertaken with injustice; that he had violated every article in the treaty of Madrid, to which he owed his liberty, and as soon as he returned to his dominions took measures for rekindling the war which that pacification had happily extinguished; that when new misfortunes compelled him to sue again for peace at Cambray, he concluded and observed it with equal insincerity; that soon after he had formed dangerous connexions with the heretical Princes in Germany, and incited them to disturb the tranquillity of the Empire; that now he had driven the Duke of Savoy, a Prince married to a sister of the Empress, and joined in close alliance with Spain, out of the greater part of

his territories; that after injuries so often repeated, and amidst so many sources of discord, all hope of amity or concord became desperate: and though he himself was still willing to grant the investiture of Milan to one of the Princes of France, there was little probability of that event taking place, as Francis, on the one hand, would not consent to what was necessary for securing the tranquillity of Europe, nor, on the other, could he think it reasonable or safe to give a rival the unconditional possession of all that he demanded. "Let us not, however," added he, "continue wantonly to shed the blood of our innocent subjects; let us decide the quarrel man to man, with what arms he pleases to choose, in our shirts, on an island, a bridge, or aboard a galley moored in a river; let the duchy of Burgundy be put in deposit on his part, and that of Milan on mine; these shall be the prize of the conqueror; and after that let the united forces of Germany, Spain, and France be employed to humble the power of the Turk, and to extirpate heresy out of Christendom. But if he, by declining this method of terminating our differences, renders war inevitable, nothing shall divert me from prosecuting it to such extremity, as shall reduce one of us to be the poorest gentleman in his own dominions. Nor do I fear that it will be on me this misfortune shall fall; I enter upon action with the fairest prospect of success; the justice of my cause, the union of my subjects, the number and valour of my troops, the experience and fidelity of my generals, all combine to ensure it. Of all these advantages the King of France is destitute; and were my resources no more certain, and my hopes of victory no better founded than his, I would instantly throw myself

at his feet, and with folded hands, and a rope about my neck, implore his mercy<sup>1</sup>."

This long harangue the Emperor delivered with an elevated voice, a haughty tone, and the greatest vehemence of expression and gesture. The French ambassadors, who did not fully comprehend his meaning, as he spake in the Spanish tongue, were totally disconcerted, and at a loss how they should answer such an unexpected invective: when one of them began to vindicate his master's conduct, Charles interposed abruptly, and would not permit him to proceed. The Pope, without entering into any particular detail, satisfied himself with a short but pathetic recommendation of peace, together with an offer of employing his sincere endeavours in order to procure that blessing to Christendom; and the assembly broke up in the greatest astonishment at the extraordinary scene which had been exhibited. In no part of his conduct, indeed, did Charles ever deviate so widely from his general character. Instead of that prudent recollection, that composed and regular deportment so strictly attentive to decorum, and so admirably adapted to conceal his own passions, for which he was at all other times conspicuous, he appears on this occasion before one of the most august assemblies in Europe, boasting of his own power and exploits with insolence; inveighing against his enemy with indecency; and challenging him to combat with an ostentatious valour, more becoming a champion in romance than the first monarch in Christendom. But the well known and powerful operation of continued prosperity, as well as of exaggerated praise, even upon the firmest minds, sufficiently accounts

<sup>1</sup> Bellay, 199. Sandov. Hist. del Emper. ii. 226.

for this seeming inconsistency. After having compelled Solyman to retreat, and having stripped Barbarossa of a kingdom, Charles began to consider his arms as invincible. He had been entertained, ever since his return from Africa, with repeated scenes of triumphs and public rejoicings; the orators and poets of Italy, the most elegant at that time in Europe, had exhausted their genius in panegyric on his conduct and merit, to which the astrologers added magnificent promises of a more splendid fortune still in store. Intoxicated with all these, he forgot his usual reserve and moderation, and was unable to restrain this extravagant sally of vanity, which became the more remarkable by being both so uncommon and so public.

He himself seems to have been immediately sensible of the impropriety of his behaviour; and when the French ambassadors demanded next day a more clear explanation of what he had said concerning the combat, he told them that they were not to consider his proposal as a formal challenge to their master, but as an expedient for preventing bloodshed; he endeavoured to soften several expressions in his discourse; and spoke in terms full of respect towards Francis. But though this slight apology was far from being sufficient to remove the offence which had been given, Francis, by an unaccountable infatuation, continued to negotiate, as if it had still been possible to bring their differences to a period by an amicable composition. Charles, finding him so eager to run into the snare, favoured the deception, and, by seeming to listen to his proposals, gained further time to prepare for the execution of his own designs<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Mém. de Bellay, 205, &c.

At last the Imperial army assembled on the frontiers of the Milanese, to the amount of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, while that of France encamped near Vercelli in Piedmont, being greatly inferior in number, and weakened by the departure of a body of Swiss, whom Charles artfully persuaded the popish cantons to recall, that they might not serve against the Duke of Savoy, their ancient ally. The French General, not daring to risk a battle, retired as soon as the Imperialists advanced. The Emperor put himself at the head of his forces [May 6], which the Marquis del Guasto, the Duke of Alva, and Ferdinand de Gonzago, commanded under him, though the supreme direction of the whole was committed to Antonio de Leyva, whose abilities and experience justly entitled him to that distinction. Charles soon discovered his intention not to confine his operations to the recovery of Piedmont and Savoy, but to push forward and invade the southern provinces of France. This scheme he had long meditated, and had long been taking measures for executing it with such vigour as might ensure success. He had remitted large sums to his sister, the Governess of the Low Countries, and to his brother, the King of the Romans, instructing them to levy all the forces in their power, in order to form two separate bodies, the one to enter France on the side of Picardy, the other on the side of Champagne; while he, with the main army, fell upon the opposite frontier of the kingdom. Trusting to these vast preparations, he thought it impossible that Francis could resist so many unexpected attacks on such different quarters; and began his enterprise with such confidence of its happy issue, that he desired Joynis the histo-

man to make a large provision of paper, sufficient to record the victories which he was going to obtain.

His ministers and generals, instead of entertaining the same sanguine hopes, represented to him, in the strongest terms, the danger of leading his troops so far from his own territories, to such a distance from his magazines, and into provinces which did not yield sufficient subsistence for their own inhabitants. They entreated him to consider the inexhaustible resources of France in maintaining a defensive war, and the active zeal with which a gallant nobility would serve a Prince whom they loved, in repelling the enemies of their country; they recalled to his remembrance the fatal miscarriage of Bourbon and Pescara, when they ventured upon the same enterprise under circumstances which seemed as certain to promise success; the Marquis del Guasto, in particular, fell on his knees, and conjured him to abandon the undertaking as desperate. But many circumstances combined in leading Charles to disregard all their remonstrances. He could seldom be brought on any occasion, to depart from a resolution which he had once taken; he was too apt to underrate and despise the talents of his rival the King of France, because they differed so widely from his own; he was blinded by the presumption which accompanies prosperity, and relied, perhaps, in some degree, on the prophecies which predicted the increase of his own grandeur. He not only adhered obstinately to his own plan, but determined to advance towards France without waiting for the reduction of any part of Piedmont, except such towns as were absolutely necessary for preserving his communication with the Milanese.

The Marquis de Saluces, to whom Francis had

intrusted the command of a small body of troops left for the defence of Piedmont, rendered this more easy than Charles had any reason to expect. That nobleman, educated in the court of France, distinguished by continual marks of the King's favour, and honoured so lately with a charge of such importance, suddenly, and without any provocation or pretext of disgust, revolted from his benefactor. His motives to this treacherous action were as childish as the deed itself was base. Being strongly possessed with a superstitious faith in divination and astrology, he believed with full assurance, that the fatal period of the French nation was at hand; that on its ruins the Emperor would establish a universal monarchy; that therefore he ought to follow the dictates of prudence, in attaching himself to his rising fortune, and could incur no blame for deserting a Prince whom Heaven had devoted to destruction<sup>10</sup>. His treason became still more odious, by his employing that very authority with which Francis had invested him, in order to open the kingdom to his enemies. Whatever measures were proposed or undertaken by the officers under his command for the defence of their conquests, he rejected, or defeated. Whatever properly belonged to himself, as commander-in-chief, to provide or perform for that purpose, he totally neglected. In this manner he rendered towns even of the greatest consequence untenable, by leaving them destitute either of provisions, or ammunition, or artillery, or a sufficient garrison; and the Imperialists must have reduced Piedmont in as short a time as was necessary to march through it, if Montpezat, the Governor of Fossano, had not by an extraordinary effort of cou-

<sup>10</sup> Bellay, 222 a. 246 b.

rage and military conduct, detained them almost a month before that inconsiderable place.

By this meritorious and seasonable service, he gained his master sufficient time for assembling his forces, and for concerting a system of defence against a danger which he now saw to be inevitable. Francis fixed upon the only proper and effectual plan for defeating the invasion of a powerful enemy; and his prudence in choosing this plan, as well as his perseverance in executing it, deserves the greater praise, as it was equally contrary to his own natural temper, and to the genius of the French nation. He determined to remain altogether upon the defensive; never to hazard a battle, or even a great skirmish, without certainty of success; to fortify his camps in a regular manner; to throw garrisons only into towns of great strength; to deprive the enemy of subsistence, by laying waste the country before them; and to save the whole kingdom by sacrificing one of its provinces. The execution of this plan he committed entirely to the Marechal Montmorency, who was the author of it; a man wonderfully fitted by nature for such a trust. Haughty, severe, confident in his own abilities, and despising those of other men; incapable of being diverted from any resolution by remonstrances or entreaties; and, in prosecuting any scheme, regardless alike of love or of pity.

Montmorency made choice of a strong camp under the walls of Avignon, at the confluence of the Rhone and the Durance, one of which plentifully supplied his troops with all necessaries from the inland provinces, and the other covered his camp on that side where it was most probable the enemy would approach. He laboured with un-

wearied industry to render the fortifications of this camp impregnable, and assembled there a considerable army, though greatly inferior to that of the enemy; while the King with another body of troops encamped at Valence higher up the Rhone. Marseilles and Arles were the only towns he thought it necessary to defend; the former, in order to retain the command of the sea; the latter, as the barrier of the province of Languedoc; and each of these he furnished with numerous garrisons of his best troops, commanded by officers on whose fidelity and valour he could rely. The inhabitants of the other towns, as well as of the open country, were compelled to abandon their houses, and were conducted to the mountains, to the camp at Avignon, or to the inland provinces. The fortifications of such places as might have afforded shelter or defence to the enemy were thrown down. Corn, forage, and provisions of every kind, were carried away or destroyed; all the mills and ovens were ruined, and the wells filled up or rendered useless. The devastation extended from the Alps to Marseilles, and from the sea to the confines of Dauphiné; nor does history afford any instance among civilized nations, in which this cruel expedient for the public safety was employed with the same rigour.

At length the Emperor arrived with the van of his army on the frontiers of Provence, and was still so possessed with confidence of success, that during a few days, when he was obliged to halt until the rest of his troops came up, he began to divide his future conquests among his officers; and, as a new incitement to serve him with zeal, gave them liberal promises of offices, lands, and honours in France<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> Bellay, 266 a.

The face of desolation, however, which presented itself to him, when he entered the country, began to damp his hopes; and convinced him that a monarch, who, in order to distress an enemy, had voluntarily ruined one of his richest provinces, would defend the rest with desperate obstinacy. Nor was it long before he became sensible that Francis's plan of defence was as prudent as it appeared to be extraordinary. His fleet, on which Charles chiefly depended for subsistence, was prevented for some time by contrary winds, and other accidents to which naval operations are subject, from approaching the French coast; even after its arrival, it afforded at best a precarious and scanty supply to such a numerous body of troops<sup>12</sup>; nothing was to be found in the country itself for their support; nor could they draw any considerable aid from the dominions of the Duke of Savoy, exhausted already by maintaining two great armies. The Emperor was no less embarrassed how to employ than how to subsist his forces; for though he was now in possession of almost an entire province, he could not be said to have the command of it, while he held only defenceless towns; and while the French, besides their camp at Avignon, continued masters of Marseilles and Arles. At first he thought of attacking the camp, and of terminating the war by one decisive blow; but skilful officers, who were appointed to view it, declared the attempt to be utterly impracticable. He then gave orders to invest Marseilles and Arles, hoping that the French would quit their advantageous post in order to relieve them: but Montmorency, adhering firmly to his plan, remained immovable at Avignon, and the Imperialists met

<sup>12</sup> Sandov. ii. 231.

with such a warm reception from the garrisons of both towns, that they relinquished their enterprises with loss and disgrace. As a last effort, the Emperor advanced once more towards Avignon, though with an army harassed by the perpetual incursions of small parties of the French light troops, weakened by diseases, and dispirited by disasters, which seemed the more intolerable because they were unexpected.

During these operations, Montmorency found himself exposed to greater danger from his own troops than from the enemy; and their inconsiderate valour went near to have precipitated the kingdom into those calamities, which he with such industry and caution had endeavoured to avoid. Unaccustomed to behold an enemy ravaging their country almost without control; impatient of such long inaction; unacquainted with the slow and remote but certain effects of Montmorency's system of defence; the French wished for a battle with no less ardour than the Imperialists. They considered the conduct of their General as a disgrace to their country. His caution they imputed to timidity; his circumspection to want of spirit; and the constancy with which he pursued his plan to obstinacy or pride. These reflections, whispered at first among the soldiers and subalterns, were adopted, by degrees, by officers of higher rank; and as many of them envied Montmorency's favour with the King, and more were dissatisfied with his harsh disgusting manner, the discontent soon became great in his camp, which was filled with general murmurings and almost open complaints against his measures. Montmorency, on whom the sentiments of his own troops made as little impression as the

insults of the enemy, adhered steadily to his system; though, in order to reconcile the army to his maxims, no less contrary to the genius of the nation than to the ideas of war among undisciplined troops, he assumed an unusual affability in his deportment, and often explained, with great condescension, the motives of his conduct, the advantages which had already resulted from it, and the certain success with which it would be attended. At last, Francis joined his army at Avignon, which, having received several reinforcements, he now considered as of strength sufficient to face the enemy. As he had put no small constraint upon himself, in consenting that his troops should remain so long upon the defensive, it can hardly be doubted but that his fondness for what was daring and splendid, added to the impatience both of officers and soldiers, would at last have overruled Montmorency's salutary caution<sup>11</sup>.

Happily the retreat of the enemy delivered the kingdom from the danger which any rash resolution might have occasioned. The Emperor, after spending two inglorious months in Provence, without having performed any thing suitable to his vast preparations, or that could justify the confidence with which he had boasted of his own power, found that, besides Antonio de Leyva, and other officers of distinction, he had lost one-half of his troops by diseases or by famine; and that the rest were in no condition to struggle any longer with calamities by which so many of their companions had perished. Necessity, therefore, extorted from him orders to retire; and though he was some time in motion before the French suspected his intention, a body of light troops, assisted by crowds of peasants, eager

<sup>11</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, 269, &c. 312, &c.

to be revenged on those who had brought such desolation on their country, hung upon the rear of the Imperialists, and, by seizing every favourable opportunity of attacking them, threw them often into confusion. The road by which they fled, for they pursued their march with such disorder and precipitation that it scarcely deserves the name of a retreat, was strewed with arms or baggage, which, in their hurry and trepidation they had abandoned, and covered with the sick, the wounded, and the dead; insomuch that Martin Bellay, an eyewitness of their calamities, endeavours to give his readers some idea of them, by comparing their miseries to those which the Jews suffered from the victorious and destructive arms of the Romans<sup>14</sup>. If Montmorency, at this critical moment, had advanced with all his forces, nothing could have saved the whole Imperial army from utter ruin. But that General, by standing so long and so obstinately on the defensive, had become cautious to excess; his mind, tenacious of any bent it had once taken, could not assume a contrary one as suddenly as the change of circumstances required; and he still continued to repeat his favourite maxims, that it was more prudent to allow the lion to escape, than to drive him to despair, and that a bridge of gold should be made for a retreating enemy.

The Emperor, having conducted the shattered remains of his troops to the frontiers of Milan, and appointed the Marquis del Guasto to succeed Leyva in the government of that duchy, set out for Genoa. As he could not bear to expose himself to the scorn of the Italians, after such a sad reverse of fortune; and did not choose, under his present circumstances,

<sup>14</sup> *M. m. de Bellay*, 316. *Sandov. Hist. del Emper.* ii. 232.

to revisit those cities through which he had so lately passed in triumph for one conquest, and in certain expectation of another; he embarked directly for Spain [November]<sup>15</sup>.

Nor was the progress of his arms on the opposite frontier of France such as to alleviate, in any degree, the losses which he had sustained in Provence. Bellay, by his address and intrigues, had prevailed on so many of the German Princes to withdraw the contingent of troops which they had furnished to the King of the Romans, that he was obliged to lay aside all thoughts of his intended irruption into Champagne. Though a powerful army levied in the Low Countries entered Picardy, which they found but feebly guarded, while the strength of the kingdom was drawn towards the south; yet the nobility, taking arms with their usual alacrity, supplied by their spirit the defects of the King's preparations, and defended Peronne, and other towns which were attacked, with such vigour, as obliged the enemy to retire, without making any conquest of importance<sup>16</sup>.

Thus Francis, by the prudence of his own measures, and by the union and valour of his subjects, rendered abortive those vast efforts in which his rival had almost exhausted his whole force. As this humbled the Emperor's arrogance no less than it checked his power, he was mortified more sensibly on this occasion than on any other, during the course of the long contests between him and the French monarch.

One circumstance alone embittered the joy with which the success of the campaign inspired Francis. That was the death of the Dauphin, his eldest son, a Prince of great hopes, and extremely beloved by

<sup>15</sup> *John Hist. lib. xxv. p. 174, &c.* <sup>16</sup> *Mém. de Bellay, 31b, &c.*

the people on account of his resemblance to his father. This happening suddenly was imputed to poison, not only by the vulgar, fond of ascribing the death of illustrious personages to extraordinary causes, but by the King and his ministers. The Count de Montecuculi, an Italian nobleman, cup-bearer to the Dauphin, being seized on suspicion, and put to the torture, openly charged the Imperial generals Gonzaga and Leyva with having instigated him to the commission of that crime : he even threw out some indirect and obscure accusations against the Emperor himself. At a time when all France was exasperated to the utmost against Charles, this uncertain and extorted charge was considered as an incontestable proof of guilt ; while the confidence with which both he and his officers asserted their own innocence, together with the indignation, as well as horror, which they expressed on their being supposed capable of such a detestable action, were little attended to, and less regarded<sup>17</sup>. It is evident, however, that the Emperor could have no inducement to perpetrate such a crime, as Francis was still in the vigour of life himself, and had two sons, beside the Dauphin, grown up almost to the age of manhood. That single consideration, without mentioning the Emperor's general character, unblemished by the imputation of any deed resembling this in atrocity, is more than sufficient to counterbalance the weight of a dubious testimony uttered during the anguish of torture<sup>18</sup>. According to the most unprejudiced historians, the Dauphin's death was occasioned by his having drunk too freely of cold water after overheating himself at tennis ; and this account, as it is the most simple, is likewise the

<sup>17</sup> Mém. de Bellay, 289. <sup>18</sup> Sandov. Hist. del Emper. u. 231.

most credible. But if his days were cut short by poison, it is not improbable that the Emperor conjectured rightly, when he affirmed that it had been administered by the direction of Catharine of Medici, in order to secure the crown to the Duke of Orleans, her husband<sup>19</sup>. The advantages resulting to her by the Dauphin's death, were obvious as well as great; nor did her boundless and daring ambition ever recoil from any action necessary towards attaining the objects which she had in view.

1537.] Next year opened with a transaction very uncommon, but so incapable of producing any effect, that it would not deserve to be mentioned, if it were not a striking proof of the personal animosity which mingled itself in all the hostilities between Charles and Francis, and which often betrayed them into such indecencies towards each other, as lessened the dignity of both. Francis, accompanied by the peers and princes of the blood, having taken his seat in the parliament of Paris with the usual solemnities, the advocate-general appeared; and after accusing Charles of Austria (for so he affected to call the Emperor) of having violated the treaty of Cambray, by which he was absolved from the homage due to the crown of France for the counties of Artois and Flanders; insisted that, this treaty being now void, he was still to be considered as a vassal of the crown, and by consequence had been guilty of rebellion in taking arms against his sovereign; and therefore he demanded that Charles should be summoned to appear in person, or by his counsel, before the parliament of Paris, his legal judges, to answer for this crime. The request was granted; a herald repaired to the frontiers of Pi-

<sup>19</sup> Vera y Zuniga Vida de Carlo V. p. 75.

cantly, and summoned him with the accustomed formalities to appear against a day prefixed. That term being expired, and no person appearing in his name, the parliament gave judgment, "That Charles of Austria had forfeited by rebellion and contumacy those fiefs; declared Flanders and Artois to be reunited to the crown of France;" and ordered their decree for this purpose to be published by sound of trumpet on the frontiers of these provinces<sup>20</sup>.

Soon after this vain display of his resentment, rather than of his power, Francis marched towards the Low Countries, as if he had intended to execute the sentence which his parliament had pronounced, and to seize those territories which it had awarded to him. As the Queen of Hungary, to whom her brother the Emperor had committed the government of that part of his dominions, was not prepared for so early a campaign, he at first made some progress, and took several towns of importance. But being obliged soon to leave his army, in order to superintend the other operations of war, the Flemings, having assembled a numerous army, not only recovered most of the places which they had lost, but began to make conquests in their turn. At last they invested Terouenne; and the Duke of Orleans, now Dauphin, by the Death of his brother, and Montmorency, whom Francis had honoured with the Constable's sword, as the reward of his great services during the former campaign, determined to hazard a battle in order to relieve it. While they were advancing for this purpose, and within a few miles of the enemy, they were stopped short by the arrival of a herald from the Queen of Hungary,

<sup>20</sup> *Lettres et Mémoires d'Etat*, par Rubier, 2, tom. Blois, 1607, tom. 1. p. 1.

acquainting him that a suspension of arms was now agreed upon.

This unexpected event was owing to the zealous endeavours of the two sisters, the Queens of France and of Hungary, who had long laboured to reconcile the contending monarchs. The war in the Netherlands had laid waste the frontier provinces of both countries, without any real advantage to either. The French and Flemings equally regretted the interruption of their commerce, which was beneficial to both. Charles, as well as Francis, who had each strained to the utmost in order to support the vast operations of the former campaign, found that they could not now keep armies on foot in this quarter without weakening their operations in Piedmont, where both wished to push the war with the greatest vigour. All these circumstances facilitated the negotiations of the two Queens; a truce was concluded [July 30], to continue in force for ten months, but it extended no further than the Low Countries<sup>21</sup>.

In Piedmont the war was still prosecuted with great animosity; and though neither Charles nor Francis could make the powerful efforts to which this animosity prompted them, they continued to exert themselves like combatants, whose rancour remains after their strength is exhausted. Towns were alternately lost and retaken; skirmishes were fought every day; and much blood was shed, without any action that gave a decided superiority to either side. At last, the two Queens, determining not to leave unfinished the good work which they had begun, prevailed, by their importunate sollicita-

<sup>21</sup> *Mémoires de Ribier, 66.*

tions, the one on her brother, the other on her husband, to consent also to a truce in Piedmont for three months. The conditions of it were, That each should keep possession of what was in his hands, and, after leaving garrisons in the towns, should withdraw his army out of the province; and that plenipotentiaries should be appointed to adjust all matters in dispute by a final treaty<sup>22</sup>.

The powerful motives which inclined both Princes to this accommodation, have been often mentioned. The expenses of the war had far exceeded the sums which their revenues were capable of supplying, nor durst they venture upon any great addition to the impositions then established, as subjects had not yet learned to bear with patience the immense burdens to which they have become accustomed in modern times. The Emperor, in particular, though he had contracted debts which in that age appeared prodigious<sup>23</sup>, had it not in his power to pay the large arrears long due to his army. At the same time, he had no prospect of deriving any aid, in money or men, either from the Pope or Venetians, though he had employed promises and threats alternately, in order to procure it. But he found the former not only fixed in his resolution of adhering steadily to the neutrality which he had always declared to be suitable to his character, but passionately desirous of bringing about a peace. He perceived that the latter were still intent on their ancient object of holding the balance even between the rivals, and solicitous not to throw too great a weight into either scale.

What made a deeper impression on Charles than

<sup>22</sup> *Memoires de Ribier*, 62.

<sup>23</sup> *Ribier*, i. 294.

all these was the dread of the Turkish arms, which, by his league with Solyman, Francis had drawn upon him. Though Francis, without the assistance of a single ally, had a war to maintain against an enemy greatly superior in power to himself, yet so great was the horror of Christians, in that age, at any union with Infidels, which they considered not only as dishonourable but profane, that it was long before he could be brought to avail himself of the obvious advantages resulting from such a confederacy. Necessity at last surmounted his delicacy and scruples. Towards the close of the preceding year, La Forest, a secret agent at the Ottoman Porte, had concluded a treaty with the Sultan, whereby Solyman engaged to invade the kingdom of Naples during the next campaign, and to attack the King of the Romans in Hungary with a powerful army while Francis undertook to enter the Milanese at the same time with a proper force. Solyman had punctually performed what was incumbent on him. Barbarossa, with a great fleet, appeared on the coast of Naples; filled that kingdom, from which all the troops had been drawn towards Piedmont with consternation; landed, without resistance, near Taranto: obliged Castro, a place of some strength, to surrender; plundered the adjacent country, and was taking measures for securing and extending his conquests, when the unexpected arrival of Doria, together with the Pope's galleys and a squadron of the Venetian fleet, made it prudent for him to retire. In Hungary the progress of the Turks was more formidable. Mahmet, their General, after gaining several small advantages, defeated the Germans in a great battle at Essek on

the Drave<sup>24</sup>. Happily for Christendom, it was not in Francis's power to execute with equal exactness what he had stipulated; nor could he assemble, at this juncture, an army strong enough to penetrate into the Milanese. By this he failed in recovering possession of that duchy; and Italy was not only saved from the calamities of a new war, but from feeling the desolating rage of the Turkish arms, as an addition to all that it had suffered<sup>25</sup>. As the Emperor knew that he could not long resist the efforts of two such powerful confederates, nor could expect that the same fortunate accidents would concur a second time to deliver Naples, and to preserve the Milanese; as he foresaw, that the Italian states would not only tax him loudly with insatiable ambition, but might even turn their arms against him, if he should be so regardless of their danger as obstinately to protract the war, he thought it necessary, both for his safety and reputation, to give his consent to a truce. Nor was Francis willing to sustain all the blame of obstructing the reestablishment of tranquillity, or to expose himself on that account to the danger of being deserted by the Swiss and other foreigners in his service. He even began to apprehend that his own subjects would serve him coldly, if, by contributing to aggrandize the power of the Infidels, which it was his duty, and had been the ambition of his ancestors to depress, he continued to act in direct opposition to all the principles which ought to influence a monarch distinguished by the title of Most Christian King. He chose, for all these reasons, rather to run the

<sup>24</sup> Istvanhefi Hist. Hung. lib. xiii. p. 139.

<sup>25</sup> Jovin Hist. lib. xxxv. p. 183.

risk of disobliging his new ally, the Sultan, than, by an unseasonable adherence to the treaty with him, to forfeit what was of greater consequence.

But though both parties consented to a truce, the plenipotentiaries found insuperable difficulties in settling the articles of a definitive treaty. Each of the monarchs, with the arrogance of a conqueror, aimed at giving law to the other; and neither would so far acknowledge his inferiority, as to sacrifice any point of honour or to relinquish any matter of right; so that the plenipotentiaries spent the time in long and fruitless negotiations, and separated after agreeing to prolong the truce for a few months.

1538.] The Pope, however, did not despair of accomplishing a point in which the plenipotentiaries had failed, and took upon himself the sole burden of negotiating a peace. To form a confederacy capable of defending Christendom from the formidable inroads of the Turkish arms, and to concert effectual measures for the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy, were two great objects which Paul had much at heart, and he considered the union of the Emperor with the King of France as an essential preliminary to both. To be the instrument of reconciling these contending monarchs, whom his predecessors, by their interested and indecent intrigues, had so often embroiled, was a circumstance which could not fail of throwing distinguished lustre on his character and administration. Nor was he without hopes, that, while he pursued this laudable end, he might secure advantages to his own family, the aggrandizing of which he did not neglect, though he aimed at it with a less audacious ambition than was common among the Popes of that century. Influenced by these considerations, he proposed an in-

terview between the two monarchs at Nice, and offered to repair thither in person, that he might act as mediator in composing all their differences. When a Pontiff of a venerable character, and of a very advanced age, was willing, from his zeal for peace to undergo the fatigues of so long a journey, neither Charles nor Francis could with decency decline the interview. But though both came to the place of rendezvous, so great was the difficulty of adjusting the ceremonial, or such the remains of distrust and rancour on each side, that they refused to see one another, and every thing was transacted by the intervention of the Pope, who visited them alternately. With all his zeal and ingenuity he could not find out a method of removing the obstacles which prevented a final accommodation, particularly those arising from the possession of the Milanese; nor was all the weight of his authority sufficient to overcome the obstinate perseverance of either monarch in asserting his own claims. At last, that he might not seem to have laboured altogether without effect, he prevailed on them to sign a truce for ten years [June 18], upon the same condition with the former, that each should retain what was now in his possession<sup>26</sup>, and in the mean time should send ambassadors to Rome, to discuss their pretensions at leisure.

Thus ended a war of no long continuance, but very extensive in its operations, and in which both parties exerted their utmost strength. Though Francis failed in the object that he had principally in view—the recovery of the Milanese—he acquired, nevertheless, great reputation by the wisdom of his

\* *Recueil des Traitez*, ii. 210. *Relatione del Nicolo Tiepolo de l'Abocamento di Nizza, chex Du Mont Corps Diplomat.* par. ii. p. 174.

measures as well as the success of his arms in repelling a formidable invasion; and by keeping possession of one half of the Duke of Savoy's dominions, he added no inconsiderable accession of strength to his kingdom. Whereas Charles, repulsed and baffled, after having boasted so arrogantly of victory, purchased an inglorious truce, by sacrificing an ally who had rashly confided too much in his friendship and power. The unfortunate Duke murmured, complained, and remonstrated against a treaty so much to his disadvantage, but in vain; he had no means of redress, and was obliged to submit. Of all his dominions, Nice, with its dependences, was the only corner of which he himself kept possession. He saw the rest divided between a powerful invader and the ally to whose protection he had trusted, while he remained a sad monument of the imprudence of weak princes, who, by taking part in the quarrel of mighty neighbours, between whom they happen to be situated, are crushed and overwhelmed in the shock.

A few days after signing the treaty of truce, the Emperor set sail for Barcelona, but was driven by contrary winds to the island of St. Margaret on the coast of Provence. When Francis, who happened to be not far distant, heard of this, he considered it as an office of civility to invite him to take shelter in his dominions, and proposed a personal interview with him at Aigues-mortes. The Emperor, who would not be outdone by his rival in complaisance, instantly repaired thither. As soon as he cast anchor in the road, Francis, without waiting to settle any point of ceremony, but relying implicitly on the Emperor's honour for his security, visited him on board his galley, and was received

and entertained with the warmest demonstrations of esteem and affection. Next day the Emperor repaid the confidence which the King had placed in him. He landed at Aigues-mortes with as little precaution, and met with a reception equally cordial. He remained on shore during the night, and in both visits the two monarchs vied with each other in expressions of respect and friendship<sup>27</sup>. After twenty years of open hostilities, or of secret enmity; after so many injuries reciprocally inflicted or endured; after having formerly given the lie, and challenged one another to single combat; after the Emperor had inveighed so publicly against Francis as a Prince void of honour or integrity; and after Francis had accused him of being accessory to the murder of his eldest son, such an interview appears altogether singular and even unnatural. But the history of these monarchs abounds with such surprising transitions. From implacable hatred they appeared to pass, in a moment, to the most cordial reconciliation; from suspicion and distrust, to perfect confidence; and from practising all the dark arts of a deceitful policy, they could assume, of a sudden, the liberal and open manners of two gallant gentlemen.

The Pope, besides the glory of having restored peace to Europe, gained, according to his expectation, a point of great consequence to his family, by prevailing on the Emperor to betroth Margaret of Austria, his natural daughter, formerly the wife of Alexander di Medici, to his grandson Octavio Farnese, and, in consideration of this marriage, to be-

<sup>27</sup> Sandov. Hist. vol. ii. 238. Relation de l'Entrevue de Charl. V. & Fran. I. par M. de la Rivoire. Hist. de Langued. par D. D. De Vie & Vaisette, tom. v. Preuves, p. 93.

stow several honours and territories upon his future son-in-law. A very tragical event, which happened about the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-seven, had deprived Margaret of her first husband. That young Prince, whom the Emperor's partiality had raised to the supreme power in Florence, upon the ruins of the public liberty, neglected entirely the cares of government, and abandoned himself to the most dissolute debauchery. Lorenzo di Medici, his nearest kinsman, was not only the companion but director of his pleasures, and, employing all the powers of a cultivated and inventive genius in this dishonourable ministry, added such elegance as well as variety to vice, as gained him an absolute ascendant over the mind of Alexander. But while Lorenzo seemed to be sunk in luxury, and affected such an appearance of indolence and effeminacy that he would not wear a sword, and trembled at the sight of blood, he concealed under that disguise a dark, designing, audacious spirit. Prompted either by the love of liberty, or allured by the hope of attaining the supreme power, he determined to assassinate Alexander his benefactor and friend. Though he long revolved this design in his mind, his reserved and suspicious temper prevented him from communicating it to any person whatever; and continuing to live with Alexander in their usual familiarity, he, one night, under pretence of having secured him an assignation with a lady of high rank, whom he had often solicited, drew that unwary Prince into a secret apartment of his house, and there stabbed him, while he lay carelessly on a couch expecting the arrival of the lady whose company he had been promised.' But no sooner was the deed done, than

standing astonished, and struck with horror at its atrocity, he forgot, in a moment, all the motives which had induced him to commit it. Instead of rousing the people to recover their liberty by publishing the death of the tyrant, instead of taking any step towards opening his own way to the dignity now vacant, he locked the door of the apartment, and, like a man bereaved of reason and presence of mind, fled with the utmost precipitation out of the Florentine territories. It was late next morning before the fate of the unfortunate Prince was known, as his attendants, accustomed to his irregularities, never entered his apartment early. Immediately the chief persons in the state assembled. Being induced partly by the zeal of Cardinal Cibo for the house of Medici, to which he was nearly related, partly by the authority of Francis Guicciardini, who recalled to their memory, and represented in striking colours, the caprice as well as turbulence of their ancient popular government, they agreed to place Cosmo di Medici, a youth of eighteen, the only male heir of that illustrious house, at the head of the government; though at the same time such was their love of liberty that they established several regulations in order to circumscribe and moderate his power.

Meanwhile Lorenzo, having reached a place of safety, made known what he had done to Philip Strozzi and the other Florentines who had been driven into exile, or who had voluntarily retired when the republican form of government was abolished, in order to make way for the dominion of the Medici. By them the deed was extolled with extravagant praises, and the virtue of Lorenzo was compared with that of the elder Brutus, who disre-

garded the ties of blood, or with that of the younger, who forgot the friendship and favours of the tyrant, that they might preserve or recover the liberty of their country<sup>28</sup>. Nor did they rest satisfied with empty panegyrics; they immediately quitted their different places of retreat, assembled forces, animated their vassals and partisans to take arms, and to seize this opportunity of reestablishing the public liberty on its ancient foundation. Being openly assisted by the French ambassador at Rome, and secretly encouraged by the Pope, who bore no good will to the house of Medici, they entered the Florentine dominions with a considerable body of men. But the persons who had elected Cosmo possessed not only the means of supporting his government, but abilities to employ them in the most proper manner. They levied, with the greatest expedition, a good number of troops; they endeavoured by every art to gain the citizens of greatest authority, and to render the administration of the young Prince agreeable to the people. Above all, they courted the Emperor's protection, as the only firm foundation of Cosmo's dignity and power. Charles, knowing the propensity of the Florentines to the friendship of France, and how much all the partisans of a republican government detested him as the oppressor of their liberties, saw it to be greatly for his interest to prevent the reestablishment of the ancient constitution in Florence. For this reason, he not only acknowledged Cosmo as head of the Florentine state, and conferred on him all the titles of honour with which Alexander had been dignified, but engaged to defend him to the utmost: and, as a pledge of this, ordered the commanders of

<sup>28</sup> *Lettere di Principi*, tom. iii. p. 52.

such of his troops as were stationed on the frontiers of Tuscany, to support him against all aggressors. By their aid Cosmo obtained an easy victory over the exiles, whose troops he surprised in the night-time, and took most of the chiefs prisoners; an event which broke all their measures, and fully established his own authority. But though he was extremely desirous of the additional honour of marrying the Emperor's daughter, the widow of his predecessor, Charles, secure already of his attachment, chose rather to gratify the Pope by bestowing her on his nephew<sup>29</sup>.

During the war between the Emperor and Francis, an event had happened which abated in some degree the warmth and cordiality of friendship which had long subsisted between the latter and the King of England. James the Fifth of Scotland, an enterprising young Prince, having heard of the Emperor's intention to invade Provence, was so fond of showing that he did not yield to any of his ancestors in the sincerity of his attachment to the French crown, and so eager to distinguish himself by some military exploit, that he levied a body of troops with an intention of leading them in person to the assistance of the King of France. Though some unfortunate accident prevented his carrying any troops into France, nothing could divert him from going thither in person. Immediately upon his landing, he hastened to Provence, but had been detained so long in his voyage that he came too late to have any share in the military operations, and met the King on his return after the retreat

<sup>29</sup> Jovii Hist. c. xcvi. p. 218, &c. Belcarii Comment. l. xxii. p. 696. Istoria de sui Tempi di Giov. Bat. Adriani. Ven. 1587. p. 10.

of the Imperialists. But Francis was so greatly pleased with his zeal, and no less with his manners and conversation, that he could not refuse him his daughter Magdalen, whom he demanded in marriage. It mortified Henry extremely to see a Prince, of whom he was immoderately jealous, form an alliance [Jan. 1, 1537], from which he derived such an accession of reputation as well as security<sup>30</sup>. He could not, however, with decency, oppose Francis's bestowing his daughter upon a monarch descended from a race of princes the most ancient and faithful allies of the French crown. But when James, upon the sudden death of Magdalen, demanded as his second wife Mary of Guise, he warmly solicited Francis to deny his suit, and, in order to disappoint him, asked that lady in marriage for himself. When Francis preferred the Scottish King's sincere courtship to his artful and malevolent proposal, he discovered much dissatisfaction. The pacification agreed upon at Nice, and the familiar interview of the two rivals at Aigues-mortes, filled Henry's mind with new suspicions, as if Francis had altogether renounced his friendship for the sake of new connexions with the Emperor. Charles, thoroughly acquainted with the temper of the English King, and watchful to observe all the shiftings and caprices of his passions, thought this a favourable opportunity of renewing his negotiations with him, which had been long broken off. By the death of Queen Catharine, whose interest the Emperor could not with decency have abandoned, the chief cause of their discord was removed; so that, without touching upon the delicate question of her divorce, he might now take what measures he

<sup>30</sup> History of Scotland, vol. i.

thought most effectual for regaining Henry's good will. For this purpose he began with proposing several marriage treaties to the King. He offered his niece, a daughter of the King of Denmark, to Henry himself; he demanded the Princess Mary for one of the Princes of Portugal, and was even willing to receive her as the King's illegitimate daughter<sup>31</sup>. Though none of these projected alliances ever took place, or perhaps were ever seriously intended, they occasioned such frequent intercourse between the courts, and so many reciprocal professions of civility and esteem, as considerably abated the edge of Henry's rancour against the Emperor, and paved the way for that union between them which afterwards proved so disadvantageous to the French King.

The ambitious schemes in which the Emperor had been engaged, and the wars he had been carrying on for some years, proved, as usual, extremely favourable to the progress of the Reformation in Germany. While Charles was absent upon his African expedition, or intent on his projects against France, his chief object in Germany was to prevent the dissensions about religion from disturbing the public tranquillity, by granting such indulgence to the Protestant Princes as might induce them to concur with his measures, or at least hinder them from taking part with his rival. For this reason, he was careful to secure to the Protestants the possession of all the advantages which they had gained by the articles of pacification at Nuremberg, in the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-two<sup>32</sup>: and, except some slight trouble from the proceed-

<sup>31</sup> *Mém. de Ribier*, tom. i. 496.

<sup>32</sup> *Du Mont Corps Diplom.* tom. iv. part ii. p. 138.

ings of the Imperial chamber, they met with nothing to disturb them in the exercise of their religion, or to interrupt the successful zeal with which they propagated their opinions.

Meanwhile the Pope continued his negotiations for convoking a general council; and though the Protestants had expressed great dissatisfaction with his intention to fix upon Mantua as the place of meeting, he adhered obstinately to his choice, and issued a bull on the second of June, one thousand five hundred and thirty-six, appointing it to assemble in that city on the twenty-third of May the year following; he nominated three cardinals to preside in his name; enjoined all Christian Princes to countenance it by their authority, and invited the prelates of every nation to attend in person. This summons of a council, an assembly which from its nature and intention demanded quiet times, as well as pacific dispositions, at the very juncture when the Emperor was on his march towards France, and ready to involve a great part of Europe in the confusions of war, appeared to every person extremely unseasonable. It was intimated, however, to all the different courts by nuncios dispatched on purpose<sup>33</sup>. With an intention to gratify the Germans, the Emperor, during his residence in Rome, had warmly solicited the Pope to call a council; but being at the same time willing to try every art in order to persuade Paul to depart from the neutrality which he preserved between him and Francis, he sent Heldo his vice-chancellor into Germany, along with a nuncio dispatched thither, instructing him to second all the nuncio's representations, and to enforce them with the whole weight of the Imperial

<sup>33</sup> Pallavic. Hist. Conc. Trid. 113.

authority. The Protestants gave them audience at Smalkalde [Feb. 25, 1537], where they had assembled in a body in order to receive them. But after weighing all their arguments, they unanimously refused to acknowledge a council summoned in the name and by the authority of the Pope alone; in which he assumed the sole right of presiding; which was to be held in a city not only far distant from Germany, but subject to a Prince who was a stranger to them, and closely connected with the court of Rome; and to which their divines could not repair with safety, especially after their doctrines had been stigmatized in the very bull of convocation with the name of heresy. These and many other objections against the council, which appeared to them unanswerable, they enumerated in a large manifesto, which they published in vindication of their conduct<sup>34</sup>.

Against this the court of Rome exclaimed as a flagrant proof of their obstinacy and presumption, and the Pope still persisted in his resolution to hold the council at the time and in the place appointed. But some unexpected difficulties being started by the Duke of Mantua, both about the right of jurisdiction over the persons who resorted to the council, and the security of his capital amidst such a concourse of strangers, the Pope [Oct. 8, 1538], after fruitless endeavours to adjust these, first prorogued the council for some months, and afterwards transferring the place of meeting to Vicenza, in the Venetian territories, appointed it to assemble on the first of May in the following year. As neither the Emperor nor the French King, who had not then come to any accommodation, would permit their

<sup>34</sup> Steidan, l. xii. 123, &c. Seckend. Com. lib. iii. p. 143, &c.

subjects to repair thither, not a single prelate appeared on the day prefixed; and the Pope, that his authority might not become altogether contemptible by so many ineffectual efforts to convoke that assembly, put off the meeting by an indefinite prorogation<sup>35</sup>.

But, that he might not seem to have turned his whole attention towards a reformation which he was not able to accomplish, while he neglected that which was in his own power, he deputed a certain number of cardinals and bishops, with full authority to inquire into the abuses and corruptions of the Roman court; and to propose the most effectual method of removing them. This scrutiny, undertaken with reluctance, was carried on slowly and with remissness. All defects were touched with a gentle hand, afraid of probing too deep, or of discovering too much. But even by this partial examination, many irregularities were detected, and many enormities exposed to light, while the remedies which they suggested as most proper were either inadequate, or were never applied. The report and resolution of these deputies, though intended to be kept secret, were transmitted by some accident into Germany, and, being immediately made public, afforded ample matter for reflection and triumph to the Protestants<sup>36</sup>. On the one hand they demonstrated the necessity of a reformation in the head as well as the members of the church, and even pointed out many of the corruptions against which Luther and his followers had remonstrated with the greatest vehemence. They showed, on the other hand, that it was vain to expect this reformation from ecclesiastics themselves, who, as Luther

<sup>35</sup> F. Paul, 117. Pallavic. 117. <sup>36</sup> Sleidan, 233.

strongly expressed it, piddled at curing warts, while they overlooked or confirmed ulcers<sup>37</sup>.

1539.] The earnestness with which the Emperor seemed, at first, to press their acquiescing in the Pope's scheme of holding a council in Italy, alarmed the Protestant Princes so much, that they thought it prudent to strengthen their confederacy, by admitting several new members who solicited that privilege, particularly the King of Denmark. Heldo, who, during his residence in Germany, had observed all the advantages which they derived from that union, endeavoured to counterbalance its effects by an alliance among the Catholic powers of the Empire. This league, distinguished by the name of *Holy*, was merely defensive; and, though concluded by Heldo in the Emperor's name, was afterwards disowned by him, and subscribed by very few Princes<sup>38</sup>.

The Protestants soon got intelligence of this association, notwithstanding all the endeavours of the contracting parties to conceal it; and their zeal, always apt to suspect and to dread, even to excess, every thing that seemed to threaten religion, instantly took the alarm, as if the Emperor had been just ready to enter upon the execution of some formidable plan for the extirpation of their opinions. In order to disappoint this, they held frequent consultations, they courted the Kings of France and England with great assiduity, and even began to think of raising the respective contingents, both in men and money, which they were obliged to furnish by the treaty of Smalkalde. But it was not long before they were convinced that these apprehensions

<sup>37</sup> Seck. l. iii. 164.

<sup>38</sup> Id. 171. *Recueil de Traitez.*

were without foundation, and that the Emperor, to whom repose was absolutely necessary after efforts so much beyond his strength in the war with France, had no thoughts of disturbing the tranquillity of Germany. As a proof of this, at an interview with the Protestant Princes in Francfort [April 19], his ambassadors agreed that all concessions in their favour, particularly those contained in the pacification of Nuremberg, should continue in force for fifteen months; that during this period all proceedings of the Imperial chamber against them should be suspended; that a conference should be held by a few divines of each party, in order to discuss the points in controversy, and to propose articles of accommodation, which should be laid before the next diet. Though the Emperor, that he might not irritate the Pope, who remonstrated against the first part of this agreement as impolitic, and against the latter as an impious encroachment upon his prerogative, never formally ratified this convention, it was observed with considerable exactness, and greatly strengthened the basis of that ecclesiastical liberty for which the Protestants contended<sup>39</sup>.

A few days after the convention at Francfort, George Duke of Saxony died [April 24], and his death was an event of great advantage to the Reformation. That Prince, the head of the Albertine or younger branch of the Saxon family, possessed, as Marquis of Misnia and Thuringia, extensive territories, comprehending Dresden, Leipsic, and other cities now the most considerable in the electorate. From the first dawn of the Reformation he had been its enemy as avowedly as the electoral Princes were its protectors, and had carried on his opposition, not

<sup>39</sup> F. Paul, 82. Sleid. 247. Seck. I. iii. 200.

only with all the zeal flowing from religious prejudices, but with a virulence inspired by personal antipathy to Luther, and imbibed by the domestic animosity subsisting between him and the other branch of his family. By his death without issue, his succession fell to his brother Henry, whose attachment to the Protestant religion surpassed, if possible, that of his predecessor to popery. Henry no sooner took possession of his new dominions, than, disregarding a clause in George's will, dictated by his bigotry, whereby he bequeathed all his territories to the Emperor and King of the Romans, if his brother should attempt to make any innovation in religion, he invited some Protestant divines, and among them Luther himself, to Leipsic. By their advice and assistance, he overturned in a few weeks the whole system of ancient rites, establishing the full exercise of the reformed religion, with the universal applause of his subjects, who had long wished for this change, which the authority of their Duke alone had hitherto prevented<sup>40</sup>. This revolution delivered the Protestants from the danger to which they were exposed by having an inveterate enemy situated in the middle of their territories; and they had now the satisfaction of seeing that the possessions of the Princes and cities attached to their cause extended in one great and almost unbroken line from the shore of the Baltic to the banks of the Rhine.

Soon after the conclusion of the truce at Nice, an event happened, which satisfied all Europe that Charles had prosecuted the war to the utmost extremity that the state of his affairs would permit. Vast arrears were due to his troops, whom he had

<sup>40</sup> Sleidan, 249.

long amused with vain hopes and promises. As they now foresaw what little attention would be paid to their demands, when by the reestablishment of peace their services became of less importance, they lost all patience, broke out into an open mutiny, and declared that they thought themselves entitled to seize by violence what was detained from them contrary to all justice. Nor was this spirit of sedition confined to one part of the Emperor's dominions; the mutiny was almost as general as the grievance which gave rise to it. The soldiers in the Milanese plundered the open country without control, and filled the capital itself with consternation. Those in garrison at Goletta threatened to give up that important fortress to Barbarossa. In Sicily the troops proceeded to still greater excesses: having driven away their officers, they elected others in their stead, defeated a body of men whom the Viceroy sent against them, took and pillaged several cities, conducting themselves all the while in such a manner, that their operations resembled rather the regular proceedings of a concerted rebellion, than the rashness and violence of military mutiny. But by the address and prudence of the Generals, who, partly by borrowing money in their own name, or in that of their master, partly by extorting large sums from the cities in their respective provinces, raised what was sufficient to discharge the arrears of the soldiers, these insurrections were quelled. The greater part of the troops were disbanded, such a number only being kept in pay as was necessary for garrisoning the principal towns, and protecting the seacoasts from the insults of the Turks<sup>41</sup>.

It was happy for the Emperor that the abilities of

<sup>41</sup> Jovii Histor. l. xxxvii. 203 c. Sandov. Ferreras, ix. 209.

his generals extricated him out of these difficulties, which it exceeded his own power to have removed. He had depended, as his chief resource for discharging the arrears due to his soldiers, upon the subsidies which he expected from his Castilian subjects. For this purpose he assembled the Cortes of Castile at Toledo; and having represented to them the extraordinary expense of his military operations, together with the great debts in which these had necessarily involved him, he proposed to levy such supplies as the present exigency of his affairs demanded, by a general excise on commodities. But the Spaniards already felt themselves oppressed with a load of taxes unknown to their ancestors. They had often complained that their country was drained not only of its wealth but of its inhabitants, in order to prosecute quarrels in which it was not interested, and to fight battles from which it could reap no benefit; and they determined not to add voluntarily to their own burdens, or to furnish the Emperor with the means of engaging in new enterprises, no less ruinous to the kingdom than most of those which he had hitherto carried on. The nobles, in particular, inveighed with great vehemence against the imposition proposed, as an encroachment upon the valuable and distinguishing privilege of their order, that of being exempted from the payment of any tax. They demanded a conference with the representatives of the cities concerning the state of the nation. They contended that if Charles would imitate the example of his predecessors, who had resided constantly in Spain, and would avoid entangling himself in a multiplicity of transactions foreign to the concerns of his Spanish dominions, the stated revenues of the crown would be fully suf-

ficient to defray the necessary expenses of government. They represented to him, that it would be unjust to lay new burdens upon the people, while this prudent and effectual method of reestablishing public credit, and securing national opulence, was totally neglected<sup>42</sup>. Charles, after employing arguments, entreaties, and promises, but without success, in order to overcome their obstinacy, dismissed the assembly with great indignation. From that period neither the nobles nor the prelates have been called to these assemblies, on pretence that such as pay no part of the public taxes should not claim any vote in laying them on. None have been admitted to the Cortes but the procurators or representatives of eighteen cities. These, to the number of thirty-six, being two from each community, form an assembly which bears no resemblance either in power or dignity or independence to the ancient Cortes, and are absolutely at the devotion of the court in all their determinations<sup>43</sup>. Thus the imprudent zeal with which the Castilian nobles had supported the regal prerogative, in opposition to the claims of the commons during the commotions in the year one thousand five hundred and twenty-one, proved at last fatal to their own body. By enabling Charles to depress one of the orders in the state, they destroyed that balance to which the constitution owed its security, and put it in his power, or in that of his successors, to humble the other, and to strip it gradually of its most valuable privileges.

At that time, however, the Spanish grandees still possessed extraordinary power as well as privileges,

<sup>42</sup> Sandoz. Hist. vol. ii. 269.

<sup>43</sup> Sandoz. Hist. Le Science du Gouvernement, par M. de Real, tom. ii. p. 102.

which they exercised and defended with a haughtiness peculiar to themselves. Of this the Emperor himself had a mortifying proof during the meeting of the Cortes at Toledo. As he was returning one day from a tournament accompanied by most of the nobility, one of the serjeants of the court, out of officious zeal to clear the way for the Emperor, struck the Duke of Infantado's horse with his baton, which that haughty grandee resenting, drew his sword, beat and wounded the officer. Charles, provoked at such an insolent deed in his presence, immediately ordered Ronquillo the judge of the court to arrest the Duke; Ronquillo advanced to execute his charge, when the constable of Castile interposing checked him, claimed the right of jurisdiction over a grandee as a privilege of his office, and conducted Infantado to his own apartment. All the nobles present were so pleased with the boldness of the constable in asserting the rights of their order, that, deserting the Emperor, they attended him to his house with infinite applauses, and Charles returned to the palace unaccompanied by any person but the Cardinal Tavera. The Emperor, how sensible soever of the affront, saw the danger of irritating a jealous and high-spirited order of men, whom the slightest appearance of offence might drive to the most unwarrantable extremities. For that reason, instead of straining at any ill timed exertion of his prerogative, he prudently connived at the arrogance of a body too potent for him to control, and sent next morning to the Duke of Infantado, offering to inflict what punishment he pleased on the person who had affronted him. The Duke, considering this as a full reparation to his honour, instantly forgave the officer: bestowing

on him, besides, a considerable present as a compensation for his wound. Thus the affair was entirely forgotten<sup>44</sup>; nor would it have deserved to be mentioned, if it were not a striking example of the high and independent spirit of the Spanish nobles in that age, as well as an instance of the Emperor's dexterity in accommodating his conduct to the circumstances in which he was placed.

Charles was far from discovering the same condescension or lenity towards the citizens of Ghent, who not long after broke out into open rebellion against his government. An event which happened in the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-six, gave occasion to this rash insurrection, so fatal to that flourishing city. At that time the Queen-dowager of Hungary, Governess of the Netherlands, having received orders from her brother to invade France with all the forces which she could raise, she assembled the States of the United Provinces, and obtained from them a subsidy of twelve hundred thousand florins, to defray the expense of that undertaking. Of this sum, the county of Flanders was obliged to pay a third part as its proportion. But the citizens of Ghent, the most considerable city in that country, averse to a war with France, with which they carried on an extensive and gainful commerce, refused to pay their quota, and contended, that in consequence of stipulations between them and the ancestors of their present sovereign the Emperor, no tax could be levied upon them, unless they had given their express consent to the imposition of it. The Governess, on the other hand, maintained, that as the subsidy of twelve hundred

<sup>44</sup> Sandov. ii. 274. Ferreras, ix. 212. Miniana, 113.

thousand florins had been granted by the States of Flanders, of which their representatives were members, they were bound, of course to conform to what was enacted by them, as it is the first principle in society, on which the tranquillity and order of government depend, that the inclinations of the minority must be overruled by the judgment and decision of the superior number.

The citizens of Ghent, however, were not willing to relinquish a privilege of such high importance as that which they claimed. Having been accustomed, under the government of the house of Burgundy, to enjoy extensive immunities, and to be treated with much indulgence, they disdained to sacrifice to the delegated power of a regent, those rights and liberties which they had often and successfully asserted against their greatest Princes. The Queen, though she endeavoured at first to soothe them, and to reconcile them to their duty by various concessions, was at last so much irritated by the obstinacy with which they adhered to their claim, that she ordered all the citizens of Ghent, on whom she could lay hold in any part of the Netherlands, to be arrested. But this rash action made an impression very different from what she expected, on men whose minds were agitated with all the violent passions which indignation at oppression and zeal for liberty inspire. Less affected with the danger of their friends and companions, than irritated at the Governess, they openly despised her authority, and sent deputies to the other towns of Flanders, conjuring them not to abandon their country at such a juncture, but to concur with them in vindicating its rights against the encroachments of a woman, who either did not

know or did not regard their immunities. All but a few inconsiderable towns declined entering into any confederacy against the Governess: they joined, however, in petitioning her to put off the term for payment of the tax so long, that they might have it in their power to send some of their number into Spain, in order to lay their title to exemption before their sovereign. This she granted with some difficulty. But Charles received their commissioners with a haughtiness to which they were not accustomed from their ancient Princes, and, enjoining them to yield the same respectful obedience to his sister, which they owed to him in person, remitted the examination of their claim to the council of Malines. This court, which is properly a standing committee of the parliament or states of the country, and which possesses the supreme jurisdiction in all matters civil as well as criminal<sup>45</sup>, pronounced the claim of the citizens of Ghent to be ill founded, and appointed them forthwith to pay their proportion of the tax.

Enraged at this decision, which they considered as notoriously unjust, and rendered desperate on seeing their rights betrayed by that very court which was bound to protect them, the people of Ghent ran to arms in a tumultuary manner, drove such of the nobility as resided among them out of the city; secured several of the Emperor's officers; put one of them to the torture, whom they accused of having stolen or destroyed the record that contained a ratification of the privileges of exemption from taxes which they pleaded; chose a council, to which they committed the direction of their affairs; gave orders

<sup>45</sup> Descrizione di tutti Paesi Bassi di Lud. Guicciardini. Ant. 1571. fol. p. 53.

for repairing and adding to their fortifications; and openly erected the standard of rebellion<sup>46</sup> against their sovereign. Sensible however of their inability to support what their zeal had prompted them to undertake, and desirous of securing a protector against the formidable forces by which they might expect soon to be attacked, they sent some of their number to Francis, offering not only to acknowledge him as their sovereign, and to put him in immediate possession of Ghent, but to assist him with all their forces in recovering those provinces in the Netherlands, which had anciently belonged to the crown of France, and had been so lately reunited to it by the decree of the parliament of Paris. This unexpected proposition, coming from persons who had it in their power to have performed instantly one part of what they undertook, and who could contribute so effectually towards the execution of the whole, opened great as well as alluring prospects to Francis's ambition. The counties of Flanders and Artois were of greater value than the duchy of Milan, which he had so long laboured to acquire with passionate but fruitless desire; their situation with respect to France rendered it more easy to conquer or to defend them; and they might be formed into a separate principality for the Duke of Orleans, no less suitable to his dignity than that which his father aimed at obtaining. To this the Flemings, who were acquainted with the French manners and government, would not have been averse; and his own subjects, weary of their destructive expeditions into Italy, would have turned

<sup>46</sup> *Mémoires sur la Révolte de Gantois en 1539*, par Jean d'Hollander, écrits en 1547. A la Haye, 1747. P.Cleuter. *Rer. Austr. lib. xi. p. 262.* Sandov. *Histor. tom. ii. p. 282.*

their arms towards this quarter with more good will and with greater vigour. Several considerations, nevertheless, prevented Francis from laying hold of this opportunity, the most favourable in appearance which had ever presented itself of extending his own dominions or distressing the Emperor. From the time of their interview at Aigues-mortes, Charles had continued to court the King of France with wonderful attention; and often flattered him with hopes of gratifying at last his wishes concerning the Milanese, by granting the investiture of it either to him or to one of his sons. But though these hopes and promises were thrown out with no other intention than to detach him from his confederacy with the Grand Seignior, or to raise suspicions in Solyman's mind by the appearance of a cordial and familiar intercourse subsisting between the courts of Paris and Madrid, Francis was weak enough to catch at the shadow by which he had been so often amused, and, from eagerness to seize it, relinquished what must have proved a more substantial acquisition. Besides this, the Dauphin, jealous to excess of his brother, and unwilling that a Prince who seemed to be of a restless and enterprising nature should obtain an establishment, which from its situation might be considered almost as a domestic one, made use of Montmorency, who, by a singular piece of good fortune, was at the same time the favourite of the father and of the son, to defeat the application of the Flemings, and to divert the King from espousing their cause. Montmorency, accordingly, represented, in strong terms, the reputation and power which Francis would acquire by recovering that footing which he had formerly in Italy, and that nothing could be so efficacious to over-

come the Emperor's aversion to this, as a sacred adherence to the truce, and refusing, on an occasion so inviting, to countenance the rebellious subjects of his rival. Francis, apt of himself to overrate the value of the Milanese, because he estimated it from the length of time as well as from the great efforts which he had employed in order to reconquer it, and fond of every action which had the appearance of generosity, assented without difficulty to sentiments so agreeable to his own, rejected the propositions of the citizens of Ghent, and dismissed their deputies with a harsh answer<sup>47</sup>.

Not satisfied with this, by a further refinement in generosity, he communicated to the Emperor his whole negotiation with the malecontents, and all that he knew of their schemes and intentions<sup>48</sup>. This convincing proof of Francis's disinterestedness relieved Charles from the most disquieting apprehensions, and opened a way to extricate himself out of all his difficulties. He had already received full information of all the transactions in the Netherlands, and of the rage with which the people of Ghent had taken arms against his government. He was thoroughly acquainted with the genius and qualities of his subjects in that country; with their love of liberty; their attachment to their ancient privileges and customs; as well as the invincible obstinacy with which their minds, slow but firm and persevering, adhered to any measure on which they had deliberately resolved. He easily saw what encouragement and support they might have derived from the assistance of France; and though now

<sup>47</sup> *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 263. P. Heuter. *Rer. Austr. lib. xi.* 263.

<sup>48</sup> *Sandov. Histor. tom. ii.* 281.

free from any danger in that quarter, he was still sensible that some immediate as well as vigorous interposition was necessary, in order to prevent the spirit of disaffection from spreading in a country where the number of cities, the multitude of people, together with the great wealth diffused among them by commerce, rendered it peculiarly formidable, and would supply it with inexhaustible resources. No expedient, after long deliberation, appeared to him so effectual as his going in person to the Netherlands; and the Governess, his sister, being of the same opinion, warmly solicited him to undertake the journey. There were only two routes which he could take; one by land through Italy and Germany, the other entirely by sea, from some port in Spain to one in the Low Countries. But the former was more tedious than suited the present exigency of his affairs; nor could he in consistency with his dignity, or even his safety, pass through Germany without such a train both of attendants and of troops, as would have added greatly to the time that he must have consumed in his journey: the latter was dangerous at this season, and, while he remained uncertain with respect to the friendship of the King of England, was not to be ventured upon, unless under the convoy of a powerful fleet. This perplexing situation, in which he was under the necessity of choosing, and did not know what to choose, inspired him at last with the singular and seemingly extravagant thought of passing through France, as the most expeditious way of reaching the Netherlands. He proposed in his council to demand Francis's permission for that purpose. All his counsellors joined with one voice in condemning the measure as no less rash than unprecedented,

and which must infallibly expose him to disgrace or danger; to disgrace, if the demand were rejected in the manner that he had reason to expect; to danger, if he put his person in the power of an enemy whom he had often offended, who had ancient injuries to revenge, as well as subjects of present contest still remaining undecided. But Charles, who had studied the character of his rival with greater care and more profound discernment than any of his ministers, persisted in his plan, and flattered himself that it might be accomplished not only without danger to his own person, but even without the expense of any concession detrimental to his crown.

With this view he communicated the matter to the French ambassador at his court, and sent Granville his chief minister to Paris, in order to obtain from Francis permission to pass through his dominions, and to promise that he would soon settle the affair of the Milanese to his satisfaction. But at the same time he entreated that Francis would not exact any new promise, or even insist on former engagements, at this juncture, lest whatever he should grant, under his present circumstances, might seem rather to be extorted by necessity, than to flow from friendship or the love of justice. Francis, instead of attending to the snare which such a slight artifice scarcely concealed, was so dazzled with the splendour of overcoming an enemy by acts of generosity, and so pleased with the air of superiority which the rectitude and disinterestedness of his proceedings gave him on this occasion, that he at once assented to all that was demanded. Judging of the Emperor's heart by his own, he imagined that the sentiments of gratitude, arising from the remembrance of good offices and liberal treatment, would deter-

mine more forcibly to fulfil what he had so often promised, than the most precise stipulations that could be inserted in any treaty.

Upon this, Charles, to whom every moment was precious, set out, notwithstanding the fears and suspicions of his Spanish subjects, with a small but splendid train of about a hundred persons. At Bayonne, on the frontiers of France, he was received by the Dauphin and the Duke of Orleans, attended by the Constable Montmorency. The two Princes offered to go into Spain, and to remain there as hostages for the Emperor's safety; but this he rejected, declaring, that he relied with implicit confidence on the King's honour, and had never demanded, nor would accept of, any other pledge for his security. In all the towns through which he passed, the greatest possible magnificence was displayed; the magistrates presented him the keys of the gates; the prison-doors were set open; and, by the royal honours paid to him, he appeared more like the sovereign of the country than a foreign prince. [1540.] The King advanced as far as Chatellerault to meet him; their interview was distinguished by the warmest expressions of friendship and regard. They proceeded together towards Paris, and presented to the inhabitants of that city the extraordinary spectacle of two rival monarchs, whose enmity had disturbed and laid waste Europe during twenty years, making their solemn entry together with all the symptoms of a confidential harmony, as if they had forgotten for ever past injuries, and would not revive hostilities for the future<sup>49</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> Thuan. Hist. lib. i. c. 14. *Mém. de Bellay*, 264.

Charles remained six days at Paris; but amidst the perpetual caresses of the French court, and the various entertainments contrived to amuse or to do him honour, he discovered an extreme impatience to continue his journey, arising as much from an apprehension of danger which constantly haunted him, as from the necessity of his presence in the Low Countries. Conscious of the disingenuity of his own intentions, he trembled when he reflected that some fatal accident might betray them to his rival, or lead him to suspect them; and though his artifices to conceal them should be successful, he could not help fearing that motives of interest might at last triumph over the scruples of honour, and tempt Francis to avail himself of the advantage now in his hands. Nor were there wanting persons among the French ministers, who advised the King to turn his own arts against the Emperor, and, as the retribution due for so many instances of fraud or falsehood, to seize and detain his person until he granted him full satisfaction with regard to all the just claims of the French crown. But no consideration could induce Francis to violate the faith which he had pledged; nor could any argument convince him that Charles, after all the promises that he had given, and all the favours which he had received, might still be capable of deceiving him. Full of this false confidence, he accompanied him to St. Quintin; and the two Princes, who had met him on the borders of Spain, did not take leave of him until he entered his dominions in the Low Countries.

As soon as the Emperor reached his own territories [Jan. 24], the French ambassadors demanded the accomplishment of what he had promised con-

cerning the investiture of Milan; but Charles, under the plausible pretext that his whole attention was then engrossed by the consultations necessary towards suppressing the rebellion in Ghent, put off the matter for some time. But in order to prevent Francis from suspecting his sincerity, he still continued to talk of his resolutions with respect to that matter in the same strain as when he entered France, and even wrote to the King much to the same purpose, though in general terms, and with equivocal expressions, which he might afterwards explain away or interpret at pleasure<sup>50</sup>.

Meanwhile, the unfortunate citizens of Ghent, destitute of leaders capable either of directing their councils or conducting their troops; abandoned by the French King, and unsupported by their countrymen, were unable to resist their offended Sovereign, who was ready to advance against them with one body of troops which he had raised in the Netherlands, with another drawn out of Germany, and a third which had arrived from Spain by sea. The near approach of danger made them, at last, so sensible of their own folly, that they sent ambassadors to the Emperor, imploring his mercy, and offering to set open their gates at his approach. Charles, without vouchsafing them any other answer than that he would appear among them as their Sovereign, with the sceptre and the sword in his hand, began his march at the head of his troops. Though he chose to enter the city on the twenty-fourth of February, his birthday, he was touched with nothing of that tenderness or indulgence which was natural towards the place of his nativity. Twenty-six of the principal citizens were put to death [April 20];

<sup>50</sup> *Memoires de Ribier*, i. 504.

a greater number was sent into banishment; the city was declared to have forfeited all its privileges and immunities; the revenues belonging to it were confiscated; its ancient form of government was abolished; the nomination of its magistrates was vested for the future in the Emperor and his successors; a new system of laws and political administration was prescribed<sup>51</sup>; and in order to bridle the seditious spirit of the citizens, orders were given to erect a strong citadel, for defraying the expense of which a fine of a hundred and fifty thousand florins was imposed on the inhabitants, together with an annual tax of six thousand florins for the support of the garrison<sup>52</sup>. By these rigorous proceedings, Charles not only punished the citizens of Ghent, but set an awful example of severity before his other subjects in the Netherlands, whose immunities and privileges, partly the effect, partly the cause of their extensive commerce, circumscribed the prerogative of their Sovereign within very narrow bounds, and often stood in the way of measures which he wished to undertake, or fettered and retarded him in his operations.

Charles having thus vindicated and reestablished his authority in the Low Countries, and being now under no necessity of continuing the same scene of falsehood and dissimulation with which he had long amused Francis, began gradually to throw aside the veil under which he had concealed his intentions with respect to the Milanese. At first he eluded the demands of the French ambassadors, when they again reminded him of his promises; then he pro-

<sup>51</sup> *Les Coutumes et Loix du Comté de Flandre*, par Alex. le Grand, 3 tom. fol. Cambray, 1719, tom. i. p. 169.

<sup>52</sup> *Harlei Annales Brabantie*, vol. i. 616.

posed, by way of equivalent for the Duchy of Milan, to grant the Duke of Orleans the investiture of Flanders, clogging the offer, however, with impracticable conditions, or such as he knew would be rejected<sup>53</sup>. At last, being driven from all his evasions and subterfuges by their insisting for a categorical answer, he peremptorily refused to give up a territory of such value, or voluntarily to make such a liberal addition to the strength of an enemy by diminishing his own power<sup>54</sup>. He denied, at the same time, that he had ever made any promise which could bind him to an action so foolish, and so contrary to his own interest<sup>55</sup>.

Of all the transactions in the Emperor's life, this, without doubt, reflects the greatest dishonour on his reputation<sup>56</sup>. Though Charles was not extremely scrupulous at other times about the means which he employed for accomplishing his ends, and was not always observant of the strict precepts of veracity and honour, he had hitherto maintained some regard for the maxims of that less precise and rigid morality by which Monarchs think themselves entitled to regulate their conduct. But, on this occasion, the scheme that he formed of deceiving a generous and open hearted Prince; the illiberal and mean artifices by which he carried it on; the insensibility with which he received all the marks of his friendship, as well as the ingratitude with which he requited them, are all equally unbecoming the dignity of his character, and inconsistent with the grandeur of his views.

This transaction exposed Francis to as much scorn as it did the Emperor to censure. After the

<sup>53</sup> *Mém. de Ribier*, i. 509. 514.

<sup>54</sup> *Ribier*, i. 519.

<sup>55</sup> *Bellay*, 365, 366.

<sup>56</sup> *Jovii Hist. lib. xxxix. p. 238 a.*

experience of a long reign, after so many opportunities of discovering the duplicity and artifices of his rival, the credulous simplicity with which he<sup>o</sup> trusted him at this juncture seemed to merit no other return than what it actually met with. Francis, however, remonstrated and exclaimed, as if this had been the first instance in which the Emperor had deceived him. Feeling, as is usual, the insult which was offered to his understanding still more sensibly than the injury done to his interest, he discovered such resentment as made it obvious that he would lay hold on the first opportunity of being revenged, and that a war, no less rancorous than that which had so lately raged would soon break out anew in Europe.

But singular as the transaction which has been related may appear, this year is rendered still more memorable by the establishment of the order of Jesuits; a body whose influence on ecclesiastical as well as civil affairs hath been so considerable, that an account of the genius of its laws and government justly merits a place in history. When men take a view of the rapid progress of this society towards wealth and power; when they contemplate the admirable prudence with which it has been governed; when they attend to the persevering and systematic spirit with which its schemes have been carried on; they are apt to ascribe such a singular institution to the superior wisdom of its founder, and to suppose that he had formed and digested his plan with profound policy. But the Jesuits, as well as the other monastic orders, are indebted for the existence of their order, not to the wisdom of their founder, but to his enthusiasm. Ignatio Loyola, whom I have already mentioned on occa-

sion of the wound which he received in defending Pampeluna<sup>57</sup>, was a fanatic distinguished by extravagances in sentiment and conduct, no less incompatible with the maxims of sober reason than repugnant to the spirit of true religion. The wild adventures and visionary schemes, in which his enthusiasm engaged him, equal any thing recorded in the legends of the Roman saints, but are unworthy of notice in history. •

Prompted by this fanatical spirit, or incited by the love of power and distinction, from which such pretenders to superior sanctity are not exempt, Loyola was ambitious of becoming the founder of a religious order. The plan, which he formed, of its constitution and laws, was suggested, as he gave out, and as his followers still teach, by the immediate inspiration of Heaven<sup>58</sup>. But, notwithstanding this high pretension, his design met at first with violent opposition. The Pope, to whom Loyola had applied for the sanction of his authority to confirm the institution, referred his petition to a committee of Cardinals. They represented the establishment to be unnecessary as well as dangerous, and Paul refused to grant his approbation of it. At last, Loyola removed all his scruples by an offer which it was impossible for any Pope to resist. He proposed that, besides three vows of poverty, of chastity, and of monastic obedience, which are common to all the orders of regulars, the members of his society should take a fourth vow of obedience to the Pope, binding themselves to go whithersoever he should command for the service of religion,

<sup>57</sup> Vol. ii. book ii. 143.

<sup>58</sup> *Compte rendu des Constitutions des Jésuites au Parlement de Provence*, par M. de Monclar, p. 285.

and without requiring any thing from the Holy See for their support. At a time when the papal authority had received such a shock by the revolt of so many nations from the Romish church; at a time when every part of the popish system was attacked with so much violence and success, the acquisition of a body of men, thus peculiarly devoted to the See of Rome, and whom it might set in opposition to all its enemies, was an object of the highest consequence. Paul, instantly perceiving this, confirmed the institution of the Jesuits by his bull [Sept. 27]; granted the most ample privileges to the members of the society; and appointed Loyola to be the first general of the order. The event hath fully justified Paul's discernment, in expecting such beneficial consequences to the See of Rome from this institution. In less than half a century the society obtained establishments in every country that adhered to the Roman Catholic church; its power and wealth increased amazingly; the number of its members became great; their character, as well as accomplishments were still greater; and the Jesuits were celebrated by the friends and dreaded by the enemies of the Romish faith, as the most able and enterprising order in the church.

END OF VOL. II.

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